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In Three Dangerous Men, defence expert Seth Jones argues that the
US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition.
While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles and
conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal
rivals-Russia, China and Iran-have increasingly adopted irregular
warfare: cyber-attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda,
espionage and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones
profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing and
Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without
waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery
Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and
vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia.
Each has spent his career studying American power and devised
techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US.
Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare,
which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US
presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber-attack. Soleimani
was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that
Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents
the most alarming challenge because China has more power and
potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US
military, diplomatic and intelligence officials, as well as
hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi and Mandarin,
Jones shows how America's rivals have bloodied its reputation and
seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic
regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely
abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence
and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In
a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United
States must take to alter how it thinks about-and engages
in-competition before it is too late.
After the swift defeat of the Taliban in 2001, American optimism
has steadily evaporated in the face of mounting violence; a new
"war of a thousand cuts" has now brought the country to its knees.
In the Graveyard of Empires is a political history of Afghanistan
in the "Age of Terror" from 2001 to 2009, exploring the fundamental
tragedy of America's longest war since Vietnam. After a brief
survey of the great empires in Afghanistan-the campaigns of
Alexander the Great, the British in the era of Kipling, and the
late Soviet Union-Seth G. Jones examines the central question of
our own war: how did an insurgency develop? Following the September
11 attacks, the United States successfully overthrew the Taliban
regime. It established security throughout the country-killing,
capturing, or scattering most of al Qa'ida's senior operatives-and
Afghanistan finally began to emerge from more than two decades of
struggle and conflict. But Jones argues that as early as 2001
planning for the Iraq War siphoned off resources and talented
personnel, undermining the gains that had been made. After eight
years, he says, the United States has managed to push al Qa'ida's
headquarters about one hundred miles across the border into
Pakistan, the distance from New York to Philadelphia. While
observing the tense and often adversarial relationship between NATO
allies in the Coalition, Jones-who has distinguished himself at
RAND and was recently named by Esquire as one of the "Best and
Brightest" young policy experts-introduces us to key figures on
both sides of the war. Harnessing important new research and
integrating thousands of declassified government documents, Jones
then analyzes the insurgency from a historical and structural point
of view, showing how a rising drug trade, poor security forces, and
pervasive corruption undermined the Karzai government, while
Americans abandoned a successful strategy, failed to provide the
necessary support, and allowed a growing sanctuary for insurgents
in Pakistan to catalyze the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has
worked thus far-and what has not-this serious and important book
underscores the challenges we face in stabilizing the country and
explains where we went wrong and what we must do if the United
States is to avoid the disastrous fate that has befallen many of
the great world powers to enter the region.
Conventional warfare-clashes between large military forces-defined
twentieth-century power. But today, facing a dominant American
military, principal adversaries Russia, China and Iran, have
adopted a new style of competition. Cyber attacks, covert action,
proxy conflicts, information and disinformation campaigns,
espionage and economic coercion-these are the tools of irregular or
asymmetric warfare, which will increasingly reshape international
politics. In Three Dangerous Men, defence expert Seth G. Jones
profiles pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing and
Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without
waging traditional warfare. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US
military, diplomatic and intelligence officials, such as CIA
directors Michael Hayden and David Petraeus, the author
demonstrates why the US abandoned its own irregular capabilities
and is thus steadily losing ground to its global adversaries. Jones
argues the US must significantly alter how it thinks about-and
engages in-competition before it is too late.
This landmark history chronicles the dramatic, decade-long war
against al Qa'ida and provides a model for understanding the ebb
and flow of terrorist activity. Tracing intricately orchestrated
terrorist plots and the elaborate, multiyear investigations to
disrupt them, Seth G. Jones identifies three distinct "waves" of al
Qa'ida violence. As Jonathan Mahler wrote in the New York Times
Book Review, "studying these waves and the counterwaves that
repelled them can tell us a lot about what works and what doesn't
when it comes to fighting terrorism." The result is a sweeping,
insider's account of what the war has been and what it might
become.
