People believe in a great many things; and yet most of us know almost nothing about why other people believe what they do, or indeed about how it feels to believe it. This book presents an objective method for understanding and comparing belief systems - irrespective of whether the investigator happens to agree with them.

Fourteen new essays by a distinguished team of authors offer a broad and stimulating re-examination of transcendental arguments. This is the philosophical method of arguing that what is doubted or denied by the opponent must be the case, as a condition for the possibility of experience, language, or thought. The line-up of contributors features leading figures in the field from both sides of the Atlantic; they discuss the nature of transcendental arguments, and consider their role and value. In particular, they consider how successful such arguments are as a response to sceptical problems. The editor's introduction provides historical context and philosophical orientation for the discussions. This is the first major appraisal of transcendental arguments since the 1970s; they have continued to play a significant role in philosophy, and recent developments in epistemology and metaphysics have raised new questions and challenges for them. Transcendental Arguments will be essential reading for anyone interested in this area of philosophy, and the starting-point for future work.

This book derives from a 1993 National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom. The Institute took place at the University of California, Berkeley, and was co-directed by Keith Lehrer and Nicholas D. Smith. The aims of the Institute were several: we sought to reintroduce wisdom as a topic of discussion among contemporary philosophers, to undertake an historical investigation of how and when and why it was that wisdom faded from philosophical view, and to ask how contemporary epistemological theories might apply to the obviously related subjects of teaching and wisdom. In recruiting participants, Lehrer and Smith put the greatest emphasis on those with professional interests in epistemology and the history of philosophy, of the ancient Greeks especially ancient Greek philosophy (because in the writings all three subjects of the Institute were explicitly related and discussed). But in addition to these two groups, some effort was made also to include others, with academic specializations in a variety of fields other than epistemology and the history of philosophy, to ensure that a broad perspective could be achieved in our discussions. To an obvious extent, the papers in this book reflect the recruitment emphases and variety. They also testify to the extent that the Institute managed to bring life to our subjects, and to raise very old questions in a contemporary context.

This book is meant to serve as an introduction to the philosophy of Thomas Reid by way of a study of certain themes central to that philosophy as we find it expounded in his extensive and influential published writings. The choice of these themes inevitably reflects philosophical interests of the author of this book to some extent but a main consideration behind their selection is that they are extensively treated by Reid in response to treatments by certain of his predecessors in an identifiable tradition called by Yolton 'The Way ofIdeas'. My interest in Reid's philosophy was first awakened by the brilliant writings of A.N. Prior, and in particular by Part II of his posthumous 'Objects of Thought' called 'What we think about' together with his suggestion that Reid was a precursor of Mill on the signification of proper names. It is my hope that the standard of exegesis and of discussion throughout the book, and especially in the case of these topics, is a not unworthy tribute to that thinker.

This monograph investigates the development of hydrostatics as a science. In the process, it sheds new light on the nature of science and its origins in the Scientific Revolution. Readers will come to see that the history of hydrostatics reveals subtle ways in which the science of the seventeenth century differed from previous periods. The key, the author argues, is the new insights into the concept of pressure that emerged during the Scientific Revolution. This came about due to contributions from such figures as Simon Stevin, Pascal, Boyle and Newton. The author compares their work with Galileo and Descartes, neither of whom grasped the need for a new conception of pressure. As a result, their contributions to hydrostatics were unproductive. The story ends with Newton insofar as his version of hydrostatics set the subject on its modern course. He articulated a technical notion of pressure that was up to the task. Newton compared the mathematical way in hydrostatics and the experimental way, and sided with the former. The subtleties that lie behind Newton's position throws light on the way in which developments in seventeenth-century science simultaneously involved mathematization and experimentation. This book serves as an example of the degree of conceptual change that new sciences often require. It will be of interest to those involved in the study of history and philosophy of science. It will also appeal to physicists as well as interested general readers.

The study is the linking of view of science with the Qur'an related to the development of science. Approach that links, this faith is one way to provide an appropriate understanding of the true religion with the development of contemporary science. During the times that are not sent Messengers and Prophets, Muslims who have an understanding of the Qur'an must play a role in the expanding missionary and apostle and prophet continued to work to continue the history of civilization. In this paper the finding of investigating people about view of people about the harmonize between the Quran and science is formulated through mathematics formula.

