The current struggles over nationality policy in Russia and in neighboring states are rooted in the history of the Narkomnats and in policies that Stalin established as Commissar. This history, based in large part on primary research, describes the Commissariat of Nationalities from 1917 to 1924, Stalin's role as its chief, and the policies that were the origins of the current ethnic dilemmas throughout the now collapsed Soviet Empire. This rich history is intended for scholars, students, and policymakers in European history and Slavic studies, and for general readers interested in the background of political and social conflicts in the former Soviet republics today.

What are the key factors that will shape the post-Soviet military system? Leading experts assess the geostrategic context in which leaders must operate, the nature of future war, foundations of military power, dilemmas confronting a multinational military force, problems in managing a nuclear arsenal, civil-military relations, economic priorities and problems, and ethnic questions. This current evaluation of how war and the Soviet Union are being transformed is an invaluable study for students and experts in military studies, political science, and the social sciences generally. In this collection of important perspectives, Soviet military elites and influential civilian policymakers discussed what previous and present developments will require in the future. This collaborative effort examines what Moscow sees as important requirements. The study analyzes Soviet forecasting methodologies, naval developments, views about theater warfare in Europe, developments in C3I, the role of space, the Soviet military economy, mobilization regimes, Soviet views on American military thought, perspectives on the initial period of warfare and changes in operational arts. Chapter endnotes and reference lists point to major sources of Soviet scholarship.

Originally published in 1990, this pertinent study focuses on the purely operational and strategic lessons of the war in Afghanistan. It insists that lessons of these kinds were present and that they offer significant insights both for such wars in general and for the course of Soviet military developments in the 1980s and 1990s. These lessons also offer important clues concerning the reforms required in order to preserve democratic civilian control over the military. It should also alert analysts everywhere as to the nature of local wars in the Third World in the 1990s, a phenomenon that shows little sign of abating. Though in many ways like all wars, this war was unique; it was not merely a series of random tactical exercises that were ultimately futile. Rather, like all wars, it shows us something of the shape of our present and future, if we are only insightful enough to understand it correctly. This is a high quality reprint, professionally scanned from the original document.

The three papers presented here are by well-known experts and were delivered at SSI's third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, European, and American experts to engage in a regular, open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security.

These papers represent the first in a series of papers taken from the Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) fourth annual Russia conference that took place at SSI's headquarters in Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. As such, they also are part of our on-going effort to make sense of and clarify developments in Russia. The three papers presented here offer attempts to characterize first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state-perhaps the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as well-in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in 2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches, though we certainly do not claim that they provide the last or definitive word on these subjects.

These three papers represent the third monograph to come out of the SSI-U.S. State Department conference "Contemporary issues in International Security," that took place at the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC, on January 25-26, 2010. This monograph consists of three deeply probing essays into the genesis of Russia's 2010 defense doctrine, the political struggle behind it, and the actual content of the doctrine. They reveal a highly politicized minefield of struggle comprising leading actors in the military, the government, and in Russian security policy as a whole. They duly illuminate the ongoing struggles between and among these sets of military and civilian elites and therefore cast a shining light on critical aspects of Russian policy that all too often are left in darkness. They are essential to any understanding of Russian defense and security policy as well as the nature of the relationship between the Russian military and the government and the way in which these actors formulate key policy statements and resolve pressing political issues.

Given the stakes involved in achieving a correct understanding of Russian and Chinese defense policies and military developments, the magnitude of Mary Fitzgerald's enlightening accomplishments in this regard becomes clear. However, the problems that we have outlined in this volume were not unfamiliar to students of the Soviet Union. Indeed, they are enduring strategic issues for Russian policymakers as well as those who analyze or contribute to foreign policies toward the Russian military, despite the magnitude of the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1989 when the Soviet empire began to collapse. Even more importantly, Mary and her colleagues recognized that the issues outlined here are not just tasks relevant for the general study of Russia, but by addressing these strategic issues, and their underlying implications, policymakers will engage in the essential tasks necessary for the creation of an enduring structure of peace. Mary Fitzgerald made many contributions to the national security field over the course of the years through her close reading of the writings of Soviet and Russian military officers. Particularly useful was her focus on those of Soviet military theorists who put forward forecasts of future warfare and the impact of technology on warfare. These Russian reviews deserved respect and study; Mary's work made this possible. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became easier to meet with and talk with a number of these Soviet officers so as to explore more fully their thinking and the continuing development of their ideas about future warfare, and the likely direction of the military revolution they had begun writing about in the late 1970s. Organizing meetings with them was greatly aided by Mary because of the good relations she had developed with several of these officers, who liked her as a person and were flattered that she had been so careful a reader of their writings. Strategic Studies Institute.

