First published in 1979. The report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, which met from early 1975 to mid-1977, represents a unique attempt to portray defence policy in the context of disarmament and the need to restructure and control the institutions of defence - in particular the defence industry. The report presented the fullest study made by any British political party concerning the implications and consequences of its stated defence policy, and embodied an examination of defence from the perspective of approaches of disarmament. At the same time, the search for a new policy in international relations was harmonised with the further development of a new industrial strategy, concentrating upon the potential for converting part of military industry to civil work. This work which presents a distinctive intervention in the general debate concerning defence policy, industrial and technological planning, economic priorities and public policy, will be of considerable relevance to both specialists in each of these fields as well as the general reader.

This book deals with the crucially important NATO crisis of 1966-67, and the intensive reorientation of NATO strategy following the departure of France from integrated military command. It includes four detailed case studies and draws on previously unavailable documents.

This book provides an empirical understanding of how EU-level defence industrial cooperation functions in practice. Using the Liberal Intergovernmental theoretical model, the book argues that while national economic preferences are an essential factor of government interests they only explain part of the dynamic that leads to the development of defence industrial policy at EU level. Moving beyond a simple adumbration of economic preferences, it shows how the EU's institutional framework and corpus of law are used by governments to reaffirm their position as the ultimate arbiter and promoter of national economic preferences in the defence industrial sector. To this end, the work asks why and how EU member state governments, European defence firms, and EU institutions developed EU-level defence industrial policy between 2003 and 2009. The book also analyses significant policy developments, including the establishment of a European Defence Agency and two EU Directives on equipment transfers and defence procurement. This book will be of much interest to students of EU policy, defence studies, security studies and International Relations in general.

The fourth and final volume in a pioneering series on the Chinese military, "Imagined Enemies" offers an unprecedented look at its history, operational structure, modernization, and strategy. Beginnning with an examination of culturee adn thought in Part I, the authors explore the transition away transition away from Mao Zedong's revolutionary doctrine, the conflict with Moscow, and Beijing's preoccupation with Taiwanese separatism and preparations for war to thwart it. Part II focuses on operational and policy decisions in the National Command Authority and, subsequently, in the People's Liberation Army. Part III provides a detailed study of the Second Artillery, China's strategic rocket forces. The book concludes with the transformation of military strategy and shows how it is being tested in military exercises, with Taiwan and the United States as "imagined enemies."

Exploring the profound differences between what the military services believe-and how they uniquely serve the nation. When the US military confronts pressing security challenges, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps often react differently as they advise and execute civilian defense policies. Conventional wisdom holds that these dynamics tend to reflect a competition for prestige, influence, and dollars. Such interservice rivalries, however, are only a fraction of the real story. In Four Guardians, Jeffrey W. Donnithorne argues that the services act instead as principled agents, interpreting policies in ways that reflect their unique cultures and patterns of belief. Chapter-length portraits of each service highlight the influence of operational environment ("nature") and political history ("nurture") in shaping each service's cultural worldview. The book also offers two important case studies of civil-military policymaking: one, the little-known story of the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in the early 1980s; the other, the four-year political battle that led to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Donnithorne uses these cases to demonstrate the principled agent framework in action while amply revealing the four services as distinctly different political actors. Combining crisp insight and empirical depth with engaging military history, Four Guardians provides practical utility for civil-military scholars, national security practitioners, and interested citizens alike. This timely work brings a new appreciation for the American military, the complex dynamics of civilian control, and the principled ways in which the four guardian services defend their nation.

Between 2021 and 2031, the UK government is set to spend over GBP230 billion on its military. Who decides how to use these funds, and how can we be sure that the UK's armed forces can meet the threats of tomorrow? This book provides the answers to these crucial questions. Concentrating on decisions taken below the political level, it uncovers the factors that underpin the translation of strategic direction into military capability. In a series of interviews, over 30 top admirals, generals and air marshals give their own views on the procurement and maintenance of the nation's current and future military capability. Their unrivalled professional knowledge and experience affords a fascinating insight into the higher management of national defence.

