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Following the career of one relatively unknown First World War
general, Lord Horne, this book adds to the growing literature that
challenges long-held assumptions that the First World War was a
senseless bloodbath conducted by unimaginative and incompetent
generals. Instead it demonstrates that men like Horne developed new
tactics and techniques to deal with the novel problems of trench
warfare and in so doing seeks to re-establish the image of the
British generals and explain the reasons for the failures of
1915-16 and the successes of 1917-18 and how this remarkable change
in performance was achieved by a much maligned group of senior
officers. Horne's important career and remarkable character sheds
light not only on the major battles in which he was involved; the
progress of the war; his relationships with his staff and other
senior officers; the novel problems of trench warfare; the
assimilation of new weapons, tactics and training methods; and the
difficulties posed by the German defences, but also on the
attitudes and professionalism of a senior British commander serving
on the Western Front. Horne's career thus provides a vehicle for
studying the performance of the British Army in the first quarter
of the Twentieth Century. It also gives an important insight into
the attitudes, ethos and professionalism of the officer corps which
led that army to victory on the Western Front, exposing not only
its flaws but also its many strengths. This study consequently
provides a judgment not only on Horne as a personality, innovator
and general of great importance but also on his contemporaries who
served with the British Armies in South Africa and France during an
era which saw a revolution in military affairs giving birth to a
Modern Style of Warfare which still prevails to this day.
This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front
to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines
the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison,
occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the
mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a
continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and
material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years
of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army,
including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the
high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to
ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior
to 1916, are analyzed. The high command rapidly learnt from the
defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an
especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a
younger, more professional leadership and the development of the
first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever
since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and
improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms
to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.
This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front
to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines
the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison,
occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the
mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a
continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and
material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years
of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army,
including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the
high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to
ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior
to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the
defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an
especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a
younger, more professional leadership and the development of the
first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever
since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and
improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms
to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.
Following the career of one relatively unknown First World War
general, Lord Horne, this book adds to the growing literature that
challenges long-held assumptions that the First World War was a
senseless bloodbath conducted by unimaginative and incompetent
generals. Instead it demonstrates that men like Horne developed new
tactics and techniques to deal with the novel problems of trench
warfare and in so doing seeks to re-establish the image of the
British generals and explain the reasons for the failures of
1915-16 and the successes of 1917-18 and how this remarkable change
in performance was achieved by a much maligned group of senior
officers. Horne's important career and remarkable character sheds
light not only on the major battles in which he was involved; the
progress of the war; his relationships with his staff and other
senior officers; the novel problems of trench warfare; the
assimilation of new weapons, tactics and training methods; and the
difficulties posed by the German defences, but also on the
attitudes and professionalism of a senior British commander serving
on the Western Front. Horne's career thus provides a vehicle for
studying the performance of the British Army in the first quarter
of the Twentieth Century. It also gives an important insight into
the attitudes, ethos and professionalism of the officer corps which
led that army to victory on the Western Front, exposing not only
its flaws but also its many strengths. This study consequently
provides a judgment not only on Horne as a personality, innovator
and general of great importance but also on his contemporaries who
served with the British Armies in South Africa and France during an
era which saw a revolution in military affairs giving birth to a
Modern Style of Warfare which still prevails to this day.
'Who is the enemy?' This is the question most asked in modern
warfare; gone are the set-piece conventional battles of the past.
Once seen as secondary to more traditional conflicts, irregular
warfare (as modified and refashioned since the 1990s) now presents
a major challenge to the state and the bureaucratic institutions
which have dominated the twentieth century, and to the politicians
and civil servants who formulate policy. Twenty-first-century
conflict is dominated by counterinsurgency operations, where the
enemy is almost indistinguishable from innocent civilians. Battles
are gunfights in jungles, deserts and streets; winning 'hearts and
minds' is as important as holding territory. From struggles in
South Africa, the Philippines and Ireland to operations in Iraq,
Afghanistan and Chechnya, this book covers the strategy and
doctrine of counterinsurgency, and the factors which ensure whether
such operations are successful or not. Recent ignorance of central
principles and the emergence of social media, which has shifted the
odds in favour of the insurgent, have too often resulted in
failure, leaving governments and their security forces embedded in
a hostile population, immersed in costly and dangerous
nation-building.
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