This is the only current book on maritime Djibouti, and the only one available in English since 1968. It describes the geography, naval history, and present strategic role of this small country, and indicates its possible future. Naval Strategy East of Suez includes previously little-known facts of French covert action in "Italian East Africa, 1938-1941"; and of "Operation Toreador "(1956), which served to aid Operation Musketeer. It also turns a spotlight on the Allied blockade of Djibouti in 1940-1942. In a sense, this book is a more readable, and less technical, treatment of what sailors call sailing directions.

Djibouti's naval base, 600 miles closer to the Strait of Hormuz than Diego Garcia, is the nearest base to Middle East oil centers likely to be available to France and its allies in the future--facts often ignored or unknown to all but the most specialized of specialists. Koburger believes that the troubles in the Middle East are only beginning. His book offers a background and strategy about an area little known to Anglophones that is of considerable potential usefulness.

Using the European Defence Community (EDC) as a case-study, this book examines the competing and often conflicting view of the British and American governments towards European integration in the early 1950s. The British, fearing an 'agonizing reappraisal' of the American defence commitment to Europe if the supranational EDC failed, went to great lengths to ensure the success of the scheme. When, despite these efforts, the EDC finally collapsed in August 1954, NATO was plunged into arguably the most severe crisis in its history. The crisis also possessed an Anglo-American dimension, with London and Washington badly divided on how it should be resolved. In the end, the British were instrumental in the creation of the Western European Union as a successor to the EDC. Their crisis management, however, had been rooted in fear of the 'agonizing reappraisal', a danger dismissed by many historians as exaggerated but which the British, in 1954, were perhaps right to take seriously.

An analysis of the CSCE/OSCE process from the perspective of security regime formation and an evaluation of its contribution to European security. This book systematically examines the whole CSCE/OSCE process from a non-European perspective, bearing in mind the transferability of the OSCE to other regions. This book displays innovative research on security regimes by presenting an empirical case-study of the CSCE/OSCE.

In a world that is increasingly unstable, intelligence services like the American CIA and the United Kingdom's MI6 exist to deliver security. Whether the challenge involves terrorism, cyber-security, or the renewed specter of great power conflict, intelligence agencies mitigate threats and provide decisional advantage to national leaders. But empowered intelligence services require adequate supervision and oversight, which must be about more than the narrow (if still precarious) task of ensuring the legality of covert operations and surveillance activities. Global Intelligence Oversight is a comparative investigation of how democratic countries can govern their intelligence services so that they are effective, but operate within frameworks that are acceptable to their people in an interconnected world. The book demonstrates how the institutions that oversee intelligence agencies participate in the protection of national security while safeguarding civil liberties, balancing among competing national interests, and building public trust in inherently secret activities. It does so by analyzing the role of courts and independent oversight bodies as they operate in countries with robust constitutional frameworks and powerful intelligence services. The book also illuminates a new transnational oversight dynamic that is shaping and constraining security services in new ways. It describes how global technology companies and litigation in transnational forums constitute a new form of oversight whose contours are still undefined. As rapid changes in technology bring the world closer together, these forces will complement their more traditional counterparts in ensuring that intelligence activities remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable.

An analysis that takes the complexity of British defence policy apart to view its anatomy and show how policy is made in this area. British defence policy is in a phase of great transition as the country confronts its Brexit future and also as world politics becomes more threatening and potentially unstable. This book uses the most up to date information to examine in a concise and readable way all the elements that go to make up Britain's defence policy as it goes through the most significant transition since the end of the Cold War in 1991. By analysing the costs of defence, the equipment issues, the personnel, the technical and intelligence back-up for it, and the strategies to employ military forces, this book offers a brief but rich guide to understanding an area of policy that many people find baffling. -- .

Two Gulf wars and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict have highlighted the salience of military factors in the Middle East. This book argues, however, that many of the most serious 'security' challenges to Arab states and societies are rooted not in external military threats but in the imperatives of socio-economic development. Contributors examine the regional security environment; the social and political impact of regional militarization; and underdevelopment as a source of regional insecurity.

The 45th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2013 in Security and conflicts Military spending and armaments Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament The SIPRI Yearbook contains extensive annexes on the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements and a chronology of events during the year in the area of security and arms control.

