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This volume of essays brings a phenomenological focus to bear on
the subject of education in order to provide a fruitful stimulus
for educational philosophy. It is for philosophers, psychologists,
sociologists and indeed anyone who seeks to understand the
perennially interesting questions about the nature of
self-consciousness and how our view of it might affect our thinking
about education. Originally published in 1978, the essays explore
some of the main phenomenological and existentialist themes in
relation to the development of consciousness. Two deal with
Kierkegaard's concern for our need to know the world that is true
for ourselves, and with the part that imagination plays here. There
are two on the development of thinking based round Piaget's work on
the child's concept of causality and an alternative view proposed
by Merleau-Ponty. The role of memory in education is considered and
a distinction drawn between mere memorizing and that process of
remembering which enables an individual to develop his self-image.
Other essays discuss some of the child's problems in establishing
himself in the adult world, and explore the contact between child
and teacher. The effects of bringing up a child in isolation from
other children is considered with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's
account of his childhood.
This volume of essays brings a phenomenological focus to bear on
the subject of education in order to provide a fruitful stimulus
for educational philosophy. It is for philosophers, psychologists,
sociologists and indeed anyone who seeks to understand the
perennially interesting questions about the nature of
self-consciousness and how our view of it might affect our thinking
about education. Originally published in 1978, the essays explore
some of the main phenomenological and existentialist themes in
relation to the development of consciousness. Two deal with
Kierkegaard's concern for our need to know the world that is true
for ourselves, and with the part that imagination plays here. There
are two on the development of thinking based round Piaget's work on
the child's concept of causality and an alternative view proposed
by Merleau-Ponty. The role of memory in education is considered and
a distinction drawn between mere memorizing and that process of
remembering which enables an individual to develop his self-image.
Other essays discuss some of the child's problems in establishing
himself in the adult world, and explore the contact between child
and teacher. The effects of bringing up a child in isolation from
other children is considered with reference to Jean-Paul Sartre's
account of his childhood.
This volume contains the proceedings of the six symposia of the
'Philosophers into Europe' conference held under he joint auspices
of the Royal Institute of Philosophy and the British Society for
Phenomenology at the University of Southampton in September 1969.
XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily
aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground
phenomena: Wittgenstein's ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such
example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of
tertiary qualities in perception, such as 'symmetry' and 'elegance'
which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red,
green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has
made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of
Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic
philosophers for not making direct use of the results of
psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing
to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that
philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned
with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that
is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is
still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the
yardstick against which questions relating to thought and
perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then
con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more
adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he
might go on to show how far the language used by psychological
researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense.
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