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Shareholder engagement with publicly listed companies is often seen
as a key means to monitor corporate performance and behavior. In
this book, the authors examine the corporate governance roles of
key institutional investors in UK corporate equity, including
pension funds, insurance companies, collective investment funds,
hedge and private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds. The
authors argue that institutions' corporate governance roles are an
instrument ultimately shaped by private interests and market
forces, as well as law and regulatory obligations, and that
policy-makers should not readily make assumptions regarding their
effectiveness, or their alignment with public interest or social
good. They critically discuss the possibilities and limitations of
shareholder stewardship i.e. the UK Stewardship Code and the EU
Shareholder Rights Directive 2017 as well as explore various
reforms of the UK pension fund structures, including the Local
Government Pension Funds reform, the move from defined benefit to
defined contribution schemes and implications for funds' asset
allocation, investment management and corporate governance roles.
This book will be of interest to academics in corporate law and
governance as well as those in the corporate governance industry,
such as institutions, trade associations, proxy advisors and other
corporate governance service providers. Think tanks and research
institutes tied to institutional investment, corporate governance,
law and business may also be a key audience.
This book draws together themes in business model developments in
relation to decentralised business models (DBMs), sometimes
referred to as the 'sharing' economy, to systematically analyse the
challenges to corporate and organisational law and governance. DBMs
include business networks, the global supply chain, public-private
partnerships, the platform economy and blockchain-based
enterprises. The law of organisational forms and governance has
been slow in responding to changes, and reliance has been placed on
innovations in contract law to support the business model
developments. The authors argue that the law of organisations and
governance can respond to changes in the phenomenon of
decentralised business models driven by transformative technology
and new socio-economic dynamics. They argue that principles
underlying the law of organisations and governance, such as
corporate governance, are crucial to constituting, facilitating and
enabling reciprocality, mutuality, governance and redress in
relation to these business models, the wealth-creation of which
subscribes to neither a firm nor market system, is neither
hierarchical nor totally decentralised, and incorporates
socio-economic elements that are often enmeshed with incentives and
relations. Of interest to academics, policymakers and legal
practitioners, this book offers proposals for new thinking in the
law of organisation and governance to advance the possibilities of
a new socio-economic future.
This book draws together themes in business model developments in
relation to decentralised business models (DBMs), sometimes
referred to as the 'sharing' economy, to systematically analyse the
challenges to corporate and organisational law and governance. DBMs
include business networks, the global supply chain, public-private
partnerships, the platform economy and blockchain-based
enterprises. The law of organisational forms and governance has
been slow in responding to changes, and reliance has been placed on
innovations in contract law to support the business model
developments. The authors argue that the law of organisations and
governance can respond to changes in the phenomenon of
decentralised business models driven by transformative technology
and new socio-economic dynamics. They argue that principles
underlying the law of organisations and governance, such as
corporate governance, are crucial to constituting, facilitating and
enabling reciprocality, mutuality, governance and redress in
relation to these business models, the wealth-creation of which
subscribes to neither a firm nor market system, is neither
hierarchical nor totally decentralised, and incorporates
socio-economic elements that are often enmeshed with incentives and
relations. Of interest to academics, policymakers and legal
practitioners, this book offers proposals for new thinking in the
law of organisation and governance to advance the possibilities of
a new socio-economic future.
The corporate governance systems of continental Europe have
traditionally been quite different to those of the liberal market
economies (e.g. the US and the UK). Company ownership has been
dominated by incumbent blockholders, with a relatively minor role
for minority shareholders and institutional investors. Business
strategy has focused on the achievement of social stability--taking
into account the interests of a broad group stakeholders--rather
than the maximisation of shareholder value.
However, since the mid-1990s, European corporations have adopted
many of the characteristics of the Anglo-American shareholder
model. Furthermore, such an increased shareholder-orientation has
coincided with a significant role for the Left in European
government. This presents a puzzle, as conventional wisdom does not
usually conceive of the Left as an enthusiastic proponent of
pro-shareholder capitalism. This book provides an analysis of this
paradox by examining how economic factors have interacted with the
policy preferences of political parties to cause a significant
change in the European system of corporate governance.
This book argues that the post-war support of the European Left for
the prevailing blockholder-dominated corporate system depended on
the willingness of blockholders to share economic rents with
employees, both through higher wages and greater employment
stability. However, during the 1990s, product markets became more
competitive in many European countries. The sharing of rents
between social actors became increasingly difficult to sustain. In
such an environment, the Left relinquished its traditional social
partnership with blockholders and embraced many aspects of the
shareholder model.
This explanation is supported through a panel data econometric
analysis of 15 non-liberal market economies. Subsequent case study
chapters examine the political economy of recent corporate
governance change in Germany and Italy.
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