History is replete with instances of what might, or might not, have been. By calling something contingent, at a minimum we are saying that it did not have to be as it is. Things could have been otherwise, and they would have been otherwise if something had happened differently. This collection of original essays examines the significance of contingency in the study of politics. That is, how to study unexpected, accidental, or unknowable political phenomena in a systematic fashion. Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated. Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait. Hurricane Katrina hits New Orleans. How might history be different had these events not happened? How should social scientists interpret the significance of these events and can such unexpected outcomes be accounted for in a systematic way or by theoretical models? Can these unpredictable events be predicted for? Political Contingency addresses these and other related questions, providing theoretical and historical perspectives on the topic, empirical case studies, and the methodological challenges that the fact of contingency poses for the study of politics.

Contributors: Sonu Bedi, Traci Burch, Jennifer L. Hochschild, Gregory A. Huber, Courtney Jung, David R. Mayhew, Philip Pettit, Andreas Schedler, Mark R. Shulman, Robert G. Shulman, Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, Elisabeth Jean Wood, and David Wootton

Usually, when we discuss racial injustice, we discuss racism in our public or political life. This means that we often focus on how the state discriminates on the basis of race in its application and enforcement of laws and policies. This book draws on the synergy of political theory and civil rights law to expand the boundary of racial justice and consider the way in which racial discrimination happens outside the governmental or public sphere. 'Private racism' is about recognizing that racial injustice also occurs in our private lives, including the television and movie industry, cyberspace, our intimate and sexual lives, and the reproductive market. Professor Sonu Bedi argues that private racism is wrong, enlarging the boundary of justice in a way that is also consistent with our Constitution. A more just society is one that seeks to address rather than ignore this less visible form of racism.

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aClear, jargon-free writing prevails throughout the volume. The authors are leaders in their respective fields of inquiry, yet each of them writes not to a narrow group of specialists but to the intelligent reading public.a
--Elisabeth Ellis, author of "Kant's Politics: Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World"

History is replete with instances of what might, or might not, have been. By calling something contingent, at a minimum we are saying that it did not have to be as it is. Things could have been otherwise, and they would have been otherwise if something had happened differently. This collection of original essays examines the significance of contingency in the study of politics. That is, how to study unexpected, accidental, or unknowable political phenomena in a systematic fashion. Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated. Saddam Huessein invades Kuwait. Hurricane Katrina hits New Orleans. How might history be different had these events not happened? How should social scientists interpret the significance of these events and can such unexpected outcomes be accounted for in a systematic way or by theoretical models? Can these unpredictable events be predicted for? Political Contingency addresses these and other related questions, providing theoretical and historical perspectives on the topic, empirical case studies, and the methodological challenges that the fact of contingency poses for the study of politics.

Contributors: Sonu Bedi, Traci Burch, Jennifer L. Hochschild, Gregory A. Huber, Courtney Jung, David R. Mayhew, Philip Pettit, Andreas Schedler, Mark R. Shulman, Robert G. Shulman, Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, ElisabethJean Wood, and David Wootton

Although the debate over same-sex marriage in the United States has ended, no one seems to know what lies on the horizon. The conversation about what marriage could be like in the future is no longer confined to academics. In his dissent in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts linked the constitutionally-mandated legal recognition of same-sex marriage to the possibility that states may also have to recognize multi-person intimate relationships as well to avoid discriminating against plural marriage enthusiasts. The popularity of television shows like TLC's Sister Wives and HBO's Big Love suggests that Americans no longer can be dismissive of the possibility that in the foreseeable future, marriage could, and perhaps should, look very different than it does today. Rather than settling the question of whether states ought to abolish marriage, make it more inclusive, contractual, or call it something else, this book exposes readers to some of the normative, legal, and empirical questions that Americans must address before they can deliberate thoughtfully about whether to keep the marital status quo where monogamy remains privileged. Unlike much of the debate over same-sex marriage, they exchange reasons with one another as they discuss marital reform. This book is for ordinary Americans, their elected representatives, and judges, to help them ultimately decide whether they want to continue to define marriage so narrowly, make it more inclusive to avoid discrimination, or have the state leave the marriage business. This edited, interdisciplinary volume contains eight original contributions, all of which illuminate important but often neglected areas of the topic.