The U.S. defense industrial base is not adequately prepared for the
international security environment that now exists. In a major
regional conflict—such as a war with China in the Taiwan
Strait—the U.S. use of munitions would likely exceed the current
stockpiles of the U.S. Department of Defense. According to the
results of a series of CSIS war games, the United States would
likely run out of some munitions—such as long-range,
precision-guided munitions—in less than one week in a Taiwan
Strait conflict. The war in Ukraine has also exposed serious
deficiencies in the U.S. defense industrial base and serves as a
stark reminder that a protracted conflict is likely to be an
industrial war that requires a defense industry able to manufacture
enough munitions, weapons systems, and matériel to replace
depleted stockpiles. As timelines for a possible conflict in Asia
shrink, the goal should be to support the production capacity
required to enable the United States and its allies and partners to
deter and, if deterrence fails, fight and win at least one major
theater war—if not two. “Just in time” and lean manufacturing
operations must be balanced with carrying added capacity. The U.S.
Department of Defense, in coordination with Congress, should
develop a plan now that involves taking steps to streamline and
improve production, acquisitions, replenishment, Foreign Military
Sales, ITAR, and other policies and procedures. A revitalization of
the defense industrial base will not happen overnight for the
United States or its allies and partners. It is time to prepare for
the era of competition that now exists.
This CSIS report examines the evolution of European military
capabilities over the next decade. It asks two main questions. What
military capabilities might European allies and partners of the
United States possess by 2030? And what types of military missions
will these states be able (and unable) to effectively perform by
2030? First, European militaries-including the largest and most
capable European NATO members-will continue to struggle to conduct
several types of missions without significant U.S. assistance.
Second, European militaries will face significant challenges in the
Indo-Pacific. Third, Europe's major powers will likely have the
capability to conduct most types of missions at the lower end of
the conflict continuum without significant U.S. military aid. To
sustain progress and overcome remaining challenges, NATO will have
to revise its burden-sharing metrics, modernize defense planning
and procurement practices, and address lagging political will.
There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military
presence in the Middle East. This CSIS report assesses three
posture options for U.S. forces in the region to inform the debate
over the United States' military presence in the Middle East. The
report finds that the United States should keep a notable but
tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further
expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the
actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the
United States and its allies and partners.
Since the end of World War II, there have been 181 insurgencies
around the world. Today, there are over three dozen violent
insurgencies, including in such high-profile countries as Iraq,
Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. These insurgencies have
been led by a range of groups, from the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In fact, most warfare today
occurs in the form of insurgencies. If we are to understand modern
warfare, we need to understand insurgencies. While numerous books
have been written on the subject of insurgencies, there is no book
that brings together all of what we know into one accessible volume
that policymakers can understand and use. Waging Insurgent Warfare
is that book. Seth G. Jones, who has been deeply involved in the
Afghanistan war over the last decade, aims to help policymakers,
scholars, and general readers better understand how groups start,
wage, and end insurgencies. He weaves together examples from today
and from recent history into an analytic synthesis that focuses on
several sets of questions. First, what factors contribute to the
rise of an insurgency? Second, what are the key components involved
in conducting an insurgency? As he explains, insurgent groups need
to decide on a strategy, employ a range of tactics, select an
organizational structure, secure outside aid from state and
non-state actors, and conduct information campaigns. They then have
to routinely re-assess these decisions over the course of an
insurgency. Third, what factors contribute to the end of
insurgencies? Finally, what do the answers to these questions mean
for the conduct of counterinsurgency warfare? Waging Insurgent
Warfare is not only a practical handbook for understanding
insurgent warfare, but it also has implications for waging
counterinsurgent warfare. Highly readable, empirically
sophisticated, and historically informed, Waging Insurgent Warfare
will become a standard work on the topic.
This report examines Russia's military and diplomatic campaign in
Syria, the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area
operation since the end of the Cold War. Russia's experience in
Syria will shape its military thinking, influence promotion and
personnel decisions, impact research and development for its arms
industry, and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond
for the foreseeable future. Yet despite the importance of Russia's
involvement in Syria-especially as the United States competes with
countries such as Russia and China-there has been little systematic
analysis of Russia's campaign in Syria. This research aims to help
fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a
broad assessment of the Russian campaign-including political
objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian targeting-which
places the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it
compiles a data set of Russia's civilian targeting and analyzes
satellite imagery of Russian activity. Overall, this report
concludes that Russia was relatively successful in achieving its
main near-term political and military objectives in Syria,
including preventing the collapse of the Assad regime (an important
regional partner) and thwarting a possible U.S. attempt to
overthrow Assad. Still, Russia used a systematic punishment
campaign that involved attacks against civilian and humanitarian
infrastructure in an attempt to deny resources-including food,
fuel, and medical aid-to the opposition while simultaneously
eroding the will of civilians to support opposition groups.
