Economic theory and philosophy have discussed concepts of fairness, but the criteria of fairness are in each case absolute: a situation is either fair or it is not. This book draws on these literatures to propose two criteria of relative fairness, and a hierarchical rule for the priority of application of these criteria, with a view to comparison of practicable alternatives in public policy. A veil-of-ignorance device of representation of rational fairness is used to argue that these criteria are normatively relevant. Applications to intergenerational fairness, fairness among regions in the context of migration, externalities and Pigovian taxes, to fair prices and wages, and to relative fairness in the status of racial and caste groups are sketched. The book is designed with real world public policy practice. Scholars with an interest in the economic evaluation of public policy will find this compelling book essential reading.

By combining recent research (especially that of Piketty and his associates) with established ideas (particularly from Sir Arthur Lewis), Roger McCain proposes policies that, together, would aim to reverse the observed tendency towards the concentration of wealth in market economies, thus 'approach equality.' The shortcomings and dangers of rising wealth inequality are discussed, both from the point of view of increasing instability and of equalitarian values. Drawing on Marxist concepts of class, the book clarifies both the relation of wealth to income inequality and the causal link between wealth inequality and economic instability, exploring practical issues related to the proposed policies. The role of the 'middle class' and the causes of the failure of much of the population to save even for retirement are analyzed. The author goes on to examine the implications for programs of distribution according to need and the role of the corporation, and the possibility of a scheme of economic planning that would retain the known advantages of the market allocation of resources. With inequality still a rising issue for public policy, professionals and students studying policy economics will benefit from the analysis in this book and its tight focus on inequality of wealth, as will interested lay readers with a background in economics and an interest in inequality.

Building on the success of the first edition, Game Theory and Public Policy, Second Edition provides a critical, selective review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their applications in public policy. The author further suggests modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy. Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches. This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly policy and labor market policies. Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.

Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?

Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.

For most of the 20th century economists focused on competition as the driving force of the modern capitalist economy. In his thoughtful and readable book, Roger A. McCain offers a different frame of reference for economists. Using game theory's distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games, he defines economics as the study of the development of cooperative agreements in the economy and the failure to bring them about. Orthodox economists who think in terms of a competitive model and heterodox economists who adhere to a class conflict paradigm will both find their ideas challenged by McCain's new frame that sees mature capitalism as the result of class compromise based on an imperfectly cooperative game.' - Donald R. Stabile, St. Mary s College of Maryland, USThe objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesian, and modern economics of the twenty-first century. Roger McCain explores economics as the study of cooperative arrangements, or the ways in which people work together. He asserts that there is no 'new paradigm', but rather a more encompassing cognitive frame. In the same spirit, the book borrows freely, without doctrinarism, from Austrian and other heterodox traditions - including Marxism where it is helpful - and social philosophers in the social contract tradition. Game theory of both branches plays a key role throughout. Presenting an innovative new framework for the major topics that together make up economic theory, this highly accessible book will strongly appeal to economics scholars, researchers and students, especially those in the fields of heterodox economics and the history of economic thought. Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: How People Work Together 2. Production: The Benefit of Working Together 3. Game Theory: Problems of Working Together 4. Exchange: How Difference Enriches Us 5. Further Benefits of Working Together: Sharing Risk Part II: Information is Not Free 6. Information is Not Free 7. Governance 8. A Grand Coalition of the Whole Society 9. Macroeconomics 10. Political Economy Index

The objective of the third edition of Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy is to introduce the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Relying on the Karplus Learning Cycle, the book is intended to teach by example. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium play the central role. In this third edition, increased stress is placed on the concept of rationalizable strategies, which has proven in teaching practice to assist students in making the bridge from intuitive to more formal concepts of noncooperative equilibrium.The Instructor Manual and PowerPoint Slides for the book are available upon request for all instructors who adopt this book as a course text. Please send your request to [email protected].

This book introduces new concepts for cooperative game theory, and particularly solutions that determine the distribution of a coalitional surplus among the members of the coalition. It also addresses several generalizations of cooperative game theory. Drawing on methods of welfare economics, new value solutions are derived for Non-Transferable Utility games with and without differences of bargaining power among the members of the coalition. Cooperation in intertemporal games is examined, and conditions that permit the reduction of these games to games in coalition function form are outlined. Biform games and games that combine non-cooperative search and matching of coalition members with cooperative solutions (i.e., efficient contracts) within the coalition are considered.

