What does it mean for ethics to say, as Wittgenstein did, that philosophy "leaves everything as it is"? Though clearly absorbed with ethical questions throughout his life and work, Wittgenstein's remarks about the subject do not easily lend themselves to summation or theorizing. Although many moral philosophers cite the influence or inspiration of Wittgenstein, there is little agreement about precisely what it means to do ethics in the light of Wittgenstein. Ethics after Wittgenstein brings together an international cohort of leading scholars in the field to address this problem. The chapters advance a conception of philosophical ethics characterized by an attention to detail, meaning and importance which itself makes ethical demands on its practitioners. Working in conversation with literature and film, engaging deeply with anthropology and critical theory, and addressing contemporary problems from racialized sexual violence against women to the Islamic State, these contributors reclaim Wittgenstein's legacy as an indispensable resource for contemporary ethics.

While the relationship between Kant and other major figures in early analytic philosophy, such as Russell, G. E. Moore, and Rudolf Carnap, has been the subject of full length studies, no such work yet exists on the relationship between Kant and Frege. The Origins of Analytic Philosophy Kant and Frege addresses this gap in our understanding of the origins of early analytic philosophy. Its concern is to chart the nature and significance of Frege's break with Kant over the question of whether arithmetic is a synthetic a priori or an analytic a priori science. In rejecting Kant's claim that arithmetic is an a priori synthetic science, Frege returns to a conception of the scope and power of pure reason that shows important similarities to the philosophical outlook of Kant's great predecessor and philosophical opponent Gottfried Leibniz.Delbert Reed shows how, in his attempts to establish the foundations of arithmetic on analytic principles, Frege developed many of the tools, concerns and problems that would dominate the development of analytic philosophy in the 20th century.

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

During the last 25 years, a large number of publications on the history of analytic philosophy have appeared, significantly more than in the preceding period. As most of these works are by analytically trained authors, it is tempting to speak of a 'historical turn' in analytic philosophy. The present volume constitutes both a contribution to this body of work and a reflection on what is, or might be, achieved in it. The twelve new essays, by an international group of contributors, range from case studies on individual philosophers (Russell, Carnap, Quine, and Ryle) through discussions of broader themes in the history of analytic philosophy (in logic and philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and psychology) to related methodological reflections (on the relationship between doing analytic philosophy and studying the history of philosophy, on various forms of philosophical history, and on their respective benefits).

"Philosophy and the Neurosciences" is the first systematic integration of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science with neuroscience research. As philosophers have come to focus more and more on the relationship between mind and brain, they have had to take greater account of theory and research in the neurosciences. Likewise, as neuroscientists have learned more about cognitive structures and functions, their investigations have expanded and merged with traditional questions from the philosophy of mind.

By introducing key themes in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science and the fundamental concepts of neuroscience, this text provides philosophers with the necessary background to engage the neurosciences and offers neuroscientists an introduction to the relevant tools of philosophical analysis. Study questions, figures, and references to further reading are provided in each chapter to enhance the reader's understanding of how philosophy and the neurosciences are related in their exploration of the human mind.

This book offers a definition of the fantastic that establishes it as a discourse in constant intertextual relation with the construct of reality. In establishing the definition of the fantastic, leading scholar David Roas selects four central concepts that allow him to chart a fairly clear map of this terrain: reality, the impossible, fear, and language. These four concepts underscore the fundamental issues and problems that articulate any theoretical reflection on the fantastic: its necessary relationship to an idea of the real, its limits, its emotional and psychological effects on the receiver and the transgression of language that is undertaken when attempting to express what is, by definition, inexpressible as it is beyond the realms of the conceivable. By examining such concepts, the book explores multiple perspectives that are clearly interrelated: from literary and comparative theory to linguistics, via philosophy, science and cyberculture.

This is the first major response to the new challenge of neuroscience to religion. There have been limited responses from a purely Christian point of view, but this takes account of eastern as well as western forms of religious experience. It challenges the prevailing naturalistic assumption of our culture, including the idea that the mind is either identical with or a temporary by-product of brain activity. It also discusses religion as institutions and religion as inner experience of the Transcendent, and suggests a form of spirituality for today.

