Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?

As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.

Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.

The objective of the third edition of Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy is to introduce the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Relying on the Karplus Learning Cycle, the book is intended to teach by example. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium play the central role. In this third edition, increased stress is placed on the concept of rationalizable strategies, which has proven in teaching practice to assist students in making the bridge from intuitive to more formal concepts of noncooperative equilibrium.The Instructor Manual and PowerPoint Slides for the book are available upon request for all instructors who adopt this book as a course text. Please send your request to [email protected].

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously exploring cooperative games, repeated play, correlated equilibrium, and a range of applications.

Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.

Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations `explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?

This survey reviews research on the economics of small business, introducing key concepts for the understanding of the research, including some basic microeconomics, distribution functions, and concepts of entrepreneurship. Accessible to readers with elementary knowledge of economics and probability, the book is suitable as a text for an undergraduate course in the economics of small business. It also covers the economics of organization, the role of the family in small business, human capital and nonpecuniary motivation, together with the relationship of small business to entrepreneurship and growth. Public policy toward small business is discussed with an emphasis on the United States, together with comparisons and contrasts of many other countries.