Perception is our main source of epistemic access to the outside world. Perception and Basic Beliefs addresses two central questions in epistemology: which beliefs are epistemologically basic (i.e., noninferentially justified) and where does perception end and inferential cognition begin. Jack Lyons offers a highly externalist theory, arguing that what makes a belief a basic belief or a perceptual belief is determined by the nature of the cognitive system, or module, that produced the beliefs. On this view, the sensory experiences that typically accompany perceptual beliefs play no indispensable role in the justification of these beliefs, and one can have perceptual beliefs--justified perceptual beliefs--even in the absence of any sensory experiences whatsoever. Lyons develops a general theory of basic beliefs and argues that perceptual beliefs are a species of basic beliefs. This results from the fact that perceptual modules are a special type of basic belief-producing modules. Importantly, some beliefs are not the outputs of this class of cognitive module; these beliefs are therefore non-basic, thus requiring inferential support from other beliefs for their justification. This last point is used to defend a reliabilist epistemology against an important class of traditional objections (where the agent uses a reliable process that she doesn't know to be reliable).
Perception and Basic Beliefs brings together an important treatment of these major epistemological topics and provides a positive solution to the traditional problem of the external world.

The distinctive feature of Madison's political theory is the Merleau-Pontyan sense of contingency that pervades his writings on the subject and, indeed, is visible throughout his entire oeuvre. The perspicacity of Madison's view of con- tingency was first noted by Paul Ricoeur. In his foreword to the English transla- tion of Madison's now classic study of the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur wrote: "More than anything, the most penetrating view which Gary Madison proposes of Merleau-Ponty's final ontology concerns the paradox of contingency. "! Twenty-eight years after the original French publication of his dissertation, we may look back over Madison's work and interpret it as working out Merleau-Ponty's insights into the implications of contingency for human political reality within the framework of a hermeneutical theory of democracy. The spirit of Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the emergence of Being at the heart of contingency and of contingency at the heart of Being is carried forward in Madison's articulation of a nondogmatic politics of communicative rational- ity. Madison's postmodern liberalism is unique in seeking to articulate a specifi- cally and explicitly hermeneutical politics, one that attempts to draw out the ul- timate praxial consequences of phenomenological hermeneutics. As might be expected from a political-economic theory of communicative rationality, Madi- son's thinking takes shape through a dialectical confrontation with a number of prominent contemporary writers-Derrida, Rorty, and Habermas, in particular.

The first comprehensive philosophical introduction and assessment to the problem of self-control, an increasingly popular topic in philosophy Self-control is one of the most fascinating problems in philosophy, studied in core subjects such as free will and ethics, yet there is no book available explaining in clear language what it is Plenty of examples from psychology and philosophy including self-deception in mental disorder, addiction and everyday examples such as loss of willpower and even mind-wandering Includes helpful additional features such as chapter summaries, annotated further reading and glossary Very strong author team led by Neil Levy, well-known for his work on addiction, consciousness and free will.

Leibniz's optimalistic cosmology is one of the most controversial--and least appreciated--sectors of his philosophical system. How can contingency figure in a context where all truth is seen as analytic? Why should the best of possibilities be realized? And how can omni-necessitation be averted if an omni-benevolent deity must create the best possible world? Moreover, how can this supposedly best of possible worlds contain so much suffering and evil? Then too, how can there be a best, anyway, seeing that anything can be improved upon? And how can an imperfect creature of limited intelligence possibly hope to fathom such cosmic mysteries? All these questions convey objections to Leibnizian ideas that have been made repeatedly over many years. In actual fact, however, Leibniz anticipated them all. The aim of the present book is to lend plausibility to how he set about it.

Infinite regresses (e.g., event3 caused event2, event2 caused event1, ad infinitum; statement3 justifies statement2, statement2 justifies statement1, ad infinitum) have been used as premises in arguments on a great variety of topics in both Eastern and Western philosophy since ancient times. They are part of a philosopher's tool kit of argumentation. But how sharp or strong is this tool? How effectively is it used? The typical presentation of infinite regress arguments throughout history is so succinct and has so many gaps that it is often unclear how an infinite regress is derived, and why an infinite regress is logically problematic, and as a result, it is often difficult to evaluate infinite regress arguments. These prevalent consequences indicate that there is a need for a theory to re-orient our practice. After well over two thousand years of using infinite regresses as premises, one would have expected that at least some theory of infinite regress arguments would have emerged. None exists. There have been only a few articles on infinite regress arguments, but they are based on the examination of only a small number of examples, discuss only a few logical or rhetorical aspects of infinite regress arguments, and so they help to meet the need for a theory in only a limited way.

