This book scrutinizes how contemporary practices of security have come to rely on many different translations of security, risk, and danger. Institutions of national security policies are currently undergoing radical conceptual and organisational changes, and this book presents a novel approach for how to study and politically address the new situation. Complex and uncertain threat environments, such as terrorism, climate change, and the global financial crisis, have paved the way for new forms of security governance that have profoundly transformed the ways in which threats are handled today. Crucially, there is a decentralisation of the management of security, which is increasingly handled by a broad set of societal actors that previously were not considered powerful in the conduct of security affairs. This transformation of security knowledge and management changes the meaning of traditional concepts and practices, and calls for investigation into the many meanings of security implied when contemporary societies manage radical dangers, risks, and threats. It is necessary to study both what these meanings are and how they developed from the security practices of the past. Addressing this knowledge gap, the book asks how different ideas about threats, risk, and dangers meet in the current practices of security, broadly understood, and with what political consequences. This book will be of interest to students of critical security studies, anthropology, risk studies, science and technology studies and International Relations. The Open Access version of this book, available at: https://www.routledge.com/Translations-of-Security-A-Framework-for-the-Study-of-Unwanted-Futures/Berling-Gad-Petersen-Waever/p/book/9781032007090 has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license

- offers most comprehensive and up to date0 history of the IAEA's six decades - features essay by leading academics and policymakers - makes an important contribution to security and nonproliferation studies, as well as to the field of international organizations and global governance

Written 2500 years ago, The Art of War is the oldest military treatise in the world, a classic study of competition and rivalry that has been utilized by soldiers ever since. Napoleon studied its strategies and tactics. It is required reading for intelligence personnel in the United States Marine Corps. "Warriors" of Wall Street and in corporation cultures rely on it for guidance. It's even been rumored to help players win at the board game Risk. This 1910 translation by the British Museum's Lionel Giles is the most popular one available, a highly readable version of this still startlingly relevant text. Lionel Giles also translated The Book of Mencius and Sayings of Confucius. Sun Tzu lived in China in the 6th century B.C. and was a contemporary of Confucius.

Military Strategy in the 21st Century explores military strategy and the new challenges facing Western democracies in the twenty- first century, including strategy in cyber operations and peacekeeping, challenges for civil-military relations, and the strategic choices of great powers and small states. The volume contributes to a better understanding of military strategy in the twenty- first century, through exploring strategy from three perspectives: first, the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; second, new areas for strategic theory, such as peacekeeping and cyberspace; and third, the makers of strategy, and why states choose suboptimal strategies. With the increasing number of threats challenging strategy makers, such as great power rivalry, terrorism, intrastate wars, and transnational criminal organisations, Military Strategy in the 21st Century will be of great value to scholars of IR, Security Studies, Strategic Studies, and War Studies as well as policymakers and practitioners working with military strategy in particular and international security and war in general. The chapters were originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies.

Cogan examines the France-NATO problem, going back to its origins in 1945-1952, when a weak France, obsessed by the threat of Germany and jealous of the ascendancy gained by the British during the war, sought security guarantees and assistance from the United States. However, in the process, France put itself in a position of dependence under the NATO integrated command to a degree that later governments of a resurgent France felt compelled to challenge-and are still doing so today. Post-World War II France was to disappoint the hopes of such American statesmen as Dean Acheson and George Kennan, who looked to it to take the lead in Western Europe in the face of a growing Soviet threat. Dogged by the humiliation of the wartime occupation, obsessed by fear of a resurgent Germany, jealous of the British ascendancy gained during the war, and dominated by an intellectual class almost wholly given over to the prevailing antifascism (and, therefore, philo-sovietism) of the postwar, France would take 20 years to live up to its promise as the motor of Western Europe. Though it was perhaps inevitable that France, falling on the western divide of the Iron Curtain, would join the U.S. camp, it did so with a loss of sovereignty, symbolized in NATO's integrated command. This was a situation which Charles de Gaulle, after his return to power in 1958, would seek to undo. His successors have continued this quest to this day. Cogan explores the Gaullist argument that the North Atlantic Alliance and NATO are two distinct movements against a background of ever-increasing threats-or perceived threats-by the Soviet Union, culminating in the North Korean invasion of 1950. The French, desperate to emerge from a position of wartime inferiority, willingly abandoned hopes of building a defense of Europe by Europeans alone. France threw itself into the arms of the United States, partly to escape the onerous tutelage of Great Britain. In 1951, when the NATO integrated command was put in place, the French wound up with very little-not even a major subordinate command. Frustration and, ultimately, withdrawal from the NATO military structure were the results. This is a major examination of contemporary international relations and Western European defense policy for scholars and researchers alike.