From the mid-1960s, after the important works by J. Hintikka, S. Korner, W. Sellars and P.F. Strawson, there has been a marked revival of Kantian epistemological thought. Against this background, featuring fruitful exchange between historical research and theoretical prospects, the main point of the book is the discussion of Kantian theory of scientific knowledge from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy and philosophy of empirical and mathematical sciences. The main topics are the problem of a priori knowledge in logic, mathematics and physics, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the constitution of physical objectivity and the questions of realism and truth, the Kantian conception of time, causal laws and induction, the relations between Kantian epistemological thought, relativity theory, quantum theory and some recent developments of philosophy of science. The book is addressed to research workers, specialists and scholars in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of science and history of philosophy. "

This is a new monograph offering the first focused study of the place of transcendental arguments within Kant's system as a whole.Two currents of thought dominated Western philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism. Despite the gradual dissemination of British ideas on the Continent in the first decades of the eighteenth century, these fundamentally disparate philosophical outlooks seemed to be wholly irreconcilable.However, the publication of Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" in 1781 presented an entirely new method of philosophical reasoning that promised to combine the virtues of Rationalism with the scientific rigour of Empiricism. This book offers the first extended analysis of Kant's method of proof in philosophy. The author constructs a model based on Kant's own statements about his procedure and then examines his famous proofs in light of it. Great emphasis is placed on historical accuracy and the debunking of popular myths about Kant's aims and doctrines. The result is a compelling new picture of Kant that will challenge current assumptions.

A distinguished group of scholars met at the State University of New York at Buffalo to share their thoughts on the nature of humans as rational animals. The result is this compelling collection of essays and commentaries titled "Naturalism and Rationality". We are affected by all sorts of stimuli that influence our beliefs and actions. How does our understanding of what it means to be rational affect our interpretation of the world around us? What problems arise as a result of our attempts to analyse rationality within the scope of naturalism? These essays offer fascinating discussion about the nature and extent of rationality - its content, focus, and the intrinsic guidelines for using the term "rational" when describing persons or actions.

In The Rise of Neoliberal Philosophy: Human Capital, Profitable Knowledge, and the Love of Wisdom, Brandon Absher argues that the neoliberal transformation of higher education has resulted in a paradigm shift in philosophy in the United States, leading to the rise of neoliberal philosophy. Neoliberal philosophy seeks to attract investment by demonstrating that it can produce optimal return. Further, philosophers in the neoliberal paradigm internalize and reproduce the values of the prevailing social order in their work, reorienting philosophical desire toward the production of attractive commodities. The aim of philosophy in the neoliberal university, Absher shows, has become the production of human capital and profitable knowledge.

"English Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung (Appeal and Justification)" develops a phenomenological theory of judgments on legitimacy. It undertakes a first systematic investigation of the structures in consciousness which enable the process of justification to unfold. The overall question is how the claim for legitimacy, inherent in both epistemological and ethical judgments, can be understood as a fundamental character of experience. The thesis that this book offers follows along the lines of a genetic answer to this question. It traces the characteristic of legitimation back to an originary appeal to which consciousness is exposed by experience. Legitimizing structures are thus to be understood as a predicative answer to this prepredicative appeal.This book investigates both the epistemological and the ethical fields, working mainly with Husserl's genetic theory in "Experience and Judgement". It offers a new and comprehensive reading of Husserl's ethics and a critical dialogue with Levinas' ethics of alterity and Apels' discourse ethics."German Version: Anspruch und Rechtfertigung" entwickelt eine phanomenologische Theorie des 'rechtlichen Denkens'.Dabei handelt es sich um eine erste systematische Untersuchung derjenigen Bewusstseinsstrukturen, die ein Begrunden, Ausweisen und Rechtfertigen uberhaupt erst ermoglichen. Die grundlegende Frage ist, wie Rechtsanspruche, die sowohl erkenntnistheoretischen als auch ethischen Urteilen inharent sind, als ein Grundmerkmal des Erfahrens verstanden werden konnen. Die vorliegende These gibt eine genetische Antwort auf diese Frage. Sie fuhrt den Rechtscharakter im Denken auf einen ursprunglichen Anspruch zuruck, dem Bewusstsein im Erfahren immer schon ausgesetzt ist.Rechtliche Strukturen mussen daher als eine pradikative Antwort auf ein vorpradikatives Angesprochen-Sein begriffen werden. Das vorliegende Buch untersucht sowohl den ethischen als auch den erkenntnistheoretischen Bereich, wobei Husserls genetische Phanomenologie in Erfahrung und Urteil den methodischen Hintergrund bildet. Es bietet ausserdem eine neue und umfassende Lekture von Husserls Schriften zur Ethik, sowie einen kritischen Dialog mit der Alteritatsethik von Levinas und der Diskursethik Apels.

