Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, and psychologists.

This is the third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson. He presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations between language, thought, and the world.

This book explores the structure and function of memory and imagination, as well as the relation and interaction between the two states. It is the first book to offer an integrative approach to these two emerging areas of philosophical research. The essays in this volume deal with a variety of forms of imagining and remembering. The contributors come from a range of methodological backgrounds: empirically minded philosophers, analytic philosophers engaging mainly in conceptual analysis, and philosophers informed by the phenomenological tradition. Part 1 consists of novel contributions to ontological issues regarding the nature of memory and imagination and their respective structural features. Part 2 focuses on questions of justification and perspective regarding both states. The chapters in Part 3 discuss issues regarding memory and imagination as skills or abilities. Finally, Part 4 focuses on the relation between memory, imagination, and emotion. Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of memory, philosophy of imagination, philosophy of mind, and epistemology.

Contemporary copyright was born in a heroic era of human history when technologies facilitated idea dissemination through the book trade reaching out mass readership. This book provides insights on the copyright evolution and how proprietary individual expression's copyright protection forms an integral part of our knowing in being, driven by the advances of technology through the proliferating trading frameworks. The book captures what is central in the process of copyright evolution which is an "onto-epistemological offset". It goes on to explain that copyright's protection of knowing in originality's delineation of expression and fair use/dealing's legitimization of unauthorized use and being are not isolatable, but rather mutually implicated. While the classic strict determinism has been subject to an onto-epistemological challenge, the book looks at the proliferation of global trade and advent of information technology and how they show us the beauty and possibility of intra-dependence between copyright authorship, entrepreneurship, and readership, which calls for a fresh copyright onto-epistemology. Building on its onto-epistemological critiques on the stakeholder, force, and mechanism of copyright evolution, the book helps readers understand why, not only copyright, but also law in general, and justice too, need to be onto-epistemologically balanced, as this is categorically imperative for being, the fundamental law of nature.

The book is an attempt to bring together what are often seen as incommensurable scientific and philosophical positions. Its core argument is that a main reason for the divisions about what constitutes scientific knowledge relates to disagreements on philosophical issues. The book explores what these disagreements are about, and to discuss whether they can be overcome. Taking a historical perspective, the book traces the divides in science back to three main philosophical traditions: realism, idealism, and scepticism. It maps how these have inspired three main current positions in science: logical empiricism, phenomenology, and sociology of scientific knowledge. The book is intended for a general audience concerned with today's debates on scientific knowledge and society. It will be useful for students and researchers studying philosophy of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, realism, phenomenology, positivism, logical empiricism, analytical philosophy, and sustainable scientific knowledge.

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph "The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments" made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich's project. He argues, in agreement with Reich's main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. New edition. First published 2012 as "Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan)

This book provides a systematic treatment of Locke's theory of probable assent. It shows how the theory applies to Locke's philosophy of science, moral epistemology, and religious epistemology.

Relativist and constructivist conceptions of truth and knowledge have become orthodoxy in vast stretches of the academic world in recent times. In his long-awaited first book, Paul Boghossian critically examines such views and exposes their fundamental flaws.
Boghossian focuses on three different ways of reading the claim that knowledge is socially constructed--one as a thesis about truth and two about justification. And he rejects all three. The intuitive, common-sense view is that there is a way the world is that is independent of human opinion; and that we are capable of arriving at beliefs about how it is that are objectively reasonable, binding on anyone capable of appreciating the relevant evidence regardless of their social or cultural perspective. Difficult as these notions may be, it is a mistake to think that philosophy has uncovered powerful reasons for rejecting them.
This short, lucid, witty book shows that philosophy provides rock-solid support for common sense against the relativists. It will prove provocative reading throughout the discipline and beyond.

The unconscious raises relevant problems in the theory of knowledge as regards non-conceptual contents and obscure representations. In the philosophy of mind, it bears on the topic of the unity of consciousness and the notion of the transcendental Self. It is a key-topic of logic with respect to the distinction between determinate-indeterminate judgments and prejudices, and in aesthetics it appears in connection with the problems of reflective judgments and of the genius. Finally, it is a relevant issue also in moral philosophy in defining the irrational aspects of the human being. The purpose of the present volume is to fill a substantial gap in Kant research while offering a comprehensive survey of the topic in different areas of research, such as history of philosophy, philosophy of mind, aesthetics, moral philosophy, and anthropology.

