The 1970s and 1980s witnessed growing concern in the United States regarding the relative decline of the American economy and, for defense planners, the military's growing dependence on foreign production of weapons' parts and subcomponents--the guts of many critical weapons systems. The period also witnessed growing interest in industrial policy as a tool for promoting U.S. international competitiveness, defense sectors proving to be particularly attractive candidates for government economic intervention. This study traces the evolution of defense dependence and the U.S. government's response to this dilemma by examining policy ideas and experiments in four defense industries--machine tools, semiconductor manufacturing, ball bearings, and high-definition television technologies--explaining successes and failures, and reviewing prospects for expansion.

Intelligence is often the critical factor in a successful military campaign. This was certainly the case for Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsular War. In this book, author Huw J. Davies offers the first full account of the scope, complexity, and importance of Wellington's intelligence department, describing a highly organized, multifaceted series of networks of agents and spies throughout Spain and Portugal - an organization that was at once a microcosm of British intelligence at the time and a sophisticated forebear to intelligence developments in the twentieth century. Spying for Wellington shows us an organization that was, in effect, two parallel networks: one made up of Foreign Office agents ""run"" by British ambassadors in Spain and Portugal, the other comprising military spies controlled by Wellington himself. The network of agents supplied strategic intelligence, giving the British army advance warning of the arrival, destinations, and likely intentions of French reinforcements. The military network supplied operational intelligence, which confirmed the accuracy of the strategic intelligence and provided greater detail on the strengths, arms, and morale of the French forces. Davies reveals how, by integrating these two forms of intelligence, Wellington was able to develop an extremely accurate and reliable estimate of French movements and intentions not only in his own theater of operations but also in other theaters across the Iberian Peninsula. The reliability and accuracy of this intelligence, as Davies demonstrates, was central to Wellington's decision-making and, ultimately, to his overall success against the French. Correcting past, incomplete accounts, this is the definitive book on Wellington's use of intelligence. As such, it contributes to a clearer, more comprehensive understanding of Wellington at war and of his place in the history of British military intelligence.

India is poised to resurge as a maritime power, with cooperative engagement as its most prominent pan-regional characteristic. Enabled by a sound national strategy within the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, this would enable successive governments to further the overarching national objective of securing the economic, material, and societal wellbeing of the people of India. In this context, the book appraises the various facets related to India's ascendance as a maritime power, and lays down policy-relevant recommendations to assist the national policy-makers to chart the 'way ahead'. This book additionally seeks to address policymakers in other countries of the Indo-Pacific region, as also extra-regional State entities that are actively seeking to engage with India.

The author develops the concept that logistics constitute a bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. He explains the role of the civilian as well as of the professional, and discusses the differences in their modes of thought and methods of operation.

This text considers the ethical credentials of the United States in branding various countries pariah states, and describes the background to the Iraq question (the role of Saddam, the genocidal sanctions regime, amongst other things). A detailed chronology of 1997-98 US/Iraq weapons inspections crisis is given, prior to a profile of the subsequent UN/Iraqi settlement and its aftermath.

In June 1944, the United States launched a crushing assault on the Japanese navy in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The capture of the Mariana Islands and the accompanying ruin of Japanese carrier airpower marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific War. No tactical masterstroke or blunder could reverse the increasingly lopsided balance of power between the two combatants. The War in the Pacific had entered its endgame. Beginning with the Honolulu Conference, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with his Pacific theater commanders to plan the last phase of the campaign against Japan, Twilight of the Gods brings to life the harrowing last year of World War II in the Pacific, when the U.S. Navy won the largest naval battle in history; Douglas MacArthur made good his pledge to return to the Philippines; waves of kamikazes attacked the Allied fleets; the Japanese fought to the last man on one island after another; B-29 bombers burned down Japanese cities; and Hiroshima and Nagasaki were vaporized in atomic blasts. Ian W. Toll's narratives of combat in the air, at sea, and on the beaches are as gripping as ever, but he also reconstructs the Japanese and American home fronts and takes the reader into the halls of power in Washington and Tokyo, where the great questions of strategy and diplomacy were decided. Drawing from a wealth of rich archival sources and new material, Twilight of the Gods casts a penetrating light on the battles, grand strategic decisions and naval logistics that enabled the Allied victory in the Pacific. An authoritative and riveting account of the final phase of the War in the Pacific, Twilight of the Gods brings Toll's masterful trilogy to a thrilling conclusion. This prize-winning and best-selling trilogy will stand as the first complete history of the Pacific War in more than twenty-five years, and the first multivolume history of the Pacific naval war since Samuel Eliot Morison's series was published in the 1950s.