For over a decade now, thinking on regional relations in the Gulf has focused on the competition for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Today, this perspective is outdated. The smaller Gulf Arab states, led by the United Arab Emirates, are calling for their own goals and interests to be considered and a new regional order has emerged. This book assesses the UAE's increasing power and the future challenges to regional security it could pose. It is a contemporary history and analysis of the changing role of the UAE. Dina Esfandiary argues that the UAE has become more assertive in the pursuit of its own interests in the region and beyond - even when this puts it at odds with its regional allies. This behavior includes the build-up of its military and non-military capabilities, the diversification of its partners, and its willingness to use these resources. The book examines the regional causes of the UAE's growing assertiveness, including the 2011 Arab Uprisings, the impact of the US-announced 'Pivot to Asia' and the perceptions of waning US power in the Middle East, and the 2015 nuclear deal. The UAE's changing role in the region will affect regional security. This book points towards how smaller states in the region will interact with regional hegemons in the long term, as they learn from the UAE's assertiveness and seek to imitate it.

This book covers various strategic issues around maritime security in terms of how Indonesia has sought to implement its Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision, evaluating its regional impact within ASEAN. The Global Maritime Fulcrum' vision was declared by President Joko Widodo to refocus Indonesia's development paradigm to prioritize its maritime aspect in the Indo-Pacific. Divided across five pillars, namely: maritime culture, maritime resource management, maritime infrastructure and connectivity development, maritime diplomacy and maritime defense, the book presents that the implementation of this vision will doubtless have a significant regional impact, particularly in setting regional maritime agendas. In promoting an understanding of the challenges presented in implementing the Global Maritime Fulcrum and unpacking its multifaceted impact in the region, this book delves into Indonesia's maritime vision, the existing maritime arrangements within ASEAN, and Indonesia's interests in terms of its political economy relating to the maritime sector, strategic security issues, maritime diplomacy, and related regional power dynamics. Translated from Bahasa Indonesia into English, the book is relevant to scholars and policymakers in maritime studies, international relations, and regional studies relating to politics and power dynamics in Indonesia, specifically, and ASEAN more broadly.

Celebrated military historian James Holland chronicles the experiences in World War II of the legendary tank unit, the Sherwood RangersIn the annals of World War II, certain groups of soldiers stand out, and among the most notable were the Sherwood Rangers. Originally a cavalry unit in the last days of horses in combat, whose officers were landed gentry leading men who largely worked for them, they were switched to the "mechanized cavalry" of tanks in 1942. Winning acclaim in the North African campaign, the Sherwood Rangers then spearheaded one of the D-Day landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944, led the way across France, were the first British troops to cross into Germany, and contributed mightily to Germany's surrender in May 1945. Inspired by Stephen Ambrose's Band of Brothers, acclaimed WWII historian James Holland memorably profiles an extraordinary group of citizen soldiers constantly in harm's way. Their casualties were horrific, but their ranks immediately refilled. Informed by never-before-seen documents, letters, photographs, and other artifacts from Sherwood Rangers' families--an ongoing fraternity--and by his own deep knowledge of the war, Holland offers a uniquely intimate portrait of the war at ground level, introducing heretofore unknowns such as Commanding Officer Stanley Christopherson, squadron commander John Semken, and Sergeant George Dring, and other memorable characters who helped the regiment become the single unit with the most battle honors of any ever in the British army. He weaves the Sherwood Rangers' exploits into the larger narrative and strategy of the war, and also brings fresh analysis to the tactics used. Following the Sherwood Rangers' brutal journey over the dramatic eleven months between D-Day and V-E Day, Holland presents a vivid and original perspective on the endgame of WWII in Europe.

This book includes a selection of articles from The 2018 Multidisciplinary International Conference of Research Applied to Defense and Security (MICRADS'18), held in Salinas, Peninsula de Santa Elena, Ecuador, from April 18 to 20, 2018. MICRADS is an international forum for researchers and practitioners to present and discuss the most recent innovations, trends, results, experiences and concerns in the various areas of defense and security, together with their technological development and applications. The main topics covered are: Information and Communication Technology in Education; Computer Vision in Military Applications; Engineering Analysis and Signal Processing; Cybersecurity and Cyberdefense; Maritime Security and Safety; Strategy, Geopolitics and Oceanopolitics; Defense planning; Leadership (e-leadership); Defense Economics; Defense Logistics; Health Informatics in Military Applications; Simulation in Military Applications; Computer Networks, Mobility and Pervasive Systems; Military Marketing; Military Physical Training; Assistive Devices and Wearable Technology; Naval and Military Engineering; Weapons and Combat Systems; Operational Oceanography. The book is aimed at all those dealing with defense and security issues, including practitioners, researchers and teachers as well as undergraduate, graduate, master's and doctorate students.

