Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.

The standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects in its arbitrary restriction of the subject matter, and its risky theoretical presuppositions. Edward Craig suggests a more illuminating approach, akin to the `state of nature' method found in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs it fulfils. Light is thrown on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, about its analysis and the obstacles to its analysis (such as the counter-examples of Edmund Gettier), and on the debate over scepticism. It becomes apparent why many languages not only have such constructions as `knows whether' and `knows that', but also have equivalents of `knows how to' and `know' followed by a direct object. Thus the inquiry is both broadened in scope and made theoretically less fragile.

From the mid-1960s, after the important works by J. Hintikka, S. Korner, W. Sellars and P.F. Strawson, there has been a marked revival of Kantian epistemological thought. Against this background, featuring fruitful exchange between historical research and theoretical prospects, the main point of the book is the discussion of Kantian theory of scientific knowledge from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy and philosophy of empirical and mathematical sciences. The main topics are the problem of a priori knowledge in logic, mathematics and physics, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the constitution of physical objectivity and the questions of realism and truth, the Kantian conception of time, causal laws and induction, the relations between Kantian epistemological thought, relativity theory, quantum theory and some recent developments of philosophy of science. The book is addressed to research workers, specialists and scholars in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of science and history of philosophy. "

Conceptual Tension: Essays on Kinship, Politics, and Individualism is a critical philosophical examination of the role of concepts and concept formation in social sciences. Written by Leon J. Goldstein, a preeminent Jewish philosopher who examined the epistemological foundations of social science inquiry during the second half of the twentieth century, the book undertakes a study of concept formation and change by looking at the four critical terms in anthropology (kinship), politics (parliament and Rousseau's concept of the general will), and sociology (individualism). The author challenges prevailing notions of concept formation and definition, specifically assertions by Gottlieb Frege that concepts have fixed, clear boundaries that are not subject to change. Instead, drawing upon arguments by R.G. Collingwood, Goldstein asserts that concepts have a historical dimension with boundaries and meanings that change with their use and context. Goldstein's work provides insight for philosophers, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and Judaica scholars interested in the study and meaning of critical concepts within their fields.

Immanuel Kant has long been considered one of the leading exponents of the theory of knowledge with his philosophical writings inspiring generations of political theorists, underpinning many notions and ideas on the concept of progress. Based on and innovative reading of Kant's theory of knowledge, this book challenges contemporary critiques of the concept of progress from post-Marxist, post-Modern and or existentialist approaches which dismiss progress as an anachronistic and deceptive concept that has formed the basis of many of modernity's abominations. Instead this book reveals Kant's unique synthetic theory of knowledge, arguing that the idea of progress should be thought of as a crucial political idea in matters of political management at the outset of the 21st century.

This book is meant to serve as an introduction to the philosophy of Thomas Reid by way of a study of certain themes central to that philosophy as we find it expounded in his extensive and influential published writings. The choice of these themes inevitably reflects philosophical interests of the author of this book to some extent but a main consideration behind their selection is that they are extensively treated by Reid in response to treatments by certain of his predecessors in an identifiable tradition called by Yolton 'The Way ofIdeas'. My interest in Reid's philosophy was first awakened by the brilliant writings of A.N. Prior, and in particular by Part II of his posthumous 'Objects of Thought' called 'What we think about' together with his suggestion that Reid was a precursor of Mill on the signification of proper names. It is my hope that the standard of exegesis and of discussion throughout the book, and especially in the case of these topics, is a not unworthy tribute to that thinker.

"English Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification)" develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold. The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the characteristic of legitimation back to an originary appeal to which consciousness is exposed by experience. Legitimizing structures are thus to be understood as a predicative answer to this prepredicative appeal.This book investigates both the epistemological and the ethical fields, working mainly with Husserl's genetic theory in "Experience and Judgement". It offers a new and comprehensive reading of Husserl's ethics and a critical dialogue with Levinas' ethics of alterity and Apels' discourse ethics."German Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung" entwickelt eine phanomenologische Theorie des 'rechtlichen Denkens'.Dabei handelt es sich um eine erste systematische Untersuchung derjenigen Bewusstseinsstrukturen, die ein Begrunden, Ausweisen und Rechtfertigen uberhaupt erst ermoglichen. Die grundlegende Frage ist, wie Rechtsanspruche, die sowohl erkenntnistheoretischen als auch ethischen Urteilen inharent sind, als ein Grundmerkmal des Erfahrens verstanden werden konnen. Die vorliegende These gibt eine genetische Antwort auf diese Frage. Sie fuhrt den Rechtscharakter im Denken auf einen ursprunglichen Anspruch zuruck, dem Bewusstsein im Erfahren immer schon ausgesetzt ist.Rechtliche Strukturen mussen daher als eine pradikative Antwort auf ein vorpradikatives Angesprochen-Sein begriffen werden. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht sowohl den ethischen als auch den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich, wobei Husserls genetische Phanomenologie in Erfahrung und Urteil den methodischen Hintergrund bildet. Es bietet ausserdem eine neue und umfassende Lekture von Husserls Schriften zur Ethik, sowie einen kritischen Dialog mit der Alteritatsethik von Levinas und der Diskursethik Apels.

"Between Eternities" interweaves the assertions of Science, Philosophy, Religion and Mysticism on the fundamental issues that underlie the universe and life, allowing a reader to find a meaning.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

This is a new monograph offering the first focused study of the place of transcendental arguments within Kant's system as a whole.Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable.However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour of Empiricism. This book offers the first extended analysis of Kant's method of proof in philosophy. The author constructs a model based on Kant's own statements about his procedure and then examines his famous proofs in light of it. Great emphasis is placed on historical accuracy and the debunking of popular myths about Kant's aims and doctrines. The result is a compelling new picture of Kant that will challenge current assumptions.

Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fatal problems attending the early modern conception of perception as a relation with particular mind-dependent objects of experience. Having set up the underlying problem and explored the lessons to be learnt from the various difficulties faced by opposing early modern responses to it, Bill Brewer argues that this contemporary approach has serious problems of its own. Furthermore, the early modern insight that perception is most fundamentally to be construed as a relation of conscious acquaintance with certain direct objects of experience is, he claims, perfectly consistent with the commonsense identification of such direct objects with persisting mind-independent physical objects themselves. Brewer here provides a critical, historical account of the philosophy of perception, in order to present a defensible vindication of empirical realism.

In this book, internationally recognized experts in philosophy of science, computer science, and modeling and simulation are contributing to the discussion on how ontology, epistemology, and teleology will contribute to enable the next generation of intelligent modeling and simulation applications. It is well understood that a simulation can provide the technical means to display the behavior of a system over time, including following observed trends to predict future possible states, but how reliable and trustworthy are such predictions? The questions about what we can know (ontology), how we gain new knowledge (epistemology), and what we do with this knowledge (teleology) are therefore illuminated from these very different perspectives, as each experts uses a different facet to look at these challenges. The result of bringing these perspectives into one book is a challenging compendium that gives room for a spectrum of challenges: from general philosophy questions, such as can we use modeling and simulation and other computational means at all to discover new knowledge, down to computational methods to improve semantic interoperability between systems or methods addressing how to apply the recent insights of service oriented approaches to support distributed artificial intelligence. As such, this book has been compiled as an entry point to new domains for students, scholars, and practitioners and to raise the curiosity in them to learn more to fully address the topics of ontology, epistemology, and teleology from philosophical, computational, and conceptual viewpoints.

Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book, first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in analytical philosophy.

The idea of a final end of human conduct - the highest good - plays an important role in Kant's philosophy. Unlike his predecessors Kant defines the highest good as a combination of two heterogeneous elements, namely virtue and happiness. This conception lies at the centre of some of the most influential Kantian doctrines such as his famous "moral argument" for the rationality of faith, his conception of the unity of reason and his views concerning the final end of nature as well as the historical progress of mankind. To be sure, the different treatments of the highest good in Kant's work have led to a great deal of discussion among his readers. Besides Kant's arguments for moral faith, recent debate has focused on the place of the highest good within Kant's moral theory, on the antinomy of pure practical reason, and on the idea of the primacy of practical reason. This collection of new essays attempts to re-evaluate Kant's doctrine of the highest good and to determine its relevance for contemporary philosophy.

In einem Brief an Martin Buber schrieb FR, am 25. Oktober 1925, daB sich seine eigentliche "literarische Entwicklung" seit 1920 im Ubersetzen abgespielt habe. Wie jede Selbstcharakteristik stimmt diese Feststellung sicher nur zum Teil. Wesentlich jedoch ist die daB es sich bei FRs Ubersetzungen urn eine literarische Tatsache, Entwicklung mit unterscheidbaren Stilperioden handelt. Am Anfang dieser Entwicklung stehen die Ubersetzungen einiger Gebetszyklen, die zunachst im grade gegriindeten eigenen Hausstand gebraucht wurden. Zur zweiten Phase geh6ren die Ubertragungen von Hymnen mittelalteriicher Dichter die, gewissermassen als Sekun- dariiteratur, in die jiidische Liturgie aufgenommen wurden. Der Weg fiihrte weiter zu der Auswahl der Gedichte Jehuda Halevis und dann zur Verdeutschung der Schrift. Schon in der liturgischen Phase machte FR es sich nicht leicht. Die Ubersetzungen muBten nicht nur dem hebraischen oder dem aramai- schen Wortsinn entsprechen - sie muBten auch mit den dem deutschen Judentum vertrauten Melodien zu singen sein. Eine wissenschaftlich genaue oder "w6rtliche" Ubersetzung konnte so nicht entstehen. Die drei Worte, mit denen die meisten Segensspriiche der hebraischen Liturgie beginnen, zum Beispie- baruch ata adonai - waren w6rtlich etwa mit "Gelobt Du me in Herr" zu iibersetzen. Da standen aber den sieben hebraischen Silben nur fiinf deutsche gegeniiber, was diese unsingbar gemacht hatte. FRs Formulierung - Lob nun ja Lob dir 0 Gott - mag als bezeichnend fiir die Anfange seiner Ubersetzungen genommen werden.

Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl focuses on the first ten years of Edmund Husserl's work, from the publication of his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) to that of his Logical Investigations (1900/01), and aims to precisely locate his early work in the fields of logic, philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Unlike most phenomenologists, the author refrains from reading Husserl's early work as a more or less immature sketch of claims consolidated only in his later phenomenology, and unlike the majority of historians of logic she emphasizes the systematic strength and the originality of Husserl's logico-mathematical work.

The book attempts to reconstruct the discussion between Husserl and those philosophers and mathematicians who contributed to new developments in logic, such as Leibniz, Bolzano, the logical algebraists (especially Boole and Schroder), Frege, and Hilbert and his school. It presents both a comprehensive critical examination of some of the major works produced by Husserl and his antagonists in the last decade of the 19th century and a formal reconstruction of many texts from Husserl's Nachlass that have not yet been the object of systematical scrutiny.

This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to analytical philosophers and phenomenologists with a background in standard logic."

This multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional collection offers the first ever full-scale analysis of legal fictions. Its focus is on fictions in legal practice, examining and evaluating their roles in a variety of different areas of practice (e.g. in Tort Law, Criminal Law and Intellectual Property Law) and in different times and places (e.g. in Roman Law, Rabbinic Law and the Common Law). The collection approaches the topic in part through the discussion of certain key classical statements by theorists including Jeremy Bentham, Alf Ross, Hans Vaihinger, Hans Kelsen and Lon Fuller. The collection opens with the first-ever translation into English of Kelsen's review of Vaihinger's As If. The 17 chapters are divided into four parts: 1) a discussion of the principal theories of fictions, as above, with a focus on Kelsen, Bentham, Fuller and classical pragmatism; 2) a discussion of the relationship between fictions and language; 3) a theoretical and historical examination and evaluation of fictions in the common law; and 4) an account of fictions in different practice areas and in different legal cultures. The collection will be of interest to theorists and historians of legal reasoning, as well as scholars and practitioners of the law more generally, in both common and civil law traditions.

This book provides a novel interpretation of the ideas about language in Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations'. In particular, the author places the 'private language argument' in the context of wider themes in the Investigations, and thereby develops a picture of what it is for words to bear the meaning they do. Travis elaborates two versions of a private language argument, and shows the consequences of these for current trends in the philosophical theory of meaning.

The generation of meaning is the most fundamental process of the mind. It underlies all major mental functions, such as intelligence, memory, perception, and communication. Not surprisingly, it has been one of the most difficult processes to understand and represent in a model of human cognition. Dr. Christine Hardy introduces two fundamental concepts to address the complexity and richness of meaning. First, she discusses Semantic Constellations, which constitute the basic transversal network organization of mental and neural processes. Second, she addresses a highly dynamic connective process that underlies conscious thought and constantly gives birth to novel emergents or meanings. Taken together, Hardy asserts, the mind's network architecture and connective dynamics allow for self-organization, generativity, and creativity. They can also account for some of the most interesting facets of mental processes, in particular, nonlinear shifts and "breakthroughs" such as intuition, insights, and shifts in states of consciousness. This connective dynamic does not just take place within the mind. Rather, it involves a continuously evolving person-environment interaction: meaning is injected into the environment, and then retrojected, somewhat modified, back into the psyche. This means that, simultaneously, we are both perceiving reality and subtly influencing the very reality we perceive: objects, events, and other individuals. The way in which we think and feel, both individually and collectively, interacts with the physical world and directly shapes the society in which we live. The very same connective dynamic, Hardy shows, is the foundation for those rare yet striking transpersonalexperiences known as synchronicity and psychic phenomena. We live in a world in which we interact with reality at a very fundamental level. Hardy's work is a major analysis for scholars and researchers in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and parapsychology.

In A Theodicy of Hell Charles Seymour tackles one of the most difficult problems facing the western theistic tradition: to show the consonance between eternal punishment and the goodness of God. Medieval theology attempted to resolve the dilemma by arguing that any sin, no matter how slight, merits unending torment. Contemporary thinkers, on the other hand, tend to eliminate the retributive element from hell entirely. Combining historical breadth with detailed argumentation, the author develops a novel understanding of hell which avoids the extremes of both its traditional and modern rivals. He then surveys the battery of objections ranged against the possibility of eternal punishment and shows how his freedom view of hell' can withstand the attack. The work will be of particular importance for those interested in philosophy of religion and theology, including academics, students, seminarians, clergy, and anyone else with a personal desire to come to terms with this perennially challenging doctrine.

In this insightful new book David J. Yount argues, against received wisdom, that there are no essential differences between the metaphysics of Plato and Plotinus. Yount covers the core principles of Plotinian thought: The One or Good, Intellect, and All-Soul (the Three Hypostases), Beauty, God(s), Forms, Emanation, Matter, and Evil. After addressing the interpretive issues that surround the authenticity of Plato's works, Plotinus: The Platonist deftly argues against the commonly held view that Plotinus is best interpreted as a Neo-Platonist, proposing he should be thought of as a Platonist proper. Yount presents thorough explanations and quotations from the works of each classical philosopher to demonstrate his thesis, concluding comprehensively that Plato and Plotinus do not essentially differ on their metaphysical conceptions. This is an ideal text for Plato and Plotinus scholars and academics, and excellent supplementary reading for upper-level undergraduates students and postgraduate students of ancient philosophy.

Is it merely a matter of taste or convention to consider something right or wrong? Or can we find good reasons for our values and judgements that are independent of culture and tradition? The problem is as old as philosophy itself; and after more than two millennia of scholarly debate, there seems no end to the controversy. But Christian Illies suggests that powerful new forms of transcendental argument (a philosophical tool known since antiquity) may offer a long-sought cornerstone for morality.

This monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them.

Simon Susen examines the impact of the 'postmodern turn' on the contemporary social sciences. On the basis of an innovative five-dimensional approach, this study provides a systematic, comprehensive, and critical account of the legacy of the 'postmodern turn', notably in terms of its continuing relevance in the twenty-first century.