The current struggles over nationality policy in Russia and in neighboring states are rooted in the history of the Narkomnats and in policies that Stalin established as Commissar. This history, based in large part on primary research, describes the Commissariat of Nationalities from 1917 to 1924, Stalin's role as its chief, and the policies that were the origins of the current ethnic dilemmas throughout the now collapsed Soviet Empire. This rich history is intended for scholars, students, and policymakers in European history and Slavic studies, and for general readers interested in the background of political and social conflicts in the former Soviet republics today.

What are the key factors that will shape the post-Soviet military system? Leading experts assess the geostrategic context in which leaders must operate, the nature of future war, foundations of military power, dilemmas confronting a multinational military force, problems in managing a nuclear arsenal, civil-military relations, economic priorities and problems, and ethnic questions. This current evaluation of how war and the Soviet Union are being transformed is an invaluable study for students and experts in military studies, political science, and the social sciences generally. In this collection of important perspectives, Soviet military elites and influential civilian policymakers discussed what previous and present developments will require in the future. This collaborative effort examines what Moscow sees as important requirements. The study analyzes Soviet forecasting methodologies, naval developments, views about theater warfare in Europe, developments in C3I, the role of space, the Soviet military economy, mobilization regimes, Soviet views on American military thought, perspectives on the initial period of warfare and changes in operational arts. Chapter endnotes and reference lists point to major sources of Soviet scholarship.

The three papers offered in this monograph provide a detailed analysis of the insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns being conducted by Islamist rebels against Russia in the North Caucasus. This conflict is Russia's primary security threat, but it has barely registered on Western minds and is hardly reported in the West as well. To overcome this neglect, these three papers go into great detail concerning the nature of the Islamist challenge, the Russian response, and the implications of this conflict. This monograph, in keeping with SSI's objectives, provides a basis for dialogue among U.S., European, and Russian experts concerning insurgency and counterinsurgency, which will certainly prove useful to all of these nations, since they will continue to be challenged by such wars well into the future. It is important for us to learn from the insurgency in the North Caucasus, because the issues raised by this conflict will not easily go away, even for the United States as it leaves Afghanistan.

Originally published in 1990, this pertinent study focuses on the purely operational and strategic lessons of the war in Afghanistan. It insists that lessons of these kinds were present and that they offer significant insights both for such wars in general and for the course of Soviet military developments in the 1980s and 1990s. These lessons also offer important clues concerning the reforms required in order to preserve democratic civilian control over the military. It should also alert analysts everywhere as to the nature of local wars in the Third World in the 1990s, a phenomenon that shows little sign of abating. Though in many ways like all wars, this war was unique; it was not merely a series of random tactical exercises that were ultimately futile. Rather, like all wars, it shows us something of the shape of our present and future, if we are only insightful enough to understand it correctly. This is a high quality reprint, professionally scanned from the original document.

The three papers presented here are by well-known experts and were delivered at SSI's third annual conference on Russia that took place at Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. This conference, like its predecessors, had as its goal the assemblage of Russian, European, and American experts to engage in a regular, open, and candid dialogue on critical issues in contemporary security.

These papers represent the first in a series of papers taken from the Strategic Studies Institute's (SSI) fourth annual Russia conference that took place at SSI's headquarters in Carlisle, PA, on September 26-27, 2011. As such, they also are part of our on-going effort to make sense of and clarify developments in Russia. The three papers presented here offer attempts to characterize first of all, the nature of the state; second, the prospects for economic reform within that state-perhaps the most pressing domestic issue and one with considerable spillover into defense and security agendas as well-in contemporary Russia; and third, the nature and lasting effects of the defense reform that began in 2008. The papers are forthright and pull no punches, though we certainly do not claim that they provide the last or definitive word on these subjects.

These three papers represent the third monograph to come out of the SSI-U.S. State Department conference "Contemporary issues in International Security," that took place at the Finnish Embassy in Washington, DC, on January 25-26, 2010. This monograph consists of three deeply probing essays into the genesis of Russia's 2010 defense doctrine, the political struggle behind it, and the actual content of the doctrine. They reveal a highly politicized minefield of struggle comprising leading actors in the military, the government, and in Russian security policy as a whole. They duly illuminate the ongoing struggles between and among these sets of military and civilian elites and therefore cast a shining light on critical aspects of Russian policy that all too often are left in darkness. They are essential to any understanding of Russian defense and security policy as well as the nature of the relationship between the Russian military and the government and the way in which these actors formulate key policy statements and resolve pressing political issues.

The essays gathered here represent a panel at SSI's annual Russia conference in 2011. They focus on the analysis of Russian foreign policy both on its material side or actual conduct as well as on the cognitive bases of Russian thinking about international affairs and Russian national security. They span much of the gamut of that foreign policy and also show its strong linkages to the Russian historical tradition and to the imperatives of Russian domestic development.

