This book investigates the extent to which various scholarly labels are appropriate for the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. As Louis Menand wrote, "Holmes has been called a formalist, a positivist, a utilitarian, a realist, a historicist, a pragmatist, (not to mention a nihilist)." Each of the eight chapters investigates one label, analyzes the secondary texts that support the use of the term to characterize Holmes's philosophy, and takes a stand on whether or not the category is appropriate for Holmes by assessing his judicial and nonjudicial publications, including his books, articles, and posthumously published correspondences. The thrust of the collection as a whole, nevertheless, bends toward the stance that Holmes is a pragmatist in his jurisprudence, ethics, and politics. The final chapter, by Susan Haack, makes that case explicitly. Edited by Seth Vannatta, this book will be of particular interest to students and faculty working in law, jurisprudence, philosophy, intellectual history, American Studies, political science, and constitutional theory.

This engaging and wide-ranging collection of essays is informed and unified by the conviction that philosophy can, and should, engage with real-world issues. Susan Haack's keen analytical skills and well-chosen illustrations illuminate a diverse range of cultural questions; and her direct style and wry sense of humor make complex ideas and subtle distinctions accessible to serious readers whatever their discipline or particular interests. "Putting Philosophy to Work" will appeal not only to philosophers but also to thoughtful scientists, economists, legal thinkers, historians, literary scholars, and humanists.
This new, expanded second edition includes several previously unpublished essays: a devastating critique of Karl Popper's highly (and dangerously) influential philosophy of science; a searching and thought-provoking analysis of scientism; and a groundbreaking paper on "academic ethics in a preposterous environment" that every professor, and would-be professor, should read.

Sweeping in scope, penetrating in analysis, and generously illustrated with examples from the history of science, this new and original approach to familiar questions about scientific evidence and method tackles vital questions about science and its place in society. Avoiding the twin pitfalls of scientism and cynicism, noted philosopher Susan Haack argues that, fallible and flawed as they are, the natural sciences have been among the most successful of human enterprises - valuable not only for the vast, interlocking body of knowledge they have discovered, and not only for the technological advances that have improved our lives, but as a manifestation of the human talent for inquiry at its imperfect but sometimes remarkable best.;This wide-ranging, trenchant, and illuminating book explores the complexities of scientific evidence, and the multifarious ways in which the sciences have refined and amplified the methods of everyday empirical inquiry; articulates the ways in which the social sciences are like the natural sciences, and the ways in which they are different; disentangles the confusions of radical rhetoricians and cynical sociologists of science; exposes the evasions of apologists for religious resistance to scientific advances; weighs the benefits and the dangers of technology; tracks the efforts of the legal system to make the best use of scientific testimony; and tackles predictions of the eventual culmination, or annihilation, of the scientific enterprise. Writing with verve and wry humour, in a witty, direct, and accessible style, Haack takes readers beyond the "Science Wars" to a balanced understanding of the value, and the limitations, of the scientific enterprise.

Forthright and wryly humorous, philosopher Susan Haack deploys her penetrating analytic skills on some of the most highly charged cultural and social debates of recent years. Relativism, multiculturalism, feminism, affirmative action, pragmatisms old and new, science, literature, the future of the academy and of philosophy itself--all come under her keen scrutiny in "Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate,"
"The virtue of Haack's book, and I mean "virtue" in the ethical sense, is that it embodies the attitude that it exalts. . . Haack's voice is urbane, sensible, passionate--the voice of philosophy that matters. How good to hear it again."--Jonathan Rauch, "Reason"
"A tough mind, confident of its power, making an art of logic . . . a cool mastery."--Paul R. Gross, "Wilson Quarterly"
"Few people are better able to defend the notion of truth, and in strong, clear prose, than Susan Haack . . . a philosopher of great distinction."--Hugh Lloyd-Jones, "National Review"
"If you relish acute observation and straight talk, this is a book to read."--"Key Reporter" (Phi Beta Kappa)
"Everywhere in this book there is the refreshing breeze of common sense, patiently but inexorably blowing."--Roger Kimball, "Times Literary Supplement"
"A refreshing alternative to the extremism that characterizes so much rhetoric today."--"Kirkus Reviews"

This book investigates the extent to which various scholarly labels are appropriate for the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. As Louis Menand wrote, "Holmes has been called a formalist, a positivist, a utilitarian, a realist, a historicist, a pragmatist, (not to mention a nihilist)." Each of the eight chapters investigates one label, analyzes the secondary texts that support the use of the term to characterize Holmes's philosophy, and takes a stand on whether or not the category is appropriate for Holmes by assessing his judicial and nonjudicial publications, including his books, articles, and posthumously published correspondences. The thrust of the collection as a whole, nevertheless, bends toward the stand that Holmes is a pragmatist in his jurisprudence, ethics, and politics. The final chapter makes that case explicitly. Edited by Seth Vannatta, this book will be of particular interest to students and faculty working in law, jurisprudence, philosophy, intellectual history, American Studies, political science, and constitutional theory.

