Whilst geopolitics, economics, religion and ethnicity all play crucial roles in starting and sustaining conflict this book advances the idea that it will be people s behaviour, and the West s ability to understand, interpret and influence that behaviour which will become the defining characteristic of resolving future armed disputes. This seminal study draws directly on the authors operational experiences in Sierra Leone, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Includes a chapter by behavioural scientist Dr. Lee Rowland and an introduction by the BBC Radio 4 More or Less presenter Tim Harford. The foreword is by former ISAF commander General (ret.) Stanley McChrystal. This book argues that future conflicts will be best resolved by focusing attention on altering the behaviours of others, either in advance and therefore deterring conflict or as a coupled component in the process of combat and post-combat operations. They also argue that Western Armies have learnt too many lessons the hard way and been found wanting too easily. "Behavioural Conflct" argues for a fundamental rethink of the way that the West s militaries are organised, educated, trained and deployed.

In this timely and realistic examination of social media, two world-class British experts examine exactly, in the defense context, what social media is and what it should and should not be used for in the future. In setting out their arguments, they define social media in four distinctly different ways: first, they assess, perhaps self-evidently, that it is a media channel, and actually differs little to newspapers and radio in anything other than reach and immediacy; second, they see it as an interactive medium that might have potential for exerting influence, but only when accompanied by robust target audience analysis (TAA); third, they see it as a means of establishing a dialogue and communications within already well-established networks and groups; and, finally, they see it as a real-time sensor network that may possibly provide the first indication of globally important events-albeit unsubstantiated and raw in its content and reporting.

Albert Einstein famously stated that: "Any fool can know; the point is to understand." Over the past 20 years, the United States has known that there exist people with a profound hatred of all that it and the West are, and all that it stands for. During that time the American people and our allies abroad have known war in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and we know that today in Syria, Iraq, in Nigeria and North Africa those enemies plan and plot more violence and more hatred against us. Yet, do we really understand? If there is one observation that has been repeated by military commanders and policymakers alike from almost every nation in our various coalitions, it is the idea that we have not understood our adversary properly. Our nations have the world's most sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. We are masters of electronic intelligence, of human intelligence, of signal intelligence, open-source intelligence, and technical intelligence.

In this timely monograph, British authors Mr. Keir Giles and Dr. Steve Tatham fuse key lessons from two disparate theaters to argue persuasively for greater education of Army personnel in human terrain disciplines. Dr. Tatham, an expert in strategic communications and influence operations with extensive experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Mr. Giles, a long-term scholar of Russian military and political decisionmaking processes, both contribute a wealth of accessible examples and anecdotes to argue their case for greater investment in human domain skills, both as an insurance against future conflict and in order to prevail in that conflict should it be joined. Drawing on a range of sources across social science and linguistics, they make the crucial point that both commanders and junior personnel must be not only prepared but also educated to set aside their cultural, social, and even linguistic preconceptions in order to accurately assess the options open to an adversary.

Through the prism of operations in Afghanistan, the author examines how the U.S. Government's Strategic Communication (SC) and, in particular, the Department of Defense's (DoD) Information Operations (IO) and Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) programs, have contributed to U.S. strategic and foreign policy objectives. It assesses whether current practice, which is largely predicated on ideas of positively shaping audiences perceptions and attitudes towards the United States, is actually fit for purpose. Indeed, it finds that the United States has for many years now been encouraged by large contractors to approach communications objectives through techniques heavily influenced by civilian advertising and marketing, which attempt to change hostile attitudes to the United States and its foreign policy in the belief that this will subsequently reduce hostile behavior. While an attitudinal approach may work in convincing U.S. citizens to buy consumer products...