Lazare Carnot was the unique example in the history of science of someone who inadvertently owed the scientific recognition he eventually achieved to earlier political prominence. He and his son Sadi producedwork that derived from their training as engineering and went largely unnoticed by physicists for a generation or more, even though their respective work introduced concepts that proved fundamental when taken up later by other hands. There was, moreover, a filial as well as substantive relation between the work of father and son. Sadi applied to the functioning of heat engines the analysis that his father had developed in his study of the operation of ordinary machines. Specifically, Sadi's idea of a reversible process originated in the use his father made of geometric motions in the analysis of machines in general.

This unique book shows how the two Carnots influenced each other in their work in the fields of mechanics and thermodynamicsand how future generations of scientists have further benefited from their work."

Proclus (412-485 A.D.) was one of the last official 'successors' of Plato at the head of the Academy in Athens at the end of Antiquity, before the school was finally closed down in 529. As a prolific author of systematic works on a wide range of topics and one of the most influential commentators on Plato of all times, the legacy of Proclus in the cultural history of the west can hardly be overestimated. This book introduces the reader to Proclus' life and works, his place in the Platonic tradition of Antiquity and the influence his work exerted in later ages. Various chapters are devoted to Proclus' metaphysical system, including his doctrines about the first principle of all reality, the One, and about the Forms and the soul. The broad range of Proclus' thought is further illustrated by highlighting his contribution to philosophy of nature, scientific theory, theory of knowledge and philosophy of language. Finally, also his most original doctrines on evil and providence, his Neoplatonic virtue ethics, his complex views on theology and religious practice, and his metaphysical aesthetics receive separate treatments. This book is the first to bring together the leading scholars in the field and to present a state of the art of Proclean studies today. In doing so, it provides the most comprehensive introduction to Proclus' thought currently available.

This book explores the methodological strategies for linking philosophy and neuroscience concerning the study of the conscious brain. The author focuses on four distinct methods for relating these two academic disciplines: isolationist, reductionist, neurophenomenological, and non-reductionist. After analyzing the pros and cons of these approaches, Steven S. Gouveia applies them to the concept of Qualia and Information to understand how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each approach influence the definitions of those specific concepts. Gouveia argues for an approach that conceives the interdisciplinarity of both philosophy and neuroscience, in a particular and sound methodology, offering empirical examples of the explanatory power of this methodology over the others. Additionally, he shows how the metaphilosophical assumptions of each methodology-usually taken by researchers implicitly and unconsciously-influence their own approach to the methodological problem.

This open access book focuses on a particular but significant topic in the social sciences: the concepts of "footprint" and "trace". It associates these concepts with hotly debated topics such as surveillance capitalism and knowledge society. The editors and authors discuss the concept footprints and traces as unintended by-products of other (differently focused and oriented) actions that remain empirically imprinted in virtual and real spaces. The volume therefore opens new scenarios for social theory and applied social research in asking what the stakes, risks and potential of this approach are. It systematically raises and addresses these questions within a consistent framework, bringing together a heterogeneous group of international social scientists. Given the multifaceted objectives involved in exploring footprints and traces, the volume discusses heuristic aspects and ethical dimensions, scientific analyses and political considerations, empirical perspectives and theoretical foundations. At the same time, it brings together perspectives from cultural analysis and social theory, communication and Internet studies, big-data informed research and computational social science. This innovative volume is of interest to a broad interdisciplinary readership: sociologists, communication researchers, Internet scholars, anthropologists, cognitive and behavioral scientists, historians, and epistemologists, among others.

Trust is pervasive in our lives. Both our simplest actions - like buying a coffee, or crossing the street - as well as the functions of large collective institutions - like those of corporations and nation states - would not be possible without it. Yet only in the last several decades has trust started to receive focused attention from philosophers as a specific topic of investigation. The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy brings together 31 never-before published chapters, accessible for both students and researchers, created to cover the most salient topics in the various theories of trust. The Handbook is broken up into three sections: I. What is Trust? II. Whom to Trust? III. Trust in Knowledge, Science, and Technology The Handbook is preceded by a foreword by Maria Baghramian, an introduction by volume editor Judith Simon, and each chapter includes a bibliography and cross-references to other entries in the volume.