Do leaders make war decisions individually or do they consider other ongoing conflicts? Most researchers assume dyadic independence out of convenience. In this book, Jeffrey Alan Carnegie presents evidence that this is a faulty assumption. First, he develops a formal theory in which limited military resources act as a constraint on the ability of leaders to engage in international conflicts. Country leaders plan accordingly by considering the entire picture of conflicts. This theory, in contrast to dyadic dependence, implies a different data-generating process for international conflicts. Second, he tests both theories using summary statistics, network analysis, and logistic regression. All three methods show strong support for military resource division theory. Carnegie further shows that the dependent effects change with time, even when controlling for polarity. The effects also differ between regions, which implies cultural factors at work. Third, he suggests for the future that researchers use multiple methods to account for different types of dependencies, because no single method can address them all. He shows how to make the best use of logistic regression and social network analysis for conflict statistics. He offers suggestions to policy makers for how best to incorporate this theory in analysis. Finally, Carnegie concludes by comparing predictions of the two theories regarding conflicts for the United States, especially Iran and North Korea. This book will be of interest to conflict researchers in academia and government who want to better understand the effect of coalitions on modern warfare.

A vivid portrayal of what drove George W. Bush to invade Iraq in 2003—an outcome that was in no way predetermined. America's decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 is arguably the most important foreign policy choice of the entire post-Cold War era. Nearly two decades after the event, it remains central to understanding current international politics and US foreign relations. In Confronting Saddam Hussein, the eminent historian of US foreign policy Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes why the US chose war and who was most responsible for the decision. Employing a unique set of personal interviews with dozens of top officials and declassified American and British documents, Leffler vividly portrays the emotions and anxieties that shaped the thinking of the president after the shocking events of 9/11. He shows how fear, hubris, and power influenced Bush's approach to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. At the core of Leffler's account is his compelling portrait of Saddam Hussein. Rather than stressing Bush's preoccupation with promoting freedom or democracy, Leffler emphasizes Hussein's brutality, opportunism, and unpredictability and illuminates how the Iraqi dictator's record of aggression and intransigence haunted the president and influenced his calculations. Bush was not eager for war, and the decision to invade Iraq was not a fait accompli. Yet the president was convinced that only by practicing coercive diplomacy and threatening force could he alter Hussein's defiance, a view shared by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other leaders around the world, including Hans Blix, the chief UN inspector. Throughout, Leffler highlights the harrowing anxieties surrounding the decision-making process after the devastating attack on 9/11 and explains the roles of contingency, agency, rationality, and emotion. As the book unfolds, Bush's centrality becomes more and more evident, as does the bureaucratic dysfunctionality that contributed to the disastrous occupation of Iraq. A compelling reassessment of George W. Bush's intervention in Iraq, Confronting Saddam Hussein provides a provocative reinterpretation of the most important international event of the 21st century.

The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021 provides insight into key regional strategic, geopolitical, economic, military and security topics. Among the topics explored are: US China decoupling and its regional security implications; Japan's security policy and China; India's emerging grand strategy; Southeast Asia amid rising great-power rivalry; Australia's new regional security posture; NATO's evolving approach to China; The United Kingdom's 'tilt' to the Indo-Pacific; and Emerging technologies and future conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Authors include leading regional analysts and academics Kanti Bajpai, Gordon Flake, Franz-Stefan Gady, Prashanth Parameswaran, Alessio Patalano, Samir Puri, Sarah Raine, Tan See Seng, Drew Thompson, Ashley Townshend, Joanne Wallis and Robert Ward.

