The limitations of America's land forces remain a fundamental constraint on U.S. military strategy. The cutbacks of the Clinton years and the Bush administration's failure to foresee the need for larger ground forces in the wake of 9/11 have undercut America's ability to fight the Long War. Resolving the stark divergence between America's military ends and means in terms of force size, training, and modernization will be a crucial challenge for the next administration. In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power, Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose five urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the force and how much will it cost? Answers to such questions are long overdue. The stresses of prolonged operations in the Middle East have strained the U.S. Army and Marine Corps; if the United States is to maintain its status as the sole superpower, American land power must be restructured to confront unprecedented challenges. Only a dedicated, bipartisan effort can create a ground force that is not only larger and more flexible, but retrained and reequipped. Donnelly and Kagan provide a plan of action for policymakers to begin that vital rebuilding.

As the guarantor of international security, the United States must commit to a long-term military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. But what are the tools necessary to succeed on the new battlefields of the Long War? In this volume, a group of the foremost U.S. military officials and national security experts analyze the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far in order to map a way forward not only for the military, but for diplomats, elected officials, and the American public. Thomas Donnelly, Frederick W. Kagan, and their coauthors offer several core lessons for success in The Long War. They argue that decentralizing command is the key to efficient operations on an ever-changing battlefield; that air power is the unsung hero of counterinsurgency warfare; that public opinion can influence crucial military decisions; and that the military should minimize its role in domestic affairs. Finally, although the battlefields have changed over the last fifty years, the authors contend that America's long-held counterinsurgency strategy to foster political support at home, employ diplomacy overseas, and extend military assistance to allies remains effective. The Long War will not soon be over. But, in the words of retired Army special forces officer Colonel Robert Killebrew, the United States already has "the tools it needs in order to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century."