This volume combines philosophy, the social theory of knowledge, and historical analysis to present a comprehensive study of the idea of certainty as defined in the Western and Chinese intellectual traditions. Philosophical ideas such as certainty are the products of deeply layered socio-historical constructions. The author shows how the highly abstract idea of certainty in philosophical discourse is connected to the concrete social process from which the meaning of certainty is derived. Three different versions of certainty--in modern Western thought, in German Idealism, and in traditional Chinese philosophy--are examined in the context of a historical-comparative study of Western and Chinese social processes.

Three versions of the idea of certainty are represented by the three distinct philosophical discourse and societies explored in this book. However, the pursuit of certainty transcends culture as a fundamental aspect of philosophical thought. This in-depth study shows how the social genesis and function in philosophy of the specific meaning of certainty has been delineated through a process of complex idealogical negotiation by dominant social groups--the bourgeoisie in modern Western Europe, the nobility and state bureaucrats in 18th- and 19th-century Germany, and the landed gentry in traditional China. The author concludes by suggesting new avenues for study inspired by his research.

"Di Iorio offers a new approach to Hayek's Sensory Order, linking neuroscience to the old Verstehen tradition and to contemporary theories of self-organizing systems; this should be on the reading list of everyone who is interested in Hayek's thought." Barry Smith University at Buffalo, editor of The Monist "This impressive and well-researched book breaks new ground in our understanding of F.A. Hayek and of methodological individualism more generally. It shows that methodological individualism sanctions neither an atomistic view of society nor a mechanical determinism. The book carefully analyzes an important tradition in the social sciences, and compares it to many important philosophical, sociological and economic systems of thought. This is an enlightening book for all scholars interested in the methodological problems of the social sciences." Mario J. Rizzo New York University "One of Hayek's most important contributions is his linking of complex methodological individualism, which deals with the emergence of spontaneous orders and unintended collective structures in complex self-organizing social systems, with a cognitive psychology. What makes Francesco Di Iorio's book of great interest is that, by building on Hayek's seminal book The Sensory Order, it deepens the connections between cognition and rules of just conduct, taking into account relevant theories on subjectivity and consciousness such as phenomenology, hermeneutics and enactivism." Jean Petitot Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, EHESS, Paris "In this thoughtful and enlightening book Francesco Di Iorio uses Hayek's cognitive psychology as the starting point for investigation of the relationship between the autonomy of the agent and socio-cultural influences within methodological individualism. The book provides an illuminating and innovative analysis of a central issue in the philosophy of social science by setting Hayek's view on mind and action in fruitful relation to approaches such as Gadamer's hermeneutics, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, Varela's and Maturana's enaction, Boudon's interpretative sociology, Popper's fallibilism and Mises' praxeology. One of the most interesting aspects of this book is its argument that hermeneutics and fallibilism refer not to two different methods but to the same one." Dario Antiseri Emeritus Professor at LUISS University, Rome "Francesco Di Iorio's book explores, in an original way, the connections between Hayek's methodological individualism and his fascinating idea that human mind is both an interpretative device and a self-organizing system. It is a brilliant, clearly written work, characterized by a certain intellectual courage, which makes a remarkable contribution to the sociology of knowledge." Gerald Bronner Paris Diderot University

In this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing, Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's epistemic norms - the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to accept some theories and not others. Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. The third part is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formulating inferences to behaviour. Finally, he presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological naturalism. By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.

Once treated as the absence of knowledge, ignorance has now become a highly influential and rapidly growing topic in its own right. This new edition of the seminal text in the field is fully revised and includes new and expanded chapters on religion; domestic law and jurisprudence; sexuality and gender studies; memory studies; international relations; psychology; decision-theory; and colonial history. The study of ignorance has attracted growing attention across the natural and social sciences where a wide range of scholars explore the social life and political issues involved in the distribution and strategic use of not knowing. This handbook reflects the interdisciplinary field of ignorance studies by drawing contributions from economics, sociology, history, philosophy, cultural studies, anthropology, feminist studies, and related fields to serve as a path-breaking guide to the political, legal and social uses of ignorance in social and political life. This book will be indispensable for anyone seeking to understand the important role played by ignorance in contemporary society, culture and politics. Chapter 21 of this book is available for free in PDF format as Open Access from the individual product page at www.routledge.com. It has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution- Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.

