We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states?
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds.
Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which avowals are expressive acts that have truth-accessible self-ascriptions as their products. When avowing, a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.

The fourteen award-winning essays in this volume discuss a range of novel ideas and controversial topics that could decisively influence the course of human life on Earth. Their authors address, in accessible language, issues as diverse as: enabling our social systems to learn; research in biological engineering and artificial intelligence; mending and enhancing minds; improving the way we do, and teach, science; living in the here and now; and the value of play. The essays are enhanced versions of the prize-winning entries submitted to the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) essay competition in 2014. FQXi, catalyzes, supports, and disseminates research on questions at the foundations of physics and cosmology, particularly new frontiers and innovative ideas integral to a deep understanding of reality, but unlikely to be supported by conventional funding sources.

In relation to the problems faced today, in contemplation and in practical affairs, philosophers must confront the question 'What is knowledge?', and consider whether knowledge has lost its object. Such was the problem placed before the seminar convened by the Philosophical Society of Turkey at Ankara in 1989. The 17 papers derived from the lectures and discussions deal with problems of knowing and believing, of the kinds and criteria of knowledge, of truth and fallibility, and of the cultural as well as individual factors in cognition. The authors include Guido Kung, L. Jonathan Cohen, Ernest Sosa, Arda Denkel, Venant Cauchy, David Evans, Gurol Irzik, Ioanna Kucuradi, Evandro Agazzi, Richard T. DeGeorge, Kwasi Wiredu, Teo Grunberg, H. Odera Oruka, Jindrich Zeleny, V.A. Lektorsky, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, and Francisco Miro Quesada. There is a critical and analytical Prologue by the convener of the Seminar, Ioanna Kucuradi.

This book examines the role that human subjective experience plays in the creation of reality and introduces a new concept, the Bubble Universe, to describe the universe as it looks from the subjective viewpoint of an individual. Drawing on a range of research, the author questions the extent to which the scientific study of the origins of life, consciousness and subjective experience is itself influenced by scientists' subjective worlds. The author argues that in many respects the Bubble Universe differs from the universe as described by science and religion, and analyzes these differences. The fabric and structure of subjective reality is described, and various aspects of the Bubble Universe are examined, including science, religion, life, morality and history. The differences between the views from inside the subjective universe and from scientific, religious and sociocultural versions of the universe are outlined, and their significance for practical and theoretical problems are highlighted and illustrated with psychological experiments. This book will be of value to all scholars interested in how subjectivity influences research and appeal in particular to those working in developmental and theoretical psychology, consciousness, epistemology, phenomenology, and the philosophy of science and of the mind.

THIS ESSAY was begun a long time ago, in 1962, when I spent a year in Rome on a Guggenheim Fellowship. That twenty one years were required to complete it is owing both to the character of the theory presented and to my peculiar habits of mind. The theory presented is a coherence theory of knowledge: the con ception of coherence is here dominant and pervasive. But considera tions of coherence dictate an attention to details. The fact of the matter is that I get hung up on details: everything must fit, and if it does not, I do not want to proceed. A second difficulty was that all the epistemological issues seemed too clear. That may sound weird, but that's the way it is. I write philosophy to make things clear to myself. If, rightly or wrongly, I think I know the answer to a question, I can't bring myself to write it down. What happened, in this case, is that I finally became persuaded, in the course of lecturing on epistemology to under graduates, that not everything was as clear as it should be, that there were gaps in my presentation that were seriously in need of filling."

This book offers a comprehensive exploration of the major key concepts common to economics and evolutionary biology. Written by a group of philosophers of science, biologists and economists, it proposes analyses of the meaning of twenty-five concepts from the viewpoint respectively of economics and of evolutionary biology -each followed by a short synthesis emphasizing major discrepancies and commonalities. This analysis is surrounded by chapters exploring the nature of the analogy that connects evolution and economics, and chapters that summarize the major teachings of the analyses of the keywords. Most scholars in biology and in economics know that their science has something in common with the other one, for instance the notions of competition and resources. Textbooks regularly acknowledge that the two fields share some history - Darwin borrowing from Malthus the insistence on scarcity of resources, and then behavioral ecologists adapting and transforming game theory into evolutionary game theory in the 1980s, while Friedman famously alluded to a Darwinian process yielding the extant firms. However, the real extent of the similarities, the reasons why they are so close, and the limits and even the nature of the analogy connecting economics and biological evolution, remain inexplicit. This book proposes basis analyses that can sustain such explication. It is intended for researchers, grad students and master students in evolutionary and in economics, as well as in philosophy of science.