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. This work provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today.

This book investigates the impact of misinformation and the role of truth in political struggle. It develops a theory of objective truth for political controversy over topics such as racism and gender, based on the insights of intersectionality, the Black feminist theory of interlocking systems of oppression. Truth is defined using the tools of model theory and formal semantics, but the theory also captures how social power dynamics strongly influence the operation of the concept of truth within the social fabric. Systemic ignorance, propagated through false speech and misinformation, sustains oppressive power structures and perpetuates systemic inequity. Truth tends to empower marginalized groups precisely because oppressive systems are maintained through systemic ignorance. If the truth sets people free, then power will work to obscure it. Hence, the rise of misinformation as a political weapon is a strategy of dominant power to undermine the political advancement of marginalized groups.

This book offers a readable introduction to the main aspects of thought experimenting in philosophy and science (together with related imaginative activities in mathematics and linguistics). It presents the main options in understanding thought experiments, from empiricism to Platonism, and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. However, it also provides some original perspectives on the topic. Firstly, it provides a new definition and analysis of thought experimenting that brings it closer to laboratory experimenting. Secondly, it develops the author's earlier theory of "mental modelling", proposed some decades ago by him, and some other researchers in the field as the crucial procedure in thought experimenting. The mental modelling approach links work with thought experimenting to cognitive science and to research on mental simulation which is a hot topic in present-day research. Thirdly, it proposes a principled way to respond to criticism of thought experimenting by "experimental philosophers" as they have been dominating the present-day debates. The response suggests a possible ameliorative, self-help project for thought experimenting. Finally, the book provides a way to systematize the history of important thought experiments in science and philosophy and thus connects, in an original way, the systematic investigation of experimenting to the historical work of famous thought experiments. It is of interest to scholars interested in history of ideas and philosophy of science.

The goal of the investigation is a phenomenological theory of the methods and later the methodology of the human sciences, first of all the philological interpretation of texts. The first part is a critical reflection on the historical development of hermeneutics as method of interpreting texts and the tradition including the first steps toward the emergence of scientific methodological hermeneutics. Such reflections show that the development of hermeneutics is onesidedly founded in the development of hermeneutical consciousness, i.e. the changing attitudes in the application and rejection of cultural traditions. All methods and finally methodologies are onesidedly founded in the activities of the lifeworld. The second part is a first attempt to develop an outline of a general phenomenological theory of pre-methodical and methodical understanding in the lifeworld. The third part offers a critical phenomenologically guided analysis of methodological hermeneutics.

This book explores curiosity from a normative epistemological viewpoint. Taking into account recent developments in the psychology of curiosity, as well as research on the nature and motivation of scientific inquiry, Miscevic identifies curiosity as a positive and vital character trait. Key topics covered include: * Curiosity as a subject in the history of philosophy * Curiosity as a possible ethical virtue * The importance of curiosity about oneself * Whether curiosity is good in itself or only as a means to an end (e.g. in the pursuit of truth). The book begins with a brief historical overview, before turning to the nature of curiosity from both a psychological and philosophical viewpoint. Curiosity is revealed as a crucial instrument in the advancement of science and wisdom, as well as within the wider picture of meaningful human life. Miscevic skilfully defends the idea that curiosity motivates and organises our cognitive abilities, playing the central role in our cognitive lives.

In Basic Structures of Reality, Colin McGinn deals with questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind from the vantage point of physics. Combining general philosophy with physics, he covers such topics as the definition of matter, the nature of space, motion, gravity, electromagnetic fields, the character of physical knowledge, and consciousness and meaning. Throughout, McGinn maintains an historical perspective and seeks to determine how much we really know of the world described by physics. He defends a version of "structuralism": the thesis that our knowledge is partial and merely abstract, leaving a large epistemological gap at the center of physics. McGinn then connects this element of mystery to parallel mysteries in relation to the mind. Consciousness emerges as just one more mystery of physics. A theory of matter and space is developed, according to which the impenetrability of matter is explained as the deletion of volumes of space. McGinn proposes a philosophy of science that distinguishes physics from both psychology and biology, explores the ontology of energy, and considers the relevance of physics to seemingly remote fields such as the theory of meaning. In the form of a series of aphorisms, the author presents a metaphysical system that takes laws of nature as fundamental. With its broad scope and deep study of the fundamental questions at the heart of philosophy of physics, this book is not intended primarily for specialists, but for the general philosophical reader interested in how physics and philosophy intersect.