While the Cold War is long past, the importance of arms control in Russo-American relations and the related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the former domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, following essays explore many, if not all, of the issues connected with Russia's relatively greater reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they constitute an important contribution to the analysis of the Obama administration's reset policy, Russo-American relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and international security in both Europe and Asia. Additionally, questions concerning the approach taken by other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security policy.

As NATO and the United States proceed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, the inherent and preexisting geopolitical, security, and strategic challenges in Central Asia become ever more apparent. The rivalry among the great powers: the United States, China, Russia, India, and others to a lesser degree, are all becoming increasingly more visible as a key factor that will shape this region after the allied withdrawal from Afghanistan. The papers collected here, presented at SSI's annual conference on Russia in 2012, go far to explaining what the agenda for that rivalry is and how it is likely to influence regional trends after 2013. Therefore, these papers provide a vital set of insights into an increasingly critical area of international politics and security, especially as it is clear that the United States is reducing, but not totally withdrawing, its military establishment in Afghanistan and is seeking to consolidate long-term relationships with Central Asian states. Accordingly, these papers provide assessments of Sino-Russian rivalry, the U.S.-Russian rivalry, and a neglected but critical topic-Chinese military capability for action in Central Asia. All of these issues are essential for any informed analysis of the future of Central Asian security, as well as relations among the great powers in Central Asia.

Although Russian observers believe that Washington imposed sanctions in Russian arms sellers and producers because of these firms' arms sales to Venezuela. Sales to such dangerous states oblige us to analyze the Russian defense export program and the structure of its defense industry. Until now, that industry would have collapsed without arms sales. Arms sales thus have become the main source of its reveneue until the present and will play a key role in Russia's ongoing attempt to regenerate its armed forces while winning friends and influence abroad.

The war in Afghanistan has added considerably to the strategic significance of Central Asia due to its proximity to the conflict. Moreover, the continuation of the war increasingly involves the vital interests of many other actors other than the U.S. and NATO forces currently there. This monograph, taken from SSI's conference with European and Russian scholars in 2010, provides a comprehensive analysis of the means and objectives of Russia's involvement in Central Asia. It also provides Russian perspectives concerning the other actors in Central Asia and how Moscow views the policy significance of those efforts.

On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) organized a conference entitled, "Contemporary is-sues in International Security." This was the second in what is hoped will be annual conference bringing together U.S., European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss such issues in an open forum. The panel presented here was devoted to civil-military relations in Russia. This is, as the papers included here show, a critical topic in understanding the domestic and foreign policy trajectories of the Russian state. The papers provided here do not deny that civilian control exists. But they both show how highly undemocratic, and even dangerous, is the absence of those democratic controls over the military and the police forces in Rus-sia which, taken together, comprise multiple militaries. These papers present differing U.S. and European assessments of the problems connected with civilian and democratic controls over the possessors of force in the Russian state and should stimulate further reflection upon these issues and those related to them."

In one way or another, the papers included in this monograph, from the Strategic Studies Institute's annual conference on Russia in May 2012, all point to the internal pathologies that render Russian security a precarious affair at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an inherently unpredictable and even potentially dangerous actor, not necessarily because it will actively attack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude that possibility, but rather because Russia may come apart trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in 1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for international security and U.S. interests.

The author assesses the interests of the United States in Central Asia and the challenges to them. These challenges consist of the revival of the Taliban, Russo-Chinese efforts to oust U.S. strategic presence from the area, and the possibility of internal instability generated by the regression of local regimes form democratizing and liberalizing policies. The author then recommends policies designed to meet those challenges to American policy in this increasingly more important area of the world.

The best recent scholarship on Russian civil-military relations explicitly addresses this issue's importance for both domestic and external security. An inquiry into the present state of those relations under conditions of defense reform and the current international situation is of immense analytical and policy relevance for both domestic and external security in Russia. While the Russian regime is serious about military reform, it is encountering severe objections from the uniformed military, and the military has successfully persuaded the government to accept its expansive concept of the threats to Russia, i.e., its threat assessment. Therefore, we must closely follow those developments to understand more clearly current tendencies in Russian politics and policy as a whole. Specifically, this chapter examines issues pertaining to civil-military relations in several areas of Russian national security policies that suggest some disturbing trends for the future.

This book presents several essays analyzing Russia's extensive nuclear agenda and the issues connected with it. It deals with strategy, doctrine, European, Eurasian, and East Asian security agendas, as well as the central U.S.-Russia nuclear and arms control equations. This work brings together American, European, and Russian analysts to discuss Russia's defense and conventional forces reforms and their impact on nuclear forces, doctrine, strategy, and the critical issues of Russian security policies toward the United States, Europe, and China. It also deals directly with the present and future roles of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy and strategy.