The relation between logic and knowledge provoked a heated debate since the 1960s. The epistemic approaches, found their formal argument in the mathematics of Brouwer and intuitionistic logic. And following Michael Dummett - started to call themselves: antirealists'. Others persisted with the formal background of the Frege-Tarski tradition, where Cantorian set theory is linked via model theory to classical logic. Jaakko Hintikka tried to join both traditions by means of what is now known as explicit epistemic logic'. Here the epistemic content is introduced into the object language as an operator which yield propositions from propositions rather than as metalogical constraint on the notion of inference. The Realism-Antirealism debate had thus three players: classical logicians, intuitionists and explicit epistemic logicians. The editors of the present volume think that in these days and age of Alternative Logics, where manifold developments in logic happen in a breathtaking pace, this debate should be revisited. Using the most recent logical and epistemological tools, this book provides a novel and refreshing view on the most important topics of the Realism vs. Antirealism debate. Its general scope is to show the most recent developments in philosophical logic to deal with problems inherited from this debate. It is meant for researcher and advanced students in philosophy, logic, formal methods. It's complete collection with a variety of approaches, it is written by leading authors in the fields, every chapter is self-contained.

Wilfrid Sellars (1912-89) has been called "the most profound and systematic epistemological thinker of the twentieth century" (Robert Brandom). He was in many respects ahead of his time, and many of his innovations have become widely acknowledged, for example, his attack on the "myth of the given", his functionalist treatment of intentional states, his proposal that psychological concepts are like theoretical concepts, and his suggestion that attributions of knowledge locate the knower "in the logical space of reasons". However, while many philosophers have begun to acknowledge Sellars's inspiration in their work, their interpretation of his thought has not always been the most accurate. His writings are difficult. Individually, his essays are complex and sometimes rely on doctrines and arguments he put forward elsewhere. Each of his articles is deepened and strengthened by seeing it in its systematic context, but he never wrote a unified exposition of his system, which therefore has to be pieced together from numerous disparate sources. Willem deVries addresses these difficulties specifically and provides a careful reading and remarkable overview of Sellars's systematic philosophy that will become the standard point of reference for all philosophers seeking to understand Sellars's hugely significant body of work.

Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the 1970s to the 1990s, whose unifying theme is the relation between the mind and the world. The essays range over a set of prominent topics in contemporary philosophy, including the analysis of knowledge, the a priori, necessity, possible worlds, realism, mental representation, appearance and reality, and colour. McGinn has written a new postscript to each essay, placing it in its philosophical context by sketching the background against which it was written, explaining its relations to other notable work, and offering his current reflections on the topic. The volume thus traces the development of McGinn's ideas and their role in some central philosophical debates. Seen together the essays offer a many-sided defence of realism, while emphasizing the epistemological price that realism exacts.

This book presents an in-depth and critical reconstruction of Prawitz's epistemic grounding, and discusses it within the broader field of proof-theoretic semantics. The theory of grounds is also provided with a formal framework, through which several relevant results are proved. Investigating Prawitz's theory of grounds, this work answers one of the most fundamental questions in logic: why and how do some inferences have the epistemic power to compel us to accept their conclusion, if we have accepted their premises? Prawitz proposes an innovative description of inferential acts, as applications of constructive operations on grounds for the premises, yielding a ground for the conclusion. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, the author discusses the reasons that have led Prawitz to abandon his previous semantics of valid arguments and proofs. The second part presents Prawitz's grounding as found in his ground-theoretic papers. Finally, in the third part, a formal apparatus is developed, consisting of a class of languages whose terms are equipped with denotation functions associating them to operations and grounds, as well as of a class of systems where important properties of the terms can be proved.

