More than ever, international security and economic prosperity depend upon safe access to the shared domains that make up the global commons: maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Together these domains serve as essential conduits through which international commerce, communication, and governance prosper. However, the global commons are congested, contested, and competitive. In the January 2012 defense strategic guidance, the United States confirmed its commitment "to continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities". In the face of persistent threats, some hybrid in nature, and their consequences, "Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons" provides a forum where contributors identify ways to strengthen and maintain responsible use of the global commons. The result is a comprehensive approach that will enhance, align, and unify commercial industry, civil agency, and military perspectives and actions.

This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba'athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency.

Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives.

War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.

This volume provides a collection of insightful essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both US-led major combat operations to defeat the Baa (TM)athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency.

Written by leading scholars on the Iraq War, many of whom have practical first-hand experience of the war, the book includes a Conclusion by leading US strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. This is the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side of the war, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives.

War in Iraq will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general.

The U.S. today faces the most complex and challenging security environment in recent memory-- even as it deals with growing constraints on its ability to respond to threats. Its most consequential challenge is the rise of China, which increasingly has the capability to deny the U.S. access to areas of vital national interest and to undermine alliances that have underpinned regional stability for over half a century. Thus, the time is right for the U.S. to adopt a long-term strategy for dealing with China; one that includes but is not limited to military means, and that fully includes U.S. allies in the region.
This book uses the theory and practice of peacetime great-power strategic competition to derive recommendations for just such a strategy. After examining the theory of peacetime strategic competition, it assesses the U.S.-China military balance in depth, considers the role of America's allies in the region, and explores strategies that the U.S could adopt to improve its strategic position relative to China over the long term.

Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.

Learning the Lessons of Modern War uses the study of the recent past to illuminate the future. More specifically, it examines the lessons of recent wars as a way of understanding continuity and change in the character and conduct of war. The volume brings together contributions from a group of well-known scholars and practitioners from across the world to examine the conduct of recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, South America, and Asia. The book's first section consists of chapters that explore the value of a contemporary approach to history and reflect on the value of learning lessons from the past. Its second section focuses on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Chapters on Iraq discuss the lessons of the Iraq War, the British perspective on the conflict, and the war as seen through the lens of Saddam Hussein's military. Chapters on Afghanistan discuss counterinsurgency operations during the war, Britain's experience in Afghanistan, raising and training Afghan forces, and U.S. interagency performance. The book's third section examines the lessons of wars involving Russia, Israel, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Georgia, and Colombia. It concludes by exploring overarching themes associated with the conduct of recent wars. Containing a foreword by former National Security Advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, Learning the Lessons of Modern War is an indispensable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, policymakers, and military professionals.

The U.S. today faces the most complex and challenging security environment in recent memory-- even as it deals with growing constraints on its ability to respond to threats. Its most consequential challenge is the rise of China, which increasingly has the capability to deny the U.S. access to areas of vital national interest and to undermine alliances that have underpinned regional stability for over half a century. Thus, the time is right for the U.S. to adopt a long-term strategy for dealing with China; one that includes but is not limited to military means, and that fully includes U.S. allies in the region.
This book uses the theory and practice of peacetime great-power strategic competition to derive recommendations for just such a strategy. After examining the theory of peacetime strategic competition, it assesses the U.S.-China military balance in depth, considers the role of America's allies in the region, and explores strategies that the U.S could adopt to improve its strategic position relative to China over the long term.

Some of the United States' greatest challenges over the coming decades are likely to emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. China and India are rising and Militant Islam continues to take root in Pakistan, while nuclear proliferation threatens to continue in fits and starts. If America is to meet these challenges comprehensively, strategists will have to learn more about Asia, and Asian scholars, policymakers, and analysts will need to understand better the enduring and timeless principles of strategy.
Based on the premise therefore that the increasing strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific region warrants greater attention from both scholars and practitioners alike, "Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security" aims to marry the fields of strategic studies and Asian studies in order to help academics and practitioners to begin addressing these challenges. The book uses the lenses of geography, culture, and economics to examine in depth the strategic context that Asia presents to the major nations of the region--including the U.S. as a Pacific nation--and the strategic scenarios that may well play out in the region in the near future. Specific attention is paid to Asia as a warfighting environment, and to the warfighting traditions and current postures of the major nations.

No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis on the role of technology in planning and waging war than the United States. In World War II the wholesale mobilization of American science and technology culminated in the detonation of the atomic bomb. Competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, combined with the U.S. Navy's culture of distributed command and the rapid growth of information technology, spawned the concept of network-centric warfare. And America's post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan have highlighted America's edge.

