The book is a collection of contributed papers in honor of Roy Radner. Reflecting Radner's broad range of research interests, the papers cover quite diverse areas, ranging over general equilibrium analysis of the market mechanism, economies undergoing transition, satisficing behavior, markets with asymmetric information, organizational resource allocation and information processing, incentives and implementation, stable sets and the core, stochastic sequential bargaining games, perfect equilibria in a macro growth model, repeated games, and evolutionary games.

We are pleased to help celebrate Roy Radner's 75th birthday, by issuing in one volume the papers that originally appeared in his honor in two special issues of Review of Economic Design (Vol. 6/2 and 6/3-4, 2001). Through his truly original ideas and lucid writing, Roy has influenced and guided the theory community for decades. Many colleagues and students have found their own work shaped and improved by Roy's wide-ranging curiosity, his encouragement, and his keen insights. In soliciting contributions to the Review of Economic Design Radner issues, we decided to approach his former students at the University of California, Berke ley, his former post-doctoral fellows at Bell Laboratories, and his published co authors. We express our sincere apology to any potential authors who fit these categories and whom we may have unintentionally failed to approach. Our job as editors of the Review of Economic Design Radner issues turned out to be easy, thanks to the enthusiastic response we received from authors and the quality of their submissions.

This book is an analysis of the modern economy's two major resource allocation mechanisms. The price mechanism has been subject to extensive examination by neoclassical economists, but there has been relatively little attention paid to the impact of the organization of firms on allocation. Professor Ichiishi presents a distinctive theory of the firm which views firms as organizations characterized by diversity of interest among their members, but an acceptance of a coordinated choice of activities: a coalition formed when people play a cooperative game. Using a theory embodying both the neoclassical market mechanism, and the cooperative game, the author derives a number of original results thereby contributing to the theory of the firm, cooperative game theory, and general equilibrium analysis theory.

This book is an analysis of the modern economy's two major resource allocation mechanisms. The price mechanism has been subject to extensive examination by neoclassical economists, but there has been relatively little attention paid to the impact of the organization of firms on allocation. Professor Ichiishi presents a distinctive theory of the firm which views firms as organizations characterized by diversity of interest among their members, but an acceptance of a coordinated choice of activities: a coalition formed when people play a cooperative game. Using a theory embodying both the neoclassical market mechanism, and the cooperative game, the author derives a number of original results thereby contributing to the theory of the firm, cooperative game theory, and general equilibrium analysis theory.