International organizations and other global governance bodies often make rules and decisions without input from many of the individuals, groups, firms, and governments that are affected by them. The standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for instance, developed by a small number of states, govern financial markets and the safety of bank deposits in over a hundred jurisdictions. Historically, the interests of developing countries, as well as non-commercial and diffuse interests within countries, have been excluded or disregarded in global governance. Scholars and practitioners have criticised this democratic deficit and called for greater participation of such marginalized stakeholders. Against this background, international institutions have introduced a variety of reforms with the goal of increasing and facilitating the participation of these excluded stakeholders. This book brings together an expert group of scholars and practitioners to investigate the consequences of stakeholder participation reforms in the global governance of health and finance: What reforms have been introduced? Have these reforms given previously marginalized stakeholders a voice in global governance bodies? What effect have these reforms had on the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance? To answer these questions, the book examines treaty-based intergovernmental organizations alongside newer forms of global governance such as trans-governmental regulatory networks, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and private standard setting bodies. Through a series of paired comparative analyses, the book provides insights into the experiences of large emerging and smaller or lower income developing countries (Brazil v. Argentina, China v. Vietnam, India v. the Philippines) in a diverse set of organizations, including the World Bank and the World Health Organization, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the International Accounting Standards Board, Codex Alimentarius Commission and more.

Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. "The New Global Rulers" examines who writes the rules in international private organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why.

Tim Buthe and Walter Mattli examine three powerful global private regulators: the International Accounting Standards Board, which develops financial reporting rules used by corporations in more than a hundred countries; and the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission, which account for 85 percent of all international product standards. Buthe and Mattli offer both a new framework for understanding global private regulation and detailed empirical analyses of such regulation based on multi-country, multi-industry business surveys. They find that global rule making by technical experts is highly political, and that even though rule making has shifted to the international level, domestic institutions remain crucial. Influence in this form of global private governance is not a function of the economic power of states, but of the ability of domestic standard-setters to provide timely information and speak with a single voice. Buthe and Mattli show how domestic institutions' abilities differ, particularly between the two main standardization players, the United States and Europe."