This book presents a novel approach to the analysis of interdisciplinary science based on the contemporary philosophical literature on scientific representation. The basic motivation for developing this approach is that epistemic issues are insufficiently dealt with in the existing literature on interdisciplinarity. This means that when interdisciplinary science is praised (as it often is), it is far from clear to what extent this praise is merited - at least if one cares about various more or less standardised measures of scientific quality. To develop a more adequate way of capturing what is going on in interdisciplinary science, the author draws inspiration from the rich philosophical literature on modelling, idealisation, perspectivism, and scientific pluralism. The discussion hereof reveals a number of critical pitfalls related to transferring mathematical and conceptual tools between scientific contexts, which should be relevant and interesting for anyone actively engaged in funding, evaluating, or carrying out interdisciplinary science.

On April 25, 1999, ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the guarded compound where China's highest leaders live and work, in a day-long peaceful protest of police brutality against fellow practitioners in the neighboring city of Tianjin. Stunned and surprised, China's leaders launched a campaign of brutal suppression against the group which continues to this day. This book, written by a leading scholar of the history Chinese popular religion, is the first to offer a full explanation of what Falun Gong is and where it came from, placing the group in the broader context of the modern history of Chinese religion as well as the particular context of post-Mao China. Falun Gong began as a form of qigong, a general name describing physical and mental disciplines based loosely on traditional Chinese medical and spiritual practices. Qigong was "invented" in the 1950s by members of the Chinese medical establishment worried that China's traditional healing arts would be lost as China modeled its new socialist health care system on Western biomedicine. In the late 1970s, Chinese scientists "discovered" that qi possessed genuine scientific qualities, which allowed qigong to become part of China's drive for modernization. With the support of China's leadership, qigong became hugely popular in the 1980s and 1990s, as charismatic qigong masters attracted millions of enthusiastic practitioners in what was known as the qigong boom, the first genuine mass movement in the history of the People's Republic. Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi founded his own school of qigong in 1992, claiming that the larger movement had become corrupted by money and magic tricks; Li wanted to refocus attention on genuine "cultivation" and preached a fundamentalist message of morality and mastery of Li's teachings. Li was welcomed into the qigong world and quickly built a nationwide following of several million practitioners, but ran afoul of China's authorities and relocated to the United States in 1995. In his absence, followers in China began to organize peaceful protests of perceived media slights of Falun Gong, which increased from the mid-90s onward as China's leaders began to realize that they had created, in the qigong boom, a mass movement with religious and nationalistic undertones, a potential threat to their legitimacy and control. Based on fieldwork among Chinese Falun Gong practitioners in North America and on extensive readings of Li Hongzhi's writings, this volume offers a depiction of Falun Gong from the inside, at the same time offering a narrative depiction of Falun Gong and its origins in the history of Chinese popular religion.

l. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY There is a philosophical issue that surely precedes all other possible questions. It concerns the very possibility of our thinking about some thing to some purpose. Short of this no philosophy, theory or research would be possible. But it is not immediately clear that we are assured that what purports to be effective thought, and cognition is such in reality. What guarantee is there for instance that when one is under the impression that one is thinking that "the cat is on the mat" it is in fact the case that one is thinking this? One could not be thinking at all, only having a misleading mystic experience. And then even if one was thinking, one might not be really thinking of the cat being on the mat, but only that one wishes there was a cat, and wonders whether if there was it would be on the mat, and yet the subjective impression was that one was thinking: "The cat is on the mat" (the same picture might stand for both the thoughts mentioned). Then one might in some way try to think 'the cat is on the mat. ' yet be mistaken in that there aren't any material objects at all, and all one does is to inventory god's perceptions. And so on, and so on These are of course the kind of problem that the layman habitually views with disdainful alarm."

