God and Time is a collection of previously unpublished essays written by leading philosophers about God's relation to time. The essays have been selected to represent current debates written between those who believe God to be atemporal and those who do not. The essays highlight issues such as how the nature of time is relevant to whether God is temporal and how God's other attributes are compatible with his mode of temporal being. By focusing on the metaphysical aspects of time and temporal existence, God and Time will make a unique contribution to the current resurgence of interest in philosophical theology within the analytic tradition.

One hundred years ago, Russell and Whitehead published their epoch-making Principia Mathematica (PM), which was initially conceived as the second volume of Russell's Principles of Mathematics (PoM) that had appeared ten years before. No other works can be credited to have had such an impact on the development of logic and on philosophy in the twentieth century. However, until now, scholars only focused on the first parts of the books - that is, on Russell's and Whitehead's theory of logic, set-theory and arithmetic.
Sebastien Gandon aims at reversing the perspective. His goal is to give a picture of Russell's logicism based on a detailed reading of the developments dealing with advanced mathematics - namely projective geometry and the theory of quantity. This book is not only the first study ever made of the 'later' portions of PoM and PM, it also shows how this shift of perspective compels us to change our view of the logicist program taken as a whole.

British Analytic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century examines three generations of analytic philosophers, who between them founded the modern discipline of analytic philosophy in Britain. The book explores how philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, A.J. Ayer, Gilbert Ryle and Isaiah Berlin believed in a link between German aggression in the twentieth century and the nineteenth-century philosophy of Hegel and Nietzsche. Thomas L. Akehurst thus identifies in this political critique of continental philosophy the origins of the hugely significant faultline between analytic and continental thought, an aspect of twentieth-century philosophy that is still poorly understood. The book also uncovers a tripartite alliance in British analytic philosophy, between nation, political virtue and philosophical method. In revealing this structure behind the assumptions of certain analytical thinkers, Akehurst challenges the conventional wisdom that sees analytic philosophy as a semi-detached narrowly academic pursuit. On the contrary, this important book suggests that the analytic philosophers were espousing a national philosophy, one they believed operated in harmony with British thinking and the British values of liberty and tolerance.

This is an important collection of essays that rectifies a long-standing misconception in the history of the relation between Hegel and analytic philosophy. Offering one of the first initiatives of reconciliation between the analytic and continental philosophical traditions, this important collection of original essays offers a new perspective on Hegel's philosophy within the context of some of the themes central to current discussion. Placing Hegel at the intersection between continental and analytic philosophy, the book presents an indispensable guide to the most current contemporary debates and to an emerging topic within Hegel studies. Analytic philosophy has long been held to consider Hegel its bete noir. Yet in fact Hegel and analytic philosophy converge on some crucial issues, which suggests that, although analytic philosophy initially declared its anti-Hegelianism, it is in fact nourished of Hegelian themes and defended through Hegelian concepts. The essays in this volume address this apparent paradox, offering 'analytic' readings of Hegel, Hegelian readings of the analytic tradition, historical explorations of Hegel's confrontation with Kant and of the analytic tradition's debt to Hegel, and new interpretations of Hegelian texts. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.

This book tells the story of the life and work of L. Susan Stebbing (1885-1943), the first woman Professor of Philosophy in Britain, and the author of a number of popular books, including Thinking to Some Purpose (1939). It traces her professional and personal associations with many of the leading philosophers of her day, including G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Stebbing's early writings were concerned with formal logic, but she came increasingly to believe in the importance of exposing misleading uses of language in, for instance, popular works of science, advertisements, newspaper editorials and political propaganda. This book considers the historical developments and the personal, social and political commitments that contributed to this belief. It also assesses Stebbing's work in the light of subsequent developments both in analytic philosophy and in linguistics, and suggests that it has important contributions to make in both fields.

A key development in Wittgenstein Studies over recent years has been the advancement of a resolutely therapeutic reading of the Tractatus. Rupert Read offers the first extended application of this reading of Wittgenstein, encompassing Wittgenstein's later work too, to examine the implications of Wittgenstein's work as a whole upon the domains especially of literature, psychopathology, and time. Read begins by applying Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning to language, examining the consequences our conception of philosophy has for the ways in which we talk about meaning. He goes on to engage with literary texts as Wittgensteinian, where 'Wittgensteinian' does not mean expressive of a Wittgenstein philosophy, but involves the literature in question remaining enigmatic, and doing philosophical work of its own. He considers Faulkner's work as productive too of a broadly Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychopathology. Read then turns to philosophical accounts of time, finding a link between the division of time into discrete moments and solipsism of the present moment as depicted in philosophy on the one hand and psychopathological states on the other. This important book positions itself at the forefront of a revolutionary movement in Wittgenstein studies and philosophy in general and offers a new and dynamic way of using Wittgenstein's works.