This volume argues that theistic philosophy should be seen not as an "armchair" enterprise but rather as a critical endeavor to bring philosophy of religion into close contact with emerging sciences of religion. This text engages with the rationality of religious belief by investigating central problems and arguments in philosophy of religion from the perspective of new naturalistic research. A central question the book analyzes is whether findings in cognitive science of religion (CSR) falsify or undermine religious ideas and beliefs. With regard to CSR, this volume offers a sustained and critical investigation of the neutrality and positive-relevance view, before offering a re-appraisal of the conflict view. The text argues that when scrutinizing these views, much more attention must be paid to specific normative premises that allow empirical findings to have epistemic relevance. A novel feature is the theoretical application of analytical epistemology in virtue-epistemology to the central question of whether CSR undermines, supports, or is neutral with respect to religious belief. This book appeals to upper-level students and researchers in the field.

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda.

This book makes the case for a pragmatist approach to the practice of social inquiry and knowledge production. Through diverse examples from multiple disciplines, contributors explore the power of pragmatism to inform a practice of inquiry that is democratic, community-centred, problem-oriented and experimental. Drawing from both classical and neo-pragmatist perspectives, the book advances a pragmatist sensibility in which truth and knowledge are contingent rather than universal, made rather than found, provisional rather than dogmatic, subject to continuous experimentation rather than ultimate proof, and verified in their application in action rather than in the accuracy of their representation of an antecedent reality. The Power of Pragmatism offers a path forward for mobilizing the practice of inquiry and knowledge production on behalf of achieving what Dewey called a sense for the better kind of life to be led. -- .

Many descriptions of empathy revolve around sharing in and understanding another person's emotions. One separate person gains access to the emotional world of another. An entire worldview holds up this idea. It is individualistic and affirms the possibility of access to other people's "inner world." Can we really see inside another, though? And are we discrete, separate selves? How can we best grapple with these questions in the field of music therapy? In response, this book offers four empathy pathways. Two are situated in a constituent approach (that prioritises discrete individuals who then enter into relationships with one another) and two are located in relational approaches (that acknowledge the foundational reality of relationships themselves). By understanding empathy more fully, music therapists, teachers and researchers can engage in ways that are congruent with diverse worldviews and ways of being. Examples used in the book are from active and receptive music therapy approaches as well as from community and clinical contexts, so as to provide clear links to practice. This book will be a valuable resource for academics and postgraduate students within music therapy and allied fields including art therapy, drama therapy, dance/movement therapy, psychology, counselling, occupational therapy and social development studies.

This book addresses the questions of what constitutes the integrative learning of theory and practice (ILTP), and how this learning progresses over time - these are important questions that have been overlooked to date. It introduces a new way of looking at the theory-practice integration and presents the conceptual and empirical research that has led to such a view. The conceptualisation of the ILTP and the description of the phenomenon of integration draw on psychological aspects of epistemological beliefs in TVET, and on philosophical aspects of social reasoning. In this inferentialist, non-dualistic epistemological perspective, theory and practice are distinguished in terms of their use in reasoning, rather than as intrinsically different forms of knowledge. In particular, the integrative learning is presented in terms of qualitative changes in chains of reasoning that connect theoretical and practical considerations. This work represents a contribution to further educational research, as it advances a novel operationalisation of the inferentialist framework. Finally, this work contributes to educational practice, as it offers evidence-based guidelines for practitioners concerned with instructional design in T-VET. The reported empirical investigations involved in-depth qualitative research methods and were conducted at a micro-level of instruction in alternating school-based and work-based programmes, in the field of Chemicals Processing Technology (CPT).

This book grew out of the lectures that I prepared for my students in epis temology at SUNY College at Brockport beginning in 1974. The conception of the problem of perception and the interpretation of the sense-datum theory and its supporting arguments that are developed in Chapters One through Four originated in these lectures. The rest of the manuscript was first written during the 1975-1976 academic year, while I held an NEH Fellowship in Residence for College Teachers at Brown University, and during the ensuing summer, under a SUNY Faculty Research Fellowship. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Research Foundation of the State University of New York for their support of my research. I am grateful to many former students, colleagues, and friends for their stimulating, constructive comments and criticisms. Among the former stu dents whose reactions and objections were most helpful are Richard Motroni, Donald Callen, Hilary Porter, and Glenn Shaikun. Among my colleagues at Brockport, I wish to thank Kevin Donaghy and Jack Glickman for their comments and encouragement. I am indebted to Eli Hirsch for reading and commenting most helpfully on the entire manuscript, to Peter M. Brown for a useful correspondence concerning key arguments in Chapters Five and Seven, to Keith Lehrer for a criticism of one of my arguments that led me to make some important revisions, and to Roderick M."

Sloan argues that a fundamental transformation of our ideas about knowing, our selves, and our world is not only possible, but necessary. The key to this transformation lies in an understanding of insight-imagination--the involvement of the thinking, feeling, willing, valuing person in knowing. The possibility and mode of effecting this transformation is the subject of Insight-Imagination. Sloan examines alternative and potentially more constructive intellectual approaches as developed in the radical humanities and the world's great religious traditions. The author explores the role of education in the transformation of consciousness and the effect of this transformation on education.

Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.

Social epistemology has been flourishing in recent years, expanding and making connections with political philosophy, virtue epistemology, philosophy of science, and feminist philosophy. The philosophy of the social world too is flourishing, with burgeoning work in the metaphysics of the social world, collective responsibility, group action, and group belief. The new philosophical vista now more clearly presenting itself is collective epistemology-the epistemology of groups and institutions. Groups engage in epistemic activity all the time-whether it be the active collective inquiry of scientific research groups or crime detection units, or the evidential deliberations of tribunals and juries, or the informational efforts of the voting population in general-and yet in philosophy there is still relatively little epistemology of groups to help explore these epistemic practices and their various dimensions of social and philosophical significance. The aim of this book is to address this lack, by presenting original essays in the field of collective epistemology, exploring these regions of epistemic practice and their significance for Epistemology, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and the Philosophy of Science.

Herder is often criticized for having embraced cultural relativism, but there has been little philosophical discussion of what he actually wrote about the nature of the human species and its differentiation through culture. This book focuses on Herder's idea of culture, seeking to situate his social and political theses within the context of his anthropology, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, theory of language and philosophy of history. It argues for a view of Herder as a qualified relativist, who combined the conception of a common human nature with a belief in the importance of culture in developing and shaping that nature. Especially highlighted are Herder's understanding of the relativity of virtue and happiness, and his belief in the impossibility of constructing a single best society. The book will appeal to a wide range of readers interested both in Herder and in Enlightenment culture more generally.

Arthapatti is a pervasive form of reasoning investigated by Indian philosophers in order to think about unseen causes and interpret ordinary and religious language. Its nature is a point of controversy among Mimamsa, Nyaya, and Buddhist philosophers, yet, to date, it has received less attention than perception, inference, and testimony. This collection presents a one-of-a-kind reference resource for understanding this form of reasoning studied in Indian philosophy. Assembling translations of central primary texts together with newly-commissioned essays on research topics, it features a significant introductory essay. Readable translations of Sanskrit works are accompanied by critical notes that introduce arthapatti, offer historical context, and clarify the philosophical debates surrounding it. Showing how arthapatti is used as a way to reason about the basic unseen causes driving language use, cause-and-effect relationships, as well as to interpret ambiguous or figurative texts, this book demonstrates the importance of this epistemic instrument in both contemporary Anglo-analytic and classical Indian epistemology, language, and logic.