This first of a two-volume work provides a new understanding of Western subjectivity as theorized in the Augustinian Rule. A theopolitical synthesis of Antiquity, the Rule is a humble, yet extremely influential example of subjectivity production. In these volumes, Jodra argues that the Classical and Late-Ancient communitarian practices along the Mediterranean provide historical proof of a worldview in which the self and the other are not disjunctive components, but mutually inclusive forces. The Augustinian Rule is a culmination of this process and also the beginning of something new: the paradigm of the monastic self as protagonist of the new, medieval worldview. In this volume, Jodra takes one of the most influential and pervasive commons experiments-Augustine's Rule-and gives us its Mediterranean backstory, with an eye to solving at last the riddle of socialism. In volume two, he will present his solution in full, as a kind of Augustinian communitarianism for today. These volumes therefore restore the unity of the Hellenistic and Judaic world as found by the first Christians, proving that the self and the other are two essential pieces in the construction of our world.

Who has access, and who is denied access, to food, and why? What are the consequences of food insecurity? What would it take for the food system to be just? Just Food: Philosophy, Justice and Food presents thirteen new philosophical essays that explore the causes and consequences of the inequities of our contemporary food system. It examines why 842 million people globally are unable to meet their dietary needs, and why food insecurity is not simply a matter of insufficient supply. The book looks at how food insecurity tracks other social injustices, covering topics such as race, gender and property, as well as food sovereignty, food deserts, and locavorism. The essays in this volume make an important and timely contribution to the wider philosophical debate around food distribution and justice.

Mary Midgley is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Over the last 40 years, Midgley's writings on such central yet controversial topics as human nature, morality, science, animals, the environment, religion, and gender have shaped the landscape of contemporary philosophy. She is celebrated for the complexity, nuance, and sensibility with which she approaches some of the most challenging issues in philosophy without falling into the pitfalls of close-minded extremism. In turn, Midgley's sophisticated treatment of the interconnected and often muddled issues related to human nature has drawn interest from outside the philosophical world, stretching from scientists, artists, theologians, anthropologists, and journalists to the public more broadly. Mary Midgley: An Introduction systematically introduces readers to Midgley's collected thought on the most central and influential areas of her corpus. Through clear and lively engagement with Midgley's work, this volume offers readers accessible explanation, interpretation, and analysis of the concepts and perspectives for which she is best known, most notably her integrated understanding of human nature, her opposition to reductionism and scientism, and her influential conception of our relationship to animals and the wider world. These insights, supplemented by excerpts from original interviews with Midgley herself, provide readers of all backgrounds with an informed understanding and appreciation of Mary Midgley and the philosophical problems to which she has devoted her life's work.

Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. In Part I (History), he explores the historical context of the debate, and discusses the moral error theories of David Hume and of some more or less influential twentieth century philosophers, including Axel Hagerstroem, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Richard Robinson. He argues that the early cases for moral error theory are suggestive but that they would have been stronger had they included something like J. L. Mackie's arguments that moral properties and facts are metaphysically queer. Part II (Critique) focuses on these arguments. Olson identifies four queerness arguments, concerning supervenience, knowledge, motivation, and irreducible normativity, and goes on to establish that while the first three are not compelling, the fourth has considerable force, especially when combined with debunking explanations of why we tend to believe that there are moral properties and facts when in fact there are none. One conclusion of Part II is that a plausible error theory takes the form of an error theory about irreducible normativity. In Part III (Defence), Olson considers challenges according to which that kind of error theory has problematic ramifications regarding hypothetical reasons, epistemic reasons, and deliberation. He ends his discussion with a consideration of the implications of moral error theory for ordinary moral thought and talk, and for normative theorizing.