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed growing concern in the United States regarding the relative decline of the American economy and, for defense planners, the military's growing dependence on foreign production of weapons' parts and subcomponents--the guts of many critical weapons systems. The period also witnessed growing interest in industrial policy as a tool for promoting U.S. international competitiveness, defense sectors proving to be particularly attractive candidates for government economic intervention. This study traces the evolution of defense dependence and the U.S. government's response to this dilemma by examining policy ideas and experiments in four defense industries--machine tools, semiconductor manufacturing, ball bearings, and high-definition television technologies--explaining successes and failures, and reviewing prospects for expansion.

Intelligence is often the critical factor in a successful military campaign. This was certainly the case for Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsular War. In this book, author Huw J. Davies offers the first full account of the scope, complexity, and importance of Wellington's intelligence department, describing a highly organized, multifaceted series of networks of agents and spies throughout Spain and Portugal - an organization that was at once a microcosm of British intelligence at the time and a sophisticated forebear to intelligence developments in the twentieth century. Spying for Wellington shows us an organization that was, in effect, two parallel networks: one made up of Foreign Office agents ""run"" by British ambassadors in Spain and Portugal, the other comprising military spies controlled by Wellington himself. The network of agents supplied strategic intelligence, giving the British army advance warning of the arrival, destinations, and likely intentions of French reinforcements. The military network supplied operational intelligence, which confirmed the accuracy of the strategic intelligence and provided greater detail on the strengths, arms, and morale of the French forces. Davies reveals how, by integrating these two forms of intelligence, Wellington was able to develop an extremely accurate and reliable estimate of French movements and intentions not only in his own theater of operations but also in other theaters across the Iberian Peninsula. The reliability and accuracy of this intelligence, as Davies demonstrates, was central to Wellington's decision-making and, ultimately, to his overall success against the French. Correcting past, incomplete accounts, this is the definitive book on Wellington's use of intelligence. As such, it contributes to a clearer, more comprehensive understanding of Wellington at war and of his place in the history of British military intelligence.

The author develops the concept that logistics constitute a bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. He explains the role of the civilian as well as of the professional, and discusses the differences in their modes of thought and methods of operation.

For the majority of the post-Cold War era, Russian maritime power has hardly featured in the Euro-Atlantic community's thinking. But in the mid-2010s, the idea that the Russian navy poses a threat to NATO began to gain ground. It took very real form in February 2022, when Moscow launched its invasion of Ukraine. This book presents the first sustained examination of Russian maritime power in the period since the Cold War. It brings together leading specialists from public policy and academia to reflect on historical and contemporary aspects of Russia's naval strategy and capacities. At a time of mounting tensions, which some observers have named the 'Fourth Battle of the Atlantic', the book offers an informed and nuanced discussion, taking into account the view from Moscow and how this differs from western perspectives. It sketches a trajectory of Russia's power at sea and reflects on current capabilities and problems, as well as Moscow's strategic planning for the future. -- .

This text considers the ethical credentials of the United States in branding various countries pariah states, and describes the background to the Iraq question (the role of Saddam, the genocidal sanctions regime, amongst other things). A detailed chronology of 1997-98 US/Iraq weapons inspections crisis is given, prior to a profile of the subsequent UN/Iraqi settlement and its aftermath.