The first years of the post-Cold War era have made clear that it is imperative for the Western allies to pursue a common strategy and a concerted diplomacy in order to secure their interests in Europe.;From four national perspectives, the authors examine what must be done for a more egalitarian Alliance to act effectively, on a multilateral basis, in addressing the new security agenda. Each of the contributors has had long experience as a government official or consultant.;The stress of the book is on the means and methods of collective decision-making and diplomacy, not organizational architecture. The book concentrates on the issues of Alliance co-operation that look beyond the transition period, its key premise being that the Western partners' ability to work together on a truly multilateral basis will determine their success or failure in meeting the challenges now at the top of their diplomatic agendas.

As European security structures are undergoing transformation in the 1990s it is crucial to examine their origins and rationale: NATO secured peace and facilitated economic and political co-operation, while also becoming the vehicle of national rivalry. This book examines why and how NATO came into existence, and what its strengths and weaknesses were during its formative years. It draws conclusions from these experiences relevant to the reforms of Western security structures in the 1990s.

This volume identifies and evaluates the relationship between outer-space geography and geographic position (astrogeography), and the evolution of current and future military space strategy. In doing so, it explores five primary propositions. First, many classical geopolitical theories of military development are fully compatible with the realm of outer space. Second, how geographical position relates to new technology. Such evolution has developed through sea, rail and air power. Space power is the logical and apparent heir. Third, the special terrain of solar space dictates specific tactics and strategies for efficient exploitation of space resources. Fourth, the concept of space as a power base in classical, geopolitical thought will easily conform to the use of outer space as an ultimate national power base. Finally, a thorough understanding of the astromechanical and physical demarcations of outer space can prove useful to planners, and will prove critical to military strategists in the future. An optimum deployment of space assets will be essential on the current terrestrial and future-based battlefield.

This is the first such study of Operation Banner, the British Army's campaign in Northern Ireland. Drawing upon extensive interviews with former soldiers, primary archival sources including unpublished diaries and unit log-books, this book closely examines soldiers' behaviour at the small infantry-unit level (Battalion downwards), including the leadership, cohesion and training that sustained, restrained and occasionally misdirected soldiers during the most violent period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It contends that there are aspects of wider scholarly literatures - including from sociology, anthropology, criminology, and psychology - that can throw new light on our understanding of the British Army in Northern Ireland. It also offers fresh insights and analysis of incidents involving the British Army during the early years of Operation Banner, including the 1972 'Pitchfork murders' of Michael Naan and Andrew Murray in County Fermanagh, and that of Warrenpoint hotel owner Edmund Woolsey in South Armagh. The central argument of this book is that British Army small infantry units enjoyed considerable autonomy during the early years of Operation Banner and could behave in a vengeful, highly aggressive or benign and conciliatory way as their local commanders saw fit. The strain of civil-military relations at a senior level was replicated operationally as soldiers came to resent the limitations of waging war in the UK. The unwillingness of the Army's senior leadership to thoroughly investigate and punish serious transgressions of standard operating procedures in Northern Ireland created uncertainty among soldiers over expected behaviour and desired outcomes. Overly aggressive groups of soldiers could also be mistaken for high-functioning units - with negative consequences for the Army's overall strategy in Northern Ireland.

This book examines the major armed conflicts in South Asia. The articles study conflict management, look at the direction the armed conflict is likely to take and provide a set of alternative measures that could be pursued by the actors. Designed as an annual series, the articles provide a brief historical sketch of the emergence of armed conflict, outlining its various phases. This volume examines the various armed conflicts in South Asia in 2009 - in Afghanistan, FATA and NWFP, J&K, North-East India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, and sectarian and Naxalite violence in Pakistan and India respectively. The volume also includes an exclusive chapter on the continuing story of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This important collection discusses India's geo-strategic importance and its common borders with its neighbours; the psychological and economic costs of violence and the problem of refugee migrants; treaties, memorandums and ceasefire agreements signed over the past several years across countries; the role of the United Nations and other peacekeeping forces; and the future of failed and failing states.