From the atom bomb to the spy satellites of the Cold War, the strategic limitations of the Vietnam War, and the technological triumphs of the Gulf war, Thomas G. Mahnken follows the development and integration of new technologies into the military and emphasizes their influence on the organization, mission, and culture of the armed services. In some cases, advancements in technology have forced different branches of the military to develop competing or superior weaponry, but more often than not the armed services have molded technology to suit their own purposes, remaining resilient in the face of technological challenges.

Mahnken concludes with an examination of the reemergence of the traditional American way of war, which uses massive force to engage the enemy. Tying together six decades of debate concerning U.S. military affairs, he discusses how the armed forces might exploit the unique opportunities of the information revolution in the future.

Some of the United States' greatest challenges over the coming decades are likely to emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. China and India are rising and Militant Islam continues to take root in Pakistan, while nuclear proliferation threatens to continue in fits and starts. If America is to meet these challenges comprehensively, strategists will have to learn more about Asia, and Asian scholars, policymakers, and analysts will need to understand better the enduring and timeless principles of strategy.
Based on the premise therefore that the increasing strategic weight of the Asia-Pacific region warrants greater attention from both scholars and practitioners alike, "Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security" aims to marry the fields of strategic studies and Asian studies in order to help academics and practitioners to begin addressing these challenges. The book uses the lenses of geography, culture, and economics to examine in depth the strategic context that Asia presents to the major nations of the region--including the U.S. as a Pacific nation--and the strategic scenarios that may well play out in the region in the near future. Specific attention is paid to Asia as a warfighting environment, and to the warfighting traditions and current postures of the major nations.

No nation in recent history has placed greater emphasis on the role of technology in planning and waging war than the United States. In World War II the wholesale mobilization of American science and technology culminated in the detonation of the atomic bomb. Competition with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, combined with the U.S. Navy's culture of distributed command and the rapid growth of information technology, spawned the concept of network-centric warfare. And America's post-Cold War conflicts in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan have highlighted America's edge. From the atom bomb to the spy satellites of the Cold War, the strategic limitations of the Vietnam War, and the technological triumphs of the Gulf war, Thomas G. Mahnken follows the development and integration of new technologies into the military and emphasizes their influence on the organization, mission, and culture of the armed services. In some cases, advancements in technology have forced different branches of the military to develop competing or superior weaponry, but more often than not the armed services have molded technology to suit their own purposes, remaining resilient in the face of technological challenges. Mahnken concludes with an examination of the reemergence of the traditional American way of war, which uses massive force to engage the enemy. Tying together six decades of debate concerning U.S. military affairs, he discusses how the armed forces might exploit the unique opportunities of the information revolution in the future.

In the shadow of the recent Iraq war, it is easy to accept that "growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and information technology" has truly heralded the long-awaited revolution in military affairs. American leaders-from the President to the Pentagon military and civilian leadership-have called for dramatic transformation of each of the services to fit this revolution. In many ways, this is a far harder task. It is the purpose of this Newport Paper to examine the views of military officers on that prospect, a critical and unstudied factor in the implementation of transformation. Its coauthors, Professors Mahnken and FitzSimonds, are members of the Naval War College faculty-Dr. Mahnken in the Strategy and Policy Department and Captain FitzSimonds (U.S. Navy, Retired) in the War Gaming Department's Research and Analysis Division. The authors argue that the opinions of military officers on transformation are crucial, and not just because these attitudes guide the transformation process. They are critical also because receptivity to change in this group will affect innovation, both now and when today's mid-grade officers assume senior leadership posts. It is from some, but not all, of today's military officers that further transformation impulses will come. Accordingly, Mahnken and FitzSimonds explore a number of questions fundamental in the present and for the future of the American military establishment. What is the level of enthusiasm among officers for transformation? How compelling do they perceive the need for transformation to be? How extensive a change do they believe is necessary? How confident are they in the ability of the U.S. military to carry out transformation? We believe that this study is in itself as innovative as the military transformation that forms its broad subject, and we are pleased to bring it to the attention of a broad range of naval, academic, and policy readers.

Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."

Intelligence operations face the challenging task of predicting the shape of future wars. This task is hindered by their limited ability to warn of peacetime foreign military innovation. Using formerly classified sources in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.

The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.

Uncovering Ways of War substantially revises the perception of how American intelligence performed prior to World War II. Mahnken challenges the assumption that intelligence regarding foreign militaries had little influence on the development of U.S. weapons and doctrine. Finally, he explains the obstacles these agencies must still negotiate as they seek to understand foreign efforts to exploit the information revolution."