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The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct
overview with analysis of the major issues in the U.S. policy on
Taiwan. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan formally
calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC), tracing its
political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in
China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United
States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained
a nondiplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in 1979. The State
Department claims an "unofficial" U.S. relationship with Taiwan,
despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy in the
absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key
statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint
Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the "Six
Assurances" of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the "One China" Policy-Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei.)
The purpose and scope of this CRS report is to provide a succinct
overview with analysis of the issues in the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship. This report will be updated as warranted. Taiwan
formally calls itself the sovereign Republic of China (ROC),
tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the
revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei
in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978
and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after
recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing in
1979. The State Department claims an "unofficial" U.S. relationship
with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed policy
in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty.
Other key statements that guide policy are the three U.S.-PRC Joint
Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982; as well as the "Six
Assurances" of 1982. (See also CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan:
Evolution of the "One China" Policy-Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei.)
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security
assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy
issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms
sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the
People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other
relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982,
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also
expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings
in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty
terminated in 1979.
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security
assistance to Taiwan, or Republic of China (ROC), including policy
issues for Congress and legislation. Congress has oversight of the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, which has governed arms
sales to Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the
People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of the ROC. Two other
relevant parts of the "one China" policy are the August 17, 1982,
U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the "Six Assurances" to Taiwan. U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan have been significant. The United States also
expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC's missile firings
in 1995-1996. However, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty
terminated in 1979.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United
States faced a challenge in enlisting the full support of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in the counterterrorism fight
against Al Qaeda. This effort raised short-term policy issues about
how to elicit cooperation and how to address PRC concerns about the
U.S.-led war (Operation Enduring Freedom). Longer-term issues have
concerned whether counterterrorism has strategically transformed
bilateral ties and whether China's support was valuable and not
obtained at the expense of other U.S. interests.
Despite apparently consistent statements in four decades, the U.S.
"one China" policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and
subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about
what the "one China" policy entails, issues have arisen about
whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have
changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in
security and democracy. In Part I, this CRS Report, updated as
warranted, discusses the "one China" policy since the United States
began in 1971 to reach presidential understandings with the
People's Republic of China (PRC) government in Beijing. Part II
records the evolution of policy as affected by legislation and key
statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. Taiwan formally
calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), celebrating in 2011 the
100th anniversary of its founding. Policy covers three major issue
areas: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion
against Taiwan; and cross-strait dialogue. The United States
recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained an
official, non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition
of the PRC in 1979. The United States did not explicitly state the
sovereign status of Taiwan in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of
1972, 1979, and 1982. The United States "acknowledged" the "one
China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Congress has long been concerned about whether U.S. policy advances
the national interest in reducing the role of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's
technology reportedly include Pakistan and countries said by the
State Department to have supported terrorism, such as Iran. This
CRS Report, updated as warranted, discusses the security problem of
China's role in weapons proliferation and issues related to the
U.S. policy response since the mid- 1990s. China has taken some
steps to mollify U.S. and other foreign concerns about its role in
weapons proliferation. Nonetheless, supplies from China have
aggravated trends that result in ambiguous technical aid, more
indigenous capabilities, longer-range missiles, and secondary
(retransferred) proliferation. According to unclassified
intelligence reports submitted as required to Congress, China has
been a "key supplier" of technology, particularly PRC entities
providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and
missile-related technology to Iran.
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