This is the first book to collect essays from philosophers, mathematicians and computer scientists working at the exciting interface of algorithmic learning theory and the epistemology of science and inductive inference. Readable, introductory essays provide engaging surveys of different, complementary, and mutually inspiring approaches to the topic, both from a philosophical and a mathematical viewpoint. Building upon this base, subsequent papers present novel extensions of algorithmic learning theory as well as bold, new applications to traditional issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. The volume is vital reading for students and researchers seeking a fresh, truth-directed approach to the philosophy of science and induction, epistemology, logic, and statistics.

The modern works on African philosophy have not been integrated and fully connected to Africa's antiquity in order to provide a foundational unity for further intellectual refinement. The philosophical dimensions of humanism, Nkrumah's concept of categorial conversion, African concepts of duality, polarity, unity, continual creation and democratic ideals must be shown their African-centered origins. In considering African philosophy, there arise conceptual and logical gaps that require the development of fundamental cognitive unity from the available data with judicious interpretation and restructuring in order to define the parameters of African philosophical unity that will allow these gaps to be closed for intellectual continuity. This monograph is devoted to the establishment of the foundations for the development of Africa's intellectual continuity and cognitive unity from antiquity to the present. Its main premise is that there is African philosophy with its own method of reasoning, analysis and synthesis. The monograph initiates self-contained philosophical foundations for African intellectual unity that is required to support African cultural unity, African personality, African essence and humanism needed for the creation of Greater Africa that is implied by African Union. These philosophical foundations, it is argued, formed the thinking system for Africa's social construct, law, economics, politics and governance of empires, kingdoms and social units that have come to pass. These philosophical foundations constitute the thinking system that must guide current and future Africa's socioeconomic dynamics. The monograph discusses also Africa's contributions to the global intellectual heritage by showing the relationships among foundations of African philosophical tradition and other philosophical systems that lead to rediviva Africana. It presents the principles of cognitive unity and continuity on the held position that without clearly developed Africa's philosophical foundations from its antiquity providing intellectual unity and cognitive continuity complete emancipation of Africa will be a mere mimicking of intellectual faults of other nations and philosophical systems. The research by African scholars and others on specific philosophical thoughts from different areas of Africa is useful materials that must be integrated into cognitive unity by accepting those that fit and rejecting those that do not fit by a defined logical process. Mindful of this, a case is thus made in this monograph for African cognitive unity and supporting reasoning methods. The system of ideas and perceptive interpretations of relevant data is, here, referred to as Africentricity, and its philosophical foundations that project thought as polyrhythmicity while the study of logic of reasoning about methodological and epistemic problems of polyrhythmicity and Africentricity is referred to as polyrhythmics. On practical level these philosophical foundations are shown to support the conceptual basis of Nguzo Saba (the Seven Principles of Kwanzaa). The monograph would be of interest to philosophers in general, professionals, researchers and students engaged in African philosophy, African studies, Black studies, socio-political philosophy and those interested in knowing the thinking system on the basis of which African essence arises and African social formations were constructed and governed from antiquity. _______________________ Kofi Kissi Dompere is a professor of economics at Howard University, USA. He has authored a number of scientific and scholarly works in economics, philosophy and decision theory. He is the producer and host of a radio program "African Rhythms and Extensions" on WPFW 89.3fm in Washington D.C., USA.

This book takes an empirically grounded perspective on research in values, intimacy and sexuality, among other topics in psychology, to highlight the importance of searching for human subjectivity in its diversity, plurality and self-generativity. The author conducts an in-depth discussion on the methodological and epistemological issues enabling the study of subjectivity, and argues that in order to improve the contribution of psychology to human knowledge, a study of subjectivity must be at the forefront.This book presents a critical reflection of the author's decades-long research within psychology to argue for a significant paradigm shift in the conception and execution of psychological research: a shift to "second order psychology".