Conceptual Tension: Essays on Kinship, Politics, and Individualism is a critical philosophical examination of the role of concepts and concept formation in social sciences. Written by Leon J. Goldstein, a preeminent Jewish philosopher who examined the epistemological foundations of social science inquiry during the second half of the twentieth century, the book undertakes a study of concept formation and change by looking at the four critical terms in anthropology (kinship), politics (parliament and Rousseau's concept of the general will), and sociology (individualism). The author challenges prevailing notions of concept formation and definition, specifically assertions by Gottlieb Frege that concepts have fixed, clear boundaries that are not subject to change. Instead, drawing upon arguments by R.G. Collingwood, Goldstein asserts that concepts have a historical dimension with boundaries and meanings that change with their use and context. Goldstein's work provides insight for philosophers, historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and Judaica scholars interested in the study and meaning of critical concepts within their fields.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions - Greek, Latin, and Arabic - and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This final volume focuses on intellectual operations and analyses some of the most exciting issues pertaining to the conceptual representation of the external world. The contributions cover the historical traditions and their impact on contemporary philosophy of mind.

This volume comprises three distinct investigations into the relationship between the nature and the value of knowledge. Each is written by one of the authors in consultation with the other two. 'Knowledge and Understanding' (by Duncan Pritchard) critically examines virtue-theoretic responses to the problem of the value of knowledge, and argues that the finally valuable cognitive state is not knowledge but understanding. 'Knowledge and Recognition' (by Alan Millar) develops an account of knowledge in which the idea of a recognitional ability plays a prominent role, and argues that this account enables us better to understand knowledge and its value. 'Knowledge and Action' (by Adrian Haddock) argues for an account of knowledge and justification which explains why knowledge is valuable, and enables us to make sense of the knowledge we have of our intentional actions.

"Between Eternities" interweaves the assertions of Science, Philosophy, Religion and Mysticism on the fundamental issues that underlie the universe and life, allowing a reader to find a meaning.

The relationship between theory and practice, research and action, is fundamental to all fields of applied social science. Should research findings and knowledge be useful for science, practice, and policy? If so, how should such research be designed, carried out and disseminated to achieve the twin goals of rigor and relevance? These challenges are particularly relevant in the applied areas of management and organization studies where there is a distinct responsibility for researchers to engage with the "real world." In this carefully crafted and thoughtful book, leading management researcher Andrew Van de Ven both presents the broad intellectual challenge of "engaged scholarship," and also sets out a clear framework and guidelines for carrying out soundly based and useful research for advancing both science and practice.
At a time when some may question the value and status of academic knowledge; and others, contrastingly, urge a closer relationship between researchers and research users--be they businesses, governments or other institutions--the challenge of engaged scholarship is as relevant as ever, and there is a real need for the thoughtful and considered approach offered by Van de Ven. The book both provides a manifesto for engaged scholarship in the social sciences, and clear framework for research design and methodology. It will be an invaluable reference point and guide for academics, researchers and graduate students across the social sciences concerned with rigorous and relevant research in the contemporary world.

Bill Brewer presents, motivates, and defends a bold new solution to a fundamental problem in the philosophy of perception. What is the correct theoretical conception of perceptual experience, and how should we best understand the most fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the physical objects in the world around us? Most theorists today analyse perception in terms of its representational content, in large part in order to avoid fatal problems attending the early modern conception of perception as a relation with particular mind-dependent objects of experience. Having set up the underlying problem and explored the lessons to be learnt from the various difficulties faced by opposing early modern responses to it, Bill Brewer argues that this contemporary approach has serious problems of its own. Furthermore, the early modern insight that perception is most fundamentally to be construed as a relation of conscious acquaintance with certain direct objects of experience is, he claims, perfectly consistent with the commonsense identification of such direct objects with persisting mind-independent physical objects themselves. Brewer here provides a critical, historical account of the philosophy of perception, in order to present a defensible vindication of empirical realism.

Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics in the Early Husserl focuses on the first ten years of Edmund Husserl's work, from the publication of his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) to that of his Logical Investigations (1900/01), and aims to precisely locate his early work in the fields of logic, philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics. Unlike most phenomenologists, the author refrains from reading Husserl's early work as a more or less immature sketch of claims consolidated only in his later phenomenology, and unlike the majority of historians of logic she emphasizes the systematic strength and the originality of Husserl's logico-mathematical work.

The book attempts to reconstruct the discussion between Husserl and those philosophers and mathematicians who contributed to new developments in logic, such as Leibniz, Bolzano, the logical algebraists (especially Boole and Schroder), Frege, and Hilbert and his school. It presents both a comprehensive critical examination of some of the major works produced by Husserl and his antagonists in the last decade of the 19th century and a formal reconstruction of many texts from Husserl's Nachlass that have not yet been the object of systematical scrutiny.

This volume will be of particular interest to researchers working in the history, and in the philosophy, of logic and mathematics, and more generally, to analytical philosophers and phenomenologists with a background in standard logic."