This book offers the first systematic, comparative analysis of military education and training in Europe within the context of the post-Cold War security environment. Based on an analysis of military education institutions in the UK, Germany, Finland, Romania and the Baltic States, this book demonstrates that the convergence of European military cultures since the end of the Cold War is linked to changes in military education. The process of convergence originates, at least in part, from the full or partial adoption of a new concept by post-commissioning professional military education institutions: the National Defence University. Officers are now educated alongside civilians and public servants, wherein they enjoy a socialization experience that is markedly different from that of previous generations of European officers, and is increasingly similar across national borders. In addition, this book argues that with the control over the curricula and graduation criteria increasingly set by civilian higher education authorities, the European armed forces, while continuing to exist, and hold significant (although declining) capabilities, stand to lose their status as a profession in the traditional sense. This book will be of much interest to students of military, European security policy, European politics, and IR in general.

George F. Kennan's strategic thought was instrumental in the formulation of the American grand strategy of containment of the Soviet Union. As Dr. Russell points out, Kennan's strategic thought was forged in the diplomatic practice and scholarship of the time. Russell looks beyond containment, however, to sift through Kennan's work to illuminate the worldview that informed his analysis of international relations and American foreign policy.

Kennan's realist worldview contained principles for governing American diplomacy and the use of force to achieve national interests within the bounds set by the international competition for power between nation-states. Kennan's worldview illuminates the continuities of international politics that are often overlooked because of the massive changes in the post-Cold War world. Ironically, Kennan's worldview continues to provide a theoretical footing for guiding American foreign policy after containment. This is an important study for scholars, policymakers, and concerned citizens interested in international relations, American foreign policy, diplomatic history, and strategic studies.

Recent concern about mainland China's intentions towards Taiwan, and more general concern about the risk of instability in the region, has led to growing interest in Taiwan's military strategy. This book brings together a range of experts from the West and from Taiwan itself who examine the key issues connected with Taiwan's air power, which is a key aspect of the China-Taiwan military balance. During the 1990s, Taiwan invested considerable resources in thoroughly re-equipping its air force with modern air defence and strike aircraft equipped with modern missiles, thereby denying China command of the air in any conflict in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, air power will remain a crucial influence on the overall balance, as China's efforts to upgrade its own air force's capabilities begin to undermine Taiwan's current advantages.

Bitzinger examines the phenomenon of attempted self-reliance in arms production within Asia, and assesses the extent of success in balancing this independence with the growing requirements of next-generation weapons systems. He analyzes China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. The overarching question in the book is whether self-reliance is a strategically viable solution for development and manufacturing of arms. Given the ever-changing dynamics and increasing demand for sophisticated next-generation weaponry, will these countries be able to individually sustain their domestic defense industries and constantly update their technologies? This is the first book to analyze arms production from a regional perspective.

