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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
This book is a discussion of some of the major philosophical problems centering around the topic of sense perception and the foundations of human knowledge. It begins with a characterization of our common sense understanding of the role of the senses in the acquisition of belief, and it argues that scientific accounts of the processes of perception undermine salient parts of this understanding. The naive point of view of direct realism cannot be sustained in the light of a scientifically instructed understanding of perception. This critique of direct realism points to the correctness of the representative theory of perception characteristic of such early modem philosophers as Descartes and Locke, and it also endorses the subjective tum that they defended. It argues that these positions do not require introducing sense data into the picture, and thus it avoids the intractable problems that the sense datum philosophy introduces. In addition, several versions of cognitive accounts of sense perception are criticized with the result that it is unnecessary to characterize sensory processes in intentional terms. The book then turns to a leading question introduced into modem philosophy by Descartes and Locke, the question of the accuracy of the information delivered by the senses to our faculty of belief. In particular, how accurate are our representations of the secondary qualities? The case of color is considered in detail.
This monograph is unique in its kind, giving as it does an independent and self-contained introduction to the eight prominent verisimilitude proposals that make up the verisimilitude literature after the breakdown of Popper's definition in 1974. The author brings them together by comparing the ways in which they order propositional formulae. Using this method, he shows that the distinction of content and likeness definitions partitions the entire field of investigation. In addition, it is shown that the weak content definitions can be strengthened by incorporating considerations of similarity between possible worlds. The resulting refined verisimilitude definition has many desirable properties. For instance, it is the first qualitative proposal that evades the problem of truth-value dependence. In addition, in chapter five the often discussed and misunderstood problem of "language dependency" is solved. The book will be of interest to those working in the fields of logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, and (computational) linguistics.
This book offers an integrated historical and philosophical examination of the origin of genetics. The author contends that an integrated HPS analysis helps us to have a better understanding of the history of genetics, and sheds light on some general issues in the philosophy of science. This book consists of three parts. It begins with historical problems, revisiting the significance of the work of Mendel, de Vries, and Weldon. Then it turns to integrated HPS problems, developing an exemplar-based analysis of the development and the progress in early genetics. Finally, it discusses philosophical problems: conceptual change, evidence, and theory choice. Part I lays out a new historiography, serving as a basis for the discussions in part II and part III. Part II introduces a new integrated HPS method to analyse and interpret the historiography in Part I and to re-examine the philosophical issues in Part III. Part III develops new philosophical accounts which will in turn make a better sense of the history of scientific practice more generally. This book provides a practical defence of integrated HPS: the best way to defend integrated HPS is to do it.
Philosophy of Probability provides a comprehensive introduction to theoretical issues that occupy a central position in disciplines ranging from philosophy of mind and epistemology to cognitive science, decision theory and artificial intelligence. Some contributions shed new light on the standard conceptions of probability (Bayesianism, logical and computational theories); others offer detailed analyses of two important topics in the field of cognitive science: the meaning and the representation of (partial) belief, and the management of uncertainty. The authors of this well-balanced account are philosophers as well as computer scientists (among them, L.J. Cohen, D. Miller, P. Gardenfors, J. Vickers, D. Dubois and H. Prade). This multidisciplinary approach to probability is designed to illuminate the intricacies of the problems in the domain of cognitive inquiry. No one interested in epistemology or aritificial intelligence will want to miss it.
Expressionism, Deleuze's philosophical commentary on Spinoza, is a critically important work because its conclusions provide the foundations for Deleuze's later metaphysical speculations on the nature of power, the body, difference and singularities. Deleuze and Spinoza is the first book to examine Deleuze's philosophical assessment of Spinoza and appraise his arguments concerning the Absolute, the philosophy of mind, epistemology and moral and political philosophy. The author respects and disagrees with Deleuze the philosopher and suggests that his arguments not only lead to eliminativism and an Hobbesian politics but that they also cast a mystifying spell.