This monograph offers a critical introduction to current theories of how scientific models represent their target systems. Representation is important because it allows scientists to study a model to discover features of reality. The authors provide a map of the conceptual landscape surrounding the issue of scientific representation, arguing that it consists of multiple intertwined problems. They provide an encyclopaedic overview of existing attempts to answer these questions, and they assess their strengths and weaknesses. The book also presents a comprehensive statement of their alternative proposal, the DEKI account of representation, which they have developed over the last few years. They show how the account works in the case of material as well as non-material models; how it accommodates the use of mathematics in scientific modelling; and how it sheds light on the relation between representation in science and art. The issue of representation has generated a sizeable literature, which has been growing fast in particular over the last decade. This makes it hard for novices to get a handle on the topic because so far there is no book-length introduction that would guide them through the discussion. Likewise, researchers may require a comprehensive review that they can refer to for critical evaluations. This book meets the needs of both groups.

Tolerance - desired by many and often demanded: By UNESCO, by the Pope, by Angela Merkel and Barack Obama. But what exactly does it mean to be tolerant? Does tolerance imply rejection? Or is tolerance merely the opposite of dogmatism? And how does a tolerant attitude differ from an indifferent one? Dominik Balg, starting from a well-founded explication of the concept of tolerance, subjects a tolerant attitude as an intellectual attitude toward conflicting opinions to a detailed critique and discusses the plausibility of general tolerance claims in specific domains such as politics, religion, or ethics. He considers possible alternatives to a tolerant attitude and presents with intellectual open-mindedness and humility two substantial attitudes that can be clearly distinguished from a tolerant attitude and - in contrast to tolerance - can also be easily demanded on a general level. - With a foreword by Thomas Grundmann. This book is a translation of the original German 1st edition Leben und leben lassen by Dominik Balg, published by J.B. Metzler, an imprint of Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature in 2020. The translation was done with the help of artificial intelligence (machine translation by the service DeepL.com). A subsequent human revision was done primarily in terms of content, so that the book will read stylistically differently from a conventional translation. Springer Nature works continuously to further the development of tools for the production of books and on the related technologies to support the authors.

The imposing scope and penetrating insights of German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann's work have received renewed interest in recent years. The Neo-Kantian turned ontological realist established a philosophical approach unique among his peers, and it provides a wealth of resources for considering contemporary philosophical problems. The chapters included in this volume examine his ethics, ontology, aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of nature. They explore his ontology of values, autonomy and human enhancement, and law; his theory of levels of reality, space-time and geometry, the categories of temporality, causality, and "life," the question of realism, and social ontology. Others take inspiration from his aesthetic theory, ideas about education, and his embrace of the Socratic pathos of wonder. They bring his philosophy into conversation with that of his contemporaries, including Roman Ingarden and Konrad Lorenz's appropriation of Hartmann, as well as with the history of philosophy, including Plato's theory of recollection, pre-Socratic philosophy, and that of his Russian teacher Nikolai Lossky. Those familiar with Hartmann's wide-ranging systematic philosophy will benefit from these new engagements with his work, and those new to it will find them relevant to a number of current philosophical debates.

Identity, existence, predication, necessity, and truth are fundamental philosophical concerns. Colin McGinn treats them both philosophically and logically, aiming for maximum clarity and minimum pointless formalism. He contends that there are real logical properties that challenge naturalistic metaphysical outlooks. These concepts are not definable, though we can say a good deal about how they work. The aim of Logical Properties is to bring philosophy back to philosophical logic.

Colin Howson offers a solution to one of the central, unsolved problems of Western philosophy, the problem of induction. In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth or probable truth of the predicting theory. Howson claims that Hume's argument is correct, and examines what follows about the relation between science and its empirical base.

This comprehensive collection brings out the rich and deep philosophical resources of the Zhuangzi. It covers textual, linguistic, hermeneutical, ethical, social/political and philosophical issues, with the latter including epistemological, metaphysical, phenomenological and cross-cultural (Chinese and Western) aspects. The volume starts out with the textual history of the Zhuangzi, and then examines how language is used in the text. It explores this unique characteristic of the Zhuangzi, in terms of its metaphorical forms, its use of humour in deriding and parodying the Confucians, and paradoxically making Confucius the spokesman for Zhuangzi's own point of view. The volume discusses questions such as: Why does Zhuangzi use language in this way, and how does it work? Why does he not use straightforward propositional language? Why is language said to be inadequate to capture the "dao" and what is the nature of this dao? The volume puts Zhuangzi in the philosophical context of his times, and discusses how he relates to other philosophers such as Laozi, Xunzi, and the Logicians.

