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This book brings together papers from a conference that took place
in the city of L'Aquila, 4-6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th
anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009.
Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated
the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson:
the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time
that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however,
believes that scientific time is derived by abstraction, even in
the sense of extraction, from a more fundamental time. The
plurality of times envisaged by the theory of Relativity does not,
for him, contradict the philosophical intuition of the existence of
a single time. But how do things stand today? What can we say about
the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative
dimensions of time in the light of contemporary science? What do
quantum mechanics, biology and neuroscience teach us about the
nature of time? The essays collected here take up the question that
pitted Einstein against Bergson, science against philosophy, in an
attempt to reverse the outcome of their monologue in two voices,
with a multilogue in several voices.
The ontological debate on the nature of properties is alive as
ever. Mainly, they are viewed either as universals or tropes
(abstract particulars), an alternative with an immediate impact on
what events are taken to be. Although much inquiry in philosophy of
mind is done without a full awareness of it, some recent works
suggest that the choice may have far-reaching consequences on
central topics of this discipline, e.g., token physicalism,
multiple realizability, mental causation, perception,
introspection, self-awareness. This book explores the extent to
which this is true with novel contributions by philosophers who
have played a major role in bringing to the fore this interplay of
foundational metaphysics and philosophical psychology and by other
experts in these fields.
The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state
are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for
some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many
philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were
marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both
resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics
and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between
developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This
volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays
challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity
theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal
argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience
are lending new support to type identity theory and still others
provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the
theory's explanatory power.
The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state
are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for
some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many
philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were
marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both
resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics
and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between
developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This
volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays
challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity
theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal
argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience
are lending new support to type identity theory and still others
provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the
theory's explanatory power.
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