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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Western philosophy > General
"How the West Was Won" contains articles in three main areas of the
humanities. It focuses on various aspects of literary imagination,
with essays ranging from Petrarch to Voltaire; on the canon, with
essays on western history as one of shifting cultural horizons and
ideals, and including censorship; and on the Christian Middle Ages,
when an interesting combination of religion and culture stimulated
the monastic and intellectual experiments of Anselm of Canterbury
and Peter Abelard. The volume is held together by the method of
persistent questioning, in the tradition of the western church
father and icon of the self Augustine, to discover what the values
are that drive the culture of the West: where do they come from and
what is their future? This volume is a Festschrift for Burcht
Pranger of the University of Amsterdam.
On the Binding Biases of Time and Other Essays on General Semantics
and Media Ecology consists of a series of explorations into our use
of symbols, language, and media to relate to our environment, and
how our different modes of perception and communication influence
human consciousness, culture, and social organization. These essays
draw upon and integrate the perspectives of general semantics,
systems theory, and media ecology, bringing them to bear upon a
diversity of topics that include the future of consciousness,
identity and meaning, the Ten Commandments, media literacy, The
Lord of the Rings, and our relationship to time. Throughout this
volume, Strate grapples with the question of what it means to be
human, and what the prospects may be for humanity's continued
survival. As he concludes in the title essay of this book: "As a
species, we are binders of time, bound up by our biases of time; we
are moved by our consciousness of time, as we tell time, and as we
tell ourselves that only time will tell; as we play for time, and
as we pray, as we pray for time."
How was Voltaire's legacy seen in France between 1830 and 1900? To
what extent did the nineteenth century reinvent Voltaire? Viewed
during these years through the distorting lens of the French
Revolution, Voltaire was vilified and venerated in roughly equal
measure: as an icon of republican anticlericalism on the one hand,
and a deeply Christian reformer on the other. This wide-ranging
study uses the rich sources of the Parisian periodical and daily
press to examine the evolution of Voltaire's legacy as it was
contested through caricature and statuary as much as through
editions and criticism of his works.
Primitive Man as Philosopher by Paul Radin, Ph. D. Research Fellow
of Yale University and sometime Lecturer in Ethnology in Cambridge
University editor of Crashing Thunder, the Autobiography of an
American Indian with a foreword by John Dewcy Professor of
Philosophy in Columbia University New York and London D, Appleton
and Company 1927 COPYRIGHT, 1927, D. APPLETON AND COMPANY PRINTED
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO MY WIFE PREFACE When a modern
historian desires to study the civilization of any people, he
regards it as a necessary preliminary that he divest himself, so
far as possible, of all prejudice and bias. He realizes that
differences between cultures exist, but he does not feel that it is
necessarily a sign of inferiority that a people differs in customs
from his own. There seems, how ever, to be a limit to what an
historian treats as legitimate difference, a limit not always easy
to determine. On the whole it may be said that he very naturally
passes the same judgments that the majority of his fellow
countrymen do. Hence, if some of the differences between admittedly
civil ized peoples often call forth unfavorable judgments or even
provoke outbursts of horror, how much more must we expect this to
be the case where the differences are of so funda mental a nature
as those separating us from people whom we have been accustomed to
call uncivilized. The term uncivilized is a very vague one, and it
is spread over a vast medley of peoples, some of whom have
comparatively simple customs and others extremely com plex ones.
Indeed, there can be said to be but two charac teristics possessed
in common by all these peoples, the absence of a written language
and the fact of originalposses sion of the soil when the various
civilized European and Asiatic nations came into contact with them.
But among all aboriginal races appeared a number of customs which
undoubtedly seemed exceedingly strange to their European and
Asiatic conquerors. Some of these customs they had never heard of
others they recognized as similar to observ vli viii PREFACE ances
and beliefs existing among the more backward mem bers of their own
communities. Yet the judgments civilized peoples have passed on the
aborigines, we may be sure, were not initially based on any calm
evaluation of facts. If the aborigines were regarded as innately
inferior, this was due in part to the tremendous gulf in custom and
belief separating them from the con querors, in part to the
apparent simplicity of their ways, and in no small degree to the
fact that they were unable to offer any effective resistance.