The more uncertain the developments in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union become, the more urgent is the need to understand Soviet military thinking over 75-year span of Soviet history. Although other books discuss various aspects of Soviet military thought, this study by senior scholars more thoroughly combines the perspectives of history and the social sciences to understand Soviet military doctrine, experience, and tendencies from its birth with Lenin's militarization of Marxism in 1915 to the far-reaching changes introduced by Gorbachev--with all the attendant dilemmas and tensions up to the coup and revolutionary upheavals of 1991. This appraisal of the Soviet way of war is significant for scholars and professionals in Soviet studies, military affairs, and international politics. This collection shows how ideology, technology, experience, and personalities have shaped Soviet military doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution. This study defines the shifting interplay of defensive and offensive strategies at different times, various policies for dealing with perceived threats of nuclear or conventional war, and reviews current discussions and future policy directions. First, the book describes the form and content of Soviet military doctrine from Lenin's creation of its premises in 1915 until Gorbachev's refutation of these premises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Next, the book examines Soviet military thinking in light of the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War, the episodes of the interwar years, World War II, and the Cold War. The book then assesses the key issues that have marked the changing political and military landscape in the last years ofthe pre-coup Soviet Union. Included is the text of the last full statement of Soviet military doctrine before the coup and the breakup of the old Soviet Union. Finally, the book presents a window into the enduring proclivities of the Soviet/Russian way of war to provide a context for meeting the future and tempering its uncertainties. A concluding bibliographical essay points to significant literature on Soviet military doctrine.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

ALEXANDER, HANNIBAL, CAESAR--each was a master of war. Each had to look beyond the battlefield to decide whom to fight, when, and why; to know what victory was and when to end the war; to determine how to bring stability to the lands he conquered. Each general had to be a battlefield tactician and more: a statesman, a strategist, a leader.
Tactics change, weapons change, but war itself remains much the same throughout the centuries, and a great warrior must know how to define success. Understanding where each of these three great (but flawed) commanders succeeded and failed can serve anyone who wants to think strategically or who has to demonstrate leadership. In "Masters of Command "Barry Strauss explains the qualities these great generals shared, the keys to their success, from ambition and judgment to leadership itself.

Overturns existing thinking to show that the Royal Navy engaged professionally in war planning in the years before the First World War. It has been widely accepted that British naval war planning from the late nineteenth century to the First World War was amateur and driven by personal political agenda. But Shawn T. Grimes argues that this was far from the case. His extensive original research shows that, in fact, the Royal Navy had a definitive war strategy, which was well thought-through and formulated in a professional manner. Faced by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat, the Admiralty adopted an offensive strategy from 1888 to 1905 based on observational blockade and combined operations. This strategy was modified after 1905 for war with Wilhelmine Germany. The book shows how specific war plans aimed at Germany's naval and economic assets in the Baltic were drawn up between 1906 and 1908 and that the strategy of primary distant blockade, formulated between 1897 and 1907, became a reality in late 1912 and not July 1914 as previously thought. The book argues that the Naval Intelligence Department, which took a lead in devising these plans, was the Navy's de facto staff. Overall, it is clear that there was a continuity underpinning British thinking about how to wage a naval war. SHAWN GRIMES received his PhD in history from the University of London and has been a Lecturer in European History at the University of Saskatchewan.

Case studies explore how to improve military adaptation and preparedness in peacetime by investigating foreign wars Preparing for the next war at an unknown date against an undetermined opponent is a difficult undertaking with extremely high stakes. Even the most detailed exercises and wargames do not truly simulate combat and the fog of war. Thus, outside of their own combat, militaries have studied foreign wars as a valuable source of battlefield information. The effectiveness of this learning process, however, has rarely been evaluated across different periods and contexts. Through a series of in-depth case studies of the US Army, Navy, and Air Force, Brent L. Sterling creates a better understanding of the dynamics of learning from "other people's wars," determining what types of knowledge can be gained from foreign wars, identifying common pitfalls, and proposing solutions to maximize the benefits for doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. Other People's Wars explores major US efforts involving direct observation missions and post-conflict investigations at key junctures for the US armed forces: the Crimean War (1854-56), Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), Spanish Civil War (1936-39), and Yom Kippur War (1973), which preceded the US Civil War, First and Second World Wars, and major army and air force reforms of the 1970s, respectively. The case studies identify learning pitfalls but also show that initiatives to learn from other nations' wars can yield significant benefits if the right conditions are met. Sterling puts forth a process that emphasizes comprehensive qualitative learning to foster better military preparedness and adaptability.

