What are our duties or rights? How should we act? What are we responsible for? How do we determine the answers to these questions? Joseph Raz examines and explains the philosophical issues underlying these everyday quandaries. He explores the nature of normativity--namely, the fact that we believe and feel we should behave in certain ways, the reasoning behind certain beliefs and emotions, and various basic features of making decisions about what to do. He goes on to consider when we are responsible for our actions and omissions, and offers a novel account of responsibility. We can think of responsibility for unjustified actions or attitudes as a precondition of the blameworthiness of a person for an attitude or an action, or perhaps for a whole set of actions, intentions, or beliefs. Responsibility for justified actions or attitudes may be a precondition of praiseworthiness. Either way responsibility may point to further consequences of being justified or unjustified, rational or not. But crucially, responsibility attaches to people in a more holistic way. Some people are responsible for their actions, while others are not. In this way, Raz argues that the end is in the beginning, in understanding how people are subject to normativity, namely how it is that there are reasons addressed to them, and what is the meaning of that for our being in the world.

Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. Love, Friendship, and the Self argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the center of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, Helm significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.

Applying Jewish Ethics: Beyond the Rabbinic Tradition is a groundbreaking collection that introduces the reader to applied ethics and examines various social issues from contemporary and largely under-represented, Jewish ethical perspectives. For thousands of years, a rich and complex system of Jewish ethics has provided guidance about which values we should uphold and utilize to confront concrete problems, create a healthy social fabric, and inspire meaningful lives. Despite its longevity and richness, many Judaic and secular scholars have misconstrued this ethical tradition as a strictly religious and biblically based system that primarily applies to observant Jews, rather than viewing it as an ethical system that can provide unique and helpful insights to anyone, religious or not. This pioneering collection offers a deep, broad, and inclusive understanding of Jewish ethical ideas that challenges these misconceptions. The chapters explain and apply these ethical ideas to contemporary issues connected to racial justice, immigration, gender justice, queer identity, and economic and environmental justice in ways that illustrate their relevance for Jews and non-Jews alike.

Kant's arguments for the reality of human freedom and the normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant's project of justification exposed to conflicting assessments and interpretations. In this ground-breaking study of Kant, Owen Ware defends the controversial view that Kant's mature writings on ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law's primacy. Using both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant's arguments for morality and freedom, situating them within Kant's critical methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian arguments for moral normativity today.

R.M. Hare was one of the most important ethical theorists of the 20th century, and one of his graduate students, Peter Singer, became famous for his writings on animals and personhood. Singer now says that he endorses Hare's "two-level utilitarianism," and he has invoked the theory's distinction between "critical thinking" and thinking in terms of "intuitive level rules" in response to certain objections to his conclusions on several issues. Hare, however, never published a systematic treatment of how his theory applies to issues in animal ethics, and he avoided the concept of "personhood." Gary Varner here fills this gap by defending the moral legitimacy of distinguishing among "persons," "near-persons," and "the merely sentient" within Harean two-level utilitarianism. He explores the implications of this distinction by applying the resulting ethical system to our treatment of animals, and shows how the results contrast with the more abolitionist conclusions reached by Singer on the same issues. In the process, he presents a new philosophical defense of two-level utilitarianism and its metaethical foundation (universal prescriptivism), and he significantly expands Hare's account of how "intuitive level rules" function in moral thinking, based on recent empirical research. The book also draws heavily on empirical research on consciousness and cognition in non-human animals as a way of approaching the question of which animals, if any, are "persons," or at least "near-persons. Philosophers, including those interested in utilitarianism in general or Hare in particular, as well as others interested in animal ethics or the debate over personhood, will find Varner's argument of great interest. "Professor Varner's earlier work, In Nature's Interests, is a very fine book. It has achieved a high level of respect from those working in the field, and is often seen as having set a new standard of debate in environmental ethics. That means that a new book by Professor Varner will be received with considerable interest. Varner draws on extensive recent empirical research regarding the degree to which animals are self-conscious and uses this information as the basis for the most serious discussion I have yet seen of whether any nonhuman animals can be considered 'persons'. There is, to my knowledge, no other book that goes into these issues anywhere near as deeply, in the context of assessing their significance for the normative issues of the wrongness of taking life, or other issues relating to ethical decision-making regarding our treatment of animals and some humans. I have no doubt that this book will, like In Nature's Interests, be seen as making an important contribution to the topics it covers." - Peter Singer, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University

Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's conception of moral agency-one that has implications both for his metaphysics and for the foundations of his political theory. Locke denies that species boundaries exist independently of human convention, holds that the human mind may be either an immaterial substance or a material one to which God has superadded the power of thought, and insists that animals possess the ability to perceive, will, and even reason-indeed, in some cases to reason better than humans. Thus, he eliminates any sharp distinction between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. However, in his ethical and political work Locke assumes that there is a sharp distinction between moral agents and other beings. He thus needs to be able to delineate the set of moral agents precisely, without relying on the sort of metaphysical and physical facts his predecessors appealed to. Lolordo argues that for Locke, to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person. Interpreting the Lockean metaphysics of moral agency in this way helps us to understand both Locke's over-arching philosophical project and the details of his accounts of liberty, personhood, and rationality.