Given the situation, I examined many infinite regress arguments to clarify the various aspects of the derivation of infinite regresses, and explain the different ways in which certain infinite regresses are unacceptable. My general approach consisted of collecting and evaluating as many infinite regress arguments as possible, comparing and contrasting many of the formal and non-formal properties, looking for recurring patterns, and identifying the properties that appeared essential to those patterns. The six chapters of this book gradually emerged from this approach. Two very general questions guided this work: (1) How are infinite regresses generated in infinite regress arguments? (2) How do infinite regresses logically function in an argument? In answering these questions I avoided as much as possible addressing the philosophical content and historical background of the arguments examined. Due to the already extensive work done on causal regresses and regresses of justification, only a few references are made to them. However, the focus is on other issues that have been neglected, and that do contribute to a general theory of infinite regress arguments: I clarify the notion of an infinite regress; identify different logical forms of infinite regresses; describe different kinds of infinite regress arguments; distinguish the rhetoric from the logic in infinite regress arguments; and discuss the function of infinite regresses in arguments. The unexamined derivation of infinite regresses is worth deriving to discover what we have kept hidden from ourselves, improve our ways of constructing and evaluating these arguments, and sharpen and strengthen one of our argumentative tools. This work is one example of empirical logic applied to infinite regress arguments: "the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation, and the sound practice of reasoning" (Finocchiaro, M. Arguments about Arguments, Systematic, Critical and Historical Essays in Logical Theory. P48). "

Late Antique Epistemology explores the techniques used by late antique philosophers to discuss truth. Non-rational ways to discover truth, or to reform the soul, have usually been thought inferior to the philosophically approved techniques of rational argument, suitable for the less philosophically inclined, for children, savages or the uneducated. Religious rituals, oracles, erotic passion, madness may all have served to waken courage or remind us of realities obscured by everyday concerns. What is unusual in the late antique classical philosophers is that these techniques were reckoned as reliable as reasoned argument, or better still. Late twentieth century commentators have offered psychological explanations of this turn, but only recently had it been accepted that there might also have been philosophical explanations, and that the later antique philosophers were not necessarily deluded.

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon calls attention to the dynamic interaction that takes place between hermeneutics and phenomenology in Ricoeur's thought. It could be said that Ricoeur's thought is placed under a twofold demand: between the rigor of the text and the requirements of the phenomenon. The rigor of the text calls for fidelity to what the text actually says, while the requirement of the phenomenon is established by the Husserlian call to return "to the things themselves." These two demands are interwoven insofar as there is a hermeneutic component of the phenomenological attempt to go beyond the surface of things to their deeper meaning, just as there is a phenomenological component of the hermeneutic attempt to establish a critical distance toward the world to which we belong. For this reason, Ricoeur's thought involves a back and forth movement between the text and the phenomenon. Although this double movement was a theme of many of Ricoeur's essays in the middle of his career, the essays in this book suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology remains implicit throughout his work. The chapters aim to highlight, in much greater detail, how this back and forth movement between phenomenology and hermeneutics takes place with respect to many important philosophical themes, including the experience of the body, history, language, memory, personal identity, and intersubjectivity.

In this book eminent philosopher Burton Porter examines the concept of "forbidden knowledge" in religion, science, government, and psychology. From the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden (forbidden fruit), to world altering scientific research (nuclear power, stem-cells, cloning) to damning government secrets (Abu Ghraib, domestic spying), to traumatic experiences that individuals want to repress (sexual abuse), humanity has encountered knowledge that has been hidden and suppressed. We experience this denial as a loss of control and respect, and we want to know exactly what knowledge has been prohibited and why we cannot have access to it. Forbidden knowledge, therefore, is of enormous interest to the general public. The basic question, then, is: when, if ever, should knowledge be forbidden? Are there sacred realms that human beings are not meant to explore? Can scientific research be a Frankenstein monster, which will harm us one day? When are government secrets necessary for national security, and when does the public have a right to know? Is too much information classified? When do databanks, eavesdropping, and surveillance invade our privacy? Is self-deception justified if the truth would be psychologically disturbing? In short, can we know more than is good for us? The author takes the general position that too much material is prohibited, especially today, even while business and government invade individual privacy more and more. A primary assumption in a democracy is that we can have confidence in the people, so information should not be forbidden unless there is a vital and compelling reason to withhold it.