The Arctic has returned with a vengeance as an area of international contention. Beginning in 2007, Russia has continued to make aggressive moves and claims regarding territory in the Arctic Ocean. These moves undoubtedly have been prompted by global climate change and the importance of energy, with which Russia believes the Arctic is lavishly supplied. These moves apparently were intended to compel other Arctic states, like Norway, to come to terms with Russia. Nonetheless, the tendency to invoke military and security issues and instruments in this region of the world continues apace. These essays, taken from SSI's 2010 conference on Russia, fully explore the Russian and international competition for influence and rights over the exploration and commercial exploitation of the Arctic.

The following three papers comprise one of the panels from a conference on U.S.-Russia relations that SSI co-sponsored with the Carnegie Council at Pocantico, NY, from June 1-3, 2011: Carnegie Council's Program on "U.S. Global Engagement: A Two-Year Retrospective." The papers offer three contrasting looks at one of the major issues in today's arms control agenda, namely the future of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The three papers were written by leading experts in the field from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia and provide a revealing glimpse into the very different assessments that are being made by those three governments and the difficult issues involved in attempting to regenerate the process that led to the original treaty in 1990. These three chapters also implicitly contribute to a better understanding of the intractabilities facing the major players in any effort to advance not only arms control but also European stability.

President Sapirmurat Niyazov, the all-powerful leader of Turkmenistan, suddenly died on December 21, 2006. Because Central Asia is a cockpit of great power rivalry and a potential theater in the Global War on Terrorism, no sooner had Niyazov died than the great powers were all in Turkmenistan seeking to influence its future policies away from the neutrality that had been Niyazov's policy. Turkmenistan's importance lies almost exclusively in its large natural gas holdings and proximity to the Caspian Sea and Iran. Because energy is regarded as a strategic asset as much if not more than as a mere lubricant or commodity, Russia, Iran, China, and the United States have all been visibly engaged in competition for influence there. The outcome of this competition and of the domestic struggle for power will have repercussions throughout Central Asia, if not beyond. The author shows the linkage between energy and security policies in Central Asia and in the policies of the major powers towards Central Asia. Beyond this analysis, he provides recommendations for U.S. policymakers as to how they should conduct themselves in this complex situation.

This book presents several essays analyzing Russia's extensive nuclear agenda and the issues connected with it. It deals with strategy, doctrine, European, Eurasian, and East Asian security agendas, as well as the central U.S.-Russia nuclear and arms control equations. This work brings together American, European, and Russian analysts to discuss Russia's defense and conventional forces reforms and their impact on nuclear forces, doctrine, strategy, and the critical issues of Russian security policies toward the United States, Europe, and China. It also deals directly with the present and future roles of nuclear weapons in Russian defense policy and strategy.

These three chapters originated in an SSI conference in January 2010 and go to the heart of a question of vital significance for both Asia and Russia, namely what are Russia's prospects in Asia. The three chapters outline the challenges Russia faces in Asia, the nature of the dynamic and complex Asian security environment, and the extent to which Russia is or is not meeting those challenges. These chapters represent both Russian and U.S. views and clearly do not agree in their conclusions or analyses. For this reason, they are all the more interesting. These chapters should provoke debate, reflection, and greater awareness as to the complexities of the current international scene in Asia and of Russia's success or lack thereof in participating in that environment. In view of the extraordinary dynamism that now characterizes Asia and the fact that it is the center of the world economy, the analysis provided here goes beyond obvious issues to address questions that we believe are unjustly neglected, e.g., Russia's prospects as an Asian power and as an independent great power player in Asia. The answers to these questions are urgent for Russians, but very consequential for the U.S. because getting Asia right will be among the most critical challenges to U.S. policymakers in the coming years.

It is obvious that U.S.-Russian relations and East-West relations more broadly have recently deteriorated. Yet analyses of why this is the case have often been confined to American policy. The author examines some of the key strategic issues at stake in this relationship and traces that decline to Russian factors which have been overlooked or neglected. At the same time, he has devoted considerable time to recording some of the shortcomings of U.S. policy and recommending a way out of the growing impasse confronting both sides.

The three papers offered in this monograph provide a detailed analysis of the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns being conducted by Islamist rebels against Russia in the North Caucasus. This conflict is Russia's primary security threat, but it has barely registered on Western minds and is hardly reported in the West as well. To overcome this neglect, these three papers go into great detail concerning the nature of the Islamist challenge, the Russian response, and the implications of this conflict. This monograph, in keeping with SSI's objectives, provides a basis for dialogue among U.S., European, and Russian experts concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, which will certainly prove useful to all of these nations, since they will continue to be challenged by such wars well into the future. It is important for us to learn from the insurgency in the North Caucasus, because the issues raised by this conflict will not easily go away, even for the United States as it leaves Afghanistan.