This monograph investigates the development of hydrostatics as a science. In the process, it sheds new light on the nature of science and its origins in the Scientific Revolution. Readers will come to see that the history of hydrostatics reveals subtle ways in which the science of the seventeenth century differed from previous periods. The key, the author argues, is the new insights into the concept of pressure that emerged during the Scientific Revolution. This came about due to contributions from such figures as Simon Stevin, Pascal, Boyle and Newton. The author compares their work with Galileo and Descartes, neither of whom grasped the need for a new conception of pressure. As a result, their contributions to hydrostatics were unproductive. The story ends with Newton insofar as his version of hydrostatics set the subject on its modern course. He articulated a technical notion of pressure that was up to the task. Newton compared the mathematical way in hydrostatics and the experimental way, and sided with the former. The subtleties that lie behind Newton's position throws light on the way in which developments in seventeenth-century science simultaneously involved mathematization and experimentation. This book serves as an example of the degree of conceptual change that new sciences often require. It will be of interest to those involved in the study of history and philosophy of science. It will also appeal to physicists as well as interested general readers.
People believe in a great many things; and yet most of us know almost nothing about why other people believe what they do, or indeed about how it feels to believe it. This book presents an objective method for understanding and comparing belief systems - irrespective of whether the investigator happens to agree with them.
A provocative approach to the possibility of philosophical ethics, this study argues that all moral positions and theories are bound to fail. Using the dialectical tensions inherent to competing moral claims as his starting point, Michael Steinmann explains what he terms the "failure of morality" both in classical and contemporary positions. As moral claims lead in various ways to contradictions, the history of morality presents itself as an endless series of controversies. By using dialectical thinking, which has gone out of favour in current philosophy, Steinmann shows how we can capture the limitations of moral theories in a more holistic way. Without embracing skepticism about moral claims, a non-naturalistic and non-relativistic understanding of the good emerges as the fundamental notion of moral thought. Reframing Ethics Through Dialectics reinvigorates the classical notion of "the absolute good" as a fruitful conceptual structure through which to understand competing moral claims, without simply reproducing neo-Aristotelian literature on the good life. From the perspective of the good, the study allows us to take non-traditional theories more seriously, making space for moral philosophy to acknowledge and embrace the contradictions that all positions incur.
Despite their neglect in many histories of ideas in the West, the Cambridge Platonists constitute the most significant and influential group of thinkers in the Platonic tradition between the Florentine Renaissance and the Romantic Age. This anthology offers readers a unique, thematically structured compendium of their key texts, along with an extensive introduction and a detailed account of their legacy. The volume draws upon a resurgence of interest in thinkers such as Benjamin Whichcote, 1609-1683; Ralph Cudworth, 1618-1688; Henry More, 1614-1687; John Smith, 1618-1652, and Anne Conway 1631-1679, and includes hitherto neglected extracts and some works of less familiar authors within the group, like George Rust 1627?-1670; Joseph Glanville, 1636-1680 and John Norris 1657-1712. It also highlights the Cambridge Platonists’ important role in the history of philosophy and theology, influencing luminaries such as Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Leibniz, Joseph de Maistre, S.T. Coleridge, and W.R. Emerson. The Cambridge Platonist Anthology is an indispensable guide to the serious study of a pivotal group of Western metaphysicians, and is of great value for both students and scholars of philosophy, literature, history, and theology. Key Features The only systematic anthology to the Cambridge Platonists available, facilitating quick comprehension of key themes and ideas Uses new translations of the Latin works, vastly improving upon faulty and misleading earlier translations Offers a wide range of new perspective on the Cambridge Platonists, showing the extent of their influence in early modern philosophy and beyond.
Intuitionism is one of the main foundations for mathematics proposed in the twentieth century and its views on logic have also notably become important with the development of theoretical computer science. This book reviews and completes the historical account of intuitionism. It also presents recent philosophical work on intuitionism and gives examples of new technical advances and applications. It brings together 21 contributions from today's leading authors on intuitionism.