The book analyses the work of R.G. Collingwood and Romantic thinkers, taking an interdisciplinary approach to mythology The book traces the changing relationship between history and myth and argues for new methodological approaches The book brings forward the broader perspective of idealism, where history is viewed as a form of knowledge, to bear upon a discussion of the nature of myths

These essays, written in the spirit of Goethe's Epimetheus who "traces the quick deed to the dim realm of form-combining possibilities," display the depth and breadth of Tallis's fascination with our lives. Whether discussing philosophical "hardy perennials" like time, or a mundane artefact like ink, Tallis challenges us to think differently about who we are and why we are. The first part of the book - Analysis - dives into the deep-end to explore some of the big questions in philosophy: perception, knowledge and belief; truth and falsehood; time; the relationship between mathematics and reality; and probability and causation. The middle section - Tetchy Interludes - takes a wry look at some aspects of contemporary art; stupidity (including the author's own); health care policy; and Christmas. The third part - Celebration - is more experimental in both its subject matter and treatment. It celebrates the complexity of ordinary, everyday consciousness by contemplating the miracle of speech, artefacts that have transformed our lives (and what they reveal about our cognition) such as the wheel, the sail, glue, and ink; and 'snapshots' of the author's own consciousness on an ordinary day, of past consciousness, as captured in historical memory. Notwithstanding their diversity in theme and style, these essays share the common aim of discovering and celebrating the submerged riches in the quick deeds of our everyday lives and perceptions.

During the summer of 1986 one of the co-editors was a fellow at the Summer Institute in Epistemology held at the University of Colorado in Boulder. It was there that the idea for this volume was born. It was clear from the discussions taking place at the i Institute that works such as Robert Nozick's Philosophical Explanations and Barry 2 Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism were beginning to have an impact and it was also clear that the debate over the issues surrounding skepticism had not gone away nor were they about to go away. Thinking that a new crop might be ready for harvest, the co-editors sent out a letter of inquiry to a long list of potential contributors. The letter elicited an overwhelmingly positive response to our inquiry from philosophers who were either writing something on skepticism at the time or who were willing to write something specifically for our volume. Still others told us that they had recently written something and if we were to consider previously published manuscripts they would permit us to consider their already published work. Out of all this material, the co-editors have put together the present collection. We believe that this anthology is not only suitable for graduate seminars but for advanced undergraduate classes as well.

This collection offers new essays by eminent scholars on Wittgenstein's third masterpiece, "On Certainty." Although Wittgenstein's language, and the problems he deals with--the nature of basic beliefs, epistemic foundationalism, knowledge, certainty, skepticism--are here much closer to traditional philosophy, the exploratory and nonlinear character of "On Certainty" make it a difficult work to penetrate. These essays probe deep into the work from four different approaches: the framework reading; the transcendental reading; the therapeutic reading; and the epistemic reading. This is the first collection ever devoted to "On Certainty," and will prove an invaluable tool to scholars and students of Wittgenstein who have thus far only fleetingly ventured beyond Philosophical Investigations.

The general topic of this book is the theory of categories, its sources, meaning and development. The inquiry can be seen to proceed on two levels. On one, the history of the theory is traced from its alleged genesis in Aristotle, through its main subsequent stages of Kant and Hegel, up to a kind of consummation in two of its prominent twentieth century adherents, Alfred North White head and Nicolai Hartmann. Special attention has been paid to that aspect of the Hegelian conception of the categorial analysis from which the principle of coherence emerged. On the second, deeper level, however, everything starts with Whitehead's metaphysical system, the central part of which con sists of a fascinating, though highly intricate, web of categorial notions and propositions. The historical perspective becomes a means for untangling that web. I am indebted to a number of people for advice, comment and criticism of various parts of this book. My greatest thanks go to my teachers and colleagues Nathan Rotenstreich, Nathan Spiegel, Yaakov Fleischman, as well as to the late Shmuel Hugo Bergman and Pepita Haezrachi. of this book was published in 1967 by An earlier, Hebrew version the Bialik Institute of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Mr Yehoshua Perel, Mr Arnold Schwartz and to my wife Varda for their cooperation in rendering the extensively revised text of the book into readable English. I also owe great appreciation to Miss Liat Dawe for an accurate and painstaking word-processing of the text."

Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality - these are the main topics in the work of John R. Searle, one of the leading philosophical figures of the present times. How language is based on intentionality, how intentionality in turn is to be explicated by means of distinctions discovered in Speech Act Theory, and how language and intentionality are both related to social facts and institutions - these are questions to be tackled in this volume. The contributions result from discussions on and with John R. Searle, containing Searle's own latest views - including his seminal ideas on Rationality in Action. The collection provides a good basis for advanced seminar debates in Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Philosophy, and will also stimulate some further research on all of the three main topics.

Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against a traditional spectator theory of knowledge, the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive beholding relation between the knower and the object known. Kulp presents Dewey's arguments with unusual clarity, but, ultimately, finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge. American philosophers have recently revived their interest in Dewey's work. Such philosophers as well as students and scholars involved with the study of American thought and schools of philosophy will find Kulp's book extremely useful.

In this book, the contributors present an overview of recent developments in philosophy of science by providing a collection of articles that together constitute a systematic and comprehensive investigation of how to understand the relation between the social sciences and democracy.