These two volumes contain all of my articles published between 1956 and 1975 which might be of interest to readers in the English-speaking world. The first three essays in Vol. 1 deal with historical themes. In each case I as far as possible, meets con have attempted a rational reconstruction which, temporary standards of exactness. In The Problem of Universals Then and Now some ideas of W.V. Quine and N. Goodman are used to create a modern sketch of the history of the debate on universals beginning with Plato and ending with Hao Wang's System L. The second article concerns Kant's Philosophy of Science. By analyzing his position vis-a-vis I. Newton, Christian Wolff, and D. Hume, it is shown that for Kant the very notion of empirical knowledge was beset with a funda mental logical difficulty. In his metaphysics of experience Kant offered a solution differing from all prior as well as subsequent attempts aimed at the problem of establishing a scientific theory. The last of the three historical papers utilizes some concepts of modern logic to give a precise account of Wittgenstein's so-called Picture Theory of Meaning. E. Stenius' interpretation of this theory is taken as an intuitive starting point while an intensional variant of Tarski's concept of a relational system furnishes a technical instrument. The concepts of inodel world and of logical space, together with those of homomorphism and isomorphism be tween model worlds and between logical spaces, form the conceptual basis of the reconstruction."

The essays collected in this volume and written between 1959-1980 clearly belong to professional philosophy in both tone and context. Yet their ultimate aim is to explore larger problems and to set the groundwork for dealing with them. For the focus of attention throughout is human nature, not so much in the details of its structure or its social and moral manifestations as in its most general features and constituents. What sort of beings we are and how mind and body are related is the question at the very core of all inquiries into human nature.

This is the first book to offer a philosophical engagement with microaggressions. It aims to provide an intersectional analysis of microaggressions that cuts across multiple dimensions of oppression and marginalization, and to engage a variety of perspectives that have been sidelined within the discipline of philosophy. The volume gathers a diverse group of contributors: philosophers of color, philosophers with disabilities, philosophers of various nationalities and ethnicities, and philosophers of several gender identities. Their unique frames of analysis articulate both how the concept of microaggressions can be used to clarify and sharpen our understanding of subtler aspects of oppression and how analysis, expansion, and reconceiving the notion of a microaggression can deepen and extend its explanatory power. The essays in the volume seek to defend microaggressions from common critiques and to explain their impact beyond the context of college students. Some of the guiding questions that this volume explores include, but are not limited to, the following: Can microaggressions be established as a viable scientific concept? What roles do microaggressions play in other oppressive phenomena like transphobia, fat phobia, and abelism? How can epistemological challenges around microaggressions be addressed via feminist theory, critical race theory, disability theory, or epistemologies of ignorance? What insights can be gleaned from intersectional analyses of microaggressions? Are there domain-specific analyses of microaggressions that would give insight to features of that domain, i.e. microaggressions related to sexuality, athletics, immigration status, national origin, body type, or ability. Microaggressions and Philosophy features cutting-edge research on an important topic that will appeal to a wide range of students and scholars across disciplines. It includes perspectives from philosophy of psychology, empirically informed philosophy, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, disability theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy.