The more uncertain the developments in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union become, the more urgent is the need to understand Soviet military thinking over 75-year span of Soviet history. Although other books discuss various aspects of Soviet military thought, this study by senior scholars more thoroughly combines the perspectives of history and the social sciences to understand Soviet military doctrine, experience, and tendencies from its birth with Lenin's militarization of Marxism in 1915 to the far-reaching changes introduced by Gorbachev--with all the attendant dilemmas and tensions up to the coup and revolutionary upheavals of 1991. This appraisal of the Soviet way of war is significant for scholars and professionals in Soviet studies, military affairs, and international politics. This collection shows how ideology, technology, experience, and personalities have shaped Soviet military doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution. This study defines the shifting interplay of defensive and offensive strategies at different times, various policies for dealing with perceived threats of nuclear or conventional war, and reviews current discussions and future policy directions. First, the book describes the form and content of Soviet military doctrine from Lenin's creation of its premises in 1915 until Gorbachev's refutation of these premises in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Next, the book examines Soviet military thinking in light of the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War, the episodes of the interwar years, World War II, and the Cold War. The book then assesses the key issues that have marked the changing political and military landscape in the last years ofthe pre-coup Soviet Union. Included is the text of the last full statement of Soviet military doctrine before the coup and the breakup of the old Soviet Union. Finally, the book presents a window into the enduring proclivities of the Soviet/Russian way of war to provide a context for meeting the future and tempering its uncertainties. A concluding bibliographical essay points to significant literature on Soviet military doctrine.

Despite their immense war-fighting capacity, the five most powerful states in the international system have failed to attain their primary political objective in almost 40% of their military operations against weak state and non-state targets since 1945. Why are states with tremendous military might so often unable to attain their objectives when they use force against weaker adversaries? More broadly, under what conditions can states use military force to attain their political objectives and what conditions limit the utility of military force as a policy instrument? Can we predict the outcome of a war before the fighting begins?
Scholars and military leaders have argued that poor military strategy choices, domestic political constraints on democratic governments, or failure to commit sufficient resources to the war effort can explain why strong states lose small wars. In contrast, Who Wins? by Patricia L. Sullivan argues that the key to understanding strategic success in war lies in the nature of the political objectives states pursue through the use of military force. Sullvian does not deny the importance of war-fighting capacity, military strategies, or resolve as determinants of war outcomes. But she provides both a coherent argument and substantial empirical evidence that the effects of these factors are dependent on the nature of the belligerents' political objectives.
The theory's predictions about the conditions under which states are able to attain their political objectives through the use of military force are tested against the most widely accepted alternative explanations of war outcomes with an abundance of historical data on violent conflicts. The results support Sullivan's argument and challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors like military strength, resolve, regime type, and war-fighting strategies on war outcomes.

On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines traces the history of the development of military staffs and ideas on the operational level of war and operational art from the Napoleonic Wars to today, viewing them through the lens of Prussia/Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. B. A. Friedman concludes that the operational level of war should be rejected as fundamentally flawed, but that operational art is an accurate description of the activities of the military staff, an organization developed to provide the brainpower necessary to manage the complexity of modern military operations. Rather than simply serve as an intercession between levels, the military staff exists as an enabler and supporting organization to tacticians and strategists alike. On Operations examines the organization of military staffs, which has changed little since Napoleon's time. Historical examinations of the functions staffs provided to commanders, and the disciplines of the staff officers themselves, leads to conclusions about how best to organize staffs in the future. Friedman demonstrates these ideas through case studies of historical campaigns based on the military discipline system developed.

Overturns existing thinking to show that the Royal Navy engaged professionally in war planning in the years before the First World War. It has been widely accepted that British naval war planning from the late nineteenth century to the First World War was amateur and driven by personal political agenda. But Shawn T. Grimes argues that this was far from the case. His extensive original research shows that, in fact, the Royal Navy had a definitive war strategy, which was well thought-through and formulated in a professional manner. Faced by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat, the Admiralty adopted an offensive strategy from 1888 to 1905 based on observational blockade and combined operations. This strategy was modified after 1905 for war with Wilhelmine Germany. The book shows how specific war plans aimed at Germany's naval and economic assets in the Baltic were drawn up between 1906 and 1908 and that the strategy of primary distant blockade, formulated between 1897 and 1907, became a reality in late 1912 and not July 1914 as previously thought. The book argues that the Naval Intelligence Department, which took a lead in devising these plans, was the Navy's de facto staff. Overall, it is clear that there was a continuity underpinning British thinking about how to wage a naval war. SHAWN GRIMES received his PhD in history from the University of London and has been a Lecturer in European History at the University of Saskatchewan.