In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the three main theories, and giving them each equal consideration, he faults the first two and embraces the third. The scholarship is immaculate, the writing crystal clear and the argumentation always powerful. Malcolm Budd, FBA, Emeritus Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London Excerpt Open publication

Recent findings about the capabilities of smart animals such as corvids or octopi and novel types of artificial intelligence (AI), from social robots to cognitive assistants, are provoking the demand for new answers for meaningful comparison with other kinds of intelligence. This book fills this need by proposing a universal theory of intelligence which is based on causal learning as the central theme of intelligence. The goal is not just to describe, but mainly to explain queries like why one kind of intelligence is more intelligent than another, whatsoever the intelligence. Shiny terms like "strong AI," "superintelligence," "singularity" or "artificial general intelligence" that have been coined by a Babylonian confusion of tongues are clarified on the way.

We know facts, but we also know how to do things. To know a fact is to know that a proposition is true. But does knowing how to ride a bike amount to knowledge of propositions? This is a challenging question and one that deeply divides the contemporary landscape. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How introduces, outlines, and critically evaluates various contemporary debates surrounding the nature of knowledge-how. Carter and Poston show that situating the debate over the nature of knowledge-how in other epistemological debates provides new ways to make progress. In particular, Carter and Poston explore the question of what knowledge-how involves, and how it might come apart from propositional knowledge, by engaging with key epistemological topics including epistemic luck, knowledge of language, epistemic value, virtue epistemology and social epistemology. New frontiers for research on knowledge-how are also explored relating to the internalism - externalism debate as well as embodied and extended knowledge. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How provides an accessible introduction to the main arguments in this important and thriving debate suited for undergraduates and postgraduates in philosophy and related areas. A strength of the book is its methodology which places a premium on placing the debates over knowledge-how in a broader conversation over the nature of knowledge. This book also offers an opinionated discussion of various lines of argument which will be of interest to professional philosophers as well.

The interest in a better understanding of what is constitutive for being a person is a concern philosophy shares with some of the sciences. The views currently discussed in evolutionary biology and in the neurosciences are very much influenced by traditional philosophical views about the self and self-knowledge, while contemporary philosophical accounts are not considered at all. Such an account will be given by an analysis of three focal elements of the use of the first-person pronoun. These elements have something to do with the faculty of taking a first-person point of view. The conceptual structure of this point of view is explained by comparing it with a second- and third-person point of view. There is an extensive discussion of various views about self-knowledge (Davidson, Bilgrami, Burge), and a new conception of authoritative self-knowledge is established. The first-person point of view is a reflexive attitude which includes various attitudes to one's past and future. These attitudes are necessarily or contingently de se. By bringing into focus the concern for one's future intentions will be discussed as an activity-based attitude, while there are other attitudes, like hope or fear, which are shaped by the acceptance of one's future situations which are not, or not completely under one's control. This view gives rise to a criticism of Frankfurt's notion of Caring.

This book is a unique and note-worthy enquiry into the implications of algorithmic knowledge for human subjectivity Eran Fisher provides timely insight on a relevant field of research, i.e., how algorithms impact our society This book will make a timely contribution to the social study of algorithms and will prove especially valuable for scholars working at the intersections of media and communication studies, internet studies, information studies, the sociology of technology, the philosophy of technology, and science and technology studies

This book analyses how the three books of visions by Hildegard of Bingen use the allegorical vision as a form of knowledge. It describes how the visionary's use of allegory and allegorical exegesis is linked to theories of cognition, interpretation, and prophecy. It argues that the form of the allegorical vision is not just the product of a medieval symbolic mentality, but specific to Hildegard's position and the major transformations taking place in the prescholastic intellectual milieu, such as the changing use of Scripture or the shift from traditional hermeneutics to cognitive language philosophy. The book shows that Hildegard uses traditional forms of knowledge - prophecy, the vision, monastic theology, allegorical hermeneutics - in startlingly innovative ways by combining them and by revising them for her own time.

