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Imaginative cases, or what might be called puzzles and other
thought experiments, play a central role in philosophy of mind. The
real world also furnishes philosophers with an ample supply of such
puzzles. This volume collects fifty of the most important
historical and contemporary cases in philosophy of mind and
describes their significance. The authors divide them into five
sections: consciousness and dualism; physicalist theories and the
metaphysics of mind; content, intentionality, and representation;
perception, imagination, and attention; and persons, personal
identity, and the self. Each chapter provides background, describes
a central case or cases, discusses the relevant literature, and
suggests further readings. Philosophy of Mind: Fifty Puzzles,
Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments promises to be a useful teaching
tool as well as a handy resource for anyone interested in the area.
Key Features: Offers stand-alone chapters, each presented in an
identical format: - Topics - Background - The Case - Discussion -
Recommended Reading Each chapter is self-contained, allowing
students to quickly understand an issue and giving instructors
flexibility in assigning readings to match the themes of the
course. Additional pedagogical features include a general volume
introduction as well as smaller introductions to each of the five
sections and a glossary at the end of the book.
Imaginative cases, or what might be called puzzles and other
thought experiments, play a central role in philosophy of mind. The
real world also furnishes philosophers with an ample supply of such
puzzles. This volume collects fifty of the most important
historical and contemporary cases in philosophy of mind and
describes their significance. The authors divide them into five
sections: consciousness and dualism; physicalist theories and the
metaphysics of mind; content, intentionality, and representation;
perception, imagination, and attention; and persons, personal
identity, and the self. Each chapter provides background, describes
a central case or cases, discusses the relevant literature, and
suggests further readings. Philosophy of Mind: Fifty Puzzles,
Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments promises to be a useful teaching
tool as well as a handy resource for anyone interested in the area.
Key Features: Offers stand-alone chapters, each presented in an
identical format: - Topics - Background - The Case - Discussion -
Recommended Reading Each chapter is self-contained, allowing
students to quickly understand an issue and giving instructors
flexibility in assigning readings to match the themes of the
course. Additional pedagogical features include a general volume
introduction as well as smaller introductions to each of the five
sections and a glossary at the end of the book.
In recent years, the problem of consciousness has developed into
one of the most important and hotly contested areas in the
philosophy of mind. Many philosophers regard consciousness as an
entirely physical phenomenon, yet it seems to elude scientific
explanation. On the other hand, viewing consciousness as a
nonphysical phenomenon brings up even larger issues. If
consciousness is not physical, how can it be explained?
Concise, up-to-date, and engaging, A Dialogue on Consciousness
explores these issues in depth. It features two main characters,
Tollens and Ponens--unemployed graduate students who secretly live
in a university library--who bring the debate alive. Tollens and
Ponens examine the most significant theories and arguments in the
field, quoting key passages from both classic and contemporary
texts. Their discussion encompasses an expansive and diverse range
of ideas, from those that originated in the Enlightenment up to
today's most current perspectives. The dialogue concludes with a
consideration of the pros and cons of modern physicalist views and
nonphysicalist alternatives. An extensive annotated list of
suggested readings directs readers to the most relevant and helpful
primary sources.
An accessible and entertaining introduction to this complex issue,
A Dialogue on Consciousness ideal for courses in philosophy of mind
and consciousness. It also serves as an excellent supplement to
introductory philosophy courses.
Over the past three decades, the challenge that conscious
experience poses to physicalism--the widely held view that the
universe is a completely physical system--has provoked a growing
debate in philosophy of mind studies and given rise to a great deal
of literature on the subject. Ideal for courses in consciousness
and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body
Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary
readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues
in this debate: the challenge for physicalism, physicalist
responses, alternative responses, the significance of ignorance,
and mental causation. Edited by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell,
the volume features work from such leading figures as Karen
Bennett, Ned Block, David J. Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Colin McGinn,
David Papineau, and many others. It is enhanced by a thorough
general introduction by the editors, which explains the hard
problem of consciousness--the question of how any physical
phenomenon could give rise to conscious experience.The introduction
also provides historical and conceptual background and explains how
the consciousness/mind-body problem is related to such theories as
the identity theory, dualism, and functionalism. In addition,
accessible introductions outline the themes and readings contained
in each section.
What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related
to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on
these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one
by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in
the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience.
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling
block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The
controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and
phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal concepts-knowledge of
consciousness and the associated concepts-have come to play
increasingly prominent roles in this debate. Consider Frank
Jackson's famous case of Mary, the super-scientist who learns all
the physical information while confined in a black-and-white room.
According to Jackson, if physicalism is true, then Mary's physical
knowledge should allow her to deduce what it's like to see in
color. Yet it seems intuitively clear that she learns something
when she leaves the room. But then how can consciousness be
physical? Arguably, whether this sort of reasoning is sound depends
on how phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge are construed.
For example, some argue that the Mary case reveals something about
phenomenal concepts but has no implications for the nature of
consciousness itself. Are responses along these lines adequate? Or
does the problem arise again at the level of phenomenal concepts?
The papers in this volume engage with the latest developments in
this debate. The authors' perspectives range widely. For example,
Daniel Dennett argues that anti-physicalist arguments such as the
knowledge argument are simplyconfused; David Papineau grants that
such arguments at least reveal important features of phenomenal
concepts; and David Chalmers defends the anti-physicalist
arguments, arguing that the "phenomenal concept strategy" cannot
succeed.
Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block
for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects
thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers
including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett,
John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine
Nida-R melin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and
Stephen White.
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