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Many debates about the moral status of things-for example,
debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman
animals-eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities
of the things in question-for example, their capacities to feel
pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often
controversial: if a human's capacities are the basis of its moral
status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I
have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? This book
answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has
a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of
typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all
human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and
I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about
situations involving "temporary incapacitation"-where a human
organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacity-this book
argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and
embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering
from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since
these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and
political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this
book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy,
bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy.
Many debates about the moral status of things-for example,
debates about the natural rights of human fetuses or nonhuman
animals-eventually migrate towards a discussion of the capacities
of the things in question-for example, their capacities to feel
pain, think, or love. Yet the move towards capacities is often
controversial: if a human's capacities are the basis of its moral
status, how could a human having lesser capacities than you and I
have the same "serious" moral status as you and I? This book
answers this question by arguing that if something is human, it has
a set of typical human capacities; that if something has a set of
typical human capacities, it has serious moral status; and thus all
human beings have the same sort of serious moral status as you and
I. Beginning from what our common intuitions tell us about
situations involving "temporary incapacitation"-where a human
organism has, then loses, then regains a certain capacity-this book
argues for substantive conclusions regarding human fetuses and
embryos, humans in a permanent vegetative state, humans suffering
from brain diseases, and humans born with genetic disorders. Since
these conclusions must have some impact on our ongoing moral and
political debates about the proper treatment of such humans, this
book will be useful to professionals and students in philosophy,
bioethics, law, medicine, and public policy.
Amid current arguments related to human life and dignity,
Christians must be clear about how their faith speaks to such
concerns and what other outlooks have to say. This book brings
together noted ethicists--Russell DiSilvestro, David P. Gushee, Amy
Laura Hall, John F. Kilner, Gilbert C. Meilaender, Scott B. Rae,
and Patrick T. Smith--to make a Christian case for human dignity.
It offers a robust critique of five influential alternative
positions, including the emerging outlook of transhumanism, showing
how a Christian view supports the crucial idea that people matter
in a way other views cannot.
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