Assuming that people want to be happy, can we show that they cannot be happy without being ethical, and that all rational people therefore should be able to see that it is in their own best interest to be ethical? Is it irrational to reject ethics? Aristotle thought so, claims Anna Lannstroem; but, she adds, he also thought that there was no way to prove it to a skeptic or an immoral person. Lannstroem probes Aristotle's view that desire is crucial to decision making and to the formation of moral habits, pinpointing the "love of the fine" as the starting point of any argument for ethics. Those who love the fine can be persuaded that ethics is a crucial part of our happiness. However, as Lannstroem explains, the immoral person does not share this love, and therefore Aristotle denied that any argument would convince the immoral person to become good. Lannstroem maintains that Aristotle's Ethics speaks not just to ancient Greeks but to all those who already love the fine, aiming to help them improve their self-understanding and encouraging them to become better human beings. As a consequence, Aristotelian ethics remain viable today. Written in accessible and lucid prose, Loving the Fine contributes to the renewed interest in Aristotle's moral philosophy and will be of interest to students of virtue ethics and the history of philosophy.

While large bodies of scholarship exist on the plays of Shakespeare and the philosophy of Heidegger, this book is the first to read these two influential figures alongside one another, and to reveal how they can help us develop a creative and contemplative sense of ethics, or an 'ethical imagination'. Following the increased interest in reading Shakespeare philosophically, it seems only fitting that an encounter take place between the English language's most prominent poet and the philosopher widely considered to be central to continental philosophy. Interpreting the plays of Shakespeare through the writings of Heidegger and vice versa, each chapter pairs a select play with a select work of philosophy. In these pairings the themes, events, and arguments of each work are first carefully unpacked, and then key passages and concepts are taken up and read against and through one another. As these hermeneutic engagements and cross-readings unfold we find that the words and deeds of Shakespeare's characters uniquely illuminate, and are uniquely illuminated by, Heidegger's phenomenological analyses of being, language, and art.

From the perspectives of positive psychology and positive communication, superheroes are often depicted as possessing virtues and serving as inspirational exemplars. However, many of the virtues enumerated as characterizing the superhero (e.g., courage, teamwork, creativity) could just as easily be applied to heroes of other genres. To understand what is unique to the superhero genre, How Superheroes Model Community: Philosophically, Communicatively, Relationally looks not only to the virtues that animate them, but also to the underlying moral framework that gives meaning to those virtues. The key to understanding their character is that often they save strangers, and they do so in the public sphere. The superhero's moral framework, therefore, must encompass both the motivation to act to benefit others rather than themselves (especially people to whom they have no relational obligation) and to preserve the public sphere against those who would disrupt it. Given such a framework, Nathan Miczo argues that superheroes are not, and could not, be loners. They constantly form team-ups, super teams, alliances, partnerships, take on mentorship roles, and create sidekicks. Social constructionist approaches in the communication field argue that communication, in part, works to shape and create our social reality. Through this lens, Miczo proposes that superheroes maintain themselves as a community through the communicative practices they engage in.

In this important and original interdisciplinary work, well-known environmental philosopher Eric Katz explores technology's role in dominating both nature and humanity. He argues that technology dominates, and hence destroys, the natural world; it dominates, and hence destroys, critical aspects of human life and society. Technology causes an estrangement from nature, and thus a loss of meaning in human life. As a result, humans lose the power to make moral and social choices; they lose the power to control their lives. Katz's argument innovatively connects two distinct areas of thought: the fundamental goal of the Holocaust, including Nazi environmental policy, to heal the degenerate elements of society; and the plan to heal degraded natural systems that informs the contemporary environmental policy of 'ecological restoration'. In both arenas of 'healing,' Katz argues that technological forces drive action, while domination emerges as the prevailing ideology. Katz's work is a plea for the development of a technology that does not dominate and destroy but instead promotes autonomy and freedom.Anne Frank, a victim of Nazi ideology and action, saw the titular tree behind her secret annex as a symbol of freedom and moral goodness. In Katz's argument, the tree represents a free and autonomous nature, resistant to human control and domination. Anne Frank's Tree is rooted in an empirical approach to philosophy, seating complex ethical ideas in an accessible and powerful narrative of historical fact and deeply personal lived experience.