This book argues that traditions in philosophy of language have mistakenly focused on highly idealized linguistic contexts. Instead, it presents a non-idealcfoundational theory of language that contends that the essential function of language is to direct attention for the purpose of achieving diverse social and political goals.

Propositions are routinely invoked by philosophers, linguists, logicians, and other theorists engaged in the study of meaning, communication, and the mind. To investigate the nature of propositions is to investigate the very nature of our connection to each other, and to the world around us. As one of the only volumes of its kind, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions provides a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of propositions, from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Comprising 33 original chapters by an international team of scholars, the volume addresses both traditional and emerging questions concerning the nature of propositions, and our capacity to engage with them in thought and in communication. The chapters are clearly organized into the following three sections: I. Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions II. Historical Theories of Propositions III. Contemporary Theories of Propositions Essential reading for philosophers of language and mind, and for those working in neighboring areas, The Routledge Handbook of Propositions is suitable for upper-level undergraduate study, as well as graduate and professional research.

This book collects original essays on the epistemology of modality and related issues in modal metaphysics and philosophical methodology.

This book contains twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on metaepistemology, that is, on the nature, existence and authority of epistemic facts. One of the central divides in metaepistemology is between epistemic realists and epistemic anti-realists. Epistemic realists think that epistemic facts (such as the fact that you ought to believe what your evidence supports) exist independently of human judgements and practices, and that they have authority over our judgements and practices. Epistemic anti-realists think that, if epistemic facts exist at all, they are grounded in human judgements and practices, and gain any authority they have from our judgements and practices. This book considers both epistemic realist and anti-realist perspectives, as well as perspectives that 'transcend' the realism/anti-realism dichotomy. As such, it constitutes the 'state of the art' with regard to metaepistemology, and will shape the debate in years to come.

This book focuses on African metaphysics and epistemology, and is an exercise in decoloniality. The authors describe their approach to "decoloniality" as an intellectual repudiation of coloniality, using the method of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic. Focusing specifically on both African metaphysics and African epistemology, the authors put forward theories formulated to stimulate fresh debates and extend the frontiers of learning in the field. They emphasize that this book is not a project in comparative philosophy, nor is it geared towards making Africa/ns the object/subjects of philosophy. Rather, the book highlights and discusses philosophical insights that have been produced from the African perspective, which the authors argue must be further developed in order to achieve decoloniality in the field of philosophy more broadly.

This open access book provides the first explicit case study for an application of the method of reflective equilibrium (RE), using it to develop and defend a precautionary principle. It thereby makes an important and original contribution to questions of philosophical method and methodology. The book shows step-by-step how RE is applied, and develops a methodological framework which will be useful for everyone who wishes to use reflective equilibrium. With respect to precautionary principles, the book demonstrates how a rights-based precautionary principle can be constructed and defended. The case study succeeds in demonstrating that RE can be successfully applied and puts real constraints on the justification process. This is all the more remarkable as the case study was designed as an open-ended process, without presupposing any specific results. This book will be highly relevant both to people interested in philosophical methodology and epistemology, as well as to researchers who are interested in using philosophical methods and tools and applying them to practical problems.

Investigating Karl Popper's philosophy of critical rationalism, Critical Rationalism and the Theory of Society, Volume 1, explores a non-justificationist conception of critical reason and its fundamental outcomes for the theory of society. Through a set of fundamental contributions to epistemology, the theory of rationality and sociology, this volume (a) situates the idea of critical rationalism in its true epistemological context, (b) uses non-justificationist epistemology to reinvent critical rationalism and (c) applies its revised concept of rationality to show how people's access to critical reason enables them to agree on the common values and social institutions necessary for a peaceful and just social order. These contributions lead the reader to a new epistemological understanding of the idea of critical rationalism and recognition of how a non-justificational concept of reason changes the content of the theory of society. The reader also learns how thinkers, movements and masses apply their critical reason to replace an established social order with an ideal one through activating five types of driving forces of social change: metaphysical, moral, legal, political and economic. Written for philosophers and sociologists, this book will appeal to social scientists such as moral philosophers, legal scholars, political scientists and economists.