Although the debate over same-sex marriage in the United States has ended, no one seems to know what lies on the horizon. The conversation about what marriage could be like in the future is no longer confined to academics. In his dissent in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts linked the constitutionally-mandated legal recognition of same-sex marriage to the possibility that states may also have to recognize multi-person intimate relationships as well to avoid discriminating against plural marriage enthusiasts. The popularity of television shows like TLC's Sister Wives and HBO's Big Love suggests that Americans no longer can be dismissive of the possibility that in the foreseeable future, marriage could, and perhaps should, look very different than it does today. Rather than settling the question of whether states ought to abolish marriage, make it more inclusive, contractual, or call it something else, this book exposes readers to some of the normative, legal, and empirical questions that Americans must address before they can deliberate thoughtfully about whether to keep the marital status quo where monogamy remains privileged. Unlike much of the debate over same-sex marriage, they exchange reasons with one another as they discuss marital reform. This book is for ordinary Americans, their elected representatives, and judges, to help them ultimately decide whether they want to continue to define marriage so narrowly, make it more inclusive to avoid discrimination, or have the state leave the marriage business. This edited, interdisciplinary volume contains eight original contributions, all of which illuminate important but often neglected areas of the topic.

The conventional interpretation of equality under the law singles out certain groups or classes for constitutional protection: women, racial minorities, and gays and lesbians. The United States Supreme Court calls these groups 'suspect classes'. Laws that discriminate against them are generally unconstitutional. While this is a familiar account of equal protection jurisprudence, this book argues that this approach suffers from hitherto unnoticed normative and political problems. The book elucidates a competing, extant interpretation of equal protection jurisprudence that avoids these problems. The interpretation is not concerned with suspect classes but rather with the kinds of reasons that are already inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. This alternative approach treats the equal protection clause like any other limit on governmental power, thus allowing the Court to invalidate equality-infringing laws and policies by focusing on their justification rather than the identity group they discriminate against.

The language of rights is ubiquitous. It shapes the way we construct our debates over issues such as abortion, affirmative action and sexual freedom. This provocative new study challenges the very concept of rights, arguing that they jeopardize our liberty and undermine democratic debate. By re-conceptualizing our ideas about limited government, it suggests that we can limit the reasons or rationales on which the polity may act. Whereas we once used the language of rights to thwart democratic majorities, Bedi argues that we should now turn our attention to the democratic state's reason for acting. This will permit greater democratic flexibility and discretion while ensuring genuine liberty. Deftly employing political theory and constitutional law to state its case, the study radically rethinks the relationship between liberty and democracy, and will be essential reading for scholars and students of political and legal philosophy.

The conventional interpretation of equality under the law singles out certain groups or classes for constitutional protection: women, racial minorities, and gays and lesbians. The United States Supreme Court calls these groups 'suspect classes'. Laws that discriminate against them are generally unconstitutional. While this is a familiar account of equal protection jurisprudence, this book argues that this approach suffers from hitherto unnoticed normative and political problems. The book elucidates a competing, extant interpretation of equal protection jurisprudence that avoids these problems. The interpretation is not concerned with suspect classes but rather with the kinds of reasons that are already inadmissible as a matter of constitutional law. This alternative approach treats the equal protection clause like any other limit on governmental power, thus allowing the Court to invalidate equality-infringing laws and policies by focusing on their justification rather than the identity group they discriminate against.

The language of rights is ubiquitous. It shapes the way we construct our debates over issues such as abortion, affirmative action and sexual freedom. This provocative new study challenges the very concept of rights, arguing that they jeopardize our liberty and undermine democratic debate. By re-conceptualizing our ideas about limited government, it suggests that we can limit the reasons or rationales on which the polity may act. Whereas we once used the language of rights to thwart democratic majorities, Bedi argues that we should now turn our attention to the democratic state's reason for acting. This will permit greater democratic flexibility and discretion while ensuring genuine liberty. Deftly employing political theory and constitutional law to state its case, the study radically rethinks the relationship between liberty and democracy, and will be essential reading for scholars and students of political and legal philosophy.