This last one out of four volumes by Richard Ned Lebow in this book series focuses on various fields of social sciences and their connection to international politics. The author writes about topics in psychology, tragedy, and ethics. All of these fields are being put into relation with political aspects, especially international relations.

Adrian Bardon's A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a short yet thorough introduction to the history, philosophy, and science of the study of time-from the pre-Socratic philosophers through Einstein and beyond. Its treatment is roughly chronological, starting with the ancient Greek philosophers Heraclitus and Parmenides and proceeding through the history of Western philosophy and science up to the present. Using illustrations and keeping technical language to a minimum, A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time covers subjects such as time and change, the experience of time, physical and metaphysical approaches to the nature of time, the direction of time, time-travel, time and freedom of the will, and scientific and philosophical approaches to eternity and the beginning of time. Bardon brings the resources of over 2500 years of philosophy and science to bear on some of humanity's most fundamental and enduring questions.

This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.

Coleridge's status as a philosopher has often been questioned. `I am a poor poet in England,' he admitted, `but in America, I am a great philosopher.' J. S. Mill's assertion that `the time is yet far distant when, in the estimation of Coleridge, and of his influence upon the intellect of our time, anything like unanimity can be looked for' seems to have been justified. Mary Anne Perkins re-examines Coleridge's claim to have developed a `logosophic' system which attempted `to reduce all knowledges into harmony'. She pays particular attention to his later writings, some of which are still unpublished. She suggests that the accusations of plagiarism and of muddled, abstruse metaphysics which have been levelled at him may be challenged by a thorough reading of his work in which his unifying principle is revealed. She explores the various meanings for the term `Logos', a recurrent theme in every area of Coleridge's thought - philosophy, religion, natural science, history, political and social criticism, literary theory, and psychology. Coleridge was responding to the concerns of his own time, a revolutionary age in which increasing intellectual and moral fragmentation and confusion seemed to him to threaten both individuals and society. Drawing on the whole of Western intellectual history, he offered a ground for philosophy which was relational rather than mechanistic. He is one of those few thinkers whose work appears to become more interesting, his perceptions more acute, as the historical gulf widens. This book is a contribution to the reassessment that he deserves.

This book centers on two dominant trends within contemporary epistemology: first, the dissatisfaction with the project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and, second, the surging popularity of virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge. Church argues that the Gettier Problem, the primary reason for abandoning the reductive analysis project, cannot viably be solved, and that prominent approaches to virtue epistemology fail to solve the Gettier Problem precisely along the lines his diagnosis predicts. Such an outcome motivates Church to explore a better way forward: non-reductive virtue epistemology. In so doing, he makes room for virtue epistemologies that are not only able to endure what he sees as inevitable developments in 21st-century epistemology, but also able to contribute positively to debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond.

Pluriverse, the final work of the American poet and philosopher Benjamin Paul Blood, was published posthumously in 1920. After an experience of the anaesthetic nitrous oxide during a dental operation, Blood came to the conclusion that his mind had been opened, that he had undergone a mystical experience, and that he had come to a realisation of the true nature of reality. This title is the fullest exposition of Blood's esoteric Christian philosophy-cum-theology, which, though deemed wildly eccentric by commentators both during his lifetime and later in the twentieth century, was nonetheless one of the most influential sources for American mystical-empiricism. In particular, Blood's thought was a major inspiration for William James, and can be seen to prefigure the latter's concept of Sciousness directly.

Featuring more than 150 articles by more than 70 leading scholars, this is the only encyclopedia devoted to Empiricism. It is an essential source of information on particular figures, topics, and doctrines, treating the topic as a 17th- and 18th-century movement as well as a broader tendency in philosophical thought. The work demonstrates the continuity and logical development of Empiricism as an historical movement and explains the relations between the movement of the 17th and 18th centuries and the various species of empiricism that prececed and succeeded it. Of great use to scholars, students, and public library patrons are the selected bibliographies of primary and secondary sources that conclude each article.

The first comprehensive philosophical introduction to risk Includes lots of additional features: text boxes, chapter summaries, study questions, review questions Most books cover either the science or ethics of risk: ours does both Packed with examples such as the nuclear industry, the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and risk in health and medicine Explains philosophical concepts and paradoxes about risk, such as Pascal's Wager and the Monte Carlo simulation

Intuitionistic type theory can be described, somewhat boldly, as a partial fulfillment of the dream of a universal language for science. This book expounds several aspects of intuitionistic type theory, such as the notion of set, reference vs. computation, assumption, and substitution. Moreover, the book includes philosophically relevant sections on the principle of compositionality, lingua characteristica, epistemology, propositional logic, intuitionism, and the law of excluded middle. Ample historical references are given throughout the book.