Over the last quarter century, crisis bargaining has become the prevailing paradigm for the study of war. This textbook presents a concise and approachable overview of the crisis bargaining literature, surveying the canonical formal models in the bargaining approach to war. It begins by considering different explanations for war, then delves into two classes of explanation: commitment problems and incomplete information. This textbook is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduates and researchers alike. Each chapter delves into a specific part of the puzzle, rigorously unravelling the twisted logic that causes wars to begin. Over 70 illuminating figures illustrate the strategic reasoning outlined and more than 100 exercises of varying levels of difficulty help clarify readers' own understanding. Online resources include an instructor answer key and 39 engaging video lectures.

Over the last quarter century, crisis bargaining has become the prevailing paradigm for the study of war. This textbook presents a concise and approachable overview of the crisis bargaining literature, surveying the canonical formal models in the bargaining approach to war. It begins by considering different explanations for war, then delves into two classes of explanation: commitment problems and incomplete information. This textbook is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduates and researchers alike. Each chapter delves into a specific part of the puzzle, rigorously unravelling the twisted logic that causes wars to begin. Over 70 illuminating figures illustrate the strategic reasoning outlined and more than 100 exercises of varying levels of difficulty help clarify readers' own understanding. Online resources include an instructor answer key and 39 engaging video lectures.

Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.

Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.