John Burgess is the author of a rich and creative body of work which seeks to defend classical logic and mathematics through counter-criticism of their nominalist, intuitionist, relevantist, and other critics. This selection of his essays, which spans twenty-five years, addresses key topics including nominalism, neo-logicism, intuitionism, modal logic, analyticity, and translation. An introduction sets the essays in context and offers a retrospective appraisal of their aims. The volume will be of interest to a wide range of readers across philosophy of mathematics, logic, and philosophy of language.

This collection concentrates on vital themes from Michael Dummett, one of the most influential and creative analytic philosophers of our time. The contributors, who include some of Dummett's distinguished former students, critically reflect on various concerns of Dummett's ground-breaking work in philosophy of language, metaphysics, and philosophy of mathematics and logic. The essays direct towards aspects of Dummett's pioneering work in the history of analytical philosophy, particularly his interpretations of the works of Frege and of Wittgenstein, which in conjunction with Dummett's own highly original ideas on truth and meaning have shaped decisive contemporary debates concerning notably the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Further, the volume includes a cheerfully serious excursion into popular philosophy by Dummett himself and reveals less known facets of Dummett's many-sided work and activities such as his political philosophy of immigration and asylum, and beyond that, his untiring and warm-hearted campaign for racial justice and humanity. Contributors: Michael Dummett, Eva Picardi, Crispin Wright, Timothy Williamson, Ian Rumfitt, Daniel Isaacson, Dag Prawitz, Dale Jacquette, Alex Burri, Michael Frauchiger.

This radical reading of Wittgenstein's third and last masterpiece, "On Certainty," has major implications for philosophy. It elucidates Wittgenstein's ultimate thoughts on the nature of our basic beliefs and his demystification of skepticism. Our basic certainties are shown to be nonepistemic, nonpropositional attitudes that, as such, have no verbal occurrence but manifest themselves exclusively in our actions. This fundamental certainty is a belief-"in," a primitive confidence or" ur-trust" whose practical nature bridges the hitherto unresolved catagorial gap between belief and action.

Philosophers often have tried to either reduce "disagreeable" objects or concepts to (more) acceptable objects or concepts. Reduction is regarded attractive by those who subscribe to an ideal of ontological parsimony. But the topic is not just restricted to traditional metaphysics or ontology. In the philosophy of mathematics, abstraction principles, such as Hume's principle, have been suggested to support a reconstruction of mathematics by logical means only. In the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, the logical analysis of language has long been regarded to be the dominating paradigm, and liberalized projects of logical reconstruction remain to be driving forces of modern philosophy. This volume collects contributions comprising all those topics, including articles by Alexander Bird, Jaakko Hintikka, James Ladyman, Rohit Parikh, Gerhard Schurz, Peter Simons, Crispin Wright and Edward N. Zalta.

The goal of this work is twofold. First, it aims to account for double genitive constructions in Serbian. Second, it aims to re-evaluate the DP hypothesis in light of their existence in Serbian. Based on evidence from the categorial status of possessives, argumenthood in the nominal domain, the morphosyntactic structure of nominalizations, and the assignment of the genitive case, it is argued that DP projection must be assumed in Serbian.

Proceedings of the von Wright conference at the Center for Intedisciplinary Studies in Bielefeld, April 26 to 27, 1996. Georg Henrik von Wright, born 1916, is an important analytical philosopher of the 20th century.

This book is dedicated to the consolidation and to the expansion of theoretic systems thinking as a necessary integration of the general reductionist and analytical attitude dominant in our culture. Reductionism and analytical approaches have produced significant results in many fields of contemporary knowledge giving a great contribution to relevant scientific discoveries and to their technological application, but their validity has been improperly universalized as the only and best methods of knowledge in every domain. It is nowadays clear that analytical or mereological approaches are inadequate to solve many problems and that we should introduce - or support the diffusion of - new concepts and different research attitudes. A good candidate to support such a shift is the well known theoretical approach based on the concept of "system" that no more considers the elementary constituents of an object, but the entity emerging from the relations and interactions among its elementary parts. It becomes possible to reconstruct several domains, both philosophical and scientific, from the systemic point of view, introducing fresh ideas in the research in view of a general rational vision of the world on more comprehensive basis. This book contributes to the diffusion and evolution of systemic thinking by focusing on two main objectives: developing and updating the systemic approach in disciplines currently using it and introducing the systemic perspective in humanistic disciplines, where the approach is not widely used. The Systemic Turn in Human and Natural Sciences: A Rock in the Pond is comprised of ten chapters. The chapter authors adopt a trans-disciplinary perspective, consisting in the recognition and harmonization of the special outlooks that together, within the general systemic paradigm, gives an ideal unity to the book.