In einem Brief an Martin Buber schrieb FR, am 25. Oktober 1925, daB sich seine eigentliche "literarische Entwicklung" seit 1920 im Ubersetzen abgespielt habe. Wie jede Selbstcharakteristik stimmt diese Feststellung sicher nur zum Teil. Wesentlich jedoch ist die daB es sich bei FRs Ubersetzungen urn eine literarische Tatsache, Entwicklung mit unterscheidbaren Stilperioden handelt. Am Anfang dieser Entwicklung stehen die Ubersetzungen einiger Gebetszyklen, die zunachst im grade gegriindeten eigenen Hausstand gebraucht wurden. Zur zweiten Phase geh6ren die Ubertragungen von Hymnen mittelalteriicher Dichter die, gewissermassen als Sekun- dariiteratur, in die jiidische Liturgie aufgenommen wurden. Der Weg fiihrte weiter zu der Auswahl der Gedichte Jehuda Halevis und dann zur Verdeutschung der Schrift. Schon in der liturgischen Phase machte FR es sich nicht leicht. Die Ubersetzungen muBten nicht nur dem hebraischen oder dem aramai- schen Wortsinn entsprechen - sie muBten auch mit den dem deutschen Judentum vertrauten Melodien zu singen sein. Eine wissenschaftlich genaue oder "w6rtliche" Ubersetzung konnte so nicht entstehen. Die drei Worte, mit denen die meisten Segensspriiche der hebraischen Liturgie beginnen, zum Beispie- baruch ata adonai - waren w6rtlich etwa mit "Gelobt Du me in Herr" zu iibersetzen. Da standen aber den sieben hebraischen Silben nur fiinf deutsche gegeniiber, was diese unsingbar gemacht hatte. FRs Formulierung - Lob nun ja Lob dir 0 Gott - mag als bezeichnend fiir die Anfange seiner Ubersetzungen genommen werden.

The generation of meaning is the most fundamental process of the mind. It underlies all major mental functions, such as intelligence, memory, perception, and communication. Not surprisingly, it has been one of the most difficult processes to understand and represent in a model of human cognition. Dr. Christine Hardy introduces two fundamental concepts to address the complexity and richness of meaning. First, she discusses Semantic Constellations, which constitute the basic transversal network organization of mental and neural processes. Second, she addresses a highly dynamic connective process that underlies conscious thought and constantly gives birth to novel emergents or meanings. Taken together, Hardy asserts, the mind's network architecture and connective dynamics allow for self-organization, generativity, and creativity. They can also account for some of the most interesting facets of mental processes, in particular, nonlinear shifts and "breakthroughs" such as intuition, insights, and shifts in states of consciousness. This connective dynamic does not just take place within the mind. Rather, it involves a continuously evolving person-environment interaction: meaning is injected into the environment, and then retrojected, somewhat modified, back into the psyche. This means that, simultaneously, we are both perceiving reality and subtly influencing the very reality we perceive: objects, events, and other individuals. The way in which we think and feel, both individually and collectively, interacts with the physical world and directly shapes the society in which we live. The very same connective dynamic, Hardy shows, is the foundation for those rare yet striking transpersonalexperiences known as synchronicity and psychic phenomena. We live in a world in which we interact with reality at a very fundamental level. Hardy's work is a major analysis for scholars and researchers in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and parapsychology.

In this book, internationally recognized experts in philosophy of science, computer science, and modeling and simulation are contributing to the discussion on how ontology, epistemology, and teleology will contribute to enable the next generation of intelligent modeling and simulation applications. It is well understood that a simulation can provide the technical means to display the behavior of a system over time, including following observed trends to predict future possible states, but how reliable and trustworthy are such predictions? The questions about what we can know (ontology), how we gain new knowledge (epistemology), and what we do with this knowledge (teleology) are therefore illuminated from these very different perspectives, as each experts uses a different facet to look at these challenges. The result of bringing these perspectives into one book is a challenging compendium that gives room for a spectrum of challenges: from general philosophy questions, such as can we use modeling and simulation and other computational means at all to discover new knowledge, down to computational methods to improve semantic interoperability between systems or methods addressing how to apply the recent insights of service oriented approaches to support distributed artificial intelligence. As such, this book has been compiled as an entry point to new domains for students, scholars, and practitioners and to raise the curiosity in them to learn more to fully address the topics of ontology, epistemology, and teleology from philosophical, computational, and conceptual viewpoints.

In A Theodicy of Hell Charles Seymour tackles one of the most difficult problems facing the western theistic tradition: to show the consonance between eternal punishment and the goodness of God. Medieval theology attempted to resolve the dilemma by arguing that any sin, no matter how slight, merits unending torment. Contemporary thinkers, on the other hand, tend to eliminate the retributive element from hell entirely. Combining historical breadth with detailed argumentation, the author develops a novel understanding of hell which avoids the extremes of both its traditional and modern rivals. He then surveys the battery of objections ranged against the possibility of eternal punishment and shows how his freedom view of hell' can withstand the attack. The work will be of particular importance for those interested in philosophy of religion and theology, including academics, students, seminarians, clergy, and anyone else with a personal desire to come to terms with this perennially challenging doctrine.