The study is the linking of view of science with the Qur'an related to the development of science. Approach that links, this faith is one way to provide an appropriate understanding of the true religion with the development of contemporary science. During the times that are not sent Messengers and Prophets, Muslims who have an understanding of the Qur'an must play a role in the expanding missionary and apostle and prophet continued to work to continue the history of civilization. In this paper the finding of investigating people about view of people about the harmonize between the Quran and science is formulated through mathematics formula.
This book derives from a 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom. The Institute took place at the University of California, Berkeley, and was co-directed by Keith Lehrer and Nicholas D. Smith. The aims of the Institute were several: we sought to reintroduce wisdom as a topic of discussion among contemporary philosophers, to undertake an historical investigation of how and when and why it was that wisdom faded from philosophical view, and to ask how contemporary epistemological theories might apply to the obviously related subjects of teaching and wisdom. In recruiting participants, Lehrer and Smith put the greatest emphasis on those with professional interests in epistemology and the history of philosophy, of the ancient Greeks especially ancient Greek philosophy (because in the writings all three subjects of the Institute were explicitly related and discussed). But in addition to these two groups, some effort was made also to include others, with academic specializations in a variety of fields other than epistemology and the history of philosophy, to ensure that a broad perspective could be achieved in our discussions. To an obvious extent, the papers in this book reflect the recruitment emphases and variety. They also testify to the extent that the Institute managed to bring life to our subjects, and to raise very old questions in a contemporary context.
This lucid, informal, and very accessible history of Western
thought takes the unique approach of interpreting skepticism--i.e.,
doubts about knowledge claims and the criteria for making such
claims--as an important stimulus for the development of philosophy.
The authors argue that practically every great thinker from the
time of the Greeks to the present has produced theories designed to
forestall or refute skepticism: from Plato to Moore and
Wittgenstein. The influence of and responses to such 20th-century
skeptics as Russell and Derrida are also discussed critically.
The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegel's theory of knowledge into main stream epist ology. Hegel's views were formed in consideration of Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegel's discussion in the context of both traditional and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments, and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegel's problematic and method by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston. I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons. One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine of "knowledge by acquaintance," in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be reconstructed within the bounds of this study.
Why is epistemic fallibilism a viable topic for Christian thought and cultural engagement today? Religious fundamentalists and scientific positivists tend to deal with reality in terms of "knockdown" arguments, and such binary approaches to lived reality have helped to underwrite the belligerence and polarization that mark this age of the social media echo chamber. For those who want to take both religion and science seriously, epistemic fallibilism offers a possible moderating stance that claims neither too much nor too little for either endeavor, nor forces a decision for one side over and against the other. This book uses this epistemological approach to fallibilism as a positive resource for conversations that arise at the intersection of philosophy, theology, and religion. The essays explore a range of openings into the interstices of these often siloed fields, with the aim of overcoming some of the impasses separating diverse ways of knowing.
Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
From the mid-1960s, after the important works by J. Hintikka, S. Korner, W. Sellars and P.F. Strawson, there has been a marked revival of Kantian epistemological thought. Against this background, featuring fruitful exchange between historical research and theoretical prospects, the main point of the book is the discussion of Kantian theory of scientific knowledge from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy and philosophy of empirical and mathematical sciences. The main topics are the problem of a priori knowledge in logic, mathematics and physics, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the constitution of physical objectivity and the questions of realism and truth, the Kantian conception of time, causal laws and induction, the relations between Kantian epistemological thought, relativity theory, quantum theory and some recent developments of philosophy of science. The book is addressed to research workers, specialists and scholars in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of science and history of philosophy. "
Immanuel Kant has long been considered one of the leading exponents of the theory of knowledge with his philosophical writings inspiring generations of political theorists, underpinning many notions and ideas on the concept of progress. Based on and innovative reading of Kant's theory of knowledge, this book challenges contemporary critiques of the concept of progress from post-Marxist, post-Modern and or existentialist approaches which dismiss progress as an anachronistic and deceptive concept that has formed the basis of many of modernity's abominations. Instead this book reveals Kant's unique synthetic theory of knowledge, arguing that the idea of progress should be thought of as a crucial political idea in matters of political management at the outset of the 21st century.
