Effects Based: Not Just For Operations Anymore The United States Air Force is in a transformational phase. Leaders are searching for new and innovative ways to look at old problems. One problem that has plagued the USAF is the measurement of operations and maintenance performance in fighter units. Traditionally, the performance has been gauged by a myriad of statistics and metrics. While statistics are often necessary to assess performance against a set of measures of merit, the current methods in place are outdated and really tell very little about actual performance. The military, and especially the USAF, has embraced the Effect Based concept in terms of warfare. This method of viewing warfare places the burden of assessment on the net effects of actions rather than measuring the actions themselves. This sea change occurred in the wake of the Vietnam War when airmen came to the realization that airpower was used ineffectively based in part to the emphasis on metrics such as sortie counts, body counts, and tonnage dropped on the enemy. The focus on the metrics was often the cause for ineffective use of fighter assets when target destruction took a back seat to the number of sorties flown and munitions expended. The Vietnam generation resolved to do it better. As a result of the debacle in Vietnam, strategic thinkers began to view airpower in terms of effects desired rather than arbitrary statistics. The result of this thinking produced the irrefutable success in the conduct of the air campaign during Operation DESERT STORM. While the inherent concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) is not new to warfare, DESERT STORM provided a culminating point after which EBO became entrenched in military lexicon. All actions taken during a conflict began to be viewed as subordinate acts conducted in order to attain a desired effect.