This book examines the crime-terror nexus in South Asia, focusing in particular on the activities of non-state actors that operate out of Pakistan, and challenges the conventional wisdom that the Pakistan Taleban (TTP) and Al-Qaeda are Pakistan's most serious security threats. Much research has focused on the policies of India and Pakistan towards Kashmir. But surprisingly little attention has been paid to several notable Pakistan-based non-state actors who are increasingly operating on their own, and who have the potential to greatly inhibit, if not derail, the peace process there. These groups blur the line between terrorism and organized crime with serious implications for policy in the region. India and Pakistan can engage in confidence-building measures, but if criminal actors such as Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT) and D-Company cannot effectively be controlled, a lack of trust between both sides will remain. Although the role of regular military forces is not to be discounted, many of the non-state actors in Indian-Held Kashmir, such as LeT, are not confined by the same restraints as state forces, thus allowing them engage in more violent actions without fear of reprisal. In order for lawmakers, security personnel, and others to develop sound, comprehensive policies, these forces and their potential to undermine political initiatives must be fully appreciated. This book explores the dynamics of the relationship between Pakistan, D-Company, and LeT and how it affects strategic thought, decision-making, and security interests in the region and explains the triangular relationships between states, terrorist groups, and organized criminal syndicates in general, and in India and Pakistan in particular. This book will of much interest to students of South Asian politics, terrorism, organised crime, war and conflict studies, and Security Studies in general.

This book examines the crime-terror nexus in South Asia, focusing in particular on the activities of non-state actors that operate out of Pakistan, and challenges the conventional wisdom that the Pakistan Taleban (TTP) and Al-Qaeda are Pakistan's most serious security threats. Much research has focused on the policies of India and Pakistan towards Kashmir. But surprisingly little attention has been paid to several notable Pakistan-based non-state actors who are increasingly operating on their own, and who have the potential to greatly inhibit, if not derail, the peace process there. These groups blur the line between terrorism and organized crime with serious implications for policy in the region. India and Pakistan can engage in confidence-building measures, but if criminal actors such as Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT) and D-Company cannot effectively be controlled, a lack of trust between both sides will remain. Although the role of regular military forces is not to be discounted, many of the non-state actors in Indian-Held Kashmir, such as LeT, are not confined by the same restraints as state forces, thus allowing them engage in more violent actions without fear of reprisal. In order for lawmakers, security personnel, and others to develop sound, comprehensive policies, these forces and their potential to undermine political initiatives must be fully appreciated. This book explores the dynamics of the relationship between Pakistan, D-Company, and LeT and how it affects strategic thought, decision-making, and security interests in the region and explains the triangular relationships between states, terrorist groups, and organized criminal syndicates in general, and in India and Pakistan in particular. This book will of much interest to students of South Asian politics, terrorism, organised crime, war and conflict studies, and Security Studies in general.

A discussion of the foundation of Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT), the development of its modus operandi, and engages in an investigation of LeT's activities in India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir region are discussed. Further, LeT's fundraising methods are touched upon, and LeT's relationships with regional state and nonstate actors such as Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Dawood Ibrahim's D-Company are analyzed. Also, the impact that these developments have on domestic Islamist terrorism in India are addressed. The author argues that although LeT has been a vital component of Islamabad's regional strategy in the past, the organization has grown beyond the control of its former patron, is largely self-sufficient and operates independently of the political process, and has expanded its agenda well beyond Kashmir. These developments challenge the long-held notion that irregulars can be sustainably used to achieve limited objectives in an asymmetric conflict and should serve as a clear warning to other state sponsors of terrorism. However, contrary to many analyses, LeT is not likely to sacrifice its independence and come under Al-Qaeda's umbrella. Rather, LeT will continue to evolve into a distinctive, South Asia-centric terrorist actor in its own right while still receiving aid from fringe elements in Pakistan's security and intelligence apparatus and elsewhere. This will not only allow LeT to continue to plan future Mumbai-style terrorist attacks in India from safe havens in Pakistan, but will also allow LeT to guide and assist the predominantly indigenous Indian Mujahideen (IM).

This monograph examines the dynamics of China's energy security dilemma and the role of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Following this, PLAN development is discussed and its future role in regional security is hypothesized. This report argues that it is domestic market inefficiencies and poor management practices that pose the greatest threat to China's energy security. Further, less and less of Chinese energy imports are making their way to the country by sea, and as such, the PLAN actually has a minimal role to play. Given these realities, Chinese fears of a naval blockade that deprives it of energy supplies, and American confidence that this is a realistic strategic option in the event of hostilities are implausible. In addition, Beijing's desire to develop aircraft carriers and other high-tech naval capabilities, combined with its contribution to the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, have led many analysts to erroneously conclude that China seeks to engage in global power projection like the United States. However, the focus of the PLAN will remain regional and on asymmetric capabilities, namely the effective use of submarines and other undersea "unknowns" that ultimately seek to deter American and possible Japanese involvement in a conflict over Taiwan and/or maritime features in the South China Sea, such as the Spratly Islands, which China views as inalienable parts of its territory. Although China's interests are expanding and becoming more international in nature, recovering from the Century of Humiliation and ensuring domestic legitimacy remain the top priorities of China's leadership.

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