A COMPANION TO WITTGENSTEIN The most comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's thought yet compiled, this volume of fifty newly commissioned essays by leading interpreters of his philosophy is a keynote addition to the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. Full of penetrating insights into the life and work of the most important philosopher of the twentieth century, the collection explores the full range of Wittgenstein's contribution to philosophy. It includes essays on his intellectual development, his work in logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, and much else. As well as examining Wittgenstein's contribution to human understanding in detail, the Companion features vital contextual analysis that traces the relationship between his ideas and those of other philosophers and schools of thought, including the Aristotelian and continental philosophical traditions. Authors also address prominent themes that remain current in today's philosophical debates, explaining Wittgenstein's continuing legacy alongside his historical significance. Essential reading for scholars of philosophy at all levels, A Companion to Wittgenstein combines engaging commentary with unrivaled academic authority.

Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being "wholly present" at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct "temporal segments" confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three-dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four-dimensional spacetime "worms"? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns about two major issues in fundamental ontology: parthood and location. It is in this context that broadly empirical considerations are increasingly brought to bear on the debate about persistence. Persistence and Spacetime pursues this empirically based approach to the questions. Yuri Balashov begins by setting out major rival views of persistence - endurance, perdurance, and exdurance - in a spacetime framework and proceeds to investigate the implications of Einstein's theory of relativity for the debate about persistence. His overall conclusion - that relativistic considerations favour four-dimensionalism over three-dimensionalism - is hardly surprising. It is, however, anything but trivial. Contrary to a common misconception, there is no straightforward argument from relativity to four-dimensionalism. The issues involved are complex, and the debate is closely entangled with a number of other philosophical disputes, including those about the nature and ontology of time, parts and wholes, material constitution, causation and properties, and vagueness.

Logic as Universal Science offers a detailed reconstruction of the underlying philosophy in The Principles of Mathematics showing how Russell sought to deliver a death blow to the dominant Kantian view that formal logic is a concise and dry science and unable to enlarge our understanding.

The Sense of Semblance is the first book to incorporate contemporary analytic philosophy in interpretations of art and architecture, literature, and film about the Holocaust. The book's principal aim is to move beyond the familiar debates surrounding postmodernism by demonstrating the usefulness of alternative theories of meaning and understanding from the Anglophone analytic tradition. The book takes as its starting point the claim that Holocaust artworks must fulfill at least two specific yet potentially reciprocally countervailing desiderata: they must meet aesthetic criteria (lest they be, say, merely historical documents) and they must meet historical criteria (they must accurately represent the Holocaust, lest they be merely artworks). I locate this problematic within the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, as a version of the conflict between aesthetic autonomy and aesthetic heteronomy, and claim that Theodor W. Adorno's "dialectic of aesthetic semblance" describes the normative demand that a successful artwork maintain a dynamic tension between these dual desiderata. While working within a framework inspired by Adorno, the book further claims that certain concepts and lines of reasoning from contemporary philosophy best explicate how individual artworks fulfill these dual desiderata, including the causal theory of names, the philosophy of tacit knowledge, analytic philosophy of quotation, Sartre's theory of the imaginary, work in the epistemology of testimony, and Walter Benjamin's theory of dialectical images. Individual chapters provide close readings of lyric poetry by Paul Celan (including a critique of Derridean deconstruction), Holocaust memorials in Berlin, texts by the Austrian quotational artist Heimrad Backer, Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah and Art Spiegelman's graphic novel Maus. The result is a set of interpretations of Holocaust artworks that, in their precision, specificity and clarity, inaugurate a dialogue between contemporary analytic philosophy and contemporary art.

Exploring the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein's thought, Iczkovits challenges the view that Wittgenstein had a vision of language and subsequently a vision of ethics, showing how the two are integrated in his philosophical method, and allowing us to reframe traditional problems in moral philosophy considered as external to questions of meaning.

This historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examines in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions of Dummett's account whilst also engaging with phenomenological approaches and recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

The book consists of a series of chapters on Carnap's ideal of explication as an alternative to the naturalistic conceptions of science, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and enriching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.

Paul Horwich develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy-and not (as assumed by most other commentators) his identification of the meaning of a word with its use-that lies at the foundation of his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion. Thus Horwich's first aim is to give a clear account of Wittgenstein's hyper-deflationist view of what philosophy is, how it should be conducted, and what it might achieve. His second aim is to defend this view against a variety of objections: that is, to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as the correct conception of philosophy itself. And the third aim is to examine the application of this view to a variety of topics-but primarily to language and to experience. A further distinctive feature of this approach is its presupposition that Wittgenstein's ideas may be formulated with precision and that solid arguments may be found on their behalf. This pair of guiding assumptions-the centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support-are admittedly controversial but are vindicated, not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them.