In Afghanistan, local communities have played a critical role in
security, especially in rural areas. Afghan national security
forces are important to the top-down strategy, but the Afghan
government and NATO forces also need to leverage local communities
to gain a complementary bottom-up strategy. This analysis discusses
the viability of establishing local security forces in Afghanistan
and addresses concerns about the wisdom of such policies.
Since 2001, Pakistan has undertaken a number of operations against
militant groups, including al Qa'ida, that directly affect U.S.
national security. Despite some successes, militant groups continue
to present a significant threat to Pakistan, the United States, and
a range of other countries. Pakistan will not be able to deal with
the militant threat over the long run unless it does a more
effective job of addressing the root causes of the crisis and makes
security of the civilian population, rather than destroying the
enemy, its top counter insurgency priority. In addition, Pakistan
needs to abandon militancy as a tool of its foreign and domestic
policy; it sends a confusing message internally and has a large
potential to backfire.
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how? Most modern groups
have ended because they joined the political process or local
police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members.
This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and
suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism
strategy: Policing and intelligence, not military force, should
form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida.All terrorist
groups end. But how do they end? Most groups since 1968 have ended
because they joined the political process or are defeated by police
and intelligence services. This has significant implications for
countering al Qa'ida.
This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan,
the key challenges and successes of the campaign, and the
capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency
operations. It argues that successful counterinsurgency requires
effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable
and legitimate local government; and the suppression of external
support for insurgents.An examination of the U.S.-led campaign in
Afghanistan illustrates that successful counterinsurgency requires
effective indigenous security forces, especially police; a viable
local government; and the suppression of external support for
insurgents.
Peace is the most essential product of nation-building. Without
peace, neither economic growth nor democratization is possible. The
authors of "Europe's Role in Nation-Building" investigate the use
of armed force as part of broader nation-building efforts led by
European powers and its success at achieving the objective of
transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace
with itself and its neighbours. They then evaluate Europe's
performance against the U.S. and United Nations records in past
nation-building operations.The authors focus on factors that can be
influenced by outside powers, making valuable recommendations that
address the pitfalls of and lessons learned from past operations.
They emphasize the need for multilateral operations and the
involvement of crucial actors like the European Union and NATO. The
success of nation-building activities depends on the wisdom with
which all resources are employed."The RAND Nation-Building" series
is just this kind of resource, having drawn from a total of 22
European, U.N. and U.S. led nation-building operations since World
War II. Other volumes in the series examine the involvement of the
United States and the UN in nation-building efforts. In this new
addition to the series, the authors take an in-depth look at six
European cases (Macedonia, Bosnia, Cote d'Ivoire, Albania, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone) and one
Australian-led operation (the Solomon Islands) to complete a
comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building. This
series serves as an indispensable reference for the planning of
successful future interventions.
The challenges of nation-building and of dealing with the societal
and political aftermaths of conflicts have consumed tremendous
international energy during the past decades. "Women and
Nation-Building" tackles the exceedingly complex task of assessing
the multilayered development of women's diverse roles in the
post-conflict context. The author examines the role of women in the
recent reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, while evaluating
the effect of societal circumstances and nation-building processes
on the status of female populations in post-conflict regions. Does
women's part make a difference to the post-conflict trajectories of
very volatile societies? "Women and Nation-Building" presents
compelling findings for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars
concerned with both the academic and pragmatic implementation of a
more engendered approach to nation-building.The book concludes that
the steps necessary to strengthen nation-building activities
include an emphasis on human security, establishing governance
based on the principles of equity and the rule of law, and women's
early economic inclusion in reconstruction activities. Societies on
a path toward equity and the rule of law are more peaceful and more
prosperous, and the status of women is not merely a litmus test but
an active agent in bringing about such an outcome.
In two earlier volumes, the authors defined nation building as the
use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a
transition to democracy. By various actors, it is often called
stabilisation and reconstruction, peace building, or state
building, but at any name these missions have become more frequent,
and frequently more complex and ambitious. As American forces
entered Iraq, little effort was made to marshal abundant, recent,
and relevant experience in support of the new nation-building
mission in Iraq, with severe consequences.This guidebook is
designed to contribute to future nation building efforts. It is
organized around the components that make up any nation-building
mission: planning, military and police contingents, civil
administrators, humanitarian and relief efforts, governance,
economic stabilization, democratisation, and infrastructure
development. This guide should help practitioners avoid repeating
earlier mistakes, help political leaders evaluate the cost and
likelihood of success of any proposed operation, and help citizens
evaluate their government's consequent performance.
