Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops
formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite
apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear
proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the
process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in
which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not
to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as
effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only
the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the
inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements,
the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other
concerns about nuclear weapons.
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