In one way or another, the papers included in this monograph, from the Strategic Studies Institute's annual conference on Russia in May 2012, all point to the internal pathologies that render Russian security a precarious affair at the best of times. As the editor suggests, the very fact of this precariousness makes Russia an inherently unpredictable and even potentially dangerous actor, not necessarily because it will actively attack its neighbors, though we certainly cannot exclude that possibility, but rather because Russia may come apart trying to play the role of a great power in Eurasia or elsewhere. As we all know, that outcome happened in 1917 and in 1989-91, with profound implications for international security and U.S. interests.

Given the stakes involved in achieving a correct understanding of Russian and Chinese defense policies and military developments, the magnitude of Mary Fitzgerald's enlightening accomplishments in this regard becomes clear. However, the problems that we have outlined in this volume were not unfamiliar to students of the Soviet Union. Indeed, they are enduring strategic issues for Russian policymakers as well as those who analyze or contribute to foreign policies toward the Russian military, despite the magnitude of the tremendous changes that have occurred since 1989 when the Soviet empire began to collapse. Even more importantly, Mary and her colleagues recognized that the issues outlined here are not just tasks relevant for the general study of Russia, but by addressing these strategic issues, and their underlying implications, policymakers will engage in the essential tasks necessary for the creation of an enduring structure of peace. Mary Fitzgerald made many contributions to the national security field over the course of the years through her close reading of the writings of Soviet and Russian military officers. Particularly useful was her focus on those of Soviet military theorists who put forward forecasts of future warfare and the impact of technology on warfare. These Russian reviews deserved respect and study; Mary's work made this possible. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it became easier to meet with and talk with a number of these Soviet officers so as to explore more fully their thinking and the continuing development of their ideas about future warfare, and the likely direction of the military revolution they had begun writing about in the late 1970s. Organizing meetings with them was greatly aided by Mary because of the good relations she had developed with several of these officers, who liked her as a person and were flattered that she had been so careful a reader of their writings. Strategic Studies Institute.

While the Cold War is long past, the importance of arms control in Russo-American relations and the related issue of nuclear weapons for Russia remain vital concerns. Indeed, without an appreciation of the multiple dimensions of the latter, progress in the former domain is inconceivable. With this in mind, following essays explore many, if not all, of the issues connected with Russia's relatively greater reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. As such, they constitute an important contribution to the analysis of the Obama administration's reset policy, Russo-American relations, Russian foreign and defense policy, and international security in both Europe and Asia. Additionally, questions concerning the approach taken by other nuclear power nations in reference to the arms control agenda provide a crucial backdrop for the progress toward curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, a long-standing central goal of U.S. security policy.

As NATO and the United States proceed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, the inherent and preexisting geopolitical, security, and strategic challenges in Central Asia become ever more apparent. The rivalry among the great powers: the United States, China, Russia, India, and others to a lesser degree, are all becoming increasingly more visible as a key factor that will shape this region after the allied withdrawal from Afghanistan. The papers collected here, presented at SSI's annual conference on Russia in 2012, go far to explaining what the agenda for that rivalry is and how it is likely to influence regional trends after 2013. Therefore, these papers provide a vital set of insights into an increasingly critical area of international politics and security, especially as it is clear that the United States is reducing, but not totally withdrawing, its military establishment in Afghanistan and is seeking to consolidate long-term relationships with Central Asian states. Accordingly, these papers provide assessments of Sino-Russian rivalry, the U.S.-Russian rivalry, and a neglected but critical topic-Chinese military capability for action in Central Asia. All of these issues are essential for any informed analysis of the future of Central Asian security, as well as relations among the great powers in Central Asia.

Although Russian observers believe that Washington imposed sanctions in Russian arms sellers and producers because of these firms' arms sales to Venezuela. Sales to such dangerous states oblige us to analyze the Russian defense export program and the structure of its defense industry. Until now, that industry would have collapsed without arms sales. Arms sales thus have become the main source of its reveneue until the present and will play a key role in Russia's ongoing attempt to regenerate its armed forces while winning friends and influence abroad.

The war in Afghanistan has added considerably to the strategic significance of Central Asia due to its proximity to the conflict. Moreover, the continuation of the war increasingly involves the vital interests of many other actors other than the U.S. and NATO forces currently there. This monograph, taken from SSI's conference with European and Russian scholars in 2010, provides a comprehensive analysis of the means and objectives of Russia's involvement in Central Asia. It also provides Russian perspectives concerning the other actors in Central Asia and how Moscow views the policy significance of those efforts.

On January 25-26, 2010, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) organized a conference entitled, "Contemporary is-sues in International Security." This was the second in what is hoped will be annual conference bringing together U.S., European, and Russian scholars and experts to discuss such issues in an open forum. The panel presented here was devoted to civil-military relations in Russia. This is, as the papers included here show, a critical topic in understanding the domestic and foreign policy trajectories of the Russian state. The papers provided here do not deny that civilian control exists. But they both show how highly undemocratic, and even dangerous, is the absence of those democratic controls over the military and the police forces in Rus-sia which, taken together, comprise multiple militaries. These papers present differing U.S. and European assessments of the problems connected with civilian and democratic controls over the possessors of force in the Russian state and should stimulate further reflection upon these issues and those related to them."