A major new history of one of World War II's most crucial campaigns--the first Allied attack on European soil--by the acclaimed author of Normandy '44 and a rising star in military history On July 10, 1943, the largest amphibious invasion ever mounted took place, larger even than the Normandy invasion eleven months later: 160,000 American, British, and Canadian troops came ashore or were parachuted onto Sicily, signaling the start of the campaign to defeat Nazi Germany on European soil. Operation HUSKY, as it was known, was enormously complex, involving dramatic battles on land, in the air, and at sea. Yet, despite its paramount importance to ultimate Allied victory, and its drama, very little has been written about the 38-day Battle for Sicily. Based on his own battlefield studies in Sicily and on much new research, James Holland's Sicily '43 offers a vital new perspective on a major turning point in World War II and a chronicle of a multi-pronged campaign in a uniquely diverse and contained geographical location. The characters involved--Generals George Patton and Bernard Montgomery among many--were as colorful as the air and naval battles and the fighting on the ground across the scorching plains and mountaintop of Sicily were brutal. But among Holland's great skills is incorporating the experience of on-the-ground participants on all sides--from American privates Tom and Dee Bowles and Tuskegee fighter pilot Charlie Dryden to British major Hedley Verity and Canadian lieutenant Farley Mowat (later a celebrated author), to German and Italian participants such as Wilhelm Schmalz, brigade commander in the Hermann Goering Division, or Luftwaffe fighter pilot major Johannes "Macky" Steinhoff and to Italian combatants, civilians and mafiosi alike--which gives readers an intimate sense of what occurred in July and August 1943. Emphasizing the significance of Allied air superiority, Holland overturns conventional narratives that have criticized the Sicily campaign for the vacillations over the plan, the slowness of the Allied advance and that so many German and Italian soldiers escaped to the mainland; rather, he shows that clearing the island in 38 days against geographical challenges and fierce resistance was an impressive achievement. A powerful and dramatic account by a master military historian, Sicily '43 fills a major gap in the narrative history of World War II.

Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts-whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want. Over the last several decades, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Spurred by these beliefs, and led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts-and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result. This vision, however, was totally dependent on a set of unproven suppositions and often nonexistent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Moreover, the services, the media, Congress, and industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.

Hurricane Katrina is the latest in a series of major disasters that were not well managed, but it is not likely to be the last. Category 4 and category 5 hurricanes will, according to most predictions, become both more frequent and more intense in the future due to global warming and/or natural weather cycles. In addition, it is often said that another terrorist attack on the United States is inevitable; that it is a question of when, not whether. Add to that the scare over a possible avian flu pandemic. As a result, the United States should expect that disaster response--to natural and other types of disasters--will continue to be of vital concern to the American public and the policymakers and officials who deal with disaster response and relief, including the military. The U.S. disaster relief program reflects a basic division of responsibility between federal, state, and local governments that has generally stood the test of time. At the federal level, a single agency, FEMA--now under the Department of Homeland Security--has been charged with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of the various federal agencies that have a role in disaster relief. A successful disaster response requires three things: timely and effective coordination between state and federal governments; effective coordination among the federal agencies; and effective coordination between and among state and local government agencies. Miskel examines the effects that operational failures after Hurricanes Agnes, Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina have had on the organizational design and operating principles of the disaster response system program. He also discusses the impact of 9/11 and the evolving role ofthe military, and he identifies reforms that should be implemented to improve the nation's ability to respond in the future.

Decisions about war have always been made by humans, but now intelligent machines are on the cusp of changing things - with dramatic consequences for international affairs. This book explores the evolutionary origins of human strategy, and makes a provocative argument that Artificial Intelligence will radically transform the nature of war by changing the psychological basis of decision-making about violence. Strategy, Evolution, and War is a cautionary preview of how Artificial Intelligence (AI) will revolutionize strategy more than any development in the last three thousand years of military history. Kenneth Payne describes strategy as an evolved package of conscious and unconscious behaviors with roots in our primate ancestry. Our minds were shaped by the need to think about warfare-a constant threat for early humans. As a result, we developed a sophisticated and strategic intelligence. The implications of AI are profound because they depart radically from the biological basis of human intelligence. Rather than being just another tool of war, AI will dramatically speed up decision making and use very different cognitive processes, including when deciding to launch an attack, or escalate violence. AI will change the essence of strategy, the organization of armed forces, and the international order. This book is a fascinating examination of the psychology of strategy-making from prehistoric times, through the ancient world, and into the modern age.

