|
Showing 1 - 2 of
2 matches in All Departments
Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat
Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat
Studies Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional
Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics
relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding
General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant
General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would
benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq
today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One
of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III)
operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current
phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David
Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI
historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors
that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution.
Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of
Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the
case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
through the lens of the critical planning factors. This study
serves as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) found in stability operations how-to manuals and the broader
military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint
doctrine. Its purpose was to identify key themes that merit
consideration when planning or conducting transitions between
combat operations and stability operations. These themes were
identified by combining a review of joint and US Army stability
operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US
occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those
themes to current stability operations to assess their
applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study
because it required that occupation forces address several
challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in
the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance
philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical
regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction
challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a one answer
fits all challenges solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle
for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the
tactical and operational levels. One can easily identify several
instances where the US Army has faced stability operations
challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic,
Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved
stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only
one time during the 20th century did the United States take the
lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure-political, economic,
industrial, military, educational, and even societal-of a former
enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army
implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning
between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense
and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the
US Army's ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of
success. A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled
America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, developed
six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and
concluded by drawing implications for future US military
operations.
The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War
on Terrorism? is the ninth offering in the Combat Studies
Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers
series. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and
CSI historian, has produced a study that examines the evolution and
continued applicability of the corpus, both conventional and
customary, that constitutes the law of war. As background, Mr.
Cavaleri provides a theoretical framework and the development of
the law within Western and, specifically, US Army doctrine and
regulation. He then presents a case study of the British
suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1950s Kenya, a conflict
with particular resonance today. Some of the more relevant
characteristics of the "emergency," as it was called, include the
clash between Western and non-Western cultures and an initially
asymmetric fight between conventional security forces and loosely
organized, poorly equipped insurgents. The genesis of this study is
the public discourse, both explicit and implicit, asserting the
possibility that the GWOT may require new rules and new law-of-war
prescripts. This important discussion is fraught with complexities
and long-term implications; the moral force in warfare is
incredibly significant and any changes to the legal framework in
place must be very carefully considered. Do we follow the law of
war to the letter, do we remain "consistent with the principles of
Geneva," or do we approach the conflict as a new challenge
requiring fundamental revisions to the law? These are the options
Mr. Cavaleri addresses, and we are pleased to contribute this
Occasional Paper to the debate. In 1630 the first governor of
Massachusetts, John Winthrop, wrote a sermon titled "A Model of
Christian Charity" in which he enjoined his fellow colonists to
make Boston a "city set on a hill." Subsequent political leaders,
President Ronald Reagan for one, have periodically employed that
image to portray the United States as a beacon of moral fortitude
and Western character. This perception of the United States as a
"shining city" creates a dilemma caused by the friction between the
regulatory principles of the law of war as codified in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the military necessity of responding to
non-Western tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) now
encountered during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This study
is intended to generate discussion about the application of the law
of war during 21st-century military campaigns conducted in the
contemporary operational environment (COE). It combines a review of
the documentary evolution of the law of war with a historical case
study of the British experience in Kenya between 1952 and 1960
against the Mau Mau insurgents. It makes no claim that every lesson
learned by the British during that counterinsurgency operation can
be directly applied by the United States to the challenges of the
GWOT, but this analysis does offer some insight about applying the
law of war to an unfamiliar, non-Western environment. The debate
concerning the law of war's applicability will grow more vocal as
non-state enemies of the United States adapt TTP to exploit
perceived centers of gravity like public opinion. In anticipation
of that escalating debate, this analysis offers the following as
its overarching question: Is the current version of the law of war
suited to the COE in general and the GWOT in particular?
|
You may like...
Sidekick
Adeline Radloff
Paperback
R250
R215
Discovery Miles 2 150
|