Do leaders make war decisions individually or do they consider other ongoing conflicts? Most researchers assume dyadic independence out of convenience. In this book, Jeffrey Alan Carnegie presents evidence that this is a faulty assumption. First, he develops a formal theory in which limited military resources act as a constraint on the ability of leaders to engage in international conflicts. Country leaders plan accordingly by considering the entire picture of conflicts. This theory, in contrast to dyadic dependence, implies a different data-generating process for international conflicts. Second, he tests both theories using summary statistics, network analysis, and logistic regression. All three methods show strong support for military resource division theory. Carnegie further shows that the dependent effects change with time, even when controlling for polarity. The effects also differ between regions, which implies cultural factors at work. Third, he suggests for the future that researchers use multiple methods to account for different types of dependencies, because no single method can address them all. He shows how to make the best use of logistic regression and social network analysis for conflict statistics. He offers suggestions to policy makers for how best to incorporate this theory in analysis. Finally, Carnegie concludes by comparing predictions of the two theories regarding conflicts for the United States, especially Iran and North Korea. This book will be of interest to conflict researchers in academia and government who want to better understand the effect of coalitions on modern warfare.

The author develops the concept that logistics constitute a bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. He explains the role of the civilian as well as of the professional, and discusses the differences in their modes of thought and methods of operation.

This book analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of Finnish military effectiveness in the Winter War (1939-40). Drawing on a wide array of primary and secondary sources, Pasi Tuunainen shows how by focusing on their own strengths and pitting these against the weaknesses of their adversary, the Finns were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Red Army whilst minimizing their own losses. The Finns were able to use their resources for effective operational purposes, and perform almost to their full potential. The Finnish small-unit tactics utilized the terrain and Arctic conditions for which they had prepared themselves, as well as forming cohesive units of well-motivated and qualitatively better professional leaders and citizen soldiers who could innovate and adapt. The Finnish Army had highly effective logistics, support and supply systems that kept the troops fighting.

This book outlines the state of play in maritime security in the Gulf and provides a historical perspective to current issues while also surveying different mechanisms for Gulf maritime security, both at the collective and individual state levels. The book addresses a number of questions related to maritime security in the Gulf States, such as what are the main threats facing maritime security? Do the Arab Gulf States have the necessary naval capabilities to confront these maritime security threats? What are the efforts that the Arab Gulf States have made in order to maintain their maritime security? What are the regional frameworks through which the Arab Gulf States can address maritime security threats? And what are the obstacles hindering the Arab Gulf States' efforts to maintain maritime security? This book would be a valuable read for Gulf Cooperation Council States, the ministries of defense in the Arabian Gulf countries, security institutions, the Arabian Gulf countries' military academies, thinks tanks and universities in the six Gulf States, Western think thanks concerned with the Arabian Gulf region, and scholars specializing in Arabian Gulf countries.

This text considers the ethical credentials of the United States in branding various countries pariah states, and describes the background to the Iraq question (the role of Saddam, the genocidal sanctions regime, amongst other things). A detailed chronology of 1997-98 US/Iraq weapons inspections crisis is given, prior to a profile of the subsequent UN/Iraqi settlement and its aftermath.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin's actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West's interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country's own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, 'Strategiya' takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia's contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia's own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking--both its conceptualisation and its implementation--from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, 'Strategiya' offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

