For more than 50 years now, Israel's national security conception has changed very little. Its stability derives from its overall success in meeting a variety of challenges throughout this period, and from the fact that the conditions on the basis of which it had originally been formed remained roughly the same.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

An analysis of Israel's relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

An analysis of Israel's relations with Abdullah before the outbreak of hostilities.

The study of strategic surprise has long concentrated on important failures that resulted in catastrophes such as Pearl Harbor and the September 11th attacks, and the majority of previously published research in the field determines that such large-scale military failures often stem from defective information-processing systems. Intelligence Success and Failure challenges this common assertion that catastrophic surprise attacks are the unmistakable products of warning failure alone. Further, Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott approach this topic uniquely by highlighting the successful cases of strategic surprise, as well as the failures, from a psychological perspective. This book delineates the critical role of individual psychopathologies in precipitating failure by investigating important historical cases. Bar-Joseph and McDermott use six particular military attacks as examples for their analysis, including: "Barbarossa," the June 1941 German invasion of the USSR (failure); the fall-winter 1941 battle for Moscow (success); the Arab attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 (failure); and the second Egyptian offensive in the war six days later (success). From these specific cases and others, they analyze the psychological mechanisms through which leaders assess their own fatal mistakes and use the intelligence available to them. Their research examines the factors that contribute to failure and success in responding to strategic surprise and identify the learning process that central decision makers use to facilitate subsequent successes. Intelligence Success and Failure presents a new theory in the study of strategic surprise that claims the key explanation for warning failure is not unintentional action, but rather, motivated biases in key intelligence and central leaders that null any sense of doubt prior to surprise attacks.

Now in paperback: A riveting feat of research and reportage hailed by the WSJ and NYTBR, The Angel explores one of the twentieth century's most compelling spy stories: the sensational life and suspicious death of Ashraf Marwan, a top-level Egyptian official who secretly worked for Israel's Mossad. "Eye-opening.... A lucid and compelling glimpse into the world of espionage and the functioning-or malfunctioning-of leaders."-WSJ SOON TO BE A NETFLIX ORIGINAL MOVIE As the son-in-law of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and a close adviser to his successor, Anwar Sadat, Ashraf Marwan had access to the deepest secrets of his country's government. But Marwan had a secret of his own: He was a spy for the Mossad, Israel's renowned intelligence service. Known to his handlers as "the Angel," Marwan turned Egypt into an open book and saved Israel from a devastating defeat by tipping off the Mossad in advance of the joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Yom Kippur in 1973. Remarkably, Marwan eluded Egypt's ruthless secret police for decades. In later years he enjoyed a luxurious life-but that would come to an abrupt end in 2007, when his body was found in a bed of roses in the garden below his apartment building in London. Police suspected he had been thrown from his balcony on the fifth floor, but the case has remained unsolved. Until now. After Marwan died, details of his shadowy life were slowly revealed. Drawing on meticulous research and exclusive interviews with key figures involved, The Angel is the first book to discuss Marwan's motives, how his identity as a Mossad spy was deliberately exposed by none other than the former chief of Israel's Military Intelligence, and how the information he provided was used-and misused. Expanding on this focus, it sheds new light on the modern history of the Middle East and the crucial role of human espionage in shaping the fate of nations. And, for the first time, it answers the questions haunting Marwan's legacy: In the end, whom did Ashraf Marwan really betray? And who killed him?

This book studies intelligence intervention in politics in the modern democratic state. In theory, intelligence work should be objective, autonomous, and free of political influence; at its best, it should be guided solely by the professional ethic of intelligence. In reality, however, unavoidable political pressures, as well as bureaucratic and personal interests, can and often do influence the conduct of intelligence work. In tracing and explaining the effects of these pressures and interests on the behavior of intelligence organizations and individuals, Uri Bar-Joseph analyzes four case studies of intelligence intervention in politics: the 1961 Bay of Pigs episode; the 1954 Israeli "Unfortunate Business Affair"; the 1920 British "Henry Wilson Affair"; and the 1924 "Zinoviev Letter Affair."