Sam Peltzman is one of the world's leading economists, and the essays in this collection are central to the modern canon in political economy. These ten articles and an original introduction respond to two broad questions: How does government work? How do voters and their elected representatives make decisions? Given the media's portrayal of the cynical political atmosphere in America, Peltzman's responses are rather surprising--the electorate really does make well-informed decisions and elected officials actually do tend to vote according to their constituents' interests. These conclusions bear the stamp of the Chicago approach to political economy (which applies microeconomic principles to political phenomena), an approach that has had considerable success explaining why certain government policies have not achieved their intended effects.
This collection reflects Peltzman's long career studying the interface between the private economy and the public sector. It will be essential to anyone who wishes to study government activity and voting behavior from an economic perspective.

Although the airline, railroad, telecommunications, and electric power industries are at very different stages in adjusting to regulatory reform, each industry faces the same critical public policy question: Are policymakers taking appropriate steps to stimulate competition or are they turning back the clock by slowing the process of deregulation? This volume addresses that issue and identifies the next steps that policymakers should take to enhance public welfare in the provision of these services. Each chapter identifies the central policy issues that have arisen in each industry as it undergoes transformation to a deregulated environment. The authors reveal the flaws in the residual regulations and make the case for faster and more comprehensive deregulation. A concluding chapter identifies how interest groups continue to exert influence on regulatory agencies and on Congress, potentially undermining deregulation. The papers included here were initially presented in December 1999 at a conference sponsored and organized by the AEI?Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.

This book uses economic theory to analyze the different aspects of organized crime. The theory of rent-seeking is adopted to help understand the origin of criminal organizations, while modern industrial organization theory is used to explain the design of internal rules. The market behavior of organized crime is analyzed, the "crime and economics" approach being applied to the analysis of corruption that occurs when the organized crime sector and the government collude to exploit their monopoly on rule-making. Each chapter outlines the normative results of the analysis in order to design more sophisticated deterrence policies.