The Cold War produced a matrix of Canadian/US extra-governmental military and economic relationships which significantly shaped Canadian political decision-making as it related to the defence of the continent under the auspices of the North American Air/Aerospace Defence Agreement (NORAD). In the post-cold War era, these relationships continue to effectively support a traditional security agenda for the Canadian government. The rewritten NORAD Agreement, signed in March 1996, is the vehicle for Canadian participation in US missile defence programs worldwide. Paying particular attention to the decisions to adopt a nuclear weapons role for Canada's continental air defence forces, to test the US air-lunched cruise missile in the Canadian North, and to become increasingly involved in active missile and space-based defence programs, the author examines: * the Cold War construction of Canadian/US military and economic relationships * the effects of these relationships on political decision-making * the public discourse as a site of alternative understandings of Canada's role in the Cold War. Ann Denholm Crosby provides a challenging analysis of Canadian defence decision-making in both its Cold war and post-Cold War contexts.

This book analyses Japan's security policy after the Cold War and engages with the question of whether, since the Cold War ended, Japan has again become a global security player. The contributions to the book explore Japan's security policy by providing a detailed overview of the evolution of Japan's security policy after the Cold War, including the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands dispute. It also reveals the preeminent security concerns of contemporary Japan by delving into regional security issues such as the Layered Security of Okinawa, the increasing nuclear threat from North Korea, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-6. The book culminates by discussing security in terms of the essential functions of energy, food, and human security, including an assessment of Japan's energy policy since World War II and an assessment of the impact food security on Japan's agriculture and trade. This book will be of interest to student and scholars of East Asian Politics, Security Studies and the International Relations of the Asia Pacific. It is also a valuable resource for diplomats and policymakers on Japan and East Asia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were catalysts for profound changes in global security and defense, including: alterations in the size, structure and configuration of armed forces; the emergence of asymmetrical warfare; the importance of coalition warfare and defense-industrial cooperation; and reform of the financial, procurement and logistical systems. The contributors to this book evaluate these environmental changes within a defense management context.

This book constitutes a multidisciplinary introduction to the analysis of air defence systems. It supplies the tools to carry out independent analysis. Individual sections deal with threat missions, observability, manoeuvrability and vulnerability. With the support of several examples, the text illustrates 12 air defence process models. These models form the foundation for any air defence system analysis, covering initial detection to kill assessment.

Successful reform of the security sector has been regarded as pivotal for a successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Contributors examine the so far relatively unexplored theme of Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia. In an attempt to escape the military-centered approaches dominating contemporary debate this volume examines a wide selection of policy fields, touching on different aspects of SSR such as local ownership, executive and legislative control of security forces, gender mainstreaming, the role of civil society organizations, and the commercialization of security services. Bridging the gap between academics and practitioners, the book brings together diverse perspectives on security sector related reforms in Southeast Asia and their possible future developments.

In October 1987 on the eve of the Washington summit, the Committee on Atlantic Studies, a group of European and North American scholars established in 1964 to promote transatlantic dialogue, met in Toronto to discuss the implications of the new arms control for European security. This book is the fruit of that meeting. Incorporating subsequent developments, up to GorbacheV's December 1988 speech to the U.N., it provides a timely assessment of arms control issues from a variety of European and North American perspectives. The contributors to this volume council caution, suggesting that while progress is possible, it will probably be slow.

At a time when arms control has arrived at a significant crossroads, the issues raised in "Arms Control and European Security" are of critical importance to both Europeans and Americans. This volume stresses the interplay of strategic and regional arms control. It includes analyses of nuclear, conventional, and naval arms control questions and embodies a broader conception of arms control. The book links arms control to such political measures as confidence-building, conflict avoidance and superpower agreement to the neutrality of particular states.

The book explores how small states adjust their military strategies in response to external shocks. Using primary sources from four Nordic countries, (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), this volume explores how small states have adjusted their military strategies in response to external shocks of the 21st century. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and the rise of the Islamic State have all forced the Nordic states to adopt new strategies. While the responses have not been uniform, their differing relations to the EU and NATO have not prevented these countries from behaving similarly in military affairs. Limitations in military capacity has led all four countries to pursue strategies that include cooperation with more resourceful partners. It is necessary for them to cooperate with others to protect and promote their national interests. Moreover, the Nordic cosmopolitan outlook expresses milieu-shaping ambitions that we generally would not expect small states to pursue against a potential great power aggressor. This book will be of much interest to students of military strategy, defense studies, security studies, and international relations.