On a clear moonlit night in November of 1940, the Luftwaffe used hundreds of bombers, thousands of high explosives and tens of thousands of incendiary bombs to attack the industrial might of England by bombing Coventry. This book analyzes the raid in detail, reviews the actions of both the Germans and the British preceeding the raid, and investigates the impact the raid had on British as well as American public opinion. The book also investigates the controversial question of how much advance notice the British actually had concerning the raid. The Coventry bombing proved to be the most concentrated single air attack of the entire Luftwaffe bombing campaign directed against the British during World War II.

This book, first published in 1988, represents a unique attempt to combine a discussion of an alternative British defence policy in terms of military strategy and new technology, with a consideration of how this policy might be secure in political terms. Written against a background of a possible future Labour government in the late 1980s with a radically different defence policy to the Conservative Government of the day, it considers questions such as: Would conventional deterrence really be effective? Just what is the Labour Party's defence policy? How precisely might Britain be transformed into a non-aligned, non-militarist state?

An Economist Best Book of 2021 Artificial Intelligence is going to war. Intelligent military systems are already reshaping conflict-from the chaos of battle, with pilotless drones and robot tanks, to the headquarters far from the action, where generals and politicians use technology to weigh up what to do. AI changes how we fight, and even how likely it is that we will. Warbots will be faster, more agile and more deadly than today's crewed weapons. New tactics are already emerging, but much deeper thinking is needed. When will an intelligent machine escalate, and how might you deter it? Can robots predict the future? And what happens to the 'art of war' as machines become creative? An international campaign against 'killer robots' hopes to ban AI from conflict. But the genie is out-autonomous weapons are too useful for states to outlaw. Still, crafting sensible rules for our warbots is possible. This fascinating book shows how it might be done.

In 1894-1895, after suffering defeat against Japan in a war primarily fought over the control of Korea, the Qing government initiated fundamental military reforms and established "New Armies" modeled after the German and Japanese military. Besides reorganizing the structure of the army and improving military training, the goal was to overcome the alleged physical weakness and lack of martial spirit attributed to Chinese soldiers in particular and to Chinese men in general. Intellectuals, government officials, and military circles criticized the pacifist and civil orientation of Chinese culture, which had resulted in a negative attitude towards its armed forces and martial values throughout society and a lack of interest in martial deeds, glory on the battlefield, and military achievements among men. The book examines the cultivation of new soldiers, officers, and civilians through new techniques intended to discipline their bodies and reconfigure their identities as military men and citizens. The book shows how the establishment of German-style "New Armies" in China between 1895 and 1916 led to the re-creation of a militarized version of masculinity that stressed physical strength, discipline, professionalism, martial spirit, and "Western" military appearance and conduct. Although the military reforms did not prevent the downfall of the Qing Dynasty or provide stable military clout to subsequent regimes, they left a lasting legacy by reconfiguring Chinese military culture and re-creating military masculinity and the image of men in China.