Coherence is a burgeoning topic of research. Diverse methodologies have been applied to shed light on the topic and its relevance to fundamental questions throughout philosophy. The collection brings together the full scope of this research in a single volume. The first group of essays attack the core topic of the book: coherence. Authors in this section take up the challenging and controversial task of measuring the coherence of an information set, while others criticize this endeavor. The second group of papers in the collection relate this foundational research to a wide array of epistemological and metaphysical challenges. For example, some papers consider the relationship between truth and coherence. Is coherence truth conducive, and if yes, under which conditions? A related issue taken up in this volume is the connection between coherence and testimony.

Wittgenstein has written a great number of remarks relevant to aesthetical issues: he has questioned the relation between aesthetics and psychology as well as the status of our norms of judgment; he has drawn philosophers' attention to such topics as aspect-seeing and aspect-dawning, and has brought insights into the nature of our aesthetic reactions. The examination of this wide range of topics is far from being completed, and the purpose of this book is to contribute to such completion. It gathers both papers discussing some of Wittgenstein's most provocative and intriguing statements on aesthetics, and papers bringing out their implications for art critic and art history, as well as their significance to epistemology and to the study of human mind.

The number of manuscripts produced in the Indian sub-continent is astounding and is the result of a massive enterprise that was carried out over a vast geographical area and over a vast stretch of time. Focusing mainly on areas of Northern India and Nepal between 800 to 1300 CE and on manuscripts containing Sanskrit texts, the present study investigates a fundamental and so far rarely studied aspect of manuscript production: visual organisation. Scribes adopted a variety of visual strategies to distinguish one text from another and to differentiate the various sections within a single text (chapters, sub-chapters, etc.). Their repertoire includes the use of space(s) on the folio, the adoption of different writing styles, the inclusion of symbols of various kind, the application of colours ('rubrication'), or a combination of all these. This study includes a description of these various strategies and an analysis of their different implementations across the selected geographical areas. It sheds light on how manuscripts were produced, as well as on some aspects of their employment in ritual contexts, in different areas of India and Nepal.

Written by highly respected theorists in psychology and philosophy, the chapters in this book explicate and address fundamental epistemological issues involved in the problem of the relationship between the individual and the collective. Different theoretical viewpoints are presented on this relationship, as well as between the nature of rationality and morality, relativism and universalism, and enculturation and internalization. Many chapters also highlight similarities and differences between these alternative frameworks and Piaget's theory, and thus correct the misperception that Piaget had nothing to say about the social dimension of development. Other chapters focus on the implications of these debates for the important topic areas of pedagogy, moral development, and the development of social understanding in infancy and childhood. Although Piaget's theory is presented and evaluated by some of the chapters in this collection, the authors remain critical and do not shy away from revising or extending Piaget's theory whenever it is deemed necessary. Though the topic covered in this book is of fundamental importance in the social sciences, it is rarely addressed in a sustained way as it is in this collection of chapters. The book benefits social scientists interested in fundamental epistemological issues, especially as these concern the relationship between the individual and the collective, with implications for the conceptualization of morality and rationality.

This introduction to modality places the emphasis on the metaphysics of modality rather than on the formal semetics of quantified modal logic. The text begins by introducing students to the "de re/de dicto" distinction, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and some of the key problems in modality, particularly Quine's criticisms. It then moves on to explain how possible worlds provide a solution to many of the problems in modality and how possible worlds themselves have been used to analyse notions outside modality such as properties and propositions. Possible worlds introduce problems of their own and the book argues that to make progress with these problems a theory of possible worlds is required. The pros and cons of various theories of possible worlds are then examined in turn, including those of Lewis, Kripke, Adams, Stalnaker and Plantinga.

This introduction to modality places the emphasis on the metaphysics of modality rather than on the formal semetics of quantified modal logic. The text begins by introducing students to the "de re/de dicto" distinction, conventionalist and conceptualist theories of modality and some of the key problems in modality, particularly Quine's criticisms. It then moves on to explain how possible worlds provide a solution to many of the problems in modality and how possible worlds themselves have been used to analyse notions outside modality such as properties and propositions. Possible worlds introduce problems of their own and the book argues that to make progress with these problems a theory of possible worlds is required. The pros and cons of various theories of possible worlds are then examined in turn, including those of Lewis, Kripke, Adams, Stalnaker and Plantinga.