This work utilizes a key security concept to examine one of the most dramatic regions of the world. Focusing on ethnic tensions, intra-ASEAN rivalries and the emergence of Chinese hegemony, the security dilemma is used to provide insights into a wide range of the region's contemporary security issues. In addition, the book expounds upon some of the uses of the security dilemma, exploring both its applicability to ethnic tensions and a new variant: a state induced security dilemma.

Distinguished military leaders evaluate the essential requirements to insure U.S. national security for the next five to ten years. Generals and admirals of the army, the navy, the marines, and the air force describe the principal risks, strategic obligations, shape, and sizing of forces; current budget constraints; and priorities and projections that must be considered if the United States is to respond to future military threats. Students, professionals, and scholars in military and media studies will benefit from this top-level appraisal of the defense posture needed for the nation's security in the 1990s.

This dialogue with top-level authorities answers fundamental questions about U.S. defense needs in the near future. The opening chapters define a basic defense insurance policy and the likely risks and uncertainties in the 1990s. The next five chapters outline the army, navy, air, marine, and strategic forces needed in the future. Two chapters consider how to cope best with the proliferation of global missiles, with forward prepositioning and with air-lift and sea-lift requirements. Another chapter deals with the industrial base that is essential to meeting these defense needs. A final chapter sums up lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, management and planning implications, and priorities in terms of modernization and technological advances and how best to improve force structure and forward prepositioning.

Two decades since the watershed of the Cold War, this book investigates NATO's staying power. This book investigates how the Alliance has adapted and managed to attend to new roles and purposes through the lens of International Relations theory. The Alliance will continue, but will remain subject to ongoing crises and challenges of change.

The aim of this study is to examine the extent to which the end of the Cold War led to Europeanisation in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The analysis takes into consideration previous studies on Europeanisation and its impact on the transformation of national security and defence, and attempts to account for the development of Europeanisation and related mechanisms. These mechanisms, which have been described as framing mechanisms and negative integration, incorporate all the major relevant factors identified here (i.e. a common Strategic Culture, new security identity, domestic political decision-making, industrial base and defence-spending decline) that contributed to the realisation of the CSDP. The relevance of these factors for CSDP Europeanisation is examined through an historical and empirical analysis, and the relationship between the CSDP and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is also explored. This approach facilitates analysis of the debate concerning the emergence of the CSDP and throws light on the political shift that led European Union (EU) leaders to support the CSDP. Another aspect of this study is the empirical examination of the dynamics and limitations of the European defence sector. The changes which took place in this sector facilitated the emergence of the CSDP and are therefore analysed in the light of globalisation issues, economies of scale, economic crises, military autonomy, new security strategy and Research and Development (R&D) impact. This book will be of interest to students of European security, EU politics, defence studies and International Relations.

The core principle underlying the strategy of nonproliferation - acceptance of a two tier international nuclear order - has become unsustainable. Policy makers and those in the academic world need to turn their attention to exploring new proliferation management strategies premised first and foremost on recognizing that nuclear weapons are here to stay and that determined proliferators can not be stopped from going nuclear. Andrew O'Neil develops this argument in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, the engine house of world economic growth. To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

It is true that in the study of Political Science, International Relations, Public Administration, and other related discipline Arthashastra is yet to receive due recognition in India and abroad. In this context, the Indian Institute of Advanced Study (IIAS) Shimla had hosted a two-day National Seminar on 'Reflections on the Relevance of Arthashastra in the 21st Century' This volume is the collection of selected papers presented at the national seminar. The relevance of Arthashastra in the contemporary world has been well explored in the seventeen articles categorized in three sections. The first part deals with the relevance of Arthashastra in the present century. The second section of the book deals with foreign and security policy, strategic culture as portrayed in Arthashastra. The third section of the book deals with Human Rights, Women's Status, Good Governance, Tax, and Treasury as reflected in Kautilya's Arthashastra.

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan that will guide the transformation of U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. Most recent books on defense prescribe how U.S. policy ought to change or critique past policies without taking Bush's new strategy into account. This book takes a different approach, providing the first comprehensive assessment of the new Regional Defense Strategy, analyzing the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examining the political difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and the major question of how such a significant change was managed in the United States.

Much is new and even radical about the Regional Defense Strategy. Bush has built it around the concept of reconstitution, under which the United States will scrap the forces needed to fight a large-scale conflict and rely on the ability to create new forces if such a conflict looms on the horizon. However, reconstitution will impose demanding requirements on U.S. intelligence and the defense industrial base. Congress will also have an important say over this proposal and the new national security strategy as a whole. So will U.S. allies in Europe and the Far East, some of whom are already moving to recast the strategy's proposals for basing U.S. forces abroad. The primary audience of this book is politico-military strategic planners and those interested in organizational theory, management of change in large organizations, and government policy.