We speak of the right to know with relative ease. You have the right to know the results of a medical test or to be informed about the collection and use of personal data. But what exactly is the right to know, and who should we trust to safeguard it? This book provides the first comprehensive examination of the right to know and other epistemic rights: rights to goods such as information, knowledge and truth. These rights play a prominent role in our information-centric society and yet they often go unnoticed, disregarded and unprotected. As such, those who control what we know, or think we know, exert an influence on our lives that is often as dangerous as it is imperceptible. Beginning with a rigorous but accessible philosophical account of epistemic rights, Lani Watson examines the harms caused by epistemic rights violations, drawing on case studies across medical, political and legal contexts. She investigates who has the right to what information, who is responsible for the quality and circulation of information and what epistemic duties we have towards each other. This book is essential reading for philosophers, legal theorists and anyone concerned with the protection and promotion of information, knowledge and truth. .

This book presents the first sustained articulation of a Foucauldian oeuvre. It situates Foucault's critique within the tradition of Kant's call for a philosophical archaeology of reason; in parallel, it demonstrates the priority in Foucault's thought of Nietzsche over Heidegger and the framing of reason against an ontology of power. Bregham Dalgliesh hereby claims that at the heart of the Foucauldian oeuvre is the philosophical method of critical history. Its task is to make the will to know that drives thought conscious of itself as a problem, especially the regimes of truth that define our governmentalities. By revealing the contingency of their constituent parts of knowledge, power and ethics, Dalgliesh demonstrates that critical history offers an alternative mode of critique to the hithertofore singular reading of the intellectual heritage of enlightenment, while it fosters an agonistic concept of freedom in respect of our putatively necessary limits.

This book investigates how collaborative scientific practice yields scientific knowledge. At a time when most of today's scientific knowledge is created in research groups, the author reconsiders the social character of science to address the question of whether collaboratively created knowledge should be considered as collective achievement, and if so, in which sense. Combining philosophical analysis with qualitative empirical inquiry, this book provides a comparative case study of mono- and interdisciplinary research groups, offering insight into the day-to-day practice of scientists. The book includes field observations and interviews with scientists to present an empirically-grounded perspective on much-debated questions concerning research groups' division of labor, relations of epistemic dependence and trust.

This book shows the importance of knowledge production using requisite terms and frameworks to the broader scheme of epistemic liberation in Africa. The text considers what this veritable direction to knowledge production would mean to other areas of concern in African philosophy such as morality, education and the environment. These contributions are important because the success of decolonising projects in African countries depend upon the methods that underpin envisioned liberative knowledge production in light of Africa's historical and present condition. This volume appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology and African philosophy.

The Osirian Codex was written as if were three sage scribes each having a different point of views but in essence all of them are looking at the same thing from different windows. This literary work of esoteric philosophy, ethics and wisdom also includes the subtitle, "Twt-Mos and the Homosexual," the "Eye of Heru," "The Divine Androgyny, Adam" and others esoteric and apocryphal work, which may be radical. The book is also apocalyptic and apocryphal in some sense but it is not intended to harm no one or to impose and convert but to show and reflect gnosis, the salvation of humanity and the path of esoteric enlightenment.

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.

This book provides an account of what is to know what things are, focusing on kinds, both natural (such as water) and social (such as marriage). It brings tools from an area that has received much attention in recent years, the epistemology of inquiry. The knowledge of what things are is to be understood as resulting from successful inquiries directed at questions of the form 'What is x?', where x stands for a given kind of thing. The book also addresses knowledge-wh in general (which includes knowledge-who and knowledge-where), as well as the phenomenon of ignorance regarding what things are and our obligations in respect to knowing what things are. It also brings to light new avenues of research for those interested in the relation between the knowledge of what things are and concept possession and amelioration. 'Knowing What Things Are' should be of interest to researchers in Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Social Philosophy and Linguistics.