From the author of Wittgenstein's Poker and Would You Kill the Fat Man?, the story of an extraordinary group of philosophers during a dark chapter in Europe's history On June 22, 1936, the philosopher Moritz Schlick was on his way to deliver a lecture at the University of Vienna when Johann Nelboeck, a deranged former student of Schlick's, shot him dead on the university steps. Some Austrian newspapers defended the madman, while Nelboeck himself argued in court that his onetime teacher had promoted a treacherous Jewish philosophy. David Edmonds traces the rise and fall of the Vienna Circle-an influential group of brilliant thinkers led by Schlick-and of a philosophical movement that sought to do away with metaphysics and pseudoscience in a city darkened by fascism, anti-Semitism, and unreason. The Vienna Circle's members included Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and the eccentric logician Kurt Goedel. On its fringes were two other philosophical titans of the twentieth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper. The Circle championed the philosophy of logical empiricism, which held that only two types of propositions have cognitive meaning, those that can be verified through experience and those that are analytically true. For a time, it was the most fashionable movement in philosophy. Yet by the outbreak of World War II, Schlick's group had disbanded and almost all its members had fled. Edmonds reveals why the Austro-fascists and the Nazis saw their philosophy as such a threat. The Murder of Professor Schlick paints an unforgettable portrait of the Vienna Circle and its members while weaving an enthralling narrative set against the backdrop of economic catastrophe and rising extremism in Hitler's Europe.

I wish to express, first of all, my profound gratitude to Professor J. M. Bochenski, without whose assistance the present work would have not been possible. To be concise, I would like to state that his contribution to this book may be viewed at three levels: (1) that of the general spirit, (2) that of the specific ideas, theses or approaches which are expressed in its pages, (3) that of this work qua doctoral dissertation. The general spirit which has guided my research coincides with that underlying Professor: Oochenski's own works, in particular his Formale Logik (Munchen 1956). Moreover, the particular occasion which suggested my investigation was a statement included in that book according to which the literature in the field still lacked a detailed work on Frege (p. 317). I wish, likewise, to express my gratitude to other professors of the University of Fribourg for their generous help. I mention especially Professors P. Wyser, M. D. Philippe, N. Luyten, and V. Kuiper. I have also benefited from Professor E. Specker's lectures at the Eidge nossische Technische Hochschule (ZUrich) and from Professor Olof Gigon's lectures at the University of Bern. From an earlier period I wish to express my gratitude to the professors of the philosophy department of the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, especially the late Professor Francisco Romero. The Swiss National Library (Bern) has greatly facilitated access to bibliographical sources, and the library of the University of Munster (Westphalien) has kindly provided microfilms of Frege's Nachlap."

Analytic philosophy has been a dominant intellectual movement in the 20th century and a reflection of the cultural pre-eminence of scientism. In response to analytic philosophy's peculiar reticence (and inability) to discuss itself, this book provides its first comprehensive history and critique. The central element in the analytic conversation has been the Enlightenment Project: the appeal to an autonomous human reason, freed of any higher authority and channeling itself through science as its privileged tool. This centrality is demonstrated by systematically examining its presence and development in the philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, language, psychology, social science, ethics, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. This journey highlights the internal logical disintegration of that project. Post-modern relativism is its natural offspring and not a viable alternative. The Enlightenment Project's conception of physical science is defective; this defective conception of physical science renders the analytic conception of social science, philosophical psychology, and epistemology defective; and that defective conception of the human condition leads to defective conceptions of both moral and political philosophy, specifically the idea of social engineering or social technology. Throughout the book, an alternative conception of philosophy is presented as a way out of the abyss of analysis, an alternative that reconnects philosophy with the mainstream of Western civilization and initiates the process of providing a coherent cultural narrative. This book will be of particular interest to any sophisticated reader concerned about the lack of a coherent cultural narrative.

Volume III of a tetralogy devoted to Divine Agency and Divine Action articulates a comprehensive vision of systematic theology focused on divine action from creation to eschatology. Volume I developed the foundational conceptual work by showing that the concept of action is a radically open concept that readily makes possible the appropriation of divine action for today. Volume II explained that in exploring divine action one needs to specify the actual divine actions under review and thus showed that there could be no progress with extensive soundings across the tradition from Paul to Molina. Work on divine action requires extended work in doctrinal criticism rooted in the history of theology as a prelude to normative work that communicates a normative vision of divine action for today. This vision is best explored by taking up the great themes of systematic theology from creation to eschatology yet treating them in a deflationary manner that sees systematic theology as university-level, postbaptismal, Christian instruction. Leading scholar William J. Abraham recognises that we live in a golden period of theological studies-the range and depth of material is extraordinary-yet we also live in a period of disorientation and confusion that calls for a fresh engagement with the demands of systematic theology. Divine Agency and Divine Action, Volume III meets that demand by insisting that systematic theology has its own content and modes of inquiry; that it belongs intimately to the journey of faith; and that it requires authentic academic clarity and rigor. It reclaims the rightful place of systematic theology as the center of gravity for theological studies but does so in a manner that makes it available to both the church and to the academy.

Possibility offers a new analysis of the metaphysical concepts of possibility and necessity, one that does not rely on any sort of 'possible worlds'. The analysis proceeds from an account of the notion of a physical object and from the positing of properties and relations. It is motivated by considerations about how we actually speak of and think of objects. Michael Jubien discusses several closely related topics, including different purported varieties of possible worlds, the doctrine of 'essentialism', natural kind terms, and alleged examples of necessity a posteriori. The book also offers a new theory of the functioning of proper names, both actual and fictional, and the discussion of natural kind terms and necessity a posteriori depends in part on this theory.

In Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy, Oskari Kuusela examines Wittgenstein's early and late philosophies of logic, situating their philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. He argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of his contemporaries. Throughout his career Wittgenstein's aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege's and Russell's accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, Kuusela seeks to open up covered up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. Offering a novel interpretation of the philosopher, he explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. In addition, this volume outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein's later work and explaining how his account of logic can be used to dissolve the long-standing methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy. It is of interest to scholars, researchers, and advance students of philosophy interested in engaging with a number of scholarly debates.

What is it to understand another person? A popular view in philosophy of mind, cognitive science and various other disciplines is that interpersonal understanding is a matter ofemploying a 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, consisting primarily of an ability to attribute internal propositional attitudes on the basis of behavioural observations. The emphasis of recent debates has been on which mechanisms enable us to do this, how they arise during development and how they might have evolved, rather than on whether we actually do it at all. Ratcliffe disputes the shared premise on which these debates rest. He argues that 'folk psychology', as generally described, is a theoretically motivated, simplistic and misleading abstraction from social life, which is wrongly asserted to be 'commonsense' or 'what the folk think'. Drawing on phenomenology, neuroscience and development psychology, he offers an alternative account of interpersonal understanding. This account emphasizes a distinctive kind of bodily relatedness between people and the extent to which interpersonal interactions are regulated by shared social environments.

This book is a defence of the philosophy of common sense in the spirit of Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, drawing on the work of Aristotle, evolutionary biology and psychology, and historical studies on the origins of early modern philosophy. It defines and explores common sense beliefs, and defends them from challenges from prominent philosophers.

First published in 1973, Rules and Meanings is an anthology of works that form part of Mary Douglas' struggle to devise an anthropological modernism conducive to her opposition to reputedly modernizing trends in contemporary society. The collection contains works by Wittgenstein, Schutz, Husserl, Hertz and other continentals. The underlying themes of the anthology are the construction of meaning, the force of hidden background assumptions, tacit conventions and the power of spatial organization to reinforce words. The work serves to complement the philosophers' work on everyday language with the anthropologists' theory of everyday knowledge.

Scientific concepts, laws, theories and models are representations but are uniquely different. This book explores each within an original, philosophical framework rooted in the Kantian tradition. Through a revisionist historical approach, it shows how this tradition helps us rethink contemporary issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science.

This book argues that it is not obvious what we means by saying our beliefs and assertions are 'truth-directed'. Do we weaken our notion of a belief if we deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism? This book defends a radically new 'ecological' model of knowledge, examining what might happen if we abandoned genuine belief.

If you take for granted the widespread assumption of our culture that matter constitutes the totality of reality, this book will challenge that assumption. The pervasive materialist or physicalist presupposition of so much thinking is not scientifically established but is a basic article of naturalistic faith. Professor Hick argues that the widely held belief that consciousness is identical with or a by-product of the functioning of the brain is unsustainable. There is non-physical as well as physical reality. It is entirely possible that there is a divine realm transcending the material universe but encountered in religious experience. He looks carefully at the epistemological implications of this. But Hick also challenges many traditional religious beliefs. He distinguishes between religion as human institutions, which have done as much harm as good in the world, and religion as the inner spiritual response to the Transcendent. Whereas institutional religion has divided humanity, spiritual or mystical experience can unite people of every part of the world.

This book is a Wittgensteinian study of concept possession and conceptual investigation in philosophy. It offers advanced introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy and original treatment of its most crucial regions. Written as a Socratic dialogue, with a glance to Plato, it makes a bold claim about Wittgenstein's place in Western philosophy.

In the early twentieth century, an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F.H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The outcome was momentous: the demise of British Idealism and the rise of analytic philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh this formative period in twentieth-cenutry thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

Does the self - a unified, separate, persisting thinker/owner/agent - exist? Drawing on Western philosophy, neurology and Theravadin Buddhism, this book argues that the self is an illusion created by a tier of non-illusory consciousness and a tier of desire-driven thought and emotion, and that separateness underpins the self's illusory status.

A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and necessity and possibility - the concepts of modality - was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that these concepts are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible, and the actual. In this book, the first of two volumes, Sanford Shieh investigates the grounds of this position and its consequences for Frege's and Russell's conceptions of logic. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The upshot of this opposition to modality is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would have to be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance, though the coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays because it is generally assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions.

A Theory of Argument is an advanced textbook intended for students in philosophy, communications studies and linguistics who have completed at least one course in argumentation theory, information logic, critical thinking or formal logic. Containing nearly 400 exercises, Mark Vorobej develops a novel approach to argument interpretation and evaluation. One of the key themes of the book is that we cannot succeed in distinguishing good argument from bad arguments until we learn to listen carefully to others. Part I develops a relativistic account of argument cogency that allows for rational disagreement. Part II offers a comprehensive and rigorous account of argument diagramming. Hybrid arguments are contrasted with linked and convergent arguments, and a novel technique is introduced for graphically recording disagreements with authorial claims.