This book scrutinises how political actors in the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) have articulated the security-democracy nexus in their discourses. Security crises expose political leaders to an uncomfortable dilemma: guaranteeing the safety of citizens while at the same time preserving democratic principles, basic rights and liberties. In this respect, Israel represents an archetypical case. Defining itself as a democracy, the state of Israel has been in quasi-constant conflict with its neighbouring countries while facing terror attacks repeatedly. This situation has resulted in the upholding of the state of emergency since the establishment of the state in 1948 and in the enactment of security measures that are often in conflict with democratic values. The tension between security and democracy is not a new question: it has been at the centre of political thought from Rousseau and Locke to Lasswell and Dahl and stood at the core of political debates after 9/11 and the 2005 terror attacks in London. Many studies have questioned how political actors manage this tension or how they could - properly - balance security and democracy. Yet, in spite of the abundant literature on the issue, the manner in which political actors conceptualise and frame this tension has been rarely explored. Even less has been said on the effects of this conceptualisation on the democratic regime. Drawing on discourse theory and on an innovative narrative analysis, the book examines 40 debates held in the Knesset on security-oriented laws enacted in two different contexts: the period of relative calm preceding the first Palestinian intifada (1987) and the period following the eruption of the second intifada (2000). More specifically, three types of laws and discussions are examined: laws establishing a relation between freedom of expression and security; laws linking the category of 'the enemy' to democracy; and finally those connecting the right to family unification and residence of Palestinians with terrorism. Through a comparative analysis of the political actors' discourses in 1985 and between 2000 and 2011, the study demonstrates that two main narratives have constantly competed: on the one hand a marginal narrative anchored in basic rights and on the other a defensive democracy narrative, which has become dominant. The latter has legitimised the restriction of freedom of expression, freedom to participate in elections, freedom of movement or the right to citizenship. The book shows how the increasing dominance of the defensive democracy narrative has had a fundamental impact in reshaping the polity and the identity of Israel's democratic regime. The analysis ultimately opens the possibility to rethink the conventional approach of the security-democracy dilemma and to reflect on processes in other states, such as the United Kingdom or the United States during different security crises. This book will be of much interest to students of critical security studies, Israeli politics, democracy studies, political theory and IR in general.

This book offers a fresh assessment of George W. Bush's foreign policies. It is not designed to offer an evaluation of the totality of George W. Bush's foreign policy. Instead, the analysis will focus on the key aspects of his foreign and security policy record, in each case considering the interplay between principle and pragmatism. The underpinning contention here is that policy formulation and implementation across Bush's two terms can more usefully be analysed in terms of shades of grey, rather than the black and white hues in which it has often been painted. Thus, in some key policy areas it will be seen that the overall record was more pragmatic and successful than his many critics have been prepared to give him credit for. The president and his advisers were sometimes prepared to alter and amend their policy direction, on occasion significantly. Context and personalities, interpersonal and interagency, both played a role here. Where these came together most visibly - for instance in connection with dual impasses over Iraq and Iran - exigencies on the ground sometimes found expression in personnel changes. In turn, the changing fortunes of Bush's first term principals presaged policy changes in his second. What emerges from a more detached study of key aspects of the Bush administration - during a complicated and challenging period in the United States' post-Cold War history, marked by the dramatic emergence of international Islamist terrorism as the dominant international security threat - is a more complex picture than any generalization can ever hope to sustain, regardless of how often it is repeated. This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, international politics and security studies.

The Routledge Handbook of Russian Security offers a comprehensive collection of essays on all aspects of Russian security and foreign policy by international scholars from across the world. The volume identifies key contemporary topics of research and debate and takes into account the changes that have occurred in the study of Russian security strategy since the end of the Cold War. The handbook is organised into five sections: The theory and nature of Russian security policy The domestic and foreign policy nexus Instruments used by Russia in pursuing its security Global and regional aspects of Russian security and foreign policy Case studies of Russian involvement in a series of security conflicts. The book concludes with case studies of the major examples of Russian involvement and operations in a series of security conflicts, including that in Georgia, the intervention in Ukraine and occupation of Crimea, and the ongoing Civil War in Syria. This volume will be of great interest to students of Russian security, strategic studies, foreign policy, European politics, and International Relations in general.

