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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Western philosophy > Modern Western philosophy, c 1600 to the present > Western philosophy, from c 1900 - > Analytical & linguistic philosophy
This book is an investigation into the descriptive task of moral philosophy. Nora Hamalainen explores the challenge of providing rich and accurate pictures of the moral conditions, values, virtues, and norms under which people live and have lived, along with relevant knowledge about the human animal and human nature. While modern moral philosophy has focused its energies on normative and metaethical theory, the task of describing, uncovering, and inquiring into moral frameworks and moral practices has mainly been left to social scientists and historians. Nora Hamalainen argues that this division of labour has detrimental consequences for moral philosophy and that a reorientation toward descriptive work is needed in moral philosophy. She traces resources for a descriptive philosophical ethics in the work of four prominent philosophers of the twentieth century: John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault, and Charles Taylor, while also calling on thinkers inspired by them.
Today, quantum field theory (QFT) the mathematical and conceptual framework for contemporary elementary particle physics is the best starting point for analysing the fundamental building blocks of the material world. QFT if taken seriously in its metaphysical implications yields a picture of the world that is at variance with central classical conceptions. The core of Kuhlmann s investigation consists in the analysis of various ontological interpretations of QFT, e.g. substance ontologies as well as a process-ontological approach. Eventually, Kuhlmann proposes a dispositional trope ontology, according to which particularized properties and not things are the most basic entities, in terms of which all other entities are to be analysed, e.g as bundles of properties. This book was chosen for the 2009 ontos-Award for research on analytical ontology and metaphysics by the German Society for Analytical Philosophy."
When this book was originally published in 2006, Epistemetrics was not as yet a scholarly discipline. With regard to scientific information there was the discipline of scientometrics, represented by a journal of that very name. Science, however, had a monopoly on knowledge. Although it is one of our most important cognitive resources, it is not our only one. While scientometrics is a centerpiece of epistemetrics, it is not the whole of it. Nicholas Rescher's endeavor to quantify knowledge is not only of interest in itself, but is also instructive in bringing into sharper relief the nature of and the explanatory rationale for the limits that unavoidably confront our efforts to advance the frontiers of knowledge. In particular, his book demonstrates the limitations of human knowledge and will be of great value to scholars working in this area.
This book has two objectives: to be a contribution to the understanding of Frege's theory of truth - especially a defence of his notorious critique of the correspondence theory - and to be an introduction to the practice of interpreting philosophical texts.
Willard Van Orman Quine was certainly the greatest analytic philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. Born in 1908, he held the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard University from 1956 to 2000. He made highly important contributions to such areas as mathematical logic, set theory, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of logic. His best known works include "From a Logical Point of View", "Ontological Relativity" and other essays, and his most influential Word and Object. One of Quine's central doctrines is the 'indeterminacy of translation' - the assertion that there is no objective answer to the question of what someone means by any given sentence. This view was first put forward in Word and Object and was shocking enough to draw criticisms from other leading philosophers like Noam Chomsky and Richard Rorty. Eve Gaudet argues that these controversies stem partly from Quine's ambiguities and changes of mind, and partly from his readers' misunderstandings. Gaudet dissipates the confusion by examining afresh. Quine's whole concept of 'a fact of the matter', and evaluating the contributions to the debate by Chomsky, Rorty, Friedman, Gibson and Follesdal in the light of her new interpretation. This is the first book devoted to a defence of Quine's indeterminacy of translation doctrine. Unlike many who conclude in Quine's favour, Gaudet adopts a critical and nuanced approach to Quine's texts, showing that Quine sometimes changed his positions and was not always as clear and consistent as many assume.
The distinguished philosopher of language, Francois Recanati, has
proposed a wide-ranging truth-conditional model of pragmatics. In
this collection, various aspects of his theories are addressed by
distinguished contributors, and are then commented on or answered
by Recanati himself so that the reader is drawn into the central
debate within philosophy of language and cognitive science as to
what kind of pragmatics system is needed.
First published in 2005. This study seeks to identify the specific mistakes that critics were alluding to in their passing asides on Wittgenstein's failure to grasp the mechanics of Godel's second incompleteness theorem. It also includes an understanding of his attack on meta-mathematics and Hilbert's Programme.