This book is meant to serve as an introduction to the philosophy of Thomas Reid by way of a study of certain themes central to that philosophy as we find it expounded in his extensive and influential published writings. The choice of these themes inevitably reflects philosophical interests of the author of this book to some extent but a main consideration behind their selection is that they are extensively treated by Reid in response to treatments by certain of his predecessors in an identifiable tradition called by Yolton 'The Way ofIdeas'. My interest in Reid's philosophy was first awakened by the brilliant writings of A.N. Prior, and in particular by Part II of his posthumous 'Objects of Thought' called 'What we think about' together with his suggestion that Reid was a precursor of Mill on the signification of proper names. It is my hope that the standard of exegesis and of discussion throughout the book, and especially in the case of these topics, is a not unworthy tribute to that thinker.
"English Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification)" develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold. The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the characteristic of legitimation back to an originary appeal to which consciousness is exposed by experience. Legitimizing structures are thus to be understood as a predicative answer to this prepredicative appeal.This book investigates both the epistemological and the ethical fields, working mainly with Husserl's genetic theory in "Experience and Judgement". It offers a new and comprehensive reading of Husserl's ethics and a critical dialogue with Levinas' ethics of alterity and Apels' discourse ethics."German Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung" entwickelt eine phanomenologische Theorie des 'rechtlichen Denkens'.Dabei handelt es sich um eine erste systematische Untersuchung derjenigen Bewusstseinsstrukturen, die ein Begrunden, Ausweisen und Rechtfertigen uberhaupt erst ermoglichen. Die grundlegende Frage ist, wie Rechtsanspruche, die sowohl erkenntnistheoretischen als auch ethischen Urteilen inharent sind, als ein Grundmerkmal des Erfahrens verstanden werden konnen. Die vorliegende These gibt eine genetische Antwort auf diese Frage. Sie fuhrt den Rechtscharakter im Denken auf einen ursprunglichen Anspruch zuruck, dem Bewusstsein im Erfahren immer schon ausgesetzt ist.Rechtliche Strukturen mussen daher als eine pradikative Antwort auf ein vorpradikatives Angesprochen-Sein begriffen werden. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht sowohl den ethischen als auch den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich, wobei Husserls genetische Phanomenologie in Erfahrung und Urteil den methodischen Hintergrund bildet. Es bietet ausserdem eine neue und umfassende Lekture von Husserls Schriften zur Ethik, sowie einen kritischen Dialog mit der Alteritatsethik von Levinas und der Diskursethik Apels.
Conceptual Tension: Essays on Kinship, Politics, and Individualism is a critical philosophical examination of the role of concepts and concept formation in social sciences. Written by Leon J. Goldstein, a preeminent Jewish philosopher who examined the epistemological foundations of social science inquiry during the second half of the twentieth century, the book undertakes a study of concept formation and change by looking at the four critical terms in anthropology (kinship), politics (parliament and Rousseau's concept of the general will), and sociology (individualism). The author challenges prevailing notions of concept formation and definition, specifically assertions by Gottlieb Frege that concepts have fixed, clear boundaries that are not subject to change. Instead, drawing upon arguments by R.G. Collingwood, Goldstein asserts that concepts have a historical dimension with boundaries and meanings that change with their use and context. Goldstein's work provides insight for philosophers, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and Judaica scholars interested in the study and meaning of critical concepts within their fields.
"Between Eternities" interweaves the assertions of Science, Philosophy, Religion and Mysticism on the fundamental issues that underlie the universe and life, allowing a reader to find a meaning.
This is a new monograph offering the first focused study of the place of transcendental arguments within Kant's system as a whole.Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable.However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour of Empiricism. This book offers the first extended analysis of Kant's method of proof in philosophy. The author constructs a model based on Kant's own statements about his procedure and then examines his famous proofs in light of it. Great emphasis is placed on historical accuracy and the debunking of popular myths about Kant's aims and doctrines. The result is a compelling new picture of Kant that will challenge current assumptions. |
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