While it is generally accepted that animal welfare matters morally, it is less clear how to morally evaluate the ending of an animal's life. It seems to matter for the animal whether it experiences pain or pleasure, or enjoyment or suffering. But does it also matter for the animal whether it lives or dies? Is a longer life better for an animal than a shorter life? If so, under what conditions is this so, and why is this the case? Is it better for an animal to live rather than never to be born at all? The Ethics of Killing Animals addresses these value-theoretical questions about animal life, death and welfare. It also discusses whether and how answers to these questions are relevant for our moral duties towards animals. Is killing animals ever morally acceptable and, if so, under what conditions? Do animals have moral rights, such as the right to life and should they be accorded legal rights? How should our moral duties towards animals inform our individual behavior and policy-making? This volume presents a collection of contributions from major thinkers in ethics and animal welfare, with a special focus on the moral evaluation of killing animals.

Is it acceptable to kill an animal that has been granted a pleasant life? This book rigorously explores the moral basis of the ideal of animal-friendly animal husbandry. Utilitarianism is recognised as being the moral theory that, historically, has contributed most to the recognition of animal suffering as an evil. This book sheds new light on utilitarian moral theory by pointing out the assumptions and implications of two different versions of utilitarianism. One version, total utilitarianism, can indeed morally justify the routine killing of animals, provided that they have been granted pleasant lives. The other version, prior existence utilitarianism, implies a much stronger protection for animals, both human and non-human. Hence, in opposition to what is typically brought forward in the classrooms and in the literature, the utilitarian concern with animals need not be restricted to the avoidance of suffering. Utilitarianism has the resources to oppose the routine killing of animals, as practiced in animal husbandry and many other common practices of animal use.

Is it acceptable to kill an animal that has been granted a pleasant life? This book rigorously explores the moral basis of the ideal of animal-friendly animal husbandry and sheds new light on utilitarian moral theory by pointing out the assumptions and implications of two different versions of utilitarianism, with surprising conclusions.

While it is generally accepted that animal welfare matters morally, it is less clear how to morally evaluate the ending of an animal's life. It seems to matter for the animal whether it experiences pain or pleasure, or enjoyment or suffering. But does it also matter for the animal whether it lives or dies? Is a longer life better for an animal than a shorter life? If so, under what conditions is this so, and why is this the case? Is it better for an animal to live rather than never to be born at all? The Ethics of Killing Animals addresses these value-theoretical questions about animal life, death and welfare. It also discusses whether and how answers to these questions are relevant for our moral duties towards animals. Is killing animals ever morally acceptable and, if so, under what conditions? Do animals have moral rights, such as the right to life and should they be accorded legal rights? How should our moral duties towards animals inform our individual behavior and policy-making? This volume presents a collection of contributions from major thinkers in ethics and animal welfare, with a special focus on the moral evaluation of killing animals.

Is my dog, with his joyful and carefree life, better off than I am? Do hens in battery cages have worse lives than cows at pasture? Will my money improve welfare more if I spend it on helping people or if I benefit chickens? How can we assess the harm of climate change for both humans and non-humans? If we want to systematically compare welfare across species, we first need to explore whether welfare subjects of different species have the same or rather a different capacity for welfare. According to what seems to be the dominant philosophical view, welfare subjects with higher cognitive capacities have a greater capacity for welfare and are generally much better off than those with lower cognitive capacities. Visak carefully explores and rejects this view. She argues instead that welfare subjects of different species have the same capacity for welfare despite different cognitive capacities. This book prepares the philosophical ground for comparisons of welfare across species. It will inform and inspire ethicists and animal welfare scientists alike, as well as a broader readership interested in wellbeing, animals, and ethics. Besides different views about capacity for welfare across species, the book discusses animal capacities, moral status, harm of death, whether bringing additional well-off individuals into existence is a good thing, and practical implications of these topics for counting and comparing the welfare of animals of different species.