This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously exploring cooperative games, repeated play, correlated equilibrium, and a range of applications.

Although it was an important specialization in economics in the mid-twentieth century, welfare economics has received less attention in the twenty-first century. This book explores the history of welfare economics, with a view to explaining its rise and subsequent decline. Drawing on both philosophy and economics, this book offers a new and original perspective on the history of welfare economics, starting with Pigou and charting the trajectory of applied and theoretical welfare economics throughout the twentieth century. This book will be of interest to students and researchers of philosophy, economics and history of economic thought.

Building on the success of the first edition, Game Theory and Public Policy, Second Edition provides a critical, selective review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their applications in public policy. The author further suggests modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy. Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches. This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly policy and labor market policies. Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.

Agent-Based Computer Simulation of Dichotomous Economic Growth reports a project in agent-based computer stimulation of processes of economic growth in a population of boundedly rational learning agents. The study is an exercise in comparative simulation. That is, the same family of growth models will be simulated under different assumptions about the nature of the learning process and details of the production and growth processes. The purpose of this procedure is to establish a relationship between the assumptions and the simulation results. The study brings together a number of theoretical and technical developments, only some of which may be familiar to any particular reader. In this first chapter, some issues in economic growth are reviewed and the objectives of the study are outlined. In the second chapter, the simulation techniques are introduced and illustrated with baseline simulations of boundedly rational learning processes that do not involve the complications of dealing with long-run economic growth. The third chapter sketches the consensus modern theory of economic growth which is the starting point for further study. In the fourth chapter, a family of steady growth models are simulated, bringing the simulation, growth and learning aspects of the study together. In subsequent chapters, variants on the growth model are explored in a similar way. The ninth chapter introduces trade, with a spacial trading model that is combined with the growth model in the tenth chapter. The book returns again and again to the key question: to what extent can the simulations `explain' the puzzles of economic growth, and particularly the key puzzle of dichotomization, by constructing growth and learning processes that produce the puzzling results? And just what assumptions of the simulations are most predictable associated with the puzzling results?

For most of the 20th century economists focused on competition as the driving force of the modern capitalist economy. In his thoughtful and readable book, Roger A. McCain offers a different frame of reference for economists. Using game theory's distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games, he defines economics as the study of the development of cooperative agreements in the economy and the failure to bring them about. Orthodox economists who think in terms of a competitive model and heterodox economists who adhere to a class conflict paradigm will both find their ideas challenged by McCain's new frame that sees mature capitalism as the result of class compromise based on an imperfectly cooperative game.' - Donald R. Stabile, St. Mary s College of Maryland, USThe objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesian, and modern economics of the twenty-first century. Roger McCain explores economics as the study of cooperative arrangements, or the ways in which people work together. He asserts that there is no 'new paradigm', but rather a more encompassing cognitive frame. In the same spirit, the book borrows freely, without doctrinarism, from Austrian and other heterodox traditions - including Marxism where it is helpful - and social philosophers in the social contract tradition. Game theory of both branches plays a key role throughout. Presenting an innovative new framework for the major topics that together make up economic theory, this highly accessible book will strongly appeal to economics scholars, researchers and students, especially those in the fields of heterodox economics and the history of economic thought. Contents: 1. Introduction Part I: How People Work Together 2. Production: The Benefit of Working Together 3. Game Theory: Problems of Working Together 4. Exchange: How Difference Enriches Us 5. Further Benefits of Working Together: Sharing Risk Part II: Information is Not Free 6. Information is Not Free 7. Governance 8. A Grand Coalition of the Whole Society 9. Macroeconomics 10. Political Economy Index

This survey reviews research on the economics of small business, introducing key concepts for the understanding of the research, including some basic microeconomics, distribution functions, and concepts of entrepreneurship. Accessible to readers with elementary knowledge of economics and probability, the book is suitable as a text for an undergraduate course in the economics of small business. It also covers the economics of organization, the role of the family in small business, human capital and nonpecuniary motivation, together with the relationship of small business to entrepreneurship and growth. Public policy toward small business is discussed with an emphasis on the United States, together with comparisons and contrasts of many other countries.

As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.