The more uncertain the developments in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union become, the more urgent is the need to understand Soviet military thinking over 75-year span of Soviet history. Although other books discuss various aspects of Soviet military thought, this study by senior scholars more thoroughly combines the perspectives of history and the social sciences to understand Soviet military doctrine, experience, and tendencies from its birth with Lenin's militarization of Marxism in 1915 to the far-reaching changes introduced by Gorbachev--with all the attendant dilemmas and tensions up to the coup and revolutionary upheavals of 1991. This appraisal of the Soviet way of war is significant for scholars and professionals in Soviet studies, military affairs, and international politics. This collection shows how ideology, technology, experience, and personalities have shaped Soviet military doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution. This study defines the shifting interplay of defensive and offensive strategies at different times, various policies for dealing with perceived threats of nuclear or conventional war, and reviews current discussions and future policy directions. First, the book describes the form and content of Soviet military doctrine from Lenin's creation of its premises in 1915 until Gorbachev's refutation of these premises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Next, the book examines Soviet military thinking in light of the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War, the episodes of the interwar years, World War II, and the Cold War. The book then assesses the key issues that have marked the changing political and military landscape in the last years ofthe pre-coup Soviet Union. Included is the text of the last full statement of Soviet military doctrine before the coup and the breakup of the old Soviet Union. Finally, the book presents a window into the enduring proclivities of the Soviet/Russian way of war to provide a context for meeting the future and tempering its uncertainties. A concluding bibliographical essay points to significant literature on Soviet military doctrine.

This new Handbook is a comprehensive collection of cutting-edge essays on all aspects of Latin American Security by a mix of established and emerging scholars. The Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security identifies the key contemporary topics of research and debate, taking into account that the study of Latin America's comparative and international politics has undergone dramatic changes since the end of the Cold War, the return of democracy and the re-legitimization and re-armament of the military against the background of low-level uses of force short of war. Latin America's security issues have become an important topic in international relations and Latin American studies. This Handbook sets a rigorous agenda for future research and is organised into five key parts: * The Evolution of Security in Latin America * Theoretical Approaches to Security in Latin America * Different 'Securities' * Contemporary Regional Security Challenges * Latin America and Contemporary International Security Challenges With a focus on contemporary challenges and the failures of regional institutions to eliminate the threat of the use of force among Latin Americans, this Handbook will be of great interest to students of Latin American politics, security studies, war and conflict studies and International Relations in general.

This updated edition of Professor Paul Moorcraft s timely and controversial book examines the international and domestic threats to the West from Jihadism. It joins the dots in the Middle East, Asia and Africa and explains what it means for the home front, mainly Britain but also continental Europe and the USA. More Brits are trying to join the Islamic State than the reserve forces. Why? It puts the whole complex jigsaw together without pulling any punches. After briefly tracing the origins of Jihadism from the time of the Prophet, The Jihadist Threat analyses the fall-out from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and how far these fuelled the rise of the self-styled Islamic State and other terror groups and the extent these pose to European society. Finally, the Author offers suggestions for defeating this existential threat to the Western way of life. This well-illustrated book is written from the inside. Professor Moorcraft, currently the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Analysis, London, has long worked at the heart of the British security establishment and has operated as a war correspondent in over thirty conflict zones since Afghanistan in the 1980s, often alongside frontline Jihadists. Arguably no-one is better qualified to write on this subject and his knowledge coupled with forthright views cannot be ignored. This claim is borne out by his predictions in the original edition which have proved prescient. This is an important work that fully deserves the acclaim it has attracted.

This volume brings together scholars from different fields to explore the power, consequences and everyday practices of security expertise. Expertise mediates between different forms of knowledge: scientific and technological, legal, economic and political knowledge. This book offers the first systematic study of security expertise and opens up a productive dialogue between science and technology studies and security studies to investigate the character and consequences of this expertise. In security theory, the study of expertise is crucial to understanding whose knowledge informs security making and to reflect on the impact and responsibility of security analysis. In science and technology studies, the study of security politics adds a challenging new case to the agenda of research on expertise and policy. The contributors investigate cases such as academic security studies, security think tanks, the collaboration between science, anthropology and the military, transnational terrorism, and the ethical consequences of security expertise. Together they challenge our understanding of how expertise works and what consequences it has for security politics and international relations. This book will be of particular interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, science and technology studies, and IR/security studies in general.

Providing perspectives from five Western capitals, this multinational study examines the formidable political and structural conditions for effective collaboration between NATO and the United Nations in performing peace-making and peacekeeping missions. The diplomatic and military requirements for operating principles of collective security in post-Cold War Europe are illuminated by contrasting the policies of major NATO governments. Candid assessments of the differing national attitudes that lie behind them are offered by an international team of scholars. Their analyses are set against the backdrop of the experience in Yugoslavia, and the momentous decisions on NATO's structural reform and enlargement.