In Morality and Ethics of War, which includes a foreword by Major General Susan Coyle, ethicist Deane-Peter Baker goes beyond existing treatments of military ethics to address a fundamental problem: the yawning gap between the diverse moral frameworks defining personal identity on the one hand, and the professional military ethic on the other. Baker argues that overcoming this chasm is essential to minimising the ethical risks that can lead to operational and strategic failure for military forces engaged in today's complex conflict environment. He contends that spanning the gap is vital in preventing moral injury from befalling the nation's uniformed servants. Drawing on a revised account of what he calls 'the Just War Continuum', Baker develops a bridging framework that combines conceptual clarity and rigour with insights from cutting edge psychological research and creates a practical means for military leaders to negotiate the moral chasm in military affairs.

Just War Theory is the governing moral doctrine for all of the major democratic militaries and indeed beyond. This book is a close study of a critical component of Just War theory, the moral status of noncombatants. In this post September 11th, 2001 time of cascading unconventional or 'dirty' wars, issues of treatment of noncombatants - whether as incidental casualties during grey area operations or as prisoners swept up by preventative security measures - have resonance across national lines. Whether or not the democracies and other states pursue their national security interests within the limits of Just War reasoning and laws, or break out of these limits in prosecuting war and security measures against terrorist organizations, is one of the top security issues of the day. Zupan examines the flaws that this complex body of moral reasoning often exhibits, arguing that many of the shortcomings of Just War theory can be resolved using Kantian methodology and the theory of autonomy. According to this conception, human beings have unconditional worth which imposes moral constraints upon the actions of other human beings. From this understanding Zupan generates principles that serve as moral guidelines for the use of force which establish a presumption against harming any human being and greatly restrict the conditions under which we may justify any unintended, collateral harm that may affect those who do not intend our harm. Considering the work of moral theorists such as Onora O'Neill, T. M. Scanlon, Michael Walzer, Paul Christopher and G. E. M. Anscombe and such issues as the Doctrine of Double Effect, autonomy and supreme emergency, Zupan concludes that if we ever are justified in targeting the innocent, it will only be under very rare conditions where the innocent themselves should accept the principle that permitted their being killed.

Shedding new light on a controversial and intriguing issue, this book will reshape the debate on how the Judeo-Christian tradition views the morality of personal and national self-defense. Are self-defense, national warfare, and revolts against tyranny holy duties-or violations of God's will? Pacifists insist these actions are the latter, forbidden by Judeo-Christian morality. This book maintains that the pacifists are wrong. To make his case, the author analyzes the full sweep of Judeo-Christian history from earliest times to the present, combining history, scriptural analysis, and philosophy to describe the changes and continuity of Jewish and Christian doctrine about the use of lethal force. He reveals the shifting patterns of thought in both religions and presents the strongest arguments on both sides of the issue. The book begins with the ancient Hebrews and Genesis and covers Jewish history through the Holocaust and beyond. The analysis then shifts to the story of Christianity from its origins, through the Middle Ages and the Reformation, up the present day. Based on this scrutiny, the author concludes that-contrary to popular belief-the legitimacy of self-defense is strongly supported by Judeo-Christian scripture and commentary, by philosophical analysis, and by the respect for human dignity and human rights on which both Judaism and Christianity are based. Takes a multidisciplinary approach, directly engaging with leading writers on both sides of the issue Examines Jewish and Christian sacred writings and commentary and explores how interpretations have changed over time Offers careful analysis of topics such as the political systems of the ancient Hebrews, the Papacy's struggle for independence, the ways in which New England ministers incited the American Revolution, and the effects of the Vietnam War on the American Catholic church's views on national self-defense Covers the many sects that have played crucial roles in the debate over the legitimacy of armed force, including Gnostics, Manicheans, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Quakers Engages with the ideas of leading Jewish philosophers such as Rashi and Maimonides; Christian philosophers such as Origen, Augustine, Aquinas, and Sidney; and the most influential modern exponents of pacifism, such as Dorothy Day, the Berrigan Brothers, and John Howard Yoder