These essays from the journal International Security assess the technical feasibility and the strategic desirability of defense against ballistic missiles. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

These essays from the journal International Security assess the technical feasibility and the strategic desirability of defense against ballistic missiles.

Originally published in 1986.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

These essays from the journal International Security cover aspects of past and present naval technologies and explore current disputes over American naval doctrine. Four of the contributions--those by Linton Brooks, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Joshua Epstein--describe the case for and against the Reagan administration's controversial Maritime Strategy, which has formed the basis for the administration's buildup to a six-hundred-ship navy. Other articles describe Soviet naval doctrine, assess the risk of nuclear war at sea, and outline the evolution of major naval technologies and doctrines. Part I: Naval Strategy Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom R. James Woolsey Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy Linton F. Brooks A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe John J. Mearsheimer Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme Joshua M. Epstein Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy Michael MccGwire Part II: Naval Technology Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare Karl Lautenschlager Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable? Richard L. Garwin The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901=2001 Karl Lautenschlager Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat Harold A. Feiveson and John Duffield Part III: Naval Operations--Controlling the Risks Nuclear War at Sea Desmond Ball Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank Barry R. Posen A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea Sean M. Lynn-Jones Originally published in 1988. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

These essays from the journal "International Security" cover aspects of past and present naval technologies and explore current disputes over American naval doctrine. Four of the contributions--those by Linton Brooks, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Joshua Epstein--describe the case for and against the Reagan administration's controversial Maritime Strategy, which has formed the basis for the administration's buildup to a six-hundred-ship navy. Other articles describe Soviet naval doctrine, assess the risk of nuclear war at sea, and outline the evolution of major naval technologies and doctrines.

Part I: Naval Strategy Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom R. James Woolsey Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy Linton F. Brooks A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe John J. Mearsheimer Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes of a Recurrent Theme Joshua M. Epstein Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy Michael MccGwire Part II: Naval Technology Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare Karl Lautenschlager Will Strategic Submarines Be Vulnerable? Richard L. Garwin The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901=2001 Karl Lautenschlager Stopping the Sea-Based Counterforce Threat Harold A. Feiveson and John Duffield Part III: Naval Operations--Controlling the Risks Nuclear War at Sea Desmond Ball Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank Barry R. Posen A Quiet Success for Arms Control: Preventing Incidents at Sea Sean M. Lynn-Jones

Originally published in 1988.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

For the last few years, Stephen Van Evera has greeted new graduate students at MIT with a commonsense introduction to qualitative methods in the social sciences. His helpful hints, always warmly received, grew from a handful of memos to an underground classic primer. That primer has now evolved into a book of how-to information about graduate study, which is essential reading for graduate students and undergraduates in political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, and history -- and for their advisers.
-- How should we frame, assess, and apply theories in the social sciences? "I am unpersuaded by the view that the prime rules of scientific method should differ between hard science and social science. Science is science".
-- A section on case studies shows novices the ropes.
-- Van Evera contends the realm of dissertations is often defined too narrowly. "Making and testing theories are not the only games in town.... If everyone makes and tests theories but no one ever uses them, then what are they for?"
-- In "Helpful Hints on Writing a Political Science Ph.D. Dissertation", Van Evera focuses on presentation, and on broader issues of academic strategy and tactics.
-- Van Evera asks how political scientists should work together as a community. "All institutions and professions that face weak accountability need inner ethical rudders that define their obligations in order to stay on course".

Soviet military policy has been one of the most important and perplexing issues confronting the United States since 1945. Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy innovations have focused renewed attention on these vital questions. In this timely reader, ten experts on the Soviet Union offer their perspectives on Soviet military strategy and defense policy, covering the foreign policy context, nuclear weapons, conventional forces, and force and Soviet diplomacy. Contents: Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy. The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and their Policy Implications. The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism? The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security. Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy. Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought. Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy. The Soviet Union and Strategic Missile Guidance. Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised. The Soviet Offensive In Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited? Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options. Contributors: Jack Snyder, Franklyn Griffiths, Stephen M. Meyer, Raymond L. Garthoff, Fritz W. Ermarth, Dimitri K. Simes, Donald MacKenzie, Matthew A Evangelista, and Richard Ned Lebow.

What causes war? How can military conflicts best be prevented? In this book, Stephen Van Evera frames five conditions that increase the risk of interstate war: false optimism about the likely outcome of a war, a first-strike advantage, fluctuation in the relative power of states, circumstances that allow nations to parlay one conquest into another, and circumstances that make conquest easy.

According to Van Evera, all but one of these conditions false optimism rarely occur today, but policymakers often erroneously believe in their existence. He argues that these misperceptions are responsible for many modern wars, and explores both World Wars, the Korean War, and the 1967 Mideast War as test cases. Finally, he assesses the possibility of nuclear war by applying all five hypotheses to its potential onset. Van Evera's book demonstrates that ideas from the Realist paradigm can offer strong explanations for international conflict and valuable prescriptions for its control."

These five essays from the prestigious journal International Security analyze the outbreak of the First World War from the standpoint of power politics and military strategy. "The disaster of 1914 continues to haunt the contemporary security debate," writes Steven E. Miller in his introduction. "In the nuclear age, the images that remain from the summer of 1914--the escalation from an isolated event in a far corner of Europe to a global war, the apparent loss of control of the situation by key decision-makers, the crowding out of diplomacy by military exigencies, the awful, protracted, often senseless slaughter on the battlefield--raise troubling doubts about our ability to forever conduct affairs of state safely in an international environment plagued by the ever-present risk of thermonuclear war." The book includes Paul Kennedy's "The First World War and the International Power System," Michael Howard's "Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," Stephen Van Evera's "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," Jack Snyder's "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Richard Ned Lebow's "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?"

Stephen Van Evera frames five conditions that increase the risk of interstate false optimism about the likely outcome of a war, a fast-strike advantage, fluctuation in the relative power of states, circumstances that allow nations to parlay one conquest into another, and circumstances that make conquest easy. According to Van Evera, all but one of these conditions -- false optimism -- rarely occur today, but policymakers often erroneously believe in their existence. He argues that these misperceptions are responsible for many modern wars, and explores both World Wars, the Korean War, and the 1967 Mideast War as test cases. Finally, he assesses the possibility of nuclear war by applying all five hypotheses to its potential onset

Van Evera's book demonstrates that ideas from the Realist paradigm can offer strong explanations for international conflict and valuable prescriptions for its control.