The task of the book is not to give a survey of the main theories on truth found in the literature. There are several books available which do this: The one of David for Deflationist (and Disquotational) Theories of Truth; that of Chapuis for Revision Theories of Truth; that of Kirkham for Correspondence Theories and several others; that ofRescher for Coherence Theories of Truth. Moreover the book is not an analy sis just of Tar ski's theory, like that of Moreno or the respective chapters in Kirkham, though Tarski's theory plays an important role in the whole work presented. The task of the book is to give a detailed answer to some basic questions on truth which have been perennial problems through the centuries and are still discussed today. The answer is given in the light of our knowledge today and with the help of modem logic. But the book explicitly aims at connecting recent problems with re lated ones in the whole history of philosophy. The method to incorporate important philosophers of the tradition into the analysis is that of disputation, i. e. of putting some of their main thesis into objections or counterobjections pro or contra a posi tive answer to the respective question. After the pros and cons are given a detailed answer to the question is proposed and finally commentaries and corrections are given to the objections and counterobjections in the light of the proposed answer."

Modern study of the mind is marked by the hegemony of thought, dominance of consciousness, and dictate of deliberation that result in an overwhelming intellectualism. However, it ignores the fundamental fact that by far most of our mental activity is not manifested in explicit reasoning, and is mostly not conscious. What then enables our successful participation in the natural, social, and cultural surroundings without recourse to the 'higher' cognitive processes? The background. It is the implicit and efficacious guide in human coping with the world without the monitoring reason. Yet how rules turn into routines? How conscious efforts convert into unreflective skills? How does the body of knowledge become the knowing body? How can most complex reactions of the human mind turn into 'just doing'? The lesson from the background teaches us that we are capacitated to do more than we explicitly know; the sort of knowledge is skilled and automated competence which is there before the conscious 'self' can report of its emergence.

Is nature creation or merely the product of non-intentional, natural processes? Mats Wahlberg argues that our perceptual experiences of nature can settle this question in favor of creation. He suggests that biological nature has expressive properties of a kind similar to human behavior and art. We may therefore be able to perceive - directly - nature as creation, i.e. as expressive of the mind of a creator. This idea resonates with the traditional Christian claim that God's invisible nature can be 'clearly perceived in the things that have been made' (Rom 1:20). Wahlberg's interpretation of this claim contradicts the common view that the existence of a creator must be established by inferential argument. The book's thesis is compatible with the fact that biological organisms have evolved by natural selection. Its viability depends, however, on the rejection of certain common assumptions about the nature of mind and perception - assumptions that may properly be called 'Cartesian'. The author presents and defends an anti-Cartesian stance on mind and perception, inspired mainly by the work of the philosopher John McDowell. The philosophical resources provided by this stance are then drawn on to defend the book's version of natural theology.

Philosophy, Aristotle is well known to have said, begins in wonder. So, of course, does everything else. Astronomy begins in wonder at the moving lights in the sky; biology, in wonder at the living creatures of the earth; psychology, in wonder at the intricacies and eccentricities of our distinctively human form of life. So, at best, wonder is only a necessary condition for philosophy. What. is peculiar about philosophers is what we are inclined to wonder about. We wonder about everything. In particular, we wonder about astron omy and biology and psychology (and about philosophy) - about whether and how such disciplines are possible and, crucially, about whether and how such disciplines fit together. We don't just wonder about everything. We wonder about everything all at once. Philosophers are general practitioners. Things stand ill with our disciplme today. There was quite recently at large in America an occasional publication under the title Jobs in Philosophy. The title rested upon a confusion, and the publication furthered the confusion upon which it rested. For it did not, in fact, list jobs in philosophy. It couldn't."

This book offers a comprehensive update on the scientific realism debate, enabling readers to gain a novel appreciation of the role of objectivity and truth in science and to understand fully the various ways in which antirealist conceptions have been subjected to challenge over recent decades. Authoritative representatives of different philosophical traditions explain their perspectives on the meaning and validity of scientific realism and describe the strategies being adopted to counter persisting antirealist positions. The coverage extends beyond the usual discussion of realism within the context of the natural sciences, and especially physics, to encompass also its applicability in mathematics, logic, and the human sciences. The book will appeal to all with an interest in the recent realist epistemologies of science, the nature of current philosophical debate, and the ongoing rehabilitation of truth as the legitimate goal of scientific research.