"Strategy and Intelligence," which brings together original essays by a number of leading authorities on various aspects of the First World War, aims both to summarise the latest literature on Britain's participation in that war and also to open up new lines of investigation. These include the role of intelligence in land and air battles; Anglo-American financial relations; Anglo-Russian and Anglo-Irish relations; the British Labour movement in the war; and the final campaigns of 1918, which led to the Allied victory. These essays are written not only for the specialist but also to be accessible to students and to the general reader.

Desertification in the Mediterranean Region: a Security Issue 1 2 William G. Kepner & Jose Luis Rubio 1. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Research and Development, P.O. Box 93478, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA, 89193-3478 ([email protected]) 2. Centro de Investigaciones sobre Desertificacion-CIDE, (CSIC, Universitat de Valencia, Generalitat Valenciana), Cami de la Marjal, s/n Apartado Oficial, 46470 Albal, Valencia, Spain ([email protected]) Security issues related to desertification in the Mediterranean Region were the subject of a special NATO workshop held on 2-5 December 2003 at the Museum of Sciences Principe Felipe in Valencia, Spain. This workshop was organized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Las Vegas, Nevada, USA), Centre for Desertification Research (Valencia, Spain), and the Desert Research Institute (Reno, Nevada, USA) on behalf of the NATO Science Committee and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (Public Diplomacy Division). Additionally, the European Society for Soil Conservation participated as a collaborating institution. Other participating institutions included the Spanish Ministry of Environment, Generalitat Valencia (Department of Territory and Housing), the Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the City of Art & Sciences of Valencia which hosted the Meeting."

In this timely work, James Giermanski describes the advent and development of security operations in the global supply chain, outlining the respective contributions of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to this worldwide concern. Global Supply Chain Security explores the potential impact of port-related catastrophic events in the United States and their effects worldwide, concentrating, in particular, on the United States' contribution to global container security. Offering insights on deficiencies in U.S. policies, Giermanski underscores the vulnerabilities in the supply chain that U.S. government agencies have ignored, avoided, and even denied. Global Supply Chain Security treats both the terrestrial and maritime borders of the United States, reserving for special analysis the threat to the nation's southern border of hazardous materials or materials in transshipment or in-bond, as well as the questionable leadership exhibited by the Department of Homeland Security in its diagnosis and treatment of these threats. Finally, Giermanski covers the important role played by the private sector and the off-the-shelf, innovative products that have been introduced to supply chain management and security.

In this provocative and thoughtful book, Amy Zegart challenges the conventional belief that national security agencies work reasonably well to serve the national interest as they were designed to do. Using a new institutionalist approach, Zegart asks what forces shaped the initial design of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council in ways that meant they were handicapped from birth.
Ironically, she finds that much of the blame can be ascribed to cherished features of American democracy--frequent elections, the separation of powers, majority rule, political compromise--all of which constrain presidential power and give Congress little incentive to create an effective foreign policy system. At the same time, bureaucrats in rival departments had the expertise, the staying power, and the incentives to sabotage the creation of effective competitors, and this is exactly what they did.
Historical evidence suggests that most political players did not consider broad national concerns when they forged the CIA, JCS, and NSC in the late 1940s. Although President Truman aimed to establish a functional foreign policy system, he was stymied by self-interested bureaucrats, legislators, and military leaders. The NSC was established by accident, as a byproduct of political compromise; Navy opposition crippled the JCS from the outset; and the CIA emerged without the statutory authority to fulfill its assigned role thanks to the Navy, War, State, and Justice departments, which fought to protect their own intelligence apparatus.
Not surprisingly, the new security agencies performed poorly as they struggled to overcome their crippled evolution. Only the NSC overcame its initial handicaps as several presidents exploited loopholes in the National Security Act of 1947 to reinvent the NSC staff. The JCS, by contrast, remained mired in its ineffective design for nearly forty years--i.e., throughout the Cold War--and the CIA's pivotal analysis branch has never recovered from its origins. In sum, the author paints an astonishing picture: the agencies Americans count on most to protect them from enemies abroad are, by design, largely incapable of doing so.