This handbook articulates how sociology can re-engage its roots as the scientific study of human moral systems, actions, and interpretation. This second volume builds on the successful original volume published in 2010, which contributed to the initiation of a new section of the American Sociological Association (ASA), thus growing the field. This volume takes sociology back to its roots over a century ago, when morality was a central topic of work and governance. It engages scholars from across subfields in sociology, representing each section of the ASA, who each contribute a chapter on how their subfield connects to research on morality.  This reference work appeals to broader readership than was envisaged for the first volume, as the relationship between sociology as a discipline and its origins in questions of morality is further renewed. The volume editors focus on three areas: the current state of the sociology of morality across a range of sociological subfields; taking a new look at some of the issues discussed in the first handbook, which are now relevant in sometimes completely new contexts; and reflecting on where the sociology of morality should go next.  This is a must-read reference for students and scholars interested in topics of morality, ethics, altruism, religion, and spirituality from across the social science.     

Human beings necessarily understand their social worlds in moral terms, orienting their lives, relationships, and activities around socially-produced notions of right and wrong.

Morality is sociologically understood as more than simply helping or harming others; it encompasses any way that individuals form understandings of what behaviors are better than others, what goals are most laudable, and what "proper" people believe, feel, and do. Morality involves the explicit and implicit sets of rules and shared understandings that keep human social groups intact. Morality includes both the "shoulds" and "should nots" of human activity, its proactive and inhibitive elements.

At one time, sociologists were centrally concerned with morality, issues like social cohesion, values, the goals and norms that structure society, and the ways individuals get socialized to reproduce those concerns. In the last half-century, however, explicit interest in these topics has waned, and modern sociology has become uninterested in these matters and morality has become marginalized within the discipline.

But a resurgence in the topic is happening in related disciplines - psychology, neurology, philosophy, and anthropology - and in the wider national discourse. Sociology has much to offer, but is not fully engaged in this conversation. Many scholars work on areas that would fall under the umbrella of a sociology of morality but do not self-identify in such a manner, nor orient their efforts toward conceptualizing what we know, and should know, along these dimensions.

The Handbook of the Sociology of Morality fills a niche within sociology making explicit the shared concerns of scholars across the disciplines as they relate to an often-overlooked dimension of human social life. It is unique in social science as it would be the first systematic compilation of the wider social structural, cultural, cross-national, organizational, and interactional dimension of human moral (understood broadly) thought, feeling, and behavior.

Human beings necessarily understand their social worlds in moral terms, orienting their lives, relationships, and activities around socially-produced notions of right and wrong.

Morality is sociologically understood as more than simply helping or harming others; it encompasses any way that individuals form understandings of what behaviors are better than others, what goals are most laudable, and what "proper" people believe, feel, and do. Morality involves the explicit and implicit sets of rules and shared understandings that keep human social groups intact. Morality includes both the "shoulds" and "should nots" of human activity, its proactive and inhibitive elements.

At one time, sociologists were centrally concerned with morality, issues like social cohesion, values, the goals and norms that structure society, and the ways individuals get socialized to reproduce those concerns. In the last half-century, however, explicit interest in these topics has waned, and modern sociology has become uninterested in these matters and morality has become marginalized within the discipline.

But a resurgence in the topic is happening in related disciplines - psychology, neurology, philosophy, and anthropology - and in the wider national discourse. Sociology has much to offer, but is not fully engaged in this conversation. Many scholars work on areas that would fall under the umbrella of a sociology of morality but do not self-identify in such a manner, nor orient their efforts toward conceptualizing what we know, and should know, along these dimensions.

The Handbook of the Sociology of Morality fills a niche within sociology making explicit the shared concerns of scholars across the disciplines as they relate to an often-overlooked dimension of human social life. It is unique in social science as it would be the first systematic compilation of the wider social structural, cultural, cross-national, organizational, and interactional dimension of human moral (understood broadly) thought, feeling, and behavior.

This book provides original evidence arguing for dignity as an indicator of public health, by offering a scientific framework for measuring dignity and its social determinants. Hitlin and Andersson show that dignity can be efficiently measured by using simple survey items that ask individuals whether there is "dignity" in their life or in how they are treated by others. National survey data show that unhappiness, sadness, anger, and lower general health are far more common for those reporting undignified lives. These differences in reported dignity come from inequalities in social and economic resources and from experiences of disrespect, threat, or life stress. Social groups with less power generally report lower levels of dignity linked to these multifaceted resource and stress inequalities, which are examined throughout the book. Hitlin and Andersson show that dignity possesses universal value for health and well-being in America, providing a scientific basis for collective consensus and social inspiration.

Unequal Foundations offers readers a novel theory and a unique use of cross-cultural data to assert that the level of economic inequality in a society is reflected in the emotional experience of its members. People living in societies with more equality (countries such as Japan, Germany, and Canada) generally experience more positive, binding emotions on a regular basis. On the other hand, those living in unequal societies (the United States and China, for example) are significantly more likely to regularly experience negative, sanctioning moral emotions. In this book, authors Steven Hitlin and Sarah K. Harkness explore the idea that morality operates at both the societal and individual levels, and contend that individual moral emotions represent the distal structure of society. In addition to developing this broad theory ranging from society to the individual, Hitlin and Harkness offer their readers a novel use of data from a tool drawn from the affect control theory tradition in order to demonstrate empirical support for this theory. As such, the authors delve deeper than previous literature by presenting data that supports their general approach using a method designed for cross-cultural comparative research.