Wittgenstein in America is a collection of essays exploring the legacy of Wittgenstein's work in contemporary American philosophy. The contributors (including several eminent philosophers) take a variety of approaches to Wittgenstein; they discuss such topics as rule-following, realism about mathematics, the method of the Tractatus, the relation between style and content in Wittgenstein, and his distinction between sense and nonsense. Wittgenstein is discussed in relation to subsequent philosophers such as Quine and Kripke. This will be essential reading for specialists in Wittgenstein, and will interest many other philosophers besides.

Dummett argues that the aim of philosophy is the analysis of thought and that, with Frege, analytical philosophy learned that the route to the analysis of thought is the analysis of language. Here are bold and deep readings of the subject's history and character, which form the topic of this volume.

The philosopher and psychologist G.F. Stout was the teacher of Moore and Russell around 1894. This book shows that Stout's ideas have played a role in Moore and Russell's development from their early idealism towards analytic realism, where Stout's ideas often find their origin in early phenomenology.
The theory of judgement and proposition that Moore and Russell defended around 1900 has to be understood against the background of a one-dimensional semantics, and the question what guarantees the objectivity of thought and judgement. Both aspects have their origin in Stout's psychological account of judgement and the way he distinguishes between act, content and object. Stout is also of interest for his critique of Russell's theory of descriptions and the multiple relation theory of judgement. The book deals with topics relevant for philosophy today, such as tropes and predication, the problem of error, psychologism, and the relation between question and judgement.

Sceptics raise doubts about our ability to have knowledge generally, and naturalists use scientific discoveries to question common-sense thinking about the world, language, and the mind. This book replies to these contentions, using a transcendental argument to show that everyday thought constitutes an interlocking system of concepts presupposed by all types of reasoning, including empirical science. Thus sceptics cannot question ordinary belief, or science challenge everyday thinking, without undermining their own legitimacy. In addition to replying to arguments by scientific naturalists in a number of areas, the book presents common-sense thought in detail about reality and the mind. It also considers the circumstances under which religious belief is justified. The result is a contemporary defense of our over-all conceptual scheme giving everyday thought a central place but also accommodating scientific and other forms of thinking.

Clinical and philosophical perspectives on key issues and debates in Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Violent and injustice are the two major political problems the world is facing today. By, offering a fresh, innovative analysis of the concept of violence, this book presents an original insight into the nature of injustice, which forces us to rethink the scope and aims of a theory of social justice. More specifically, it explores three close related questions: What is violence? What is the relationship between violence and social justice? Can social justice be promoted through violence?

This groundbreaking volume casts light on the long shadow of naturalistic monism in modern thought and culture. When monism's philosophical proposition - the unity of all matter and thought in a single, universal substance - fused with scientific empiricism and Darwinism in the mid-nineteenth century, it led to the formation of a powerful worldview articulated in the work of figures such as Ernst Haeckel. The compelling essays collected here, written by leading international scholars, investigate the articulation of monism in science, philosophy, and religion and its impact on a range of social movements, from socialism and early feminism to imperialism and eugenics. The result is a broad and comprehensive chronological, disciplinary, and geographic map of a century of monism, as well as a bellwether for innovative new directions in the interdisciplinary study of science, religion, philosophy, and culture.

This book is a philosophical examination of the main stages in our journey from hominid to human. It deals with the nature and origin of language, the self, self-consciousness, and the religious ideal of a return to Eden. It approaches these topics through a philosophical anthropology derived from the later writings of Wittgenstein. The result is an account of our place in nature consistent with both a hard-headed empiricism and a this-worldy but religiously significant mysticism.

Wittgenstein's later writings generate a great deal of controversy and debate, as do the implications of his ideas for such topics as consciousness, knowledge, language and the arts. Oswald Hanfling addresses a widespeard tendency to ascribe to Wittgenstein views that go beyond those he actually held. Separate chapters deal with important topics such as the private language argument, rule-following, the problem of other minds, and the ascription of scepticism to Wittgenstein. Describing Wittgenstein as a 'humanist' thinker, he contrasts his views on language, art humanity and philosophy itself with those of scientifically minded philosophers. He argues that 'the human form of life' calls for a kind of understanding that cfannot be achieved by the methods of emirical science; that consiousness, for example, cannot properly be regarded as a property of the bran; and that the resulting 'problem of consoiusness is an illusion. Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life is essential reading for anyone interested in Wittgenstein's approach to what it means to be human. It will be invaluable to all Wittgenstein scholars, and all who are interested in the philosophy of mind, language and aesthetics.

