In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not."

This volume contains papers on truth, logic, semantics, and history of logic and philosophy. These papers are dedicated to Jan Wolenski to honor his 60th birthday. Jan Wolenski is professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland. He is likely to be the most well-known Polish philosopher of this time, best known for his work on the history of the philosophy and logic of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

This volume contains papers on truth, logic, semantics, and history of logic and philosophy. These papers are dedicated to Jan Wolenski to honor his 60th birthday. Jan Wolenski is professor of philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, Poland. He is likely to be the most well-known Polish philosopher of this time, best known for his work on the history of the philosophy and logic of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Quantum theory is the most successful of all physical theories: it has a towering mathematical structure, a vast range of accurate predictions, and technological applications. Its interpretation, however, is as unsettled now as in the heroic days of Einstein and Bohr.

This book focuses on quantum non-locality, the curious quantum correlations between spatially separated systems. Quantum non-locality was one subject of the debates between Einstein, Bohr and others such as Schrodinger. The topic was revived in the 1960s as a result of Bell's epoch-making theorems; since then it has been a very active research field, both theoretically and experimentally.

This book contains twenty new papers by eminent researchers, who report recent developments in both the physics of the subject and its philosophy. The physics topics covered include quantum information, the unsharp (positive-operator) approach to observables, the state-space approach, and the pilot-wave theory. The philosophy papers include precise studies of Bohr's reply to the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen non-locality paradox, and of non-locality's relation to causation, probability and modality."

Quantum theory is the most successful of all physical theories: it has a towering mathematical structure, a vast range of accurate predictions, and technological applications. Its interpretation, however, is as unsettled now as in the heroic days of Einstein and Bohr.

This book focuses on quantum non-locality, the curious quantum correlations between spatially separated systems. Quantum non-locality was one subject of the debates between Einstein, Bohr and others such as Schrodinger. The topic was revived in the 1960s as a result of Bell's epoch-making theorems; since then it has been a very active research field, both theoretically and experimentally.

This book contains twenty new papers by eminent researchers, who report recent developments in both the physics of the subject and its philosophy. The physics topics covered include quantum information, the unsharp (positive-operator) approach to observables, the state-space approach, and the pilot-wave theory. The philosophy papers include precise studies of Bohr's reply to the original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen non-locality paradox, and of non-locality's relation to causation, probability and modality."

In 1907 Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer defended his doctoral dissertation on the foundations of mathematics and with this event the modem version of mathematical intuitionism came into being. Brouwer attacked the main currents of the philosophy of mathematics: the formalists and the Platonists. In tum, both these schools began viewing intuitionism as the most harmful party among all known philosophies of mathematics. That was the origin of the now-90-year-old debate over intuitionism. As both sides have appealed in their arguments to philosophical propositions, the discussions have attracted the attention of philosophers as well. One might ask here what role a philosopher can play in controversies over mathematical intuitionism. Can he reasonably enter into disputes among mathematicians? I believe that these disputes call for intervention by a philo sopher. The three best-known arguments for intuitionism, those of Brouwer, Heyting and Dummett, are based on ontological and epistemological claims, or appeal to theses that properly belong to a theory of meaning. Those lines of argument should be investigated in order to find what their assumptions are, whether intuitionistic consequences really follow from those assumptions, and finally, whether the premises are sound and not absurd. The intention of this book is thus to consider seriously the arguments of mathematicians, even if philosophy was not their main field of interest. There is little sense in disputing whether what mathematicians said about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts belongs to philosophy, or not."