Prosecutes the civil litigation system and proposes practical reforms to increase access to the courts and reduce costs. Civil litigation has come under fire in recent years. Some critics portray a system of dishonest lawyers and undeserving litigants who prevail too often, and are awarded too much money. Others criticize the civil justice system for being out of reach for many who have suffered real injury. But contrary to these perspectives and popular belief, the civil justice system in the United States is not out of control. In Civil Justice Reconsidered, Steven Croley demonstrates that civil litigation is, for the most part, socially beneficial. An effective civil litigation system is accessible to parties who have suffered legal wrongs, and it is reliable in the sense that those with stronger claims tend to prevail over those with weaker claims. However, while most of the system's failures are overstated, they are not wholly off base; civil litigation often imposes excessive costs that, among other unfortunate consequences, impede access to the courts, and Croley offers ways to reform civil litigation in the interest of justice for potential plaintiffs and defendants, and for the rule of law itself. A better litigation system matters only because of what is at stake for real people, and Civil Justice Reconsidered speaks to the thought leaders, litigation reformers, members of the bar and bench, and policymakers who can answer the call for reforming civil litigation in the United States.

Not since the 1960s have U.S. politicians, Republican or Democrat, campaigned on platforms defending big government, much less the use of regulation to help solve social ills. And since the late 1970s, "deregulation" has become perhaps the most ubiquitous political catchword of all. This book takes on the critics of government regulation. Providing the first major alternative to conventional arguments grounded in public choice theory, it demonstrates that regulatory government can, and on important occasions does, advance general interests.

Unlike previous accounts, "Regulation and Public Interests" takes agencies' decision-making rules rather than legislative incentives as a central determinant of regulatory outcomes. Drawing from both political science and law, Steven Croley argues that such rules, together with agencies' larger decision-making environments, enhance agency autonomy. Agency personnel inclined to undertake regulatory initiatives that generate large but diffuse benefits (while imposing smaller but more concentrated costs) can use decision-making rules to develop socially beneficial regulations even over the objections of Congress and influential interest groups. This book thus provides a qualified defense of regulatory government. Its illustrative case studies include the development of tobacco rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, ozone and particulate matter rules by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service's "roadless" policy for national forests, and regulatory initiatives by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission.