The general topic of this book is the theory of categories, its sources, meaning and development. The inquiry can be seen to proceed on two levels. On one, the history of the theory is traced from its alleged genesis in Aristotle, through its main subsequent stages of Kant and Hegel, up to a kind of consummation in two of its prominent twentieth century adherents, Alfred North White head and Nicolai Hartmann. Special attention has been paid to that aspect of the Hegelian conception of the categorial analysis from which the principle of coherence emerged. On the second, deeper level, however, everything starts with Whitehead's metaphysical system, the central part of which con sists of a fascinating, though highly intricate, web of categorial notions and propositions. The historical perspective becomes a means for untangling that web. I am indebted to a number of people for advice, comment and criticism of various parts of this book. My greatest thanks go to my teachers and colleagues Nathan Rotenstreich, Nathan Spiegel, Yaakov Fleischman, as well as to the late Shmuel Hugo Bergman and Pepita Haezrachi. of this book was published in 1967 by An earlier, Hebrew version the Bialik Institute of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Mr Yehoshua Perel, Mr Arnold Schwartz and to my wife Varda for their cooperation in rendering the extensively revised text of the book into readable English. I also owe great appreciation to Miss Liat Dawe for an accurate and painstaking word-processing of the text."

This collection offers new essays by eminent scholars on Wittgenstein's third masterpiece, "On Certainty." Although Wittgenstein's language, and the problems he deals with--the nature of basic beliefs, epistemic foundationalism, knowledge, certainty, skepticism--are here much closer to traditional philosophy, the exploratory and nonlinear character of "On Certainty" make it a difficult work to penetrate. These essays probe deep into the work from four different approaches: the framework reading; the transcendental reading; the therapeutic reading; and the epistemic reading. This is the first collection ever devoted to "On Certainty," and will prove an invaluable tool to scholars and students of Wittgenstein who have thus far only fleetingly ventured beyond Philosophical Investigations.

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon calls attention to the dynamic interaction that takes place between hermeneutics and phenomenology in Ricoeur's thought. It could be said that Ricoeur's thought is placed under a twofold demand: between the rigor of the text and the requirements of the phenomenon. The rigor of the text calls for fidelity to what the text actually says, while the requirement of the phenomenon is established by the Husserlian call to return "to the things themselves." These two demands are interwoven insofar as there is a hermeneutic component of the phenomenological attempt to go beyond the surface of things to their deeper meaning, just as there is a phenomenological component of the hermeneutic attempt to establish a critical distance toward the world to which we belong. For this reason, Ricoeur's thought involves a back and forth movement between the text and the phenomenon. Although this double movement was a theme of many of Ricoeur's essays in the middle of his career, the essays in this book suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology remains implicit throughout his work. The chapters aim to highlight, in much greater detail, how this back and forth movement between phenomenology and hermeneutics takes place with respect to many important philosophical themes, including the experience of the body, history, language, memory, personal identity, and intersubjectivity.

Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against a traditional spectator theory of knowledge, the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive beholding relation between the knower and the object known. Kulp presents Dewey's arguments with unusual clarity, but, ultimately, finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge. American philosophers have recently revived their interest in Dewey's work. Such philosophers as well as students and scholars involved with the study of American thought and schools of philosophy will find Kulp's book extremely useful.

Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality - these are the main topics in the work of John R. Searle, one of the leading philosophical figures of the present times. How language is based on intentionality, how intentionality in turn is to be explicated by means of distinctions discovered in Speech Act Theory, and how language and intentionality are both related to social facts and institutions - these are questions to be tackled in this volume. The contributions result from discussions on and with John R. Searle, containing Searle's own latest views - including his seminal ideas on Rationality in Action. The collection provides a good basis for advanced seminar debates in Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Philosophy, and will also stimulate some further research on all of the three main topics.

Coleridge's status as a philosopher has often been questioned. `I am a poor poet in England,' he admitted, `but in America, I am a great philosopher.' J. S. Mill's assertion that `the time is yet far distant when, in the estimation of Coleridge, and of his influence upon the intellect of our time, anything like unanimity can be looked for' seems to have been justified. Mary Anne Perkins re-examines Coleridge's claim to have developed a `logosophic' system which attempted `to reduce all knowledges into harmony'. She pays particular attention to his later writings, some of which are still unpublished. She suggests that the accusations of plagiarism and of muddled, abstruse metaphysics which have been levelled at him may be challenged by a thorough reading of his work in which his unifying principle is revealed. She explores the various meanings for the term `Logos', a recurrent theme in every area of Coleridge's thought - philosophy, religion, natural science, history, political and social criticism, literary theory, and psychology. Coleridge was responding to the concerns of his own time, a revolutionary age in which increasing intellectual and moral fragmentation and confusion seemed to him to threaten both individuals and society. Drawing on the whole of Western intellectual history, he offered a ground for philosophy which was relational rather than mechanistic. He is one of those few thinkers whose work appears to become more interesting, his perceptions more acute, as the historical gulf widens. This book is a contribution to the reassessment that he deserves.

This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.

In this book, the contributors present an overview of recent developments in philosophy of science by providing a collection of articles that together constitute a systematic and comprehensive investigation of how to understand the relation between the social sciences and democracy.

Featuring more than 150 articles by more than 70 leading scholars, this is the only encyclopedia devoted to Empiricism. It is an essential source of information on particular figures, topics, and doctrines, treating the topic as a 17th- and 18th-century movement as well as a broader tendency in philosophical thought. The work demonstrates the continuity and logical development of Empiricism as an historical movement and explains the relations between the movement of the 17th and 18th centuries and the various species of empiricism that prececed and succeeded it. Of great use to scholars, students, and public library patrons are the selected bibliographies of primary and secondary sources that conclude each article.

The present Volume 4 of the Vienna Circle Yearbook is dedicated to Otto Neurath, one of the leading figures of the Vienna Circle and one of last polymaths representative of the vanished culture from which the Circle emerged. Situating Neurath's work between the topoi of Encyclopedism - as a theoretical, scientific tool of the unfinished' project of (post-) enlightenment - and Utopianism - as the resolve to work for the systematic improvement of society and science - this volume presents the most recent research as well as critical and updated surveys and assessments of Neurath's many-faceted and impressive life work. The contributions range from history and philosophy of science, epistemology, sociology and economics to pictorial statistics (ISOTYPE) and museology. Special attention is given to Neurath's methodological holism and epistemological naturalism, as well as to the interrelations of the different disciplines in Neurath's conception of the Unity of Science. Most contributors agree that the historical and systematic reconstruction of Neurath's conception of science leads to issues of crucial relevance to the ongoing task of sharpening the instrument that is science for its responsible application in the natural and social world. The volume also includes Neurath's previously unpublished full manuscript on visual education, a report on archival holdings concerning Neurath's work and a review section focusing on recent publications on Neurath and Logical Empiricism. An overview of the activities of the Institute Vienna Circle 1996/97 concludes the volume. Audience: Philosophers in general, philosophers of science and historians of science, and sociologists. The book will alsointerest scholars specialized in adult education, museology and economics.

What do philosophy and computer science have in common? It turns out, quite a lot! In providing an introduction to computer science (using Python), Daniel Lim presents in this book key philosophical issues, ranging from external world skepticism to the existence of God to the problem of induction. These issues, and others, are introduced through the use of critical computational concepts, ranging from image manipulation to recursive programming to elementary machine learning techniques. In illuminating some of the overlapping conceptual spaces of computer science and philosophy, Lim teaches the reader fundamental programming skills and also allows her to develop the critical thinking skills essential for examining some of the enduring questions of philosophy. Key Features Teaches readers actual computer programming, not merely ideas about computers Includes fun programming projects (like digital image manipulation and Game of Life simulation), allowing the reader to develop the ability to write larger computer programs that require decomposition, abstraction, and algorithmic thinking Uses computational concepts to introduce, clarify, and develop a variety of philosophical issues Covers various aspects of machine learning and relates them to philosophical issues involving science and induction as well as to ethical issues Provides a framework to critically analyze arguments in classic and contemporary philosophical debates

When down from the moon stepped the goddess of the night, she bid Minerva/Athene come to her. "Minerva/Athene," she said, "you sprang fully formed from the head of your father. Now all the daughters of mankind think they, too, are as rootless as you. Tonight I bid you dance, join the circle round 1 that tree glistening with the clarity of wisdom. Mother Natura and Lady Philosophia, hands together, already have begun the promenade of myth and allegory. " Still in the garb of gold and white stone, Minerva/ Athene did as she was bid and danced till dawn. Then in new light, she found herself suddenly a budding flower on a tall branch, and even more swiftly a crystalline fruit, rivaling the morning sun, refracting the light. Behold, she had grown roots, difficult to discover down in the dark of history, deep in the solid knowledge of earth. And the daughters of humankind saw and reveled in their roots. This is the story of this book, a history, long and diverse, of women thinkers and their thought. It will become a legacy for all who study it, a legacy that Heloi"se, Marie de Gournay, Sor Juana Ines de Ia Cruz, and Judith Sargent Murray among many women philosophers assured by composing lists of the names of women little acknowledged century after century. While the Hannah Arendt's, Susanne K.

Pluriverse, the final work of the American poet and philosopher Benjamin Paul Blood, was published posthumously in 1920. After an experience of the anaesthetic nitrous oxide during a dental operation, Blood came to the conclusion that his mind had been opened, that he had undergone a mystical experience, and that he had come to a realisation of the true nature of reality. This title is the fullest exposition of Blood's esoteric Christian philosophy-cum-theology, which, though deemed wildly eccentric by commentators both during his lifetime and later in the twentieth century, was nonetheless one of the most influential sources for American mystical-empiricism. In particular, Blood's thought was a major inspiration for William James, and can be seen to prefigure the latter's concept of Sciousness directly.