In recent years, Western experts have generally portrayed the Kremlin's actions as either strategic or tactical. Yet this proposition raises a very important question: how closely does the West's interpretation of Russian strategy reflect the country's own definitions? While many military historians have sought to interpret Russian strategy, 'Strategiya' takes a different approach. It brings together, in English, the classic works of the Russian art of strategy, which were rediscovered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Instead of explaining his analysis of Russia's contemporary strategy, Ofer Fridman offers his translation of and commentary upon the founding texts of Russia's own Clausewitzes, Baron Jominis and Liddell Harts, who have been inspiring Russian strategic thinking--both its conceptualisation and its implementation--from the moment Moscow rejected the exclusive role of Marxism-Leninism in strategic affairs. Russian contemporary strategists draw their inspiration from three main schools of thought. While works by Soviet military thinkers have already been translated into English, those by both Imperial strategists and military thinkers in exile have remained almost inaccessible to the Western reader. Filling this lacuna, 'Strategiya' offers a fascinating glimpse inside the foundations of Russian strategic thought and practice.

Wars never run according to plan, perhaps never more so than during the Italian campaign, 1943-45, where necessary coordination between the different armies added additional complexity to Allied plans. Errors in the strategies, tactics, the coalition tensions, and operations at campaign command level can be clearly seen in first-hand accounts of the period. This new account examines the Italian campaign, from Sicily to surrender in 1945, exploring the strategy, intentions, motives, plans, and deeds. It then offers a detailed insight into the five commanders who led the battles in Italy - the two British commanders: Montgomery and Alexander; two American: Patton and Clark; and the leading German commander, Field Marshal Kesselring. Their personal notes and accounts, taken alongside archival material, provides some surprising conclusions - Montgomery was not quite the master of war he is portrayed as; Patton had serious flaws, exposed by wasting men's lives to save a relative and overlooking the shooting of prisoners of war; Clark lost lives to bolster his image; Alexander the gentleman was far too vague to be effective as a senior leader. Meanwhile, condemned war criminal Kesselring appears to be the most efficient and also, like Alexander, one of the most popular leaders.

This wide-ranging book analyses EU-Asia security relations in a systematic, substantive and comparative manner. The contributions assess similarities and differences between the EU and its Asian partners with respect to levels of threat perception, policy response and security cooperation in the context of historical, institutional and external factors - such as the influence of the United States. The book presents original empirical research organised in four parts: a number of contributions providing discussions of the global context in which EU-Asia security relations develop; a series of chapters covering the range of dimensions of EU-Asian security, including both traditional and non-military aspects of security; chapters addressing the specific issues touching on bilateral relations between the EU and its partners in the Asia-Pacific region; and a final part presenting the overall findings across the various contributions together with the future outlook for EU-Asia security relations.

Providing perspectives from five Western capitals, this multinational study examines the formidable political and structural conditions for effective collaboration between NATO and the United Nations in performing peace-making and peacekeeping missions. The diplomatic and military requirements for operating principles of collective security in post-Cold War Europe are illuminated by contrasting the policies of major NATO governments. Candid assessments of the differing national attitudes that lie behind them are offered by an international team of scholars. Their analyses are set against the backdrop of the experience in Yugoslavia, and the momentous decisions on NATO's structural reform and enlargement.