Most contemporary moral and political philosophers would like to have an argument showing that morality is rationally required. In From Rationality to Equality, James P. Sterba provides just such an argument and further shows that morality, so justified, requires substantial equality. His argument from rationality to morality is based on the principle of non-question-beggingness and has two forms. The first assumes that the egoist is willing to argue for egoism non-question-beggingly, and the second only assumes that the egoist is willing to assent to premises she actually needs to achieve her egoistic goals. Either way, he argues, morality is rationally (i.e., non-question-beggingly) preferable to egoism. Sterba's argument from morality to equality non-question-beggingly starts with assumptions that are acceptable from a libertarian perspective, the view that appears to endorse the least enforcement of morality, and then shows that this perspective requires a right to welfare which, when extended to distant peoples and future generations, leads to equality. He defends his two-part argument against recent critics, and shows how it is preferable not only to alternative attempts to justify morality, but also to alternative attempts to show that morality leads to a right to welfare and/or to equality.

Sren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is simultaneously one of the most obscure philosophers of the Western world and one of the most influential. His writings have influenced atheists and faithful alike. Yet despite his now pervasive influence, there is still widespread disagreement on many of the most important aspects of his thought. Kierkegaard was deliberately obscure in his philosophical writings, forcing his reader to interpret and reflect. But at the same time that Kierkegaard produced his esoteric, pseudonymous philosophical writings, he was also producing simpler, direct religious writings. Since his death the connections between these two sets of writings have been debated, ignored or denied by commentators. Here W. Glenn Kirkconnell undertakes a thorough examination of the two halves of Kierkegaard's authorship, demonstrating their ethical and religious relationship and the unifying themes of the signed and pseudonymous works. In particular the book examines Kierkegaard's understanding of the fall of the self and its recovery and the implications of his entire corpus for the life of the individual.

Sharing Common Ground makes a compelling contribution to an important emerging field that affects a broad swath of humanities. It uses historical, photographic, and literary examples, including an entirely new translation of a little known work by Marguerite Duras, presented here in full, to showcase the ethical capacity of art. Robert Harvey deploys critical tools borrowed from literature, aesthetics, and philosophy to mobilize the thought of several seminal figures in literature and theory including Michel Foucault, Marguerite Duras, Georges Didi-Huberman, and Giorgio Agamben, among a host of others. Construction sites, concentration camps, cemeteries, slums-such are only a few of the spaces that impel our imagination naturally toward what we commonly call "cultural memory." Sharing Common Ground reveals how the endeavor to think and imagine in common, and especially about the spaces we inhabit together, is critically important to human beings, artistically, culturally, and ethically.

Talbot Brewer presents an invigorating new approach to ethical theory, in the context of human selfhood and agency. The first main theme of the book is that contemporary ethical theorists have focused too narrowly on actions and the discrete episodes of deliberation through which we choose them, and that the subject matter of the field looks quite different if one looks instead at unfolding activities and the continuous forms of evaluative awareness that carry them forward and that constitute an essential element of those activities. The second is that ethical reflection is itself a centrally important life activity, and that philosophical ethics is an extension of this practical activity rather than a merely theoretical reflection upon it.
Brewer's approach is founded on a far-reaching reconsideration of the notions of the nature and sources of human agency, and particularly of the way in which practical thinking gives shape to activities, relationships and lives. He contests the usual understanding of the relationship between philosophical psychology and ethics. The Retrieval of Ethics shows the need for a new contemplative vision of the point or value of human action -- without which we will remain unable to make optimal sense of our efforts to unify our lives around a tenable conception of how best to live them, or of the yearnings that draw us to our ideals and to each other.

Virginia Held assesses the ethics of care as a promising alternative to the familiar moral theories that serve so inadequately to guide our lives. The ethics of care is only a few decades old, yet it is by now a distinct moral theory or normative approach to the problems we face. It is relevant to global and political matters as well as to the personal relations that can most clearly exemplify care.
This book clarifies just what the ethics of care is: what its characteristics are, what it holds, and what it enables us to do. It discusses the feminist roots of this moral approach and why the ethics of care can be a morality with universal appeal. Held examines what we mean by "care," and what a caring person is like. Where other moral theories demand impartiality above all, the ethics of care understands the moral import of our ties to our families and groups. It evaluates such ties, focusing on caring relations rather than simply on the virtues of individuals. The book proposes how such values as justice, equality, and individual rights can "fit together" with such values as care, trust, mutual consideration, and solidarity.
In the second part of the book, Held examines the potential of the ethics of care for dealing with social issues. She shows how the ethics of care is more promising than Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism for advice on how expansive, or not, markets should be, and on when other values than market ones should prevail. She connects the ethics of care with the rising interest in civil society, and considers the limits appropriate for the language of rights. Finally, she shows the promise of the ethics of care for dealing with global problems and seeinganew the outlines of international civility.

"Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen "is a collection of historical anecdotes written during the reign of the Emperor Tiberius in the fist century A.D. The book aims to redefine the significance of the work of Valerius Maxiums, author of The Memorable Deeds of the Men of Rome and Foreign Nations and is likely to become the standard reference work on this author.
Dr Skidmore argues that modern scholarship's view of Valerius' work as a mere source-book for rhetoricians is misconceived. The popularity of the work during the Middle Ages and Renaissance was due to its value to the readers of those times as a source of moral exhortation and guidance which was as relevant to them as it had been to Valerius' contemporaries. The wider appeal of the book lies in its examination of earlier forms of exemplary literature, in its discussion of how Roman literature was communicated to its audience, and in its original theory concerning the identity of Valerius Maximus himself.

We need to know what sustainability is, before it can be achieved. How must sustainability be defined? Fuzzy Ethics describes a new moral criterion which locates ethics in the physical world and, based on it, proposes a new definition of sustainability that generalizes concepts from engineering, physics, and ethics. This book has two main parts. The first conducts a dialogue in order to establish the operative definitions (for example: order; and effort) needed to increase the rigor of argumentation; ethical framework; and moral criterion to follow. The second sees a final reflection isolating one by one, the main sentences on which the previous dialogue is based. Here the key points that the reader must interrogate in order to find any flaws in the theory are detailed. The final part links ethics and sustainability, and reveals how the finitude of humankind leads to fuzziness. Efren M. Benavides is a Professor at the School of Aeronautics, Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Spain. He specialises in theories of sustainable design, mechanical design, reciprocating engines and propulsion systems with research work in the field of aeronautics. Efren has written books and numerous articles about these subjects in a variety of scholarly journals and scientific literature. This is his first book with TrueHeart Press.

Weakness of will, the phenomenon of acting contrary to one's own better judgment, has remained a prominent discussion topic of philosophy. The history of this discussion in ancient, medieval, and modern times has been outlined in many studies. Weakness of Will in Renaissance and ReformationThought is, however, the first book to cover the fascinating source materials on weakness of will between 1350 and 1650. In addition to considering the work of a broad range of Renaissance authors (including Petrarch, Donato Acciaiuoli, John Mair, and Francesco Piccolomini), Risto Saarinen explores the theologically coloured debates of the Reformation period, such as those provided by Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, John Calvin, and Lambert Daneau. He goes on to discuss the impact of these authors on prominent figures of early modernity, including Shakespeare, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.
While most of the historical research on weakness of will has focused on the reception history of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Saarinen pays attention to the Platonic and Stoic discussions and their revival during the Renaissance and the Reformation. He also shows the ways in which Augustine's discussion of the divided will is intertwined with the Christian reception of ancient Greek ethics, and argues that the theological underpinnings of early modern authors do not rule out weakness of will, but transform the philosophical discussion and lead it towards new solutions.

Torture has recently been the subject of some sensational headlines. As a result, there has been a huge surge in interest in the ethical implications of this contentious issue.
"The Ethics of Torture" offers the first complete introduction to the philosophical debates surrounding torture. The book asks key questions in light of recent events such as the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib. What makes torture morally reprehensible? Are there any conditions under which torture is acceptable? What is it like to be tortured, and why do people engage in torture?
The authors argue that the force of the most common arguments for torture (like the ticking-bomb argument) are significantly overestimated, while the wrongness of torture has been significantly underestimated--even by those who argue against it.
This is the ideal introduction to the ethics of torture for students of moral philosophy or political theory. It also constitutes a significant contribution to the torture debate in its own right, presenting a unique approach to investigating this dark practice.

Contemporary discussions about the nature of leadership abound. But what constitutes a good leader? Are ethics and leadership even compatible? Accounts of leadership often lie at either end of an ethical spectrum: on one end are accounts that argue ethics are intrinsically linked to leadership; on the other are (Machiavellian) views that deny any such link-intrinsic or extrinsic. Leadership appears to require a normative component of virtue; otherwise 'leadership' amounts to no more than mere power or influence. But are such accounts coherent and justifiable? Approaching a controversial topic, this series of essays tackles key questions from a range of philosophical perspectives, considering the nature of leadership separate from any formal office or role and how it shapes the world we live in.