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This volume collects twelve essays by Sanford C. Goldberg on the
topic of social epistemology. The collection falls into two halves:
the first half develops a proposal for a programme for social
epistemology, its animating vision, foundational questions, and
core concepts; the other half focuses on applications of this
programme to particular topics. Goldberg characterizes the research
programme as the exploration of the epistemic significance of other
minds. This programme is dedicated to an examination of the various
ways in which we depend epistemically on others, and to describe
the proper way to evaluate beliefs according to the sort of
dependence they exhibit. It thus provides the basis for identifying
and characterizing various dysfunctions of our epistemic
communities. The programme is put into practice by exploring such
topics as the epistemic agency exhibited in inquiry, the practices
that constitute news coverage, the basis for allegations of what we
or others should have known, how reliance on another's testimony
contrasts with reliance on an instrument, our reliance on others as
consumers of testimony, and the epistemic significance of
non-epistemic social norms-moral, political, professional, or
relationship-based.
The scenario of the brain in a vat, first aired thirty-five years
ago in Hilary Putnam's classic paper, has been deeply influential
in philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics.
This collection of new essays examines the scenario and its
philosophical ramifications and applications, as well as the
challenges which it has faced. The essays review historical
applications of the brain-in-a-vat scenario and consider its impact
on contemporary debates. They explore a diverse range of
philosophical issues, from intentionality, external-world
scepticism, and the nature of truth, to the extended mind
hypothesis, reference magnetism, and new versions of realism. The
volume will be a rich and valuable resource for advanced students
in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind and language,
as well as anyone interested in the relations between language,
thought and the world.
Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the
communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic
implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and
language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for
anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the
contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend
for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In
Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge
communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of
communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and
linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an
ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic
categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book
develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of
mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is
epistemology, on the other.
Written by an international team of leading scholars, this
collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of
semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing
recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of
language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in
three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content
transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental
content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, including 2D
semantics, transparency views of self-knowledge, and theories of
linguistic understanding, as well as epistemological debates on
contextualism, contrastivism, pragmatic encroachment,
anti-luminosity arguments and testimony. The scope of the volume
will appeal to graduate students and researchers in epistemology,
philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science,
psychology and linguistics.
Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our
attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this
reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to
acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and
cases involving "coverage," where a subject aims to acquire
knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she
would have heard about it by now. Goldberg argues that these cases
challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony
cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist
epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed
never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And
both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a
cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the
knowing subject herself. Goldberg uses results of this sort to
question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist
epistemology, and to explore what a non-orthodox reliabilist
epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a
social-reliabilist epistemology -- one that results from the
application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which
belief-fixation involves epistemic reliance on others. Sanford
Goldberg presents an important contribution both to the reliability
literature in general epistemology and to the social epistemology
of testimony and related topics.
Sanford Goldberg investigates the role that others play in our
attempts to acquire knowledge of the world. Two main forms of this
reliance are examined: testimony cases, where a subject aims to
acquire knowledge through accepting what another tells her; and
cases involving "coverage," where a subject aims to acquire
knowledge of something by reasoning that if things were not so she
would have heard about it by now. Goldberg argues that these cases
challenge some cherished assumptions in epistemology. Testimony
cases challenge the assumption, prominent in reliabilist
epistemology, that the processes through which beliefs are formed
never extend beyond the boundaries of the individual believer. And
both sorts of case challenge the idea that, insofar knowledge is a
cognitive achievement, it is an achievement that belongs to the
knowing subject herself. Goldberg uses results of this sort to
question the broadly individualistic orthodoxy within reliabilist
epistemology, and to explore what a non-orthodox reliabilist
epistemology would look like. The resulting theory is a
social-reliabilist epistemology -- one that results from the
application of reliabilist criteria to situations in which
belief-fixation involves epistemic reliance on others. Sanford
Goldberg presents an important contribution both to the reliability
literature in general epistemology and to the social epistemology
of testimony and related topics.
To what extent are meaning, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the
other, determined by aspects of the 'outside world'? Internalism
and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology presents twelve
specially written essays exploring these debates in metaphysics and
epistemology and the connections between them. In so doing, it
examines how issues connected with the nature of mind and language
bear on issues about the nature of knowledge and justification (and
vice versa). Topics discussed include the compatibility of semantic
externalism and epistemic internalism, the variety of internalist
and externalist positions (both semantic and epistemic), semantic
externalism's implications for the epistemology of reasoning and
reflection, and the possibility of arguments from the theory of
mental content to the theory of epistemic justification (and vice
versa).
Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic
normativity - the sort of normativity implicated in assessments of
whether a belief amounts to knowledge - is grounded in the things
we properly expect of one another as epistemic subjects. In
developing this claim Goldberg argues that epistemic norms and
standards themselves are generated by the expectations that arise
out of our profound and ineliminable dependence on one another for
what we know of the world. The expectations in question are those
through which we hold each other accountable to standards of both
(epistemic) reliability and (epistemic) responsibility. In arguing
for this Goldberg aims to honor the insights of both internalist
and externalist approaches to epistemic justification. The
resulting theory has far-reaching implications not only for the
theory of epistemic normativity, but also for the nature of
epistemic assessment itself, as well as for our understanding of
epistemic defeat, epistemic justification, epistemic
responsibility, and the various social dimensions of knowledge.
Written by an international team of leading scholars, this
collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of
semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing
recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of
language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in
three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content
transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental
content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, including 2D
semantics, transparency views of self-knowledge, and theories of
linguistic understanding, as well as epistemological debates on
contextualism, contrastivism, pragmatic encroachment,
anti-luminosity arguments and testimony. The scope of the volume
will appeal to graduate students and researchers in epistemology,
philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science,
psychology and linguistics.
Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the
communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic
implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and
language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for
anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the
contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend
for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In
Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge
communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics of
communication-based beliefs depend on features of the cognitive and
linguistic acts of the subject's social peers. In acknowledging an
ineliminable social dimension to mind, language, and the epistemic
categories of knowledge, justification, and rationality, his book
develops fundamental links between externalism in the philosophy of
mind and language, on the one hand, and externalism is
epistemology, on the other.
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