Is truth in the law just plain truth or something sui generis? Is a trial a search for truth? Do adversarial procedures and exclusionary rules of evidence enable, or impede, the accurate determination of factual issues? Can degrees of proof be identified with mathematical probabilities? What role can statistical evidence properly play? How can courts best handle the scientific testimony on which cases sometimes turn? How are they to distinguish reliable scientific testimony from unreliable hokum? The dozen interdisciplinary essays collected here explore a whole nexus of such questions about science, proof, and truth in the law. With her characteristic clarity and verve, in these essays Haack brings her original and distinctive work in theory of knowledge and philosophy of science to bear on real-life legal issues. She includes detailed analyses of a wide variety of cases and lucid summaries of relevant scientific work, of the many roles of the scientific peer-review system, and of relevant legal developments."

Is truth in the law just plain truth or something sui generis? Is a trial a search for truth? Do adversarial procedures and exclusionary rules of evidence enable, or impede, the accurate determination of factual issues? Can degrees of proof be identified with mathematical probabilities? What role can statistical evidence properly play? How can courts best handle the scientific testimony on which cases sometimes turn? How are they to distinguish reliable scientific testimony from unreliable hokum? The dozen interdisciplinary essays collected here explore a whole nexus of such questions about science, proof, and truth in the law. With her characteristic clarity and verve, in these essays Haack brings her original and distinctive work in theory of knowledge and philosophy of science to bear on real-life legal issues. She includes detailed analyses of a wide variety of cases and lucid summaries of relevant scientific work, of the many roles of the scientific peer-review system, and of relevant legal developments."

Described by Hilary Putnam as "both a fine introduction and a significant contribution"
to epistemology, and by Anthony Quinton as "at once comprehensive ... and judicious," Evidence and Inquiry is unique both in its scope and in its originality. C. I. Lewis's foundationalism, BonJour's and Davidson's coherentism, Popper's critical rationalism, Quine's naturalism, and Rorty's, Stich's, and Churchland's anti-epistemological neopragmatism all come under Haack's uniquely thorough critical scrutiny. Core epistemological questions about the nature of belief, the character and structure of evidence, the determinants of evidential quality, the relation of justification, probability, and truth, among others, are given refreshingly novel, and reasonable, answers.
Most books in epistemology are written only for other epistemologists. But Evidence and Inquiry has proven of interest not only to specialists but also to many other readers, from thoughtful scientists to thoughtful scholars of law and literature.
This new, expanded edition--with a substantial new foreword and several additional papers on topics ranging from feminist epistemology to Peirce's critique of the adversarial legal system and Bentham's critique of exclusionary rules of evidence--should attract longtime readers and newcomers alike.

The first systematic exposition of all the central topics in the philosophy of logic, Susan Haack's book has established an international reputation (translated into five languages) for its accessibility, clarity, conciseness, orderliness, and range as well as for its thorough scholarship and careful analyses. Haack discusses the scope and purpose of logic, validity, truth-functions, quantification and ontology, names, descriptions, truth, truth-bearers, the set-theoretical and semantic paradoxes, and modality. She also explores the motivations for a whole range of nonclassical systems of logic, including many-valued logics, fuzzy logic, modal and tense logics, and relevance logics.

Sweeping in scope, penetrating in analysis, and generously illustrated with examples from the history of science, this new and original approach to familiar questions about scientific evidence and method tackles vital questions about science and its place in society. Avoiding the twin pitfalls of scientism and cynicism, noted philosopher Susan Haack argues that, fallible and flawed as they are, the natural sciences have been among the most successful of human enterprises-valuable not only for the vast, interlocking body of knowledge they have discovered, and not only for the technological advances that have improved our lives, but as a manifestation of the human talent for inquiry at its imperfect but sometimes remarkable best. This wide-ranging, trenchant, and illuminating book explores the complexities of scientific evidence, and the multifarious ways in which the sciences have refined and amplified the methods of everyday empirical inquiry; articulates the ways in which the social sciences are like the natural sciences, and the ways in which they are different; disentangles the confusions of radical rhetoricians and cynical sociologists of science; exposes the evasions of apologists for religious resistance to scientific advances; weighs the benefits and the dangers of technology; tracks the efforts of the legal system to make the best use of scientific testimony; and tackles predictions of the eventual culmination, or annihilation, of the scientific enterprise. Writing with verve and wry humor, in a witty, direct, and accessible style, Haack takes readers beyond the "Science Wars" to a balanced understanding of the value, and the limitations, of the scientific enterprise.