Twentieth-century philosophy has often been pictured as divided into two camps, analytic and continental. This study challenges this depiction by examining encounters between some of the leading representatives of either side. Starting with Husserl and Frege's fin-de-siecle turn against psychologism, it turns to Carnap's 1931 attack on Heidegger's metaphysics (together with its background in the Cassirer-Heidegger dispute of 1929), moving on to Ayer's 1951 meeting with Bataille and Merleau-Ponty at a Parisian bar, followed by the 'dialogue of the deaf' between Oxford linguistic philosophers and phenomenologists at the 1951 Royaumont colloquium, leading up to the Derrida-Searle controversy. Careful study shows that it is implausible to assume the existence of a century-old 'gulf' between two sides of philosophy. Vrahimis argues that miscommunication and ignorance over the exact content of the above encounters must to a large extent be held accountable for any perceived gap.
Donald Davidson's work has been of seminal importance in the development of analytic philosophy and his views on the nature of language, mind and action remain the starting point for many of the central debates in the analytic tradition. His ideas, however, are complex, often technical, and interconnected in ways that can make them difficult to understand. This introduction to Davidson's philosophy examines the full range of his writings to provide a clear succinct overview of his ideas. This book begins with an account of the assumptions and structure of Davidson's philosophy of language, introducing his compositionalism, extensionalism and commitment to a Tarski-style theory of truth as the model for theories of meaning. It goes on to show how that philosophical framework is to be applied and how it challenges the traditional picture. Marc Joseph examines Davidson's influential work on action theory and events and discusses the commonly made charge that his theory of action and mind leaves the mental as a mere 'epiphenomenon' of the physical. The final section explores Davidson's philosophy of mind, some of its consequences for traditional views of subjectivity and objectivity and, more generally, the relation between minded beings and the physical and mental world they occupy.
This analysis of Wittgenstein's concept of a Spielraum, in which the author approaches the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus both systematically and from the perspective of the history of philosophy and knowledge, opens up a new and important perspective in Wittgenstein research. In establishing unexpected cross-connections between physics, the theory of perception, and logic, Hyder also makes a valuable contribution to the history of 19th century science. In particular, the links he establishes between early sensory physiology and the logicism of Russell and Frege yield a sharper and more plausible account of the notion of a "space" of possible meanings than has hitherto been available in the secondary literature. In showing this notion to be a formal precursor to that of a language game, the study also provides important pointers for the interpretation of Wittgenstein's late work.
First published in 2000. This is Volume II of six in the Library of Philosophy series on the Philosophy of Science. Written in 1938, philosophical systems which employ logical methods almost exclusively would undoubtedly be expected to produce non-empirical results. If, however, logic is taken simply as a method of connecting meanings it is not difficult to reconcile logical methods with empirical results. If logical formular, in other words, assert nothing about the meanings of propositions, but simply show how such meanings are connected, then an empiricism based on a logical analysis of meanings is not inconsistent. This is what the Logical Positivists have attempted to do. This book looks at two areas: the foundations of a scientific method free from metaphysics, and the elimination of pseudo-concepts introduced by metaphysics into science and philosophy.
Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of language and logic. In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap explains how his entire theory of language structure came to him like a vision when he was ill. He postulates that concepts of the theory of logic are purely syntactical and therefore can be formulated in logical syntax.
This volume is the first English resource to shed light on the philosophy of Joseph Petzoldt (1862-1929), the main pupil of Ernst Mach and founder of the Gesellschaft fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, later the association of Berlin logical positivists. A central figure in the early debate on the theory of relativity, his work was praised by Einstein himself. Tracing the development of Petzoldt's ideas, starting from his early acceptance of materialism and Kantian agnosticism, Chiara Russo Krauss presents a comprehensive reconstruction of his philosophy in the context of the German milieu. She examines his attempt to develop a new philosophy following Gustav Fechner and the empiriocriticism of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. In the final chapter, she sets out how Petzoldt proposed relativistic positivism as the official interpretation of Einstein's relativity. By illuminating key elements of Petzoldt's work, this is a valuable case study for students and scholars of philosophy of science and late 19th-century and early 20th-century philosophy. It reveals the complex interplay of two different tendencies of the time: neo-Kantianism and its struggle to overcome the notion of thing-in-itself, as well as the need for an epistemological foundation for the new advances of science.