Hamner seeks to discover what makes pragmatism uniquely American. She argues that the inextricably American character of pragmatism of such figures as C.S. Peirce and William James lies in its often understated affirmation of America as a uniquely religious country with a God-given mission and populated by God-fearing citizens. The development of Pragmatism is the most important achievement in the history of American Philosophy. M. Gail Hamner here examines the European roots of the movement in a search for what makes Pragmatism uniquely American. Hamner argues that the inextricably American character of the Pragmatism of such figures as C.S Peirce and William James lies in its often understated affirmation of America as a uniquely religious country with a God-given mission and a populated by God-fearing citizens. By looking at European and British thinkers whom pragmatists read, Hamner examines how pragmatism's notions of self, nation, and morality were formed in reaction to the work of these thinkers. Hamner finds that the pervasive religiosity of nineteenth-century American public language underlies Peirce's and James' resistance to aspects of the philosophy and science of their non-American colleagues. This religiosity, Hamner shows, is linked strongly to the continuing rhetorical power of American Puritanism.

This book is a collection of articles authored by renowed Polish ontologists living and working in the early part of the 21st century. Harking back to the well-known Polish Lvov-Warsaw School, founded by Kazimierz Twardowski, we try to make our ontological considerations as systematically rigorous and clear as possible - i.e. to the greatest extent feasible, but also no more than the subject under consideration itself allows for. Hence, the papers presented here do not seek to steer clear of methods of inquiry typical of either the formal or the natural sciences: on the contrary, they use such methods wherever possible. At the same time, despite their adherence to rigorous methods, the Polish ontologists included here do not avoid traditional ontological issues, being inspired as they most certainly are by the great masters of Western philosophy - from Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas and Leibniz, to Husserl, to name arguably just the most important.

To what extent can we doubt certainties? How are certainties expressed in words? Which language games convey certainty? To answer these questions we have to recall the method Wittgenstein used in his investigations. When we look at language games and forms of life as inseparable phenomena, do forms of life then provide any certainty? On the other hand, do we automatically relapse into relativism once we doubt certainties? Which formal structures underlie certainty and doubt? The book is intended to answer these questions.

The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed," and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.

In the early twentieth century an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The historical outcome was momentous: the demise of the movement known as British Idealism, and its eventual replacement by the various forms of analytic philosophy. Since then, a conception of this debate and its rights and wrongs has become entrenched in English-language philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh the events of this formative period in twentieth-century thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

Hilary Whitehall Putnam was one of the leading philosophers of the second half of the 20th century. As student of Rudolph Carnap's and Hans Reichenbach's, he went on to become not only a major figure in North American analytic philosophy, who made significant contributions to the philosophy of mind, language, mathematics, and physics but also to the disciplines of logic, number theory, and computer science. He passed away on March 13, 2016. The present volume is a memorial to his extraordinary intellectual contributions, honoring his contributions as a philosopher, a thinker, and a public intellectual. It features essays by an international team of leading philosophers, covering all aspects of Hilary Putnam's philosophy from his work in ethics and the history of philosophy to his contributions to the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics. Each essay is an original contribution. "Hilary Putnam is one of the most distinguished philosophers of the modern era, and just speaking personally, one of the smartest and most impressive thinkers I have ever been privileged to know-as a good friend for 70 years. The fine essays collected here are a fitting tribute to a most remarkable figure." Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology "In Engaging Putnam excellent philosophers engage the writings and ideas of Hilary Putnam, one of the most productive and influential philosophers of the last century. Putnam stands out because of the combination of brilliance and a firm grasp of reality he brought to a very broad range of issues: the logic and the philosophy of mathematics, free-will, skepticism, realism, internalism and externalism and a lot more. Along with this he offered penetrating insights about other great philosophers, from Aristotle to Wittgenstein. All great philosophers make us think. With many, we try to figure out the strange things they say. With Putnam, we are made to think about clearly explained examples and arguments that get to the heart of the issues he confronts. This book is a wonderful contribution to the continuation of Putnam-inspired thinking." John Perry, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University

This book offers a Wittgensteinian study of concept possession and of the nature of conceptual investigation in philosophy. It is both an ideal advanced introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and an original treatment of some of its most crucial yet least developed regions. The book is written as a Socratic dialogue, which frames the discussion within a backward glance to Plato's Theory of Forms. In so doing it makes a bold claim as to Wittgenstein's place in Western philosophy.

In "Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition" Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole.
Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition.

This book consists of a series of chapters on Carnap's ideal of explication as an alternative to the naturalistic conceptions of science, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and entiching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.