One of the most striking developments in recent international
politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation
among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase
in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons
production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred
because of the changing structure of the international and regional
systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system
has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by
United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in
the security realm to increase their ability to project power
abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European
leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure
long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security
cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe
whilst building power abroad.
One of the most striking developments in recent international
politics has been the significant increase in security cooperation
among European Union states. Seth Jones argues that this increase
in cooperation, in areas such as economic sanctions, weapons
production and collaboration among military forces, has occurred
because of the changing structure of the international and regional
systems. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system
has shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar structure characterized by
United States dominance. This has caused EU states to cooperate in
the security realm to increase their ability to project power
abroad and to decrease reliance on the US. Furthermore, European
leaders in the early 1990s adopted a 'binding' strategy to ensure
long-term peace on the continent, suggesting that security
cooperation is caused by a desire to preserve peace in Europe
whilst building power abroad.
In a nation-building operation, outside states invest much of their
resources in establishing and maintaining the host country's
police, internal security forces, and justice system. This book
examines post-Cold War reconstruction efforts, such as those in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and assesses the success of U.S. and allied
efforts in reconstructing internal security institutions.
Reports the results of a two-day workshop that brought together a
diverse group of modelers, specialists in international relations,
and thinkers about power from both the public and the private
sectors. Reports the results of a two-day workshop that brought
together a diverse group of modelers, specialists in international
relations, and thinkers about power from both the public and the
private sectors. They considered how to measure state power and the
power of non-state actors, and how states and non-state actors
wield power on a continuum ranging from persuasion, through
economic aid, to military action.
Reviews UN nation-building efforts to transform unstable countries
into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares
those efforts to U.S.-led missions. Reviews UN efforts to transform
eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous
partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building
operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional
framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than
20,000 men-one with a comparatively low cost structure, a
comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of
international legitimacy.
This title presents a nearly 50-year review of U.S. efforts to
transform defeated and broken enemies into democratic and
prosperous allies.
Following the U.S. killing of Qasem Soleimani, head of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), the United States
and Iran are involved in an escalating conflict. What is badly
needed now is a coherent long-term U.S. strategy to deal with Iran
in ways that protect U.S. national security and leverage U.S.
partners. The United States' "maximum pressure" campaign has not
led to a change in Iran's behavior-at least not yet-though U.S.
sanctions have severely damaged Iran's economy. As this CSIS report
highlights with new data and analysis, the IRGC-QF has supported a
growing number of non-state fighters in Yemen, Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Pakistan-including nearly a 50 percent
increase since 2016. Thanks to Iran, these forces are better
equipped with more sophisticated weapons and systems. This report
also uses satellite imagery to identify an expansion of
IRGC-QF-linked bases in countries like Iran and Lebanon to train
non-state fighters. Iran has constructed more sophisticated and
longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles and conducted missile
attacks against countries like Saudi Arabia. In addition, Iran has
developed offensive cyber capabilities and used them against the
United States and its partners. In the nuclear arena, Iran has
ended commitments it made to limit uranium enrichment, production,
research, and expansion-raising the prospect of Iranian nuclear
weapons. Moving forward, the United States should implement a
containment strategy against Iran that attempts to de-escalate the
current military situation and work toward achieving several goals:
Prevent Iran from becoming a regional hegemon capable of dominating
other states in the Middle East. Stop nuclear proliferation in the
region and prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, including
thwarting Iran from pursuing weapons-grade uranium enrichment,
warhead development, and plutonium reprocessing. Curb significant
Iranian military, political, and ideological expansion in the
region, including the export of Iran's revolutionary ideology.
Encourage a process of change inside Iran toward a more pluralistic
political and economic system in which the power of the clerical
establishment is gradually reduced. This report highlights a range
of weaknesses that make Iran vulnerable to containment and lays out
the political, military, economic, and informational components of
such a strategy. The United States needs to credibly demonstrate
that its policy toward Iran is not a blueprint for an endless
struggle, but instead an effort to encourage Iran to be more
democratic and open, as political and economic change must be
driven by Iranians themselves.
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