Romance soon threw its distorting screen over the whole primitive
picture. Within one hundred years of the dis covery of America it
had already become an ineradicably established tradition that all
the aborigines encountered by Europeans were simple, untutored
savages from whom little more could be expected than from
uncontrolled children, individuals who were at all times the slaves
of their passions, of which the dominant one was hatred. Much of
this tradi tion, in various forms, disguised and otherwise, has
persisted to the present day. The evolutionary theory, during its
heyday in the iSyos and Sos, still further complicated and
misrepresented the situation, and from the great classic that
created modern ethnology Tylors Primitive Culture, published in
1870 future ethnologists were to imbibe the cardinal andfunda
mentally misleading doctrine that primitive peoples represent an
early stage in the history of the evolution of culture. What was,
perhaps, even more dangerous was the strange and uncritical manner
in which all primitive peoples were lumped together in ethnological
discussion simple Fuegians with the highly advanced Aztecs and
Mayans, Bushmen with the peoples of the Nigerian coast, Australians
with Poly nesians, and so on. PREFACE ix For a number of years
scholars were apparently content with the picture drawn by Tylor
and his successors...
The International Kierkegaard Commentary-For the first time in
English the world community of scholars systematically assembled
and presented the results of recent research in the vast literature
of Soren Kierkegaard. Based on the definitive English edition of
Kierkegaard's works by Princeton University Press, this series of
commentaries addresses all the published texts of the influential
Danish philosopher and theologian. This is volume 7 in a series of
commentaries based upon the definitive translations of
Kierkegaard's writings published by Princeton University Press,
1980ff.
The problem of the unity of the proposition is almost as old as
philosophy itself, and was one of the central themes of early
analytical philosophy, greatly exercising the minds of Frege,
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey. The problem is how propositions
or meanings can be simultaneously unities (single things) and
complexes, made up of parts that are autonomous of the positions
they happen to fill in any given proposition. The problem has been
associated with numerous paradoxes and has motivated general
theories of thought and meaning, but has eluded any consensual
resolution; indeed, the problem is sometimes thought to be wholly
erroneous, a result of atomistic assumptions we should reject. In
short, the problem has been thought to be of merely historical
interest. Collins argues that the problem is very real and poses a
challenge to any theory of linguistic meaning. He seeks to resolve
the problem by laying down some minimal desiderata on a solution
and presenting a uniquely satisfying account. The first part of the
book surveys and rejects extant 'solutions' and dismissals of the
problem from (especially) Frege and Russell, and a host of more
contemporary thinkers, including Davidson and Dummett. The book's
second part offers a novel solution based upon the properties of a
basic syntactic principle called 'Merge', which may be said to
create objects inside objects, thus showing how unities can be both
single things but also made up of proper parts. The solution is
defended from both philosophical and linguistic perspectives. The
overarching ambition of the book, therefore, is to strengthen the
ties between current linguistics and contemporary philosophy of
language in a way that is genuinely sensitive to the history of
both fields.
In Philosophies of Gratitude, Ashraf H. A. Rushdy explores
gratitude as a philosophical concept. The first half of the book
traces its significance in fundamental Western moral philosophy and
notions of ethics, specifically examining key historical moments
and figures in classical antiquity, the early modern era, and the
Enlightenment. In the second half of the book, Rushdy focuses on
contemporary meanings of gratitude as a sentiment, action, and
disposition: how we feel grateful, act grateful, and cultivate
grateful being. He identifies these three forms of gratitude to
discern various roles our emotions play in our ethical responses to
the world around us. Rushdy then discusses how ingratitude, instead
of indicating a moral failure, can also act as an important
principle and ethical stand against injustice. Rushdy asserts that
if we practice gratitude as a moral recognition of the other, then
that gratitude varies alongside the different kinds of benefactors
who receive it, ranging from the person who provides an expected
service or gift, to the divine or natural sources whom we may
credit with our very existence. By arguing for the necessity of
analyzing gratitude as a philosophical concept, Rushdy reminds us
of our capacity and appreciation for gratitude simply as an
acknowledgment and acceptance of our humble dependency on and
connectedness with our families, friends, communities,
environments, and universe.
Kant's arguments for the reality of human freedom and the
normativity of the moral law continue to inspire work in
contemporary moral philosophy. Many prominent ethicists invoke
Kant, directly or indirectly, in their efforts to derive the
authority of moral requirements from a more basic conception of
action, agency, or rationality. But many commentators have detected
a deep rift between the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
and the Critique of Practical Reason, leaving Kant's project of
justification exposed to conflicting assessments and
interpretations. In this ground-breaking study of Kant, Owen Ware
defends the controversial view that Kant's mature writings on
ethics share a unified commitment to the moral law's primacy. Using
both close analysis and historical contextualization, Owen Ware
overturns a paradigmatic way of reading Kant's arguments for
morality and freedom, situating them within Kant's critical
methodology at large. The result is a novel understanding of Kant
that challenges much of what goes under the banner of Kantian
arguments for moral normativity today.
Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's
conception of moral agency-one that has implications both for his
metaphysics and for the foundations of his political theory. Locke
denies that species boundaries exist independently of human
convention, holds that the human mind may be either an immaterial
substance or a material one to which God has superadded the power
of thought, and insists that animals possess the ability to
perceive, will, and even reason-indeed, in some cases to reason
better than humans. Thus, he eliminates any sharp distinction
between humans and the rest of the animal kingdom. However, in his
ethical and political work Locke assumes that there is a sharp
distinction between moral agents and other beings. He thus needs to
be able to delineate the set of moral agents precisely, without
relying on the sort of metaphysical and physical facts his
predecessors appealed to. Lolordo argues that for Locke, to be a
moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.
Interpreting the Lockean metaphysics of moral agency in this way
helps us to understand both Locke's over-arching philosophical
project and the details of his accounts of liberty, personhood, and
rationality.
The Long Life invites the reader to range widely from the writings
of Plato through to recent philosophical work by Derek Parfit,
Bernard Williams, and others, and from Shakespeare's King Lear
through works by Thomas Mann, Balzac, Dickens, Beckett, Stevie
Smith, Philip Larkin, to more recent writing by Saul Bellow, Philip
Roth, and J. M. Coetzee.
Helen Small argues that if we want to understand old age, we have
to think more fundamentally about what it means to be a person, to
have a life, to have (or lead) a good life, to be part of a just
society. What did Plato mean when he suggested that old age was the
best place from which to practice philosophy - or Thomas Mann when
he defined old age as the best time to be a writer - and were they
right? If we think, as Aristotle did, that a good life requires the
active pursuit of virtue, how will our view of later life be
affected? If we think that lives and persons are unified, much as
stories are said to be unified, how will our thinking about old age
differ from that of someone who thinks that lives and/or persons
can be strongly discontinuous? In a just society, what constitutes
a fair distribution of limited resources between the young and the
old? How, if at all, should recent developments in the theory of
evolutionary senescence alter our thinking about what it means to
grow old?
This is a groundbreaking book, deep as well as broad, and likely
to alter the way in which we talk about one of the great social
concerns of our time - the growing numbers of those living to be
old, and the growing proportion of the old to the young.
This book describes and analyzes the conceptual ambiguity of
vulnerability, in an effort to understand its particular
applications for legal and political protection when relating to
groups. Group vulnerability has become a common concept within
legal and political scholarship but remains largely undertheorized
as a phenomenon itself. At the same time, in academia and within
legal circles, vulnerability is primarily understood as a
phenomenon affecting individuals, and the attempts to identify
vulnerable groups are discredited as essentialist and
stereotypical. In contrast, this book demonstrates that a
conception of group vulnerability is not only theoretically
possible, but also politically and legally necessary. Two
conceptions of group vulnerability are discussed: one focuses on
systemic violence or oppression directed toward several
individuals, while another requires a common positioning of
individuals within a given context that conditions their agency,
ability to cope with risks and uncertainties, and manage their
consequences. By comparing these two definitions of group
vulnerability and their implications, Macioce seeks a more precise
delineation of the theoretical boundaries of the concept of group
vulnerability.
"Beyond Homo Sapiens Enlightened Faith, " is the last book of the
"Beyond Homo Sapiens" trilogy. It concludes the series
mystical/political review of the historical events of the last
5,000 years with the struggle of progressive thinkers and activists
to help people recognize their universality and achieve
enlightenment during the last 140 years. The ongoing fight for
human rights and social justice is a battle against the interests
of the privileged few who work to stay in power by keeping the
masses anchored in their automatic reactions of self-defense and
in-fighting, immediate gratification and reproduction.
Advances in human knowledge can lead us to our next phase of
evolution, one that must be made consciously. Quantum physics has
shown us that the wall of separation we perceive between everything
that exists in the universe and therefore, between matter and
energy, subject and object, is not really there. Matter is not
solid and space is not empty. The same particles that make up a
table are interwoven with the air around it and with the table s
owner. Once all of humanity accepts this vision of matter as a
single but multiform creative energy event, we can begin a new era
and the possibility of enlightened faith.
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