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus. The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951-1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank's structure and function and relative value in NATO's overall policy, and the alliance's response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

This volume brings together scholars from different fields to explore the power, consequences and everyday practices of security expertise. Expertise mediates between different forms of knowledge: scientific and technological, legal, economic and political knowledge. This book offers the first systematic study of security expertise and opens up a productive dialogue between science and technology studies and security studies to investigate the character and consequences of this expertise. In security theory, the study of expertise is crucial to understanding whose knowledge informs security making and to reflect on the impact and responsibility of security analysis. In science and technology studies, the study of security politics adds a challenging new case to the agenda of research on expertise and policy. The contributors investigate cases such as academic security studies, security think tanks, the collaboration between science, anthropology and the military, transnational terrorism, and the ethical consequences of security expertise. Together they challenge our understanding of how expertise works and what consequences it has for security politics and international relations. This book will be of particular interest to students of critical security studies, sociology, science and technology studies, and IR/security studies in general.

This book outlines the state of play in maritime security in the Gulf and provides a historical perspective to current issues while also surveying different mechanisms for Gulf maritime security, both at the collective and individual state levels. The book addresses a number of questions related to maritime security in the Gulf States, such as what are the main threats facing maritime security? Do the Arab Gulf States have the necessary naval capabilities to confront these maritime security threats? What are the efforts that the Arab Gulf States have made in order to maintain their maritime security? What are the regional frameworks through which the Arab Gulf States can address maritime security threats? And what are the obstacles hindering the Arab Gulf States' efforts to maintain maritime security? This book would be a valuable read for Gulf Cooperation Council States, the ministries of defense in the Arabian Gulf countries, security institutions, the Arabian Gulf countries' military academies, thinks tanks and universities in the six Gulf States, Western think thanks concerned with the Arabian Gulf region, and scholars specializing in Arabian Gulf countries.

This book gathers the proceedings of the Multidisciplinary International Conference of Research Applied to Defense and Security (MICRADS), held at the Eloy Alfaro Military Academy (ESMIL) in Quito, Ecuador, on May 13-15,2020. It covers a broad range of topics in systems, communication, and defense; strategy and political-administrative vision in defense; and engineering and technologies applied to defense. Given its scope, it offers a valuable resource for practitioners, researchers, and students alike.

This study is one of the rare contributions to the very small library of genuine strategic studies. Strategy here covers all military activity. The broad purpose is to show how strategy works, using air power and special operations as substantial case studies, but also addressing sea power, nuclear deterrence, and information warfare. Although this book says interesting things about the future of air power, the reliability of non-nuclear deterrence, the true character of joint warfare, the utility of special warriors, and the limitations of excellence in information warfare, the primary intention is to deepen the understanding of the nature and working of strategy and strategic effect.

American politicians have long been troubled by the question of whether or not to deploy a national missile defense system. The argument has focused upon the questions of cost, both political and fiscal, plus the reliability of the technologies. This study places that debate within the context of an ongoing controversy over the direction of American foreign and defense policy since the 1950s. Since that time several distinct worldviews (labeled Believers, Pragmatists, and Wilsonians) have been articulated, views which predetermine decision-makers' positions on national missile defense. Those worldviews structure how technology tests and costs are evaluated regardless of outcomes. Politics, not technological proficiency, drives policy decisions.

In effect, the debate has been a dialogue of the deaf and blind wherein each perceives only that which fits their predetermined views. This controversy raises questions regarding the use of deterrence as the basis for national policy and the role of technology in making such decisions. Handberg places this debate within the historical flow of events, dating back to the first inkling that national missile defense might be possible. The arrival of the George W. Bush administration moves national missile defense to the forefront with the question of deployment now considered a near reality.

Why have militaries so often failed to learn from conflict and war? Why, for example, despite years of unsuccessful counterinsurgency experiences in Vietnam and El Salvador and repeated recommendations from official Army studies, has the U.S. Army not changed its doctrine for counterinsurgency? Writing for scholars as well as military professionals and policymakers, Downie examines the sources of doctrinal change and innovation from a theoretical perspective and derives practical and relevant policy recommendations.

Contrasting with other findings in this field, Downie provides case studies showing that neither external pressure on a military nor institutional recognition of the requirement for doctrinal change is sufficient to explain the process of doctrinal change. A military innovates when it learns, by proceeding through a learning cycle that includes achieving an organizational consensus that permits adoption of new approaches that respond to factors that make existing doctrine deficient. When that process is blocked, militaries are left with outmoded doctrinal approaches that constrain military performance and lead to defeat. This is an important study for military leaders, civilian policymakers, and scholars and researchers dealing with contemporary U.S. military issues.