This book examines US recourse to military force in the post-9/11 era. In particular, it evaluates the extent to which the Bush and Obama administrations viewed legitimizing the greater use-of-force as a necessary solution to thwart the security threat presented by global terrorist networks and WMD proliferation.

Missile Defenses and Western European Security is an important contribution to the current debate on how new weapons initiatives will affect prospects for world peace. Soofer generously sprinkles the book with relevant quotes from high-ranking NATO officials, respected academicians, and military policy experts, thus enhancing the readers understanding of the subject. Friday Review of Defense Literature The NATO alliance has come under increasing strain since President Reagan's announcement of plans for the strategic defense initiative (SDI) in March 1983. This study examines the logic underlying Western European reactions to SDI and assesses the validity of European anxieties about missile defenses. Systematically analyzing the positions of France, Britain, and West Germany on the full spectrum of NATO defense issues, the author attempts to determine whether strategic and tactical missile defenses can in fact contribute to U.S. and Western security. In his introduction, the author traces the history of NATO's doubts concerning the strategic nuclear guarantee, which were frequently expressed after the Soveits' first successful missile launches in the late 1950s. He next looks at Western European reactions to the SDI announcement and NATO's strategic thinking on deterrence and escalation. He discusses the relation between arms control considerations and the strategic defense initiative, focusing on NATO fears that SDI would lead to the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and with it the end of the arms control process. Turning to antitactical missile defense, Soofer argues that despite political opposition, there exists a substantial strategic rationale for missile defenses deployed in Western Europe. Offering clarification and new perspectives on many complex defense issues. Missile Defenses and Western European Security will be an important contribution to the current debate on how new weapons initiatives will affect prospects for world peace. This timely book is for specialists, students, and academics in the fields of strategic studies, peace studies,, arms control, diplomacy, and international relations.

Today, more than ever, the use of denial and deception (D&D) is being used to compensate for an opponent's military superiority, to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction, and to violate international agreements and sanctions. Although the historical literature on the use of strategic deception is widely available, technical coverage of the subject is scattered in hard-to-find and out-of-print sources. This is the first technical volume to offer a current, comprehensive and systematic overview of the concepts and methods that underlie strategic deception and, more importantly, to provide an in-depth understanding of counterdeception.

Dwight D. Eisenhower achieved prominence as a military leader during World War II and as a statesman following the conflict, but less is known about his ambitions and preparation between the wars that served as the foundation for his later success. The first modern analysis of Eisenhower's career before his rise to fame, this study examines Ike's intellectual ideas concerning politics, military strategy, and history in the decades between the wars. Holland details Eisenhower's quest to make himself the best officer in the U.S. Army and to prepare for the next war--which he firmly believed was coming. Based upon the voluminous collection at the Eisenhower Library, this book includes discussion of Eisenhower's intellectual development, family life, military education, the roles of mentors and friends, as well as his political and international experiences. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Ike labored thanklessly in an army marked by budget cuts and incompetence. Despite this atmosphere, he persevered to become a pioneer in mechanized and aerial warfare, the author of an official history of World War I, the creator of the first industrial mobilization plan in American history, a one man public relations section for the War Department, and the organizer of the Philippine army. Through it all, Ike remained a man with a big heart, a man equally able to work with presidents or privates without losing his common touch.

Sooner or later, if the world keeps following its current course, there will be a nuclear war. Roger Hilsman, who played a significant role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is convinced that the only way to prevent an eventual nuclear conflict is to abolish war itself. This study examines and critiques all of the various proposals to date for incorporating nuclear weapons into strategic doctrine and concludes that these efforts have failed. Plans for abolishing only nuclear weapons are, according to Hilsman, good-intentioned but ill-advised attempts to rehabilitate war. Instead, he proposes a gradual transition to world government, which will perform the traditional social and political functions that were in the past served only by war.

War will not disappear immediately. The world must still be prepared to deal with three types of war: wars that have the potential for escalating to a nuclear World War III; wars that are self-confining; and civil wars that cry out for peacekeeping intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the United States will have to be responsible for dealing with potentially nuclear wars, an entirely new force structure will be necessary. Self-confining wars, such as Bosnia, pose a particular problem as far as world public opinion for intervention is concerned; this study proposes solutions to such dilemmas. Finally, because national forces are ill-suited to peacekeeping missions in countries ravaged by civil war, the UN must recruit and maintain an international force along the lines of the French Foreign Legion.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict.

For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?