The investigation of the mind has been one of the major concerns of our philosophical tradition and it still is a dominant subject in modern philosophy as well as in science. Many philosophers in the scientific tradition want to solve the "puzzles of the mind". But many philosophers in the very same tradition do regard these puzzles as puzzles of the brain. So, whilst the former think of the mental as something of its own kind, the latter deny that philosophy of mind has to do with anything else but the brain. And then there are those who think that reduction is the way to go: maybe the mental is brain-dependent and hence reducible to the physical, in some way. This volume collects contributions comprising all those points of view, including articles by William Bechtel, Jerry Fodor, Jaegwon Kim, Joelle Proust and Patrick Suppes.

This work is for scholars, researchers and students in history and philosophy of science focusing on Logical Empiricism and analytic philosophy (of science). It provides historical and systematic research and deals with the influence and impact of the Vienna Circle/Logical Empiricism on today's philosophy of science. It also explores the intellectual context of this scientific philosophy and focuses on main figures and peripheral adherents.

The first book in English to offer a systematic survey of Bolzano's philosophical logic and theory of knowledge, it offers a reconstruction of Bolzano's views on a series of key issues: the analysis of meaning, generality, analyticity, logical consequence, mathematical demonstration and knowledge by virtue of meaning.

Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind aims to reassess the work of Wittgenstein in terms of its importance to contemporary debates surrounding the philosophy of mind.The first part of this study examines Wittgenstein in the context of current views on the human mind in relation to the body and behavior. The arguments confront the views of Quine and Dennett, as well as functionalism, eliminative materialism, and the current debate about consciousness. The essays that make up the second part focus on a particular psychological concept, thinking, imagining, sensation, knowledge, and reason. This study takes a fresh look at this established thinker and demonstrates both the relevance and power of his arguments in the 21st century.

This volumes aim is to provide an introduction to Carnaps book from a historical and philosophical perspective, each chapter focusing on one specific issue. The book will be of interest not only to Carnap scholars but to all those interested in the history of analytical philosophy.

This book is an important and original contribution to the philosophy of art that bridges the disciplines of philosophy and art. It engages with a long-standing debate about what it is that bestows the designation "art" on an artwork. Tiffany Sutton shows how the history of art should influence the classification of visual art. She considers the various theories that have been put forward to define the nature of the artwork and then offers her own set of classificatory norms.

Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

Gilboa and Schmeidler provide a new paradigm for modeling decision making under uncertainty. Case-based decision theory suggests that people make decisions by analogies to past cases: they tend to choose acts that performed well in the past in similar situations, and to avoid acts that performed poorly. The authors describe the general theory and its relationship to planning, repeated choice problems, inductive inference, and learning. They highlight its mathematical and philosophical foundations and compare it to expected utility theory as well as to rule-based systems.

Meaning, Understanding, and Practice is a selection of the most notable essays of an eminent contemporary philosopher on a set of central topics in analytic philosophy. Barry Stroud offers penetrating studies of meaning, understanding, necessity, and the intentionality of thought, with particular reference to the thought of Wittgenstein.

The problem of truth and the liar paradox is one of the most extensive problems of philosophy. The liar paradox can be avoided by assuming a so-called theory of partial truth instead of a classical theory of truth. Theories of partial truth, however, cannot solve the so-called strengthened liar paradox, which is the problem that many semantic statements about the so-called strengthened liar cannot be true in a theory of partial truth. If such semantic statements were true in the theory, another paradox would emerge. To proponents of contextual accounts, which assume that the concept of truth is context-dependent, the strengthened liar paradox is the core of the liar problem. This book provides an overview of current contextual approaches to the strengthened liar paradox. For this purpose, the author investigates formal theories of truth that result from formal reconstructions of such contextual approaches.