Japan has been expanding its military roles in the post-Cold War period. This book analyses the shift in Japan's security policy by examining the collective ideas of political parties and the effect of an international norm. Starting with the analysis of the collective ideas held by political parties, this book delves into factors overlooked in existing literature, including the effects of domestic and international norms, as well as how an international norm is localised when a conflicting domestic norm already exists. The argument held throughout is that these factors play a primary role in framing Japan's security policy. Overall, three security areas are studied: Japan's arms trade ban policy, Japan's participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and Japan's enlarged military roles in international security. Close examination demonstrates that the weakening presence of the left since the mid-1990s and the localisation of an international norm encouraged Japan to broaden its military role. Providing a comprehensive picture of Japan's evolving security policy, this book asserts that shifts have occurred in ways that do not violate the pacifist domestic norm. Japan's Evolving Security Policy will appeal to students and scholars of International Relations, Asian Politics, Asian Security Studies and Japanese Studies.

The words of the ancient Chinese sages are as timeless as they are wise. The words of ancient Chinese philosophers have influenced other thinkers across the world for more than 2,000 years, and continue to shape our ideas today. The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy includes translations of Sun Tzu's Art of War, Lao-Tzu's Tao Te Ching, the teachings of the master sage Confucius, and the writings of Mencius. From insights on warfare and diplomacy to advice on how to deal with one's neighbors and colleagues, this collection of classical Eastern philosophy will provide readers with countless nuggets of wisdom. IBPA Benjamin Franklin Gold Award Winner 2017!

This Handbook brings together 30 state-of-the-art essays covering the essential aspects of global security research and practice for the 21st century. * Embraces a broad definition of security that extends beyond the threat of foreign military attack to cover new risks for violence * Offers comprehensive coverage framed around key security concepts, risks, policy tools, and global security actors * Discusses pressing contemporary issues including terrorism, disarmament, genocide, sustainability, international peacekeeping, state-building, natural disasters, energy and food security, climate change, and cyber warfare * Includes insightful and accessible contributions from around the world aimed at a broad base of scholars, students, practitioners, and policymakers

This book explores citizens' perceptions and experiences of security threats in contemporary Britain, based on twenty focus groups and a large sample survey conducted between April and September 2012. The data is used to investigate the extent to which a diverse public shares government framings of the most pressing security threats, to assess the origins of perceptions of security threats, to investigate what makes some people feel more threatened than others, to examine the effects of threats on other areas of politics and to evaluate the effectiveness of government messages about security threats. We demonstrate widespread heterogeneity in perceptions of issues as security threats and in their origins, with implications for the extent to which shared understandings of threats are an attainable goal. While this study focuses on the British case, it seeks to make broader theoretical and methodological contributions to Political Science, International Relations, Political Psychology, and Security Studies. -- .

This book, first published in 1992, examines the changing post-Cold War changing patterns of security in Europe by analysing the major themes, the primary security organisations and the policies of countries at the forefront of the security debate. Leading experts discuss the problems of nationalism, the difficulties of peacekeeping in Europe, and the future of NATO.

Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy. Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. He was the foremost authority on the intricacies of denial and deception strategy and tactics. For Whaley, deception was a mind-game, requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of the enemy as well as one's self (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents 88 vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley's analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves victory in combat.

From 2003 to 2008, the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq posed a key challenge to political stability in the country and to Coalition objectives there. This paper explains the onset, composition and evolution of this insurgency. It begins by addressing both its immediate and deeper sociopolitical origins, and goes on to examine the multiple ideological strands within the insurgency and their often conflicting methods and goals. Despite organisational incoherence due to the existence of a large number of competing groups, the insurgency in Iraq sustained a particularly high tempo of operations between 2004 and 2006, causing considerable military and civilian casualties. Some insurgent groups focused on attempting to foment civil war between two of Iraq's major communities, the Sunni and Shia Arabs and, by late 2006, they had come close to unravelling Iraq and presenting the Coalition with a major defeat. The adoption of a new approach by the US in 2007 helped reduce the level of violence in Iraq. In addition, deep fissures within the insurgency itself, between those fighting for more practical, immediate goals and the transnational Islamists and their local allies fighting for wider-reaching goals - including the promotion of sectarian strife - contributed to the insurgency's diminution. It remains to be seen whether there will be a widespread recognition among Sunni Iraqis of the need to work with the Coalition to facilitate their community's reintegration into the new Iraqi body politic.