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank's structure and function and relative value in NATO's overall policy, and the alliance's response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

The wars between 1792 and 1815 saw the making of the modern world, with Britain and Russia the key powers to emerge triumphant from a long period of bitter conflict. In this innovative book, Jeremy Black focuses on the strategic contexts and strategies involved, explaining their significance both at the time and subsequently. Reinterpreting French Revolutionary and Napoleonic warfare, strategy, and their consequences, he argues that Napoleon's failure owed much to his limitations as a strategist. Black uses this framework as a foundation to assess the nature of warfare, the character of strategy, and the eventual ascendance of Britain and Russia in this period. Rethinking the character of strategy, this is the first history to look holistically at the strategies of all the leading belligerents from a global perspective. It will be an essential read for military professionals, students, and history buffs alike.

This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. Strategy here covers all military activity. The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book says interesting things about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

American politicians have long been troubled by the question of whether or not to deploy a national missile defense system. The argument has focused upon the questions of cost, both political and fiscal, plus the reliability of the technologies. This study places that debate within the context of an ongoing controversy over the direction of American foreign and defense policy since the 1950s. Since that time several distinct worldviews (labeled Believers, Pragmatists, and Wilsonians) have been articulated, views which predetermine decision-makers' positions on national missile defense. Those worldviews structure how technology tests and costs are evaluated regardless of outcomes. Politics, not technological proficiency, drives policy decisions.

In effect, the debate has been a dialogue of the deaf and blind wherein each perceives only that which fits their predetermined views. This controversy raises questions regarding the use of deterrence as the basis for national policy and the role of technology in making such decisions. Handberg places this debate within the historical flow of events, dating back to the first inkling that national missile defense might be possible. The arrival of the George W. Bush administration moves national missile defense to the forefront with the question of deployment now considered a near reality.

In The Tank Debate, John Stone highlights the equivocal position that armour has traditionally occupied in Anglo-American thought, and explains why - despite frequent predictions to the contrary - the tank has remained an important instrument of war. This book provides a timely and provocative study of the tank's developmental history, against the changing background of Anglo-American military thought.

The end of the Cold War provides challenges and opportunities for American foreign policy leadership that arguably have been equalled in modern times only by the period in which the Cold War began. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the partners of the Atlantic alliance have achieved a profound diplomatic and political victory of historic importance. The international system which has resulted, however, arguably has more uncertainty and unpredictability than the familiar bipolar competition between the two superpowers and their allies. The book describes these changes and provides suggestions for policy analysis and definition in the future. There is extensive discussion of developments during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations, with particular reference to the two regions of Europe and Asia.; There is a three-fold division between intellectual, structural and sociological dimensions of foreign policy, focusing respectively on the ideas and themes, alliance and other regional and international organizations - including the private corporation, and human dimensions which both define and influence evolving international relations.

Drawing upon a wide range of interviews with many of the key actors, Andrew Dorman examines how defense policy was formulated and implemented during the premiership of Margaret Thatcher. This period witnessed major transformations in international and domestic politics, with defense emerging from its traditional postwar position of relative insignificance to become one of the key issues at the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Dorman provides a new understanding of policymaking by analyzing defense policy in terms of three constituent parts: declaratory policy; military strategy and procurement policy.

To understand wars and armed conflicts, we need to understand the inner logic of military institutions and warrior culture. In Making Warriors in a Global Era, Tone Danielsen employs ethnographic methods to analyze and discuss current debates among both military personnel and academics about the rise of the special operations forces and their effects on how armed conflicts are handled and wars are fought. Based on a decade of research and Danielsen's unprecedented access inside a Norwegian Naval Special Operations Commando, Danielsen describes the culture, experiences, and skill sets of a special operations unit and explores the historical and political implications these types of units have on modern warfare and society as a whole.