Herbert Hochberg is one of the most influential analytical philosophers and one of the most influential critics of analytical philosophy. He disputed with almost all leading analytical philosophers, from Quine, Goodman and Wilfrid Sellars to David Lewis and David Armstrong. His point of view is ontological and he harks back to the origins of analytical philosophy where he finds unknown precursors of current views. And he finds parallels to contemporary non-analytic philosophies. In his own ontology he tries to dispense with simple particulars.
This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.
This volume discusses some crucial ideas of the founders of the analytic philosophy: Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, or the 'golden trio'. The book shows how these 'old' ideas are still present and influential in the current philosophical debates and to what extent these debates echo the original ideas. The collection aim is twofold: to better understand these fruitful ideas by placing them in the original setting, and to systematically examine these ideas in the context of the current debates animating philosophical discussions today. Divided into five sections, the book first sets the stage and offers a general introduction to the background influences, as well as delimitations of the initial foundational positions. This first section contains two papers dedicated to the discussion of realism and the status of science at that time, followed by two papers that tackle the epistemic status of logical laws. The next three sections constitute the core of the volume, each being dedicated to the most important figures in the early analytic tradition: Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. The last section gathers several essays that discuss either the relation between two or more analytic thinkers, or various important concepts such as 'predicativism' and 'arbitrary function', or the principles of abstraction and non-contradiction.
This book investigates the significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for aesthetic understanding. Focusing on the aesthetic elements of Wittgenstein's philosophical work, the authors explore connections to contemporary currents in aesthetic thinking and the illuminating power of Wittgenstein's philosophy when considered in connection with the interpretation of specific works of literature, music, and the arts. Taken together, the chapters presented here show what aesthetic understanding consists of and the ways we achieve it, how it might be articulated, and why it is important. At a time of strong renewal of interest in Wittgenstein's contributions to the philosophy of mind and language, this book offers insight into the connections between philosophical-psychological and linguistic issues and the understanding of the arts.
In this book, the author shows that it is necessary to enrich the conceptual frame of the theory of rational choice beyond consequentialism. He argues that consequentialism as a general theory of rational action fails and that this does not force us into the dichotomy teleology vs deontology. The unity of practical reason can be saved without consequentialism. In the process, he presents insightful criticism of standard models of action and rational choice. This will help readers discover a new perspective on the theory of rationality. The approach is radical: It transcends the reductive narrowness of instrumental rationality without denying its practical impact. Actions do exist that are outlined in accordance to utility maximizing or even self-interest maximizing. Yet, not all actions are to be understood in these terms. Actions oriented around social roles, for example, cannot count as irrational only because there is no known underlying maximizing heuristic. The concept of bounded rationality tries to embed instrumental rationality into a form of life to highlight limits of our cognitive capabilities and selective perceptions. However, the agent is still left within the realm of cost-benefit-reasoning. The idea of social preferences or meta-preferences cannot encompass the plurality of human actions. According to the author they ignore the plurality of reasons that drive agency. Hence, they coerce agency in fitting into a theory that undermines humanity. His theory of structural rationality acknowledges lifeworld patterns of interaction and meaning.
"Intention" is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
This book provides a detailed and comprehensive account of the problem of a priori knowledge from a historical as well as a systematic perspective. The author explores Kant's views in connection with the possibility of revision, something hardly, if at all, done in philosophical literature. Furthermore, the views of well-renowned philosophers such as Quine, Putnam, Kitcher, and Hale are discussed in detail and are put into a historical and systematic perspective. Finally, this book contains a glossary of important notions offering illuminating accounts of a priori knowledge and related notions and explains the relationship between a priori knowledge, fallibility and revision. The detailing of concepts such as 'defeasibility', 'infallibility', 'falsifiability' helps anyone reading philosophical literature to pin down the meaning of the terms and its implications in this context. The enriched and dual approach the author takes makes the book a very useful and lucid guide to the problem of a priori knowledge. |
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