Intuitionistic type theory can be described, somewhat boldly, as a partial fulfillment of the dream of a universal language for science. This book expounds several aspects of intuitionistic type theory, such as the notion of set, reference vs. computation, assumption, and substitution. Moreover, the book includes philosophically relevant sections on the principle of compositionality, lingua characteristica, epistemology, propositional logic, intuitionism, and the law of excluded middle. Ample historical references are given throughout the book.

Having enjoyed more than twenty years of development, feminist epistemology and philosophy of science are now thriving fields of inquiry, offering current scholars a rich tradition from which to draw. In addition to a recognition of the power of knowledge itself and its effects on women s lives, a central feature of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science has been the attention they draw to the role of power dynamics within knowledge-seeking practices and the implications of these dynamics for our understandings of knowledge, science, and epistemology.
"Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge" collects new works that address today s key challenges for a power-sensitive feminist approach to questions of knowledge and scientific practice. The essays build upon established work in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science, offering new developments in the fields, and representing the broad array of the feminist work now being done and the many ways in which feminists incorporate power dynamics into their analyses.

This last one out of four volumes by Richard Ned Lebow in this book series focuses on various fields of social sciences and their connection to international politics. The author writes about topics in psychology, tragedy, and ethics. All of these fields are being put into relation with political aspects, especially international relations.

In this book eminent philosopher Burton Porter examines the concept of "forbidden knowledge" in religion, science, government, and psychology. From the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden (forbidden fruit), to world altering scientific research (nuclear power, stem-cells, cloning) to damning government secrets (Abu Ghraib, domestic spying), to traumatic experiences that individuals want to repress (sexual abuse), humanity has encountered knowledge that has been hidden and suppressed. We experience this denial as a loss of control and respect, and we want to know exactly what knowledge has been prohibited and why we cannot have access to it. Forbidden knowledge, therefore, is of enormous interest to the general public. The basic question, then, is: when, if ever, should knowledge be forbidden? Are there sacred realms that human beings are not meant to explore? Can scientific research be a Frankenstein monster, which will harm us one day? When are government secrets necessary for national security, and when does the public have a right to know? Is too much information classified? When do databanks, eavesdropping, and surveillance invade our privacy? Is self-deception justified if the truth would be psychologically disturbing? In short, can we know more than is good for us? The author takes the general position that too much material is prohibited, especially today, even while business and government invade individual privacy more and more. A primary assumption in a democracy is that we can have confidence in the people, so information should not be forbidden unless there is a vital and compelling reason to withhold it.

In ancient times, the main approaches to metaphysical realism were intuitive. In modern times, foundationalism has replaced intuition as the main strategy to make out metaphysical realist claims to know. In On Foundationalism, Rockmore argues that foundationalism fails in all its known variants. Furthermore, Rockmore argues that Kant plays a crucial role in this regard. Kant's complex position is both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist, committed to metaphysical realism, and also, through its commitment to empirical realism, opposed to metaphysical realism. Before Kant, it made eminent sense to be committed to eventually making out a claim for metaphysical realism by formulating an acceptable version of foundationalism. After Kant, it no longer makes sense even to try to do so.

It is convenient to divide the theory of knowledge into three sets of problems: 1. the nature of knowledge, certainty and related notions, 2. the nature and validi ty of the sources of knowledge, and 3. answers to skeptical arguments. The first set includes questions such as: What is it to know that something is the case? Does knowledge imply certainty? If not, how do they differ? What are the con ditions of knowledge? What is it to be justified in accepting something? The sec ond deals with the ways in which knowledge can be acquired. Traditional sources have included sources of premisses such as perception, memory, in trospection, innateness, revelation, testimony, and methods for drawing conclu sions such as induction and deduction, among others. Under this heading, philosophers have asked: Does innateness provide knowledge? Under what con ditions are beliefs from perception, testimony and memory justified? When does induction yield justified belief? Can induction itself be justified? Debates in this area have sometimes led philosophers to question sources (e. g., revela tion, innateness) but usually the aim has been to clarify and increase our understanding of the notion of knowledge. The third class includes the peren nial puzzles taught to beginning students: the existence of other minds, the problem of the external world (along with questions about idealism and phenomenalism), and more general skeptical problems such as the problem of the criterion. These sets of questions are related."

Do judges' decisions depend on how long it is since they ate their lunch? Is the best place for a woman to seduce a man on a rickety bridge? Does free will really exist? This book explores how our genes and experiences determine our behaviour as well as discussing the implications determinism may have on personal responsibility and morality.

John McDowell's 'minimal empiricism' is one of the most influential and widely discussed doctrines in contemporary philosophy. Richard Gaskin subjects it to careful examination and criticism. The doctrine is undermined, he argues, by inadequacies in the way McDowell conceives what he styles the 'order of justification' connecting world, experience, and judgement. McDowell's conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity; and the requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the 'order of justification' and so are deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell's position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege's radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell's metaphysical economy. Gaskin goes on to show how to correct the mistake, and thereby presents his own version of empiricism. First we must follow Frege in his location of concepts at the level of reference, but then we must go beyond Frege and locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level; and this in turn requires us to take seriously an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us 'in the world's own language'. If empiricism is to have any chance of success it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows: in particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the 'order of justification'.