The text is structured in chronological and ideological order and presents nine basic types of the classical perception of the problem of knowledge through an analysis of the atomistic theory of perception, Platonism, Aristotle's doctrine, scepticism, rationalism, sensualism, Kant's theory, phenomenological-existential, pragmatic, and (post) analytical perceptions. The proposed work aspires to be an introduction (not a complete presentation, neither in the number of types, nor in a full interpretation) and a basis for the reader's interpretations which is reflected in the structure of the text.

This open access book focuses on a particular but significant topic in the social sciences: the concepts of "footprint" and "trace". It associates these concepts with hotly debated topics such as surveillance capitalism and knowledge society. The editors and authors discuss the concept footprints and traces as unintended by-products of other (differently focused and oriented) actions that remain empirically imprinted in virtual and real spaces. The volume therefore opens new scenarios for social theory and applied social research in asking what the stakes, risks and potential of this approach are. It systematically raises and addresses these questions within a consistent framework, bringing together a heterogeneous group of international social scientists. Given the multifaceted objectives involved in exploring footprints and traces, the volume discusses heuristic aspects and ethical dimensions, scientific analyses and political considerations, empirical perspectives and theoretical foundations. At the same time, it brings together perspectives from cultural analysis and social theory, communication and Internet studies, big-data informed research and computational social science. This innovative volume is of interest to a broad interdisciplinary readership: sociologists, communication researchers, Internet scholars, anthropologists, cognitive and behavioral scientists, historians, and epistemologists, among others.

This book explores the methodological strategies for linking philosophy and neuroscience concerning the study of the conscious brain. The author focuses on four distinct methods for relating these two academic disciplines: isolationist, reductionist, neurophenomenological, and non-reductionist. After analyzing the pros and cons of these approaches, Steven S. Gouveia applies them to the concept of Qualia and Information to understand how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each approach influence the definitions of those specific concepts. Gouveia argues for an approach that conceives the interdisciplinarity of both philosophy and neuroscience, in a particular and sound methodology, offering empirical examples of the explanatory power of this methodology over the others. Additionally, he shows how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each methodology-usually taken by researchers implicitly and unconsciously-influence their own approach to the methodological problem.

This book makes the case for a pragmatist approach to the practice of social inquiry and knowledge production. Through diverse examples from multiple disciplines, contributors explore the power of pragmatism to inform a practice of inquiry that is democratic, community-centred, problem-oriented and experimental. Drawing from both classical and neo-pragmatist perspectives, the book advances a pragmatist sensibility in which truth and knowledge are contingent rather than universal, made rather than found, provisional rather than dogmatic, subject to continuous experimentation rather than ultimate proof, and verified in their application in action rather than in the accuracy of their representation of an antecedent reality. The Power of Pragmatism offers a path forward for mobilizing the practice of inquiry and knowledge production on behalf of achieving what Dewey called a sense for the better kind of life to be led. -- .

The book addresses two main areas of Kant's theoretical philosophy: the doctrine of transcendental idealism and various central aspects of the arguments from the Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, as well as the relation between the deduction argument and idealism. Among the topics covered are the nature of objective validity, the role and function of transcendental logic in relation to general or formal logic, the possibility of contradictory thoughts, the meaning of the Leitfaden at A79 and the unity of cognition, the two-steps-in-one-proof interpretation and categorial instantiation, categorial illusion, Strawson's transcendental argument, the persistently perplexing question of the derivation of the categories, and the relation between apperception, objectivity, judgement, and idealism. With regard to idealism in particular, the focus is on the metaphysical two-aspect interpretation and its problems, on the merits and demerits of the controversial phenomenalist reading of Kant's idealism, and on the topic of subjectivism and epistemic humility. In all of the aforementioned topics